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Acting out the Myths: The Power of Narrative Discourse in Shaping the Zimbabwe 
Conflict of Matabeleland – 1980-1987 
 
 
This thesis interrogates the Matabeleland disturbances of 1980-1987 by analysing the 
conflict narratives promulgated by the ZANU-PF and how these narratives directly 
impacted the socio-political construction of violence that was enacted during that period. 
Of critical relevance is the interplay between the revolutionary narratives manufactured 
and imposed by the ZANU-PF regime and the myriad of contrasting, yet subjugated 
counter-narratives that were formulated as alternative resistances by the recipient 
communities. Through in-depth interview and document analysis methodologies, this 
research deconstructs the generative nature of scripted violence through the exploration 
of five salient themes employed by the ZANU-PF to produce its political meta-narrative: 
Ethnicity, Nationalism, Loyalty, Legitimacy and Unity. This study explores the power 
and function of narrative discourse in the formulation of ethnic identities, nation-state 
ordering, historical exclusion, political discipline, and social uniformity. The premise of 
this dissertation suggests that durable peace in Zimbabwe will only be realised to the 
degree that the silenced victims of the Matabeleland massacres are afforded a public 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – Recovering the Silenced Scripts 
 
“You can talk to your sons, we speak to graves.”1 
 
1.1. Silence does not mean Consent 
 
This thesis is concerned with recovering the silenced scripts of the violence that 
occurred in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe in the early 1980s with the aim of exploring how 
these hidden texts may assist in building peace in the future. Few sources in this research 
sample could deny that the victims of violence in Matabeleland were not silenced. While 
the direct violence of Matabeleland was perpetrated between 1980 and 1987, most of the 
survivors of that violence interviewed in this study did not start to freely talk about their 
painful experiences of traumatic violence until 1991-92 at the earliest and 2005-06 at the 
latest. Interview respondent NM1, who survived a harrowing experience of a direct threat 
of violence and death at the hands of a Fifth Brigade Unit in 1982, speaks of her own 
silencing as follows:       
“I wouldn’t speak. Maybe I started talking about this freely say maybe 2001, 
really. Because, I was afraid; if I told that story, I might have been a victim again 
of some violence or … I wasn’t sure on whose ears it would fall and what the 
consequences would be. Like after that nasty experience which I have related, my 
husband and the pastor drove through Esigodini, and [met] the army commander 
who was harassing us, and he said to them ‘You people, if you have a god that 
you are worshipping, stick to him. Because I had been given a command to come 
and wipe you out. Not even to talk but to just set that fire ablaze in whatever way. 
But when I got there, I found someone…that one was looking at me, I didn’t see 
human eyes looking at me. I was just frozen with fear; I couldn’t even command 
‘shoot!’ I should have done that but I never did.’ And he said ‘I was punished for 
that’. But then he said ‘what stories are you telling about that?’ It was maybe 
some months from [the incident]… He wanted to know ‘what stories is that 
woman [respondent] telling around about what happened?’ And my husband said 
‘what stories are you expecting?’ He said ‘no, I want to know what she’s saying 
and to whom she’s saying it because you go around telling stories, you get into 
trouble.’ So when my husband came home he told me of the guard and I said ‘I’m 
not telling the story to anybody. And I never did. Until I started on issues of peace 
and justice and then I’ve been telling this story to this day.”2 
 
                                                
1 A quote by Sylvia Dhlomo, founder of a support group for victims of political violence called Khulumani 
(translated as ‘speak-out’ in IsiZulu) located in South Africa. Sylvia lost her teenage son to the political 
violence under the South African Apartheid regime.  




The reasons for this pervading sense of silence are one of the key interrogations of 
this thesis, however, there were six primary sources of silencing that emerged from the 
interview transcriptions and the document analysis conducted in this research that 
deserve to be highlighted at the start. Firstly, the severity of violence enacted by the Fifth 
Brigade during the Gukurahundi period engulfed the Matabeleland citizenry in an ocean 
of paralysing fear: 
 “Zimbabwe is a very different country because, although we call ourselves  
‘free’…we are not free. And people in Zimbabwe today, I don’t know how we 
can say we are free; because you can not speak your mind. You can not speak 
freely about your feelings, how you feel because you’ll be perceived as somebody 
who is a … it’s not that you can be perceived as somebody who is a ‘dissident’; 
you are perceived as somebody who is ‘opposing’…people should be able to 
express themselves and say what they feel freely without any fear, but in 
Zimbabwe we are living in fear, you cannot say anything freely, because you can 
be killed, you can be really beaten up.”3 
 
Secondly, the protracted nature of violence in Matabeleland has entrenched individuals 
and communities in patterns of unresolved trauma that function as barriers for people to 
speak openly about their pain: 
“No. Even the people [we] are interviewing…do you know that they are even 
scared to tell us the story of how it happened, they still feel ZANU-PF [is] around, 
…And since I started [speaking out].. I’m the founder of this organization, that’s 
when I felt to talk about it, and it has helped me, to talk about it. Because I 
remember my relatives at home, how they were grieving for the ones who died 
and when people came back from those camps in Matopos, then my Aunty’s son 
didn’t come back, ah!, that was a blow. No, nobody talks [about] it. I am the only 
one who talks about it now. You can’t talk. And even if ... some of them who are in 
South Africa, they don’t want to talk about it.”4 
 
Thirdly, the extended network of ZANU-PF intelligence surveillance has resulted in a 
great deal of paranoia regarding who may be listening to those who do want to speak out: 
“Carefully [speak], yes. But even there, you’ll never know. As soon as you are 
through, you would find that what you’d have said out there will be broadcasted 
here at home. You remind me of some Zimbabweans I found in Atlanta, Georgia 
[USA] a month ago. They felt they recognized that there were some Zimbabwean 
                                                
3Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker with 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s). 
4Interview: JD1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 15/09/06 – (Female Ndebele NGO activist advocating for 




agents who kept following them up. Until they reported them to the State and 
those guys were deported. So even Zimbabweans who are outside the country are 
not as free as they should be, they still carry the fear ‘who else is listening as I 
speak’?”5 
 
Fourthly, a number of respondents indicated that they are silent because there is no public 
‘space’, an avenue or a forum in which to tell their story: 
“For the people in Matabeleland there was no public space. Like I was saying to 
you, Carl, that for the people of Matabeleland before the ‘unity’, it was like the 
war was still on, and they were not free; they could not say anything freely. They 
could not really say that ‘okay, something bad has happened to us’; nobody was 
there to listen to them, and they couldn’t say anything. And if ever you were to say 
that even to somebody outside, the ZANU-PF government would say you are 
lying. And so people were not free, they could not say anything really and be 
listened to by anybody.”6  
 
Fifthly, there were those interviewees who tagged the issue of proximity (far enough 
away in distance from Zimbabwe) as a necessary precursor to break their silence and 
begin to speak or write their stories publicly: 
“No, I kept the story quiet, not because I wanted to be quiet, but because maybe 
there was no avenue to express that story. In fact, the story that you read about my 
father was…I wrote it while I was doing a course on Grief and Suffering, at 
Ashland [in USA]. That’s when I wrote that story, for the first time [1991-92]. So 
I kind-of said ‘I think I want to write this story’. I’ve always kept it in my heart, 
so after having written it, I then said, I want it published; that’s when it was 
published [2003]. From thereon I take it, it’s now public knowledge.”7                  
 
Lastly, places that are meant to be havens of debate and dialogical discourse such as 
among the youth sector and on the university campuses became locations of threat and 
intimidation and therefore, also functioned to silence the voices of Matabeleland: 
“That was ’91, my second year. I remember we actually went to lecture theatre at 
about 7 [pm], and the people wanted to talk about the issue of Matabeleland. It 
was the Ndebele-speaking students, they thought ‘this is our thing’, and we were 
supposed to go there to air the views of [our] experience … And when the two 
speakers actually went on the stage, Welshman Ncube was the first, then when 
                                                
5Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist). 
6Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker with 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s). 
7Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed by 





some students went on the stage to express that … then there were Shona-
speaking students who went on the stage. And one of the things which sparked 
violence that day was that these other students from Mashonaland said ‘you know 
but, you can’t actually claim this victory [be]cause the ZIPRA combatants 
actually killed a lot of Shona people in Entumbane and so you are not the only 
victims’. And everything just flared up and the whole seminar just broke up then 
some people were running away. So the emotions were still too high and the 
people feared to talk about it. But every time you talk about it, it raises personal 
emotions. I remember when one raised the argument that they wer  dissidents and 
that the government was right in taking that action, this other guy responded 
personally by saying ‘You mean my father was a dissident?’ So you can start to 
take things personally and then not prove things anyway.”8 
 
Hence, while it remains clear that the comprehensive silencing of Matabeleland 
victims of violence had many points of origins, and these represent rather straight 
forward observations, this thesis concerns itself with the significance of this silencing 
effect. For the ZANU-PF, this silencing served the purpose of confirming their chosen 
mantra of ‘silence means consent’ as a standard measure for ‘effective’ rule over the 
‘contented’ masses. However, they were mistaken. For the many Matabeleland victims 
and survivors who could not, or dared not speak out, there were deep and catastrophic 
consequences to the suppression of their narratives. Surfacing a portion of these pivotal, 
subjugated narratives and exposing the ramifications of their meaning in the processes of 
social construction is central to this study.     
1.2. The Narrative Location of this Study 
 
“ZANU- PF used the language as a vehicle, not only to transport the message 
they wanted people to get, but the language was also used in order to hide who 
they really were…the Shona language became an instrument of violence and 
destruction. It’s then carried a message that traumatised people. Because the 
language in itself reminds, carries people back to the incidents of what 
happened.”9 
 
The intrigue of narrative as a critical component to this thesis on violent conflict 
and its counterpart of peace need explanation upfront. Classical conflict resolution theory 
                                                
8Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
9 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 





(both at the interpersonal and at the collective level) has leaned toward a highly linear 
teleology of conflict analysis through the lenses of rationalistic, interest-based bargaining 
and / or materialistic, unequal distribution of scarce resources as the diagnosis for 
violence.  These approaches while useful in many conflictual situations tend to sideline or 
suppress the powerful impulses that flow out of a cyclical, illogical, and often ethereal 
reality. These traditional theories of conflict escalation err on the side of ‘essentialist-
reductionist’ trappings and have failed to give explanation to the continuous convulsive 
outbursts of horrific, often seemingly unexplainable violence experienced at all levels of 
human societal configurations. The goal of this study is to unearth other explanations 
which may run parallel and complimentary to the dominant frames of social conflict 
analysis, but that will not only satisfy the intellect, but will also connect to the soul.  It is 
at this juncture (between intellect and intuition) that the narrative approach becomes 
particularly relevant and useful.         
This intangible and often elusive narrative reality is what one might call the ‘story 
behind the story’ as in the words of Alice of Wonderland, “Where things are not what 
they seem.” This mysterious space is often the world of the hidden, the unspoken, the 
emotive, the psycho-social domain of myth and symbol. Many times this insubstantial yet 
driving force finds its expression in ceremonial ritual, the creative arts and in story 
discourse.  Proponents of the narrative reality, readily subsume all of life experience as it 
is known under the totality of the story process and its formative power to create all that 
exists.  This would include the realm of conflict and its multifaceted expressions.         
This study aims to surface the narrative approach as the essential scaffolding 
utilised for the social construction of violence as well as peace.  The danger of this thesis 
is that the destructive power of violent conflict will somehow be perceived to be excused 
and wiped away by a set of words.  It may appear that through the articulation of certain 
philosophical or literary notions and theories, that the concrete pain of the physical reality 
of war can be explained as subjective, a figment of the imagination. The fear being that 
the tangible social consequences of the injustice of severe violence would systematically 
be ‘narrativized’ away into oblivion. Being fully aware of these concerns, this thesis not 
only attempts to identify and explain the narrative discourses that underpin violent 
conflicts and peace-building endeavours, but will also expose the means by which these 
16 
 
processes (of violence and peace) are socially constructed realities. As such, if these 
processes can be socially constructed, they can be deconstructed.  It is in this action of 
deconstruction that this study intends to contribute to the ‘real-time’ practice of conflict 
transformation in Africa and beyond.   
In sum, this study does not endorse narrative as a ‘totalising’ explanation of 
reality; that there is no form of reality outside the creative act of narrative discourse.  
Instead, it sees narrative as playing a pivotal role in shaping the descriptive language of 
conflict that we as humans live by; that which gives direction to our beliefs and 
behaviours.  In the process of acting out these guiding social narratives we create reality.  
When this created reality results in violent conflict, we as human change agents have the 
responsibility to deconstruct these narratives and reconstruct them by telling and acting 
out another story; a positive, desirable story that builds a durable peace for future 
generations.  
1.3. Research Motivation 
“When a dialogue becomes a monologue, oppression ensues.”10 
 
The Matabeleland violence of 1980-1987, (the primary focus of this thesis) has 
been gazed upon with many eyes and described by many voices.  By and large this 
specific conflict crisis has been perceived as emanating from competitive military 
strategies, political power dynamics, and/or historic inter-ethnic clashes.  The first 
published mentions of the Matabeleland conflict began to emerge in the late1980s and the 
early 1990s.11 While substantially limited in scope, much of this body of literature 
propagates that the violence unleashed in the Matabeleland conflict was even more 
traumatic than that experienced in the Liberation struggle.12 The element of ethnic 
identity manipulation combined with the power of state violence in the Matabeleland 
                                                
10 Boal, A. 1979. Theater of the Oppressed. London: Pluto Press. 
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12 Werbner, R. 1991. Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography of an African Family. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press; Berkeley, B. 1986. Zimbabwe: Wages of War – A Report on Human Rights. New York: 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights; Weitzer, R. 1984. “In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe”. 
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conflict is often omitted altogether or dealt with in a highly cursory manner within the 
current literature.13 Katri Pohjolainen Yap has done the most to fill this gap in her 
excellent doctoral dissertation on power, ethnicity and violence in the Matabeleland 
conflict.  In her synopsis of the problem she states that: “The issue of conflict [in 
Matabeleland] is often presented mainly as a ‘rift’ between two parties and the years of 
political and military terror are downplayed”.14   
The Matabeleland conflict was more than a ‘war of words’; it was a clash of 
narratives.  Narrative discourses embedded in recent events, lived experience and 
remembered histories.15 Narratives are birthed out of world-views16 propelled by deep 
currents of identity-formation17, recognition inter-subjectivities18 and collective ‘chosen 
traumas and glories’.19 These primal-stories of life, survival and co-existence are not 
merely spoken about but they are acted upon.  The power of organised violence is never 
created or wielded in a vacuum.  Structural power is rooted and grows out of ‘texts 
produced within contexts’20. Oppressive power (systematic repression) is the climactic 
expression of a tightly knit meta-narrative that has been born from and nurtured within a 
particular locale of violence.       
For the purposes of this study, the Matabeleland conflict is understood to 
represent a culminating centre stage on which this clash of narratives was (and still is) 
enacted.  Amidst the clamouring chaos of competing social discourses, a primary and 
hegemonic story usually seems to emerge bringing with it an organising frame and 
                                                
13 Banana, C. (ed.) 1989. Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990. Harare: The College Press. 
14 Yap, K. 2001. Uprooting the Weeds – Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict 1980-
1987. Stockholm: Elanders Novum, 7. 
15 Lederach, John Paul. 2005. The Moral Imagination – The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford / New 
York: Oxford University Press, 141. 
16 Docherty, J. 2001. Learning Lessons from Waco – When the Parties Bring their Gods to the Negotiation 
Table. New York: Syracuse University Press, 49-68. 
17 Mamdani, M. 2001. When Victims become Killers – Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda. 
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Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press; Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest 
– War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Curry; Ignatieff, M. 1998. The Warrior’s 
Honour – Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. Ontario: Viking – Published by Penguin Group. 
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The MIT Press, 11. 
19 Volkan, V. 1994. The Need to have Enemies and Allies. New Jersey: Jason Aronson Inc.; Bar-On, D. 
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Central European University Press. 
20 Kohler Riessman, C. 1993. Narrative Analysis. Oxford: James Curry Ltd., 1. 
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function.  As dominant meta-narratives surface, other competing narratives are frequently 
relegated to the periphery of society, becoming suppressed, labelled as the dissenting 
‘subjugated voices’21 outside the status quo. Indeed, a great strength of the mono-
narrative lies within its capability to squelch dissident scripts often by brute force. 
However, the longevity of the mono-narrative depends on its insidious ability to cleverly 
reframe, correct and absorb the multiple counter-narratives that do arise and in so doing 
‘silence’ them through careful ideological suffocation. In his thought-provoking work on 
historical memory, Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes on what he terms the ‘mentions’ and 
the ‘silences’ of history: 
“By silence, I mean an active and transitive process: one ‘silences’ a fact or an  
individual as a silencer silences a gun. One engages in the practice of silencing. 
Mentions and silences are thus active, dialectical counterparts of which history is 
the synthesis.”22 
 
Accordingly, when applying Trouillot to the narrative discourse of the Matabeleland 
conflict, it can be understood as “…an ambiguous blend of ‘mentions’ and ‘silences,’ 
whereby some peoples and their times are left out of history.”23 It is precisely this 
synthesis of the ‘mentions’ (ZANU-PF meta-narrative) and the ‘silences’ (subjugated 
narratives of the victims of violence in Matabeleland) which have become the focal point 
of this thesis study.   
Approaching the Matabeleland conflict from a narrative perspective; a socially 
constructed conflict reality24 provides a unique analysis that is not evident in the current 
body of knowledge on this subject.  From a narrative analysis lens, the violence of 
Matabeleland in the early 1980s can be interpreted as a consequence of the cessation of 
dialogue and the pre-eminence of a monologue; the voice of one history, one ideology, 
one political party and one leader. It is the premise of this research that multiple sites of 
narrated contestation in Matabeleland were systematically suppressed. This repressive 
                                                
21 Foucault, M. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
22 Trouillot, M. 1995. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: Beacon Press. 
23 Anderson, K. 1997. Honorable Mentioning. Retrieved from the web 07/09/09. 
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24 Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
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silencing of counter multi-narratives resulted in heightening the exacerbating effects of 
violence unleashed in Matabeleland from 1980 to 1987.  
In this Thesis, the application of dramaturgical studies25 to the socio-political 
conflicts of Matabeleland reveals that the ‘domination-subjugation’ transaction is 
expressed in the prominence given to the lead protagonists (actors) in the violence, while 
other significant role-players may be relegated to the position of under-study or assigned 
the ‘audience-observer’ status. The drama of Matabeleland violence was acted out on the 
stage of the lives of ordinary people living in Matabeleland. In other words, while it did 
represent a geographical violence (regional war) in the sense that the violence was carried 
out in Matabeleland North and South as well as Midlands, the real drama was staged and 
enacted on the bodies of the civilian masses themselves and the script was created around 
the fear, manipulation and terror that could be aroused in, and imposed upon the unarmed 
citizenry. This violence performance is likened to ‘participatory theatre’ where the actors
on stage (the main protagonists) in this case the ZANU-PF government and its security 
forces descended off the stage, so to speak, and implored, manipulated, coerced and 
forced the audience consisting of Matabeleland community members who were 
witnessing the unfolding drama, to take part in the whole bloody affair. 
This thesis functions as a discourse autopsy of the Matabeleland conflict as a 
story of the relations between the ‘narrative communities and constituencies’ that 
surrounded ZANU-PF and ZAPU as political organizations throughout the liberation 
struggle and ultimately the rise of ZANU-PF to solidify its foundational power in 
Zimbabwe.  Once the master narrative of ZANU-PF became the only script in Zimbabwe 
the majority of socio-political configurations, systems, and organisations were then 
aligned and submitted to this all encompassing story. Utilising the Matabeleland violence 
as the research context, this study aims at revealing the crux of power in a monolithic, 
historical-political narrative discourse that has been fashioned for destructive social ends.   
Alexander, McGregor and Ranger in their social historical text on Matabeleland articulate 
this point clearly:  
“But their [Zanu-PF] version of nationalist history was decidedly partial.  
Zimbabwean school books and official histories celebrated the successes of the 
ruling Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (Patriotic Front) (ZanuPF) and its 
                                                
25 Bozzoli, B. 2004. Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. 
20 
 
guerrilla army, Zanla. The contribution of Zapu – which was the loser in the 
national elections of 1980 and whose supporters were concentrated in 
Matabeleland – was downplayed or denigrated.  Zanu (PF) politicians and the 
state-controlled media cast Zapu and its guerrilla army, Zipra, not as heroic 
liberators and nation-builders, but as a threat to the country’s hard-won 
independence.  A brutal campaign of violence directed against Matabeleland in 
the 1980s powerfully confirmed this exclusion from the nation.”26  
 
At the same time, it is believed that this reflective study will serve as a motivation; a 
beckoning invitation for the return to a transparent dialogue in Zimbabwe, surfacing the 
suppressed voices that both ‘acted out’ and were ‘acted on’ by the violence of 
Matabeleland in the early 1980’s. 
1.4. Thesis Objective and Specific Aims 
 
This study identified four particular elements comprising the research problem 
under investigation. First, the historical conflict of Matabeleland remains a subjugated 
story; a silenced discourse even up to the present. Second, the ZANU-PF government has 
not made an official apology or accepted responsibility for this violent rupture and as 
such there remains a high level of trauma among survivors and the victim’s families and 
communities. These wounds cannot be healed until they are given a public voice which 
requires the engagement in reciprocal processes of acknowledgment and the politics of 
recognition by all invested stakeholders to the conflict. Third, the past violence 
necessitates a re-write of conflict history in order to bring this critical narrative out from 
the shadowy margins of its current existence and into the public domain of the 
Zimbabwean national psyche. Despite the periodic release of a few publications giving 
voice to the victims of Matabeleland violence27, the ZANU-PF government has refused a 
public space for the victim narratives to be acknowledged or recognised by the nation. No 
public forum was ever condoned in which the terror of Gukurahundi could be 
investigated, explored, confessed or purged from society. Added to this, all counter 
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narratives were silenced by the dramatic staging of dominant narrative events 
orchestrated by the ZANU-PF in order to counter any other explanations of reality. 
Fourth, there is need to explore violence ‘in-context’ in order to shed new light on the 
interplay between narrative texts ( cripts) and their relationship to social construction of 
violence and peace for the future.  The importance of this research is highlighted in the 
following set of questions asked by interview respondent JM1, a professor of political 
science: 
“That [the study of narrative] is important because it enables us to better 
understand the whole process and the whole unfortunate incident. But I don’t 
know whether you are able to do that without really zeroing in on what was or 
what were the primary objectives, whose objectives were they? Were they 
consensually agreed? Or were they in fact viewed as…was Gukurahundi in fact a 
national project? Or was it a personal project? We need to know that, we need to 
know who is behind the order. Who is in fact the primary mover of the whole 
exercise? Who is approving it? Is it seen as something in the public domain, or is 
it in the private domain? Was the Fifth Brigade a private army or a party army, or 
was it part of the state machinery, coercive apparatus, and why does it only 
become integrated in the national army after 1987, you know? Where was it 
placed organizationally prior to that?”28 
 
Bearing in mind the significance of this research investigation, the overall 
objective (question) and specific aims (sub-questions) for this Thesis were identified as 
follows: 
• Overall Question: How did narrative discourse mould the violence in 
Matabeleland, Zimbabwe between the years of 1980-1987, and how has / has not 
this violence discourse influenced the socio-political crisis being experienced in 
Matabeleland today? 
 
• Specific Aim One: What are the salient themes (component parts) of the 
meta-narrative constructed by the ZANU-PF in order to explain and justify the 
violence that occurred in Matabeleland over this time frame? 
 
• Specific Aim Two: What were the counter-narratives that emerged during this 
time and how were they subjugated and silenced by the ruling ZANU-PF? 
 
• Specific Aim Three: What are the inter-relational connections between the 
narrative discourse and the social construction of preferred realities, both of 
violence and peace in the Zimbabwe context?  
 
                                                




• Specific Aim Four: What are the linkages (if any) between the processes of 
surfacing subjugated and silenced narratives in Matabeleland and finding a 
durable and sustainable peace in Zimbabwe for the future? 
 
This study is not only concerned with the content (the what?) of the violence story 
of Matabeleland, but it is also concerned with the form (the how?) of that narrative 
discourse. How does this suffocating silencing of alternative narratives occur?  How does 
one break the strangulating grip of silence and allow subjugated voices to emerge?  How 
can one encourage the pluralistic space of dialogue in the face of an entrenched 
homogenous monologue?  These and other questions form the backbone of the ensuing 
narrative analysis of the context of the Matabeleland conflict (1980-87). This analysis, 
while contextually grounded in a particular region of Matabeleland, Zimbabwe is 
overlaid with various frames of universality in which the rhetoric of violence and its 
deconstruction, and the construction of peace can be generally applied in other settings 
internationally. 
1.5. Thesis Structure and Overview of Chapters 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters and follows a structural flow of three parts. 
The first part (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) provides the framework in which the research is 
nested and consists of the introduction, literature review and methodological description 
and motivation. The second part (Chapters 4-8) lays out the research analysis and 
findings by exploring the major themes that emerged from the study including narratives 
of ethnicity, nationalism, loyalty, legitimacy and unity. A separate chapter is dedicated to 
each one of these particular themes and their unique contribution to the violence meta-
narrative constructed by the ZANU-PF government. Due to the nature and flow of 
narrative analysis the counter (or subjugated) narratives that were unearthed in this 
research and which serve to deconstruct the ZANU-PF meta-narrative are woven 
throughout these respective research analysis and findings chapters. The third part 
(Chapter 9) presents a number of critical issues that surfaced in the research and ties them 
to peace and reconciliation processes already in operation in the country. A proposed 
values-based model for transitional justice that addresses the narrative discourse needs of 
the people of Matabeleland is considered and applied in search of a durable peace in 
Zimbabwe.     
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 Chapter 2 (Literature Review) threads together three streams of literature; social 
conflict theory, narratology and peace-building processes. In the first section, the existing 
body of literature on the Matabeleland conflict is reviewed through the ‘structural-
functionalist’ lens of social conflict theory and practice. The Matabeleland conflict 
literature reviewed is argued to fall into four categories of couplets: ethno-cultural, 
personal-relational, political-structural and historical-ideological. Each of these 
characterisations is then critiqued against the narrative approach to the analysis of 
conflict. In the second section, the study of narrative is explored through the lens of 
discourse. Of particular interest here is the intersection between narrative discourse and 
violent or peaceful construction of preferred realities. Five major currents in the field of 
Narratology (linguistics, mythology, literary criticism, new historicism and therapeutic 
models of narrative mediation and ritual) are examined as they relate to the production of 
discourses of violence or peace. Finally, in section three the swell of literature which 
highlights the performative nature of narrative violence is reviewed. More specifically, 
this section interrogates the application of ‘dramaturgical theatre’ as a means to analyse 
and understand the social phenomena of violence construction. Various writings on 
conceptions of conflict memory, the intersections of temporal and spatial dimensions of 
conflict and the idea of conflict as political theatre are identified as the conduits through 
which narrative discourse contributes to the social production of reality. 
 Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) is about the story as a structure for narrative 
flow; as “the organising principle for human action”29. This qualitative research project 
locates itself within the epistemological frame of ‘interpretive-critical’ analysis. The lens 
of ‘interpretive-critical’ analysis focuses on three equally important components of 
narrative discourse; content (meaning), structure (form) and performance (interaction). 
An integrated research framework is proposed that draws from conceptions of social 
construction, story analysis, and dramaturgical theatre. The research engages in three 
different methodologies; literature review, historical document analysis, and thirty-five 
(35) open interviews conducted over four field visits between the years of 2006 and 2008. 
As a purposive sample, the interview respondents are motivated as representative of 
seven sectors of society: political, ex-combatant, media, legal, education, church, women, 
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and rural agricultural populations. The interviewees are justified from a cross-section of 
social-political and economic standing in society from formerly high ranking government 
officials to rural village farmers. Various forms of research validation and reliability are 
outlined such as instrument piloting, field journals, member checking and peer review, 
and corroboration of findings. The chapter concludes with samples of the interview 
instrument, list of respondents interviewed, and the research programme and schedule.  
 Chapter 4 concerns itself with the ethnic-conflict narrative surrounding the 
Matabeleland massacres. Moving from the premise that ethnicity is not an in-born (innate 
or static) state of being this chapter explores the historical ‘ebb and flow’ of ethnic- 
identity interpretations and conflicts surrounding the Matabeleland since the 1800s. 
Matabeleland as a region provided the ZANU-PF with a number of natural ethnic 
cleavages that it could distort such as a geographic divide between Ndebele and Shona, 
the demarcation of ruling party and opposition, majority and minority populations, and an 
ideological rupture between global Cold-war actors; China and the Soviet Union. Of 
particular interest is the narrative meaning of certain pivotal patriotic phrases such as 
‘victor and vanquished’ and ‘Sons of the Soil’ and the significance of this kind of 
language in the formation and subsequent embrace of exclusionary identity labels. These 
exclusionary ethnic identifications provided the contextual basis for ensuing enemy-
formation and the application of ‘justified’ violent aggression between the Ndebele and 
the Shona populations at specific historical ‘flash-points’ in the Matabeleland past. Ethnic 
animosity climaxed in Matabeleland through the Gukurahundi campaign of the early 
1980s as the fatal rupture of ethnic-hate language and the trauma of severe violence were 
fused together in the hearts and minds of many Matabele citizenry. The chapter concludes 
with a series of suppositions that attribute ethnic identity formation to the combined 
interplay and intersection of collective distorted patriotic history, traumatic memory, and 
continued political manipulation. 
 Chapter 5 interrogates the narrative of nationalism and its ordering impact on a 
society. For this study, Zimbabwe’s independence is situated in the context of what has 
been termed the ‘failed nation-state’ or the ‘exhausted nationalism’ of Africa. Three 
elemental components of the nation-building narrative are unpacked in this chapter. First, 
the difficulties of managing nationalist discourse through the minefields of rev lution to 
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negotiation and finally to rule are discussed. Second, a case is argued that the ZANU-PF 
had an ideological need to manufacture a collective regulatory memory of the past 
(patriotic history). Third, evidence is vetted that reveals the ZANU-PF government’s 
‘constructivist’ need to produce a normative experience for the masses in the present 
(stage-managed violent conflict) in order to solidify their partisan concept of nationalism. 
This chapter maintains that the ZANU-PF government has consistently plotted to 
establish a one-party state and to rule the country with absolute power for life. However, 
in the post-independence era the ZANU-PF as the ruling party had to face a number of 
troubling questions: What were they to do with a strong opposition; strong militarily, 
strong in support among the masses and strong in populist leadership? Building on the 
natural ethnic cleavages mentioned above, the ZANU-PF appeared to ascribe true 
nationalism to a particular ethnic group. The ZANU-PF brand of nationalism was 
buttressed by a socio-political meta-narrative that redefined history, the current reality 
and what one could believe as politically true or not. All other voices that countered this 
established ZANU-PF ‘truth’ were both literally and figuratively subjugated by violence, 
fear and terror, official control of politics, media, education and security forces, and 
‘stage-managed’ happenings (political theatre) that were utilised to prove the ideological 
or political power demands of the ZANU-PF. Applying a dramaturgical analysis to the 
nationalist project this chapter follows the flow of key Matabeleland events that were 
either shaped by, or shaped for the purposes of reinforcing the ZANU-PF nationalist 
discourse. In the conclusion, the ZANU-PF nationalism is compared to a religion 
consisting of ritual and ceremonial structures aimed at providing the experience of 
ascendance; a form of corporate worship of the state. 
 Chapter 6 concentrates on the conceptions of loyalty s key to the process of 
entrenching nationalism. In simple terms, loyalty is the science of figuring out ‘who is in’ 
and ‘who is out’.  Political loyalty is often built on narratives of rank, exclusion and 
embrace. The loyalty narrative of the ZANU-PF hinged on at least three main elements; 
enemy-invention, linking scripts of disloyalty with acts of dehumanisation, and the 
reciprocal texts of political recognition. This chapter connects the process of enemy-
formation to the identification of a ‘dissident movement’ in Matabeleland; what this 
study refers to as a manufactured insurgency. In this case, loyalty and disloyalty were 
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articulated in the polarising narrative binaries of ‘hero’ and ‘dissident’. These 
designations carry a debilitating effect of deconstruction; the stripping of social identity, 
political ideology and patriotic history for all those rejected by the ruling ZANU-PF party 
(mostly Matabeleland citizenry). These scripts of ‘belonging’ propagated by the ZANU-
PF government had a gripping effect on the moral imagination of the nation and were 
central to the question of the existence of the ‘dissidents’. This chapter builds the case 
that highly contested clusters of narratives have emerged as to the significance of the 
dissident threat (high, medium or low?), the justification of the ZANU-PF violent 
response in Matabeleland (was it defence, to wipe-out opposition, or genocide?), and the 
implications for an attainable peace in Zimbabwe for the future (uniformity, power-
sharing, or Matabeleland secession?).       
Chapter 7 grapples with the idea of legitimacy as a precursor to the demand for 
loyalty. Possessing legitimacy begs the question of sourcing. In Zimbabwe there has been 
a growing disconnect between the legitimacy to govern sourced in the ruling party and 
the people they purport to lead. This chapter maintains that immediately after 
independence the ZANU-PF staked its claim to legitimacy in the narrative of violence, 
which was initially effective as it reinforced their liberation fighter credentials and the 
continuous militarisation of the state. However, as the ZANU-PF turned its state-
sanctioned ‘legitimate’ violence on the civilian populace of Matabeleland it lost its 
credibility to lead. Failing to subvert the Matabeleland resistance by force, the ZANU-PF 
attempted to extend its indirect violent legitimacy through the region of Matabeleland by 
employing certain disciplinary functions ecessary to retain power and further monitor 
and control all sectors of the public political domain. These measures of disciplinary 
surveillance failed to invoke the legitimacy that the ZANU-PF intended and instead they 
entrenched narratives of protest from the people who experienced these repressive 
actions. The chapter concludes with a narrative autopsy on the characteristics, structures 
and motivations behind systematic violence as employed by the ZANU-PF in 
Matabeleland in the early 1980s. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the Unity Accord of 1987 with special attention being 
given to the narratives of uniformity and diversity that surfaced at that time. Heralded as 
the end of violence and the beginning of unity by the ZANU-PF government, the Unity 
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Accord was framed within the language of triumphant diplomacy. However, for many of 
the Matabeleland masses the Unity Accord represented a complete defeat, loss of 
political identity and a compromised ceasefire with the only redeeming factor being the 
end of the killing. Moreover, it failed to address the diversity needs of the Matabeleland 
region. Key to the protest narrative of the Matabeleland opposition was the descriptive 
narrative of ZAPU being ‘swallowed-up’ by ZANU-PF. This chapter promulgates the 
argument that the Unity Accord was a defining moment in the history of the 
Matabeleland violence. For the ZANU-PF it was a victory for the solidification of a one-
party state and for the Matabeleland opposition it was a silencing of the narratives of 
resistance against hegemony. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the 
repression of uniformity can sometimes be masqueraded in official narratives of unity. 
Chapter 9 as the concluding portion of this thesis delves into what is termed 
‘emancipatory’ narratives and the search for durable peace in Zimbabwe. In an effort to 
link the past and present violence of Matabeleland, this chapter identifies various 
organising frameworks that emerged from the research; eclipsing narratives, multiple 
layers of victims, and the lack of a future view. In search of harmonising narratives, the 
chapter explores how to resuscitate a unifying memory, corporate belonging and 
responsibility, vibrant public participation and engaged collective healing processes. The 
chapter concludes with an invitation to release emancipatory narratives through a 
proposed values-based transitional justice model aimed at sustainable peace in 
Zimbabwe.  
1.6. Navigating through the Maze of Silenced Narratives  
In his incisive essays on the Haitian revolution against the French in 1791, 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot argues that this uprising was in fact the first recorded successful 
native revolution against colonial tyranny, but it was silenced in history because of the 
implications that this self-organised black resistance had on the dominant racist 
worldview of colonial Europe at the time. Trouillot identifies and articulates two major 
forms of historical silencing that have been employed in order to ensure that this 
revolution would be forgotten in the production of power in history: 
“The first kind of tropes are formulas that tend to erase directly the fact of a 
revolution. I call them, for short, formulas of erasure. The second kind tends to 
empty a number of singular events of their revolutionary context so that the entire 
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string of facts, gnawed from all sides, becomes trivialized. I call them formulas of 
banalization. The first kind of tropes characterizes mainly the generalists and the 
popularizers – textbook authors, for example. The second are the favourite tropes 
of the specialists…Both are formulas of silence.”30 
 
The ZANU-PF government became masters of both the above-mentioned formulas of 
silencing by their continuous manufacture of biased patriotic history (erasure) and the 
perpetual barrage of oratorical rhetoric (trivialisation) through their ‘official’ channels of 
propaganda such as the state-run media, political speeches, and the infamous Ministry of 
Information as the mouthpiece for the ruling party. 
 This Thesis attempts to produce a counter intuitive process of narrative analysis 
that neither erases nor trivialises the history of the Matabeleland massacres of Zimbabwe. 
It takes seriously the broad strokes of revolutionary drive present in both the structures of 
ZANU and ZAPU that liberated Zimbabwe in 1980. It respects the moral cause of justice 
for the freedom of the black majority from the tyranny of white minority rule in 
Zimbabwe. It acknowledges the violent complexities, the chosen glories and chosen 
traumas, and the dilemmas of leadership struggle throughout the independence war. The 
emancipation of black Zimbabwe is an unequivocal truth that must remain untouched. 
For this just cause historical revisionists should resist all forms of erasure or trivialisation. 
 With this standard as a vanguard, this thesis purposes to enshrine the forgotten 
history of the Matabeleland violence of the early 1980s. By extracting and analysing the 
narrative details of the memory of Matabeleland victims and survivors of violence, this 
study aims to hold a light to the many people who suffered death, disappearance, 
kidnapping, torture, rape, beatings and other forms of physical and emotional humiliation 
at the hands of the state-sponsored security forces between 1980 and 1987. It desires to 
hold a light to the ZANU-PF revolutionary leaders who claim to be the ‘saviours’ of the 
poor and oppressed and yet use the same repressive violence that they suffered under to 
torment those they claim to lead. It insists on holding light to the regenerative violence of 
victims becoming killers, of freedom fighters becoming dictators, of history repeating 
itself. The voices of those in Matabeleland who were victimised by those claiming to be 
their liberationists will not be erased, nor will they be trivialised by state-sanctioned 
patriotic history and narrative manipulation and subjugation.  
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The silenced scripts of Matabeleland must be recovered or they will be sacrificed 
on the Alter of erasure; being continually denied, minimised and rationalised away by the 
official historical script of the international community and the ruling ZANU-PF party; or 
they will be lost on the dusty shelves of memorial archives, swallowed in the passing of 
time and by the bureaucratic appetite of specialists trivialisation. The integrity of history 
demands this re-telling of the Matabeleland injustice to guard against formulas of erasure 
or banalisation which would want to render the reality of the Matabeleland conflict as 
irrelevant, an artefact of obsolete history. The Matabeleland violence of 1980-1987 



































Chapter 2: Literature Review – Exploring Narratives of Conflict and Peace  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the intersection between the fields of social conflict theory, 
narratology and peace-building. The literary sources being reviewed are interrogated in a 
tri-partite model which describes the ontology of violent conflict as revealed in practice, 
discourse and performance.31 The first section on practice xamines the available 
literature published on the Matabeleland conflict and categorises it according to the most 
salient social conflict theories. Most available literature on the Matabeleland conflict is 
extrapolated from a structural-functionalist framework of social conflict theory.32 There 
is a minimal body of literature published specifically on the Matabeleland violence of the 
1980s, and the discourse that emanates from this literature is primarily clustered around 
nodes of ethno-cultural, personal-relational, political-structural and historical-ideological 
interpretations of conflict origin.  
The second section on discourse introduces and explores the conception of 
narratology (the study of narrative discourse); its ‘root’ beginnings, its theories and its 
application to the topic at hand. Spanning a considerable period of time, this section 
posits a progression from the study of linguistics and its subsequent overlap with the 
anthropological parley on mythology. Further application then moves into the realm of 
literary criticism, new historicism and finally narrative as practice. Central to this 
discussion is the sociological constructivist thinking which espouses the idea that 
phenomena like conflict and peace are socially constructed by the relational-behaviour 
interactions emanating from narrative discourse.    
The third and final section on performance gives credence to pivotal theories from 
the conflict and peace-building fields that integrate the material, social and symbolic33 
components of analysis in contexts of collective violence. To this end, three primary 
frames of conflict theory will be explored in relation to narrative discourse; first, 
                                                
31 Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest – War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone. The 
International African Institute, Oxford: James Curry, xxi-xxiv.   
32 See critical social conflict theorists such as: Marx, K. Das Kapital: 1867; Parsons, T. The Structure of 
Social Action: 1937; Simmel, G. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation, 1956; Coser, L.A. The 
Functions of Social Conflict: 1956; Dahrendorf, R. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society: 1959; 
Weber, M. Economy and Society: 1968; Curle, A. Making Peace. 1971; Kriesberg, L. The Sociology of 
Social Conflicts: 1973; Collins, R. Conflict Sociology: 1975.    
33 Schirch, L. 2005. Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding. Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc., 33. 
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conceptions of conflict memory; second, intersections of temporal and spatial dimensions 
of conflict; and third, conflict as political theatre of struggle. In essence, this literature 
review lays the foundation to understand how the violence script was carefully crafted 
and socially reproduced by the ZANU-PF regime and then enforced on the psyche and 
experiential canvasses of the Matabeleland people during the Gukurahundi conflict of the 
early 1980s. 
2.2. Section One: Practice - Social Conflict Theory and the Matabeleland Violence 
Practice theory concerns itself with the interrogation of how knowledge is 
produced through experiential processes. Contrary to the rationalities of abstract thought, 
practice theory stems from the notion that knowledge emerges from “context and action”, 
not just by means of “cognition and training”34. Learning then grows out of the routine of 
daily human activity, a process of “kinetic” trial and error not formal calculations.35  
Thus, in practice, theory knowledge is birthed from a cycle of action-reflection only to be 
tested again through a reapplication to yet another action-reflection cycle of learning.  
While some of the founding theories of social conflict evolved from observation 
and systematic application of social science research, by and large social conflict theory 
has been nursed from practice in the midst of real-time social conflicts (Fanon’s writing 
on violence and the oppressive colonial system in Algeria provides a clear example of 
this).36 In this case, the violence itself is seen as actively and forcibly forging new 
pathways for social change. Many of the dominant paradigms of social conflict theory 
have their origins in the lessons that are discovered after practitioners have passed 
through a guided process of intentional reflection on their own conflict management 
processes and the consequential outcomes.  
Most of the writing on the Matabeleland conflict follows the reflective pathways 
and patterns of well-recognised social conflict theories. For purposes of this study, these 
theories have been grouped as ethno-cultural, personal-relational, political-structural 
and historical-ideological interpretations of conflict origin. The conception of power is 
not listed as a separate element in these configurations because it is the premise of this 
research that all of these dyads are descriptive of instrumentalities through which power 
                                                
34 Bourdieu, P. 1979. Outline of A Theory of Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
35 Richards, 1996: xxi. 
36 Fanon, F. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. England: Penguin Books.  
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is expressed. In other words, the exertion of power is the endgame outcome; the means to 
that end are wrapped in the different packages categorised above.  
This research proposes that narrative discourse becomes the unifying factor, the 
glue that holds together the various means of power expression being explored in this 
section. Narrative discourse as a centrifugal ordering principle for the explanation of 
Matabeleland violence is consistently absent in a categorical review of literature 
published on this period of history. This research argues that a durable peace in 
Zimbabwe is only possible if the violence narrative of Gukurahundi is deconstructed and 
a new narrative of justice and reconciliation is constructed in its stead.    
2.2.1. Ethno-Cultural Interpretations 
With the back-drop of entangled and often stormy relations between the ethnic 
groups labelled ‘Ndebele’ and ‘Shona’ in Zimbabwe history, the Matabeleland conflict 
provides seed-bed for the classic ethno-culturalist debate of origin and its relationship to 
socio-political conflict; is ethnic identity innate or constructed? Ethno-cultural 
‘essentialists’ argue for a unique, inherited sense of ethnic identity based on biological 
traits and cultural traditions that are the basis for instinctual defensive violence and are 
collectively transmitted from one generation to another. Ethno-culturalist thinking 
remains a strong draw for a small grouping of academics and populist writers when 
analysing violence in Zimbabwe.  
Royal Prince Peter Zwide Khumalo argues to keep the cultural traditions of the 
Umthwakazi (Ndebele Nation) because “the culture has unique features and those 
features have a value of their own that cannot or rather should not be eclipsed by any 
other cultural impositions.”37 Khumalo continues with the following critique, “The 
concept of ‘culture as dynamic’ has been in most cases abused to discard that culture or 
belief that defines UBUNTU.”38 Writing within the context of Zimbabwean politics, 
Masipula Sithole argues that despite the apparent political manipulation of identities, the 
Zimbabwean masses still tend to vote along ethnic lines. In other words, contrary to the 
Marxist class analysis, ethnicity trumps class categorisation when it comes to the masses 
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political affiliations.39 Enocent Msindo provides a reversal critique of the 1929 Bulawayo 
Faction Fights40, debunking the generally held Marxist class analysis of this event as 
propagated by Phimister & van Onselen41. Msindo maintains three arguments: first, that 
there was evidence of organised efforts to identify and categorise the ‘Shona’ as enemies; 
second, that all Shona people were targeted for violence not just the newly arrived job-
seekers; and third, that the Ndebele-Shona divide was manifest in at least five 
competitive social arenas: labour, sport, class, politics, and culture. However, Terence 
Ranger argues against an ethnic-based theory of the event of 1929 and instead describes 
this conflict rupture as a contestation over social capital and who was to have the power 
of setting societal trends and thereby affecting relational interactions: “But above all the 
claims of clever and smart young migrant men to define the ‘style’ of Bulawayo were 
being violently repudiated.”42         
Contrary to the ethnic essentialist ideation, a growing body of knowledge is being 
amassed that strongly argues against cultural identity essentialism. Proponents of this 
argument maintain that “ideas, beliefs, classifications, perceptions of risk, etc. are tied to, 
and shaped by, systematic features of community organization (specifically, the degree to 
which people are bound into institutions reflecting hierarchical, egalitarian or 
individualistic orientations)”43. Already in the late 1960s, Fredrik Barth released a treatise 
on ethnicity in which he stated, “that ethnic identity is socially constructed, that it is 
dependent on situations, and that it is used instrumentally”44.  
These notions are substantiated in the research conducted by Stafford Glass on the 
Matabele War of 1893. Glass documents the military organisation and prowess of the 
Matabele people and how the colonial powers not only feared and respected them for this 
power; subsequently behaved opportunistically by according the Ndebele precedence 
                                                
39 Sithole, M. 1985. “The Salience of Ethnicity in African Politics: The Case of Zimbabwe”. Journal of 
Asian and African Studies, XX (3-4): 187-190.  
40 Msindo, E. 2006. “Ethnicity, not Class? The 1929 Bulawayo Faction Fights Reconsidered”. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 32 (3): 429-447. 
41 Phimister, I. and van Onselen, C. 1979. “The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case Study of 
the 1929 Bulawayo Location ‘Faction Fight’”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 6 (1): 1-43.  
42 Ranger, T. 2006. “The Meaning of Urban Violence in Africa: Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 1890-
1960”. The Journal of Cultural and Social History Society 3 (2): 218. 
43 Richards, P. 1995: xxiv. 
44 Barth, as quoted by Lindgren, B. 2004. “The Internal Dynamics of Ethnicity: Clan Names, Origins and 
Castes in Southern Zimbabwe”. Africa, 74 (2): 175. (Source: Barth, F. 1969. Introduction, in Barth, F (Ed.) 
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over the Shona in intelligence, organisation and superiority (a classic ethnic ‘divide and 
rule’ tactic). However, it was only in the advent of the Matabele War of 1893, where the 
Ndebele challenged white rule and the imperialist indignation was fully awakened that 
the colonial rulers began to justify their violence against the Ndebele as a means of 
“protecting” the Shona and began recruiting Shona men to fight with them against the 
Matabele.45  This same idea is born out in the work of Eliakim Sibanda who maintains 
that the colonial version of history highly exaggerated these ethnic divisions: “Basically, 
according to this [white] version, the AmaNdebele held the Shona who, were the rightful 
heirs to Zimbabwe, in slavery until the settlers themselves rescued them.”46      
In his research around military hierarchy, race and ethnicity in the Rhodesian 
Native Regiment of World War I, Tim Stapleton makes a clear case for racial and ethnic 
manipulation by the colonial rulers. Not only were all native regiments commanded by 
white officers, but these officers often favoured Ndebele soldiers over Shona recruits. 
The prejudice here being that the Ndebele were seen as born ‘warriors’; more highly 
skilled and equipped for battle than the Shona. While historically, it has been documented 
that the Ndebele did maintain a more sophisticated military structure and history than the 
Shona, this stereotype played itself out in the place of promotion within the Rhodesian 
Native Regiment. Despite similar training and evidenced individual merit, the Ndebele 
fighters were consistently given the higher posts of rank, authority, responsibility (special 
operations) and commendation above the Shona in this Regiment.47    
In his fascinating study of the internal sub-divisions within seemingly unified 
tribal groupings, Bjorn Lindgren makes the case that ethnic identity is considerably more 
layered than the essentialist view propagates. Lindgren extrapolates on the three 
classifications of clan names (i ibongo) in the Ndebele culture that connote a separate 
position or ‘caste’ order within the socio-economic web of intra-clan relationships (the 
Zanzi representing royalty, Enhla representing other incorporated tribes, and Lozwi/Holi 
                                                
45 Glass, S. 1968. The Matabele War. London and Harlow: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. 
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representing the slave or servant class48). In sum, Lindgren and others cited in this section 
argue against ethnic-cultural essentialism by insisting on the nullification of homogeneity 
as a primary element to the essentialist worldview and by thickening the nuance of 
ranking within a given ethnic configuration in a specific historical-political context. Thus, 
to deduce that the Matabeleland violence was caused by primarily an ethnic-based 
conflict is to be seduced by reductionism and oversimplification.     
2.2.2. A Critique of the Ethno-Cultural Interpretation  
The distinctiveness of particular identities, ethnicities and cultures, however, is 
not the primary concern here. Instead of engaging in the polarised debate of the merits of 
essentialist verses constructivist frames of ethnic reference, this study argues that it is 
vital to interrogate the process by which healthy differences (constructed diversities) 
become mutually exclusive (essentialist ideations). The exclusivist ideation is provoked 
by the threat of extinction, when life or death, livelihood or poverty, honour or 
humiliation is at stake. The key question then is how or when does this distinctiveness 
which is an inherent characteristic of the essentialist worldview become exclusive and 
destructive? 
This research puts forward the notion that it is precisely through the conduit of 
divisive narrative discourse (an articulation of the other as ‘enemy’) that an essentialist 
cultural outlook can morph into an exclusivist proposition resulting in oppression, 
violence and death. Thus, it becomes apparent that when essentialist ideas are articulated 
in exclusivist rhetoric, violence can be justified and acted out. Once violence is acted 
upon, a form of social construction has been transacted and the intimate connection 
between essentialist thinking and constructivist action through the vehicle of destructive 
narrative discourse becomes evident. This study proposes that these impulses of 
‘essentialist thinking-constructivist action’, as birthed in a violence-inciting narrative 
discourse, are part of the dynamics that propelled the Matabeleland conflict of the early 
1980s.        
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2.2.3. Personal-Relational Interpretations 
 Volumes of pages have been written in an attempt to deconstruct the personality 
and psychological conflict profile of Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe (Chan, 
2003; Hill, 2005; Meredith, 2007)49. Scores of memoirs from well-known political 
activists or journalist have recently appeared on the bookstore shelves (Meldrum, 2004; 
Godwin, 2006; Nyarota, 2006; Todd, 2007)50. Autobiographies and personal stories from 
all sides of the political spectrum vie for the spotlight of public attention to be turned on 
their particular slice of truth (Nkomo, 1984; Buckle, 2002; Chung, 2006)51. All of these 
genres are aimed at a popular readership and as such are full of the necessary ingredients 
of mystery and drama required to satisfy the demand of the public interest.  
The personal-relational lens of interpretation concentrates on the intrigue of the 
individual persona and the magnitude of actual or perceived power that he/she exhibits in 
the relational context. Stephen Chan (2003) writes with the reason and the caution of a 
true diplomat. His analysis carefully tracks the life of Robert Mugabe; his growing years, 
his rise to power in the ranks of the liberation movement, his favoured era of the first 
eighteen years of rule, and then his ‘fall from grace’ between 1998 and 2002. Halfway 
through his book, Chan summarises his findings in nine points that revolve around 
Mugabe’s intellect, ideology, pragmatism, style of leadership, sincere belief in what he 
stands for, manipulation of issues of war and land, need for political endorsement from 
world leaders, diplomatic abilities, and his continual need for personal validation through 
ongoing elections.52 This form of personality-based assessment is the norm in many 
political analyst circles because negotiation between high profile government figures 
dominates the diplomat’s professional skill-base and worldview. For other examples 
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showcasing this kind of track-one diplomatic intervention void of multiple levels of local 
representation, see Africa case studies by Hare53, Hume54, and Sahoun55.      
2.2.4. A Critique of the Personal-Relational Interpretation 
While these forms of published works make for popular reading and contribute to 
the recording of history through personal story, they fall short in assisting this study to 
meet at least two of its pivotal objectives. Firstly, they are anecdotal in style and thereby 
tend to oversimplify the conflict by focusing on the behaviours and actions of lone 
protagonists, as if individual public figures act in isolation. It may be interesting to read 
about the curious lives of notorious political leaders, but the resultant outcome is often a 
misappropriation of blame assigned to individual persons for the causes of complex 
social conflicts. An example is the recent DVD production by the young journalist-
activist Zenzele Ndebele, one of several explanations of why the Gukurahundi violence 
occurred was that of personal vendetta. According to the film, Mugabe may have had a 
personal score to avenge as his father left his mother when he was a young boy and 
moved to Matabeleland where he remarried an Ndebele woman.56 While this theory may 
have a conspiratorial appeal, it would be problematic to hang the complexities of the 
Matabeleland conflict on the premise of one man’s personal need for vengeance. This 
cautionary note is not, however, an attempt to negate the potential power of Mugabe’s 
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childhood trauma as one of many conscious or sub-conscious driving factors in his 
personal life narrative.                        
Secondly, the personal-relational frame can fail to give deeper interpretation to 
the interconnectivities of the socio-political systems that these actors operate from within. 
Again, the work of Chan offers an example of this dilemma. Chan’s work has been 
described as follows: “[a] tightly argued and rigorous narrative, based on close personal 
knowledge of Zimbabwe, [which] depicts the emergence of a ruthless and single-minded 
despot amassing and firmly clinging to his power. We follow the triumphant nationalist 
leader, reconciling all in the new multi-racial Zimbabwe, degenerate into a petty tyrant 
consumed by hubris and self righteousness facing an endgame of potentially horrifying 
dimensions”57. In this representation alone, the reader is led to believe that Mugabe as an 
individual holds all power, reconciles all of Zimbabwe, and is the only person who may 
suffer a destructive end. This research maintains that all persons (including the likes of 
Mugabe) speak and act within certain plural contextual realities, i.e. a set of social 
assumptions and networks that give meaning to what they say and do.  
The personal-relational analysis privileges individual agency; it dissects the 
personal narrative as if it exists in a void making up the sum total of reality. It glorifies 
the individual story as having ‘stand-alone’ universal quality. While the personal-
relational narrative is useful to understand individual personalities, behaviours and 
attached motivations, it rarely accounts for collective agency. The sense that human 
beings act out larger; multiple corporate narratives must be given credence in order to 
truly comprehend the fullness of constructed social reality.   
2.2.5. Political-Structural Interpretations 
In contrast to the personal-relational lens of analysis, the political-structural 
framework privileges collective agency above individual agency. For the first two 
decades after Zimbabwe’s independence, the structural interpretation dominated most 
political thought and analysis from both internal and external sources. The reasons for 
this are at least three-fold: first, a political-structural analysis is foundational to 
revolutionary ideologies; second, to analyse the socio-political climate in Zimbabwe from 
any other framework smacked of anti-revolutionary sentiments; and third, the political-
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structural interpretation justified early repressive attitudes by the State. Thus, the 
political-structural explanation was used to bolster and nurture the meta-narrative of the 
newly elected mass-based liberation government of ZANU-PF.  
For instance, in 1990, Victor De Waal wrote in glowing terms about the quest for 
unity in Zimbabwe one decade into independence citing the most urgent reconciliation 
agenda being that of “forgiving those blacks who were part of the internal settlement of 
1978-9”58 referring to the breakaway black political leaders Abel Muzorewa and 
Ndabaningi Sithole. Likewise, in 1991 Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye59 op ned up 
a highly intellectual and well-tempered debate on the merits and demerits of a one-party 
state, with an underlying assumption that there will always be the ‘democratic space’ for 
this contentious debate and that finally, the ‘will of the people’ will be honoured. Both of 
these writings exemplify the dominant political-structural belief that the Unity Accord of 
1987-8 had resolved the Matabeleland conflict to the extent that De Waal did not feel it 
necessary to include Gukurahundi as one of the reconciliation agendas of Zimbabwe in 
1990, while Mandaza and Sachikonye assumed that the democracy was taking root in 
Zimbabwe in 1991 despite the state-sanctioned violence unleashed against the dissident 
movement in Matabeleland between 1980-88: 
“However, if the state is also indeed a terrain of struggles – and the last eleven 
 years demonstrate this - then some of the pessimism or dismissiveness towards 
 the potential and trajectory of on-going democratic struggles are overdrawn…the 
 abandonment of the intention to install a de jureon -party state is only one 
 example where the state has had to make a concession to pressure from the civil 
 society. This provides grounds for optimism for the outcome of related 
 democratic struggles in the future.”60     
Even more recently, Fay Chung’s memoirs of the ‘Second Chimurenga’ released in 2006, 
unabashedly rehearses the ideological script of the ZANU-PF’s liberation rhetoric. 
Preben Kaarsholn of the Nordic Africa Institute, who writes the introduction for Chung’s 
book, produces no apology for his critique of her stance: “In her memoirs, Fay Chung 
seems to support Robert Mugabe’s and the ZANU(PF)’s attempt – through the ‘Third 
Chimurenga’ – to monopolise the history of the liberation struggle, pose themselves as its 
                                                
58 De Waal, V. 1990. The Politics of Reconciliation – Zimbabwe’s First Decade. London & Cape Town: 
Hurst & Co. & David Philip, 99.  
59 Mandaza, I & Sachikonye, L. (Eds.) (1991). The One Party State and Democracy – The Zimbabwe 
Debate. Southern Africa: Sapes Books. 
60 Ibid, 15. 
40 
 
only rightful heir, and dismiss the challenge of democratic opposition as something alien 
and hostile to this historical mission.”61   
Thus, while the political-structural frame was utilised to encourage a status quo 
view of the state, one that made criticism of the state very unfashionable in the first few 
decades of independent Zimbabwe62, variations of the same frame of analysis became a 
vital form of evaluation used to critique and deconstruct the state apparatus and the ruling 
party starting in 1998 and onwards. For example, Timothy Scarnecchia makes the strong 
case for the parallels between the formations of a fascist cycle in Italy between the years 
of 1920-1924 and Zimbabwe between the years 2000-2005:  
“[Scarnecchia’s] comparison focuses on the following areas: the state’s use of 
paramilitary organisations, or militias, to maintain or regain control; the abuse of 
legislative and judicial powers to protect ruling party interests; party membership 
as a prerequisite for involvement in basic areas of social and economic life; and 
the primacy of political survival over strategic economic planning.”63   
    
Volumes of analysis on the current Zimbabwe dilemma have cascaded into the 
public purview since 2000, exposing the many and varied battlegrounds on which the 
narratives of the Zimbabwean people and the narrative of the ruling elite has been pitted 
against each other over issues such as unionization, economy, militarization, land 
redistribution, opposition politics, war veterans, human rights, justice, detainment and 
torture and women’s roles and concerns. 
Suzanne Dansereau64, Brian Raftopoulis and Lloyd Sachikonye65 document the 
relationship of the Zimbabwe Unions and the ruling ZANU-PF. Starting with a highly 
amicable relationship directly after independence, these authors chart the widening chasm 
that developed over time as ZANU-PF struggled to keep control of the unions which 
were becoming increasingly independent in their critique and even shrill in their 
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condemnation of the economic policies of ZANU-PF, especially as it related to workers 
rights. The rift between the narrative of the government and the narrative of the unions in 
describing the Zimbabwean workers’ reality became so contradictory that the ZANU-PF 
intervened by force and replaced the union leadership; the disenfranchised remnant union 
leadership fomented the opposition movement into what it is today.  
On Zimbabwean economics, Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyanya caution 
readers not to fall into the binary debate of ‘exhausted nationalism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’, 
both of whose narrative discourses no longer hold sway with the poor and their daily 
conditions of hunger and suffering: “Separating the truth from the myth-making in 
ZANU’s repertoire is important, for the contestation of political rhetoric and reality 
remains profound”66. Bond and Manyanya, in striving to define a new narrative, believe 
there is a third way of ‘social justice struggle’: “…it is eminently feasible for genuinely 
democratic social forces in Zimbabwe to engage in social struggle that serves the 
interests of the majority and puts deeper political-economic dilemmas (such as debt) on 
to the table for debate”67. Echoing Bond and Manyanya, Brian Raftopoulos68 also speaks 
of the crisis in Zimbabwe whereby rightist neo-liberal policies have been shrouded by 
leftist socialist rhetoric; this is commonly referred to as ‘talking left and acting right.’ 
Raftopoulos also touts an alternative economic narrative, a discourse that he believes 
could have taken care of the structural-land and material-economic needs while at the 
same time securing human rights and the necessary democratic space for all 
Zimbabweans. However, in its all-consuming effort to retain and entrench itself in power, 
ZANU-PF never provided the necessary space or time for this kind of comprehensive 
narrative to emerge. This lost opportunity could explain the mystifying disconnect 
between the abundant intellectual capital resident in the ZANU-PF government and their 
inability to find their way out of the present day political-economic crisis.  
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Authors Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni69 and Muchaparara Musemwa70 locate the 
debate on political economies in Zimbabwe within the frame of ‘disciplinary’71 nature of 
development practices driven by politics. Ndlovu-Gathsheni explores the disciplinary 
nature of the geo-political economic system on the development of Zimbabwe as a 
nation: “…[the author] situates the Zimbabwe crisis within the current global 
environment, which is characterised by triumphant neo-liberalism and its concern with 
maintaining the status quo through aggressive ‘disciplining’ of any alternative way of 
imagining the world.”72 Musemwa illustrates a ‘disciplinary’ development process by 
tracking the political neglect of Bulawayo and the Matabeleland region by the ZANU-PF 
government. Of special significance is the failure of ZANU-PF leadership to act in good 
faith to complete the Zambezi Water Project, a promised development project conceived 
at independence and still outstanding today. Despite on-going financial and bureaucratic 
reasons stated by the authorities to explain this delay, Musemwa maintains that this 
situation is a prime example of the politicisation of development, with the ZANU-PF elite 
masterfully using this denial of development in order to entrench its power and to 
‘discipline’ and isolate the political opposition rooted in Matabeleland. This specific form 
of ‘discipline’ becomes even more sinister when one considers that the Matabeleland is a 
climatically arid region which has historically suffered from cyclical seasons of drought. 
To understand the Matabeleland violence of the early 1980s, it is necessary to also 
interrogate the militarisation of Zimbabwean society as whole. The militarization analysis 
of Matabeleland would need to consider pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras of 
time. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s work around civil-military relations and the nationalist-
military alliance in Zimbabwe provide important scholarly insights into the structures of 
militarisation and their far-reaching implications for life in Zimbabwe today. In regards 
to pre-colonial times, Ndlovu-Gatsheni debunks the ‘mythology’ that he claims surrounds 
the Ndebele military violence history: “The Ndebele nation is said to have survived by 
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plunder, pillage and violent raids upon their neighbours.”73 While Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
acknowledges the military organisation of the Ndebele nation, he takes pain to show that 
what was mistakenly interpreted as a highly organised military system was more often 
connected to civilian structures (e.g. cultural formations by age-groups) primarily 
existing as units of social production: “... [These] groups performed important civil and 
community services like building homes, herding cattle and cultivating crops.”74  
In another work, Ndlovu-Gatsheni75 traces the twinning together of the 
nationalist-military agenda in Zimbabwe. After outlining the theoretical dangers of 
involving the military in politics, he identifies the forerunners to the birthing of a 
military-state in independent Zimbabwe. Throughout the war of liberation, the guerrilla 
armies of ZIPRA and ZANLA regularly utilised coercive force on the peasants, 
immersed themselves in the doctrines of nationalist ideology and maintained their 
operational base from within the civilian population.76 Pointing to the recent 
developments of election rigging, fast-track land reform, and the revival of youth militia 
(referred to as the ‘Green Bombers’), Ndlovu-Gatsheni establishes the primary pillars that 
buttress the nationalist-military ‘oligarchy’ in Zimbabwe: Ethnic manipulation, material 
resource perks, political power co-option and ideological indoctrination.77 The 
‘ industrial-military complex’78 of Zimbabwe became the structural extension of the voice 
of the grand political narrative of the ZANU-PF elite and as such it acted as the 
constructed mechanism through which this homogeneous political view of reality was 
enacted upon the people of the nation.  
Another key structural analysis of the Zimbabwean conflict is generated from the 
implosion of the state as a result of the surfacing of internal oppositional forces. Liisa 
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Laakso79 discusses three distinct periods of political opposition in Zimbabwe. First, 
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union), until its amalgamation with ZANU-PF in 
1987-8, represented a strong regional opposition that having founded and launched the 
independence struggle could legitimately challenge the liberation war credentials of the 
ZANU-PF and its apparent ‘right’ to rule: “The [ZAPU] party’s resistance of intimidation 
and violence for more than five years, helped foster a climate of political pluralism in the 
country…”80. Second, ZUM (Zimbabwe Unity Movement) arose in 1990 declaring its 
defiance to the government proposition of a one-party state and touting itself as a safe-
guard for multi-party politics and a watch-dog against corruption. Third, the MDC 
(Movement for Democratic Change) launched in 1999 in direct response to at least four 
crises in the Nation: a new generation of young people who had lost the liberation 
memory and who were demanding change, a growing discontent with the leadership of 
ZANU-PF, a country in economic turmoil, and the masses calling for drastic 
constitutional reform. Each of these formalised oppositional entities represented the 
different strands of the subjugated narratives of the ordinary citizens of Zimbabwe.   
The current regime’s intolerance of any form of opposition expressed itself in 
2005 with the State-sanctioned ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (translated as ‘clean out the 
rubbish’ or ‘take out the trash’). In this operation approximately 700,000 urban poor were 
displaced.81 While the government attempted to entrench a public narrative that revolved 
around the need to deal with illegal shack dwellers and street vendors, those affected by 
the forced removals retained a counter-narrative of being politically punished and 
intimidated for having voted against ZANU-PF in the Presidential election polls. Victor 
Shale82 concurs with this view: “Operation Murambatsvina is therefore widely seen in 
Zimbabwe and afar as a direct act of retribution against the urban electorate who are 
known or suspected for having voted against ZANU-PF.”83 In sum, as the clandestine 
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narratives of the urban poor became amplified through the electoral process, the State 
heightened its instrumentalities of violence to forcibly silence these contradictory texts.          
There remain ironic, paradoxical pockets in Zimbabwe where support for, and 
opposition to ZANU-PF are in juxtaposition one to another. These include the war 
veterans (and their agency in the land reform question), the media and various women’s 
movements. Much of the scholarship surrounding the liberation war veterans is aimed at 
demystifying the nationalist discourse that consciously subverts certain aspects of the 
historical record and elevates that which is favourable to the ruling party.84 While the 
ZAPU-ZIPRA contribution to the armed struggle has been almost erased from the official 
ZANU-PF history, Jeremy Brickhill commends the ZIPRA fighting contingent as an 
army recruited from the proletariat which had so much favour with the peasants that they 
rarely needed to use force, and which had, by the end of the war, made the successful 
transition from a guerrilla army to a strategic military force poised to liberate Zimbabwe 
from Rhodesian rule through conventional warfare.85  
Central to the successful re-write of Zimbabwean war veterans’ experience is to 
resist the polarising pull of the ‘good guys / bad guys’ narrative that so easily entices 
nationalist liberation rhetoric. The plot of the drama of war and the motivations of the 
chief protagonists must never become monolithic; they must be layered and complex so 
as to keep at bay the temptation to seek revenge among the generations to come. Teresa 
Barnes has recorded and transcribed the narrative stories of many Zimbabwean ex-
combatants in order to expose the depth of emotions, motivations and actions that drive 
these soldiers:  
“A further complexity is the common historiographical treatment of war. Wars are 
often summed up as the decisions of leaders and the movements of armies. It is 
often forgotten that these depend on ordinary soldiers, who make personal 
sacrifices to achieve advances and victories, and who suffer the consequences of 
retreats and defeats physically. But their experiences are usually obliterated in the 
manufacture of histories and may even be lost to popular memory. The result is 
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the propagation of an official mythology of war, with heavy emphasis on its 
abstract and ‘glorious’ aspects.”86 
 
Norma Kriger makes a strong case for the opportunistic partnership between the ZANU-
PF and the war veterans in two parallel seven year periods of time 1980-87 and 2000-07: 
“…veterans and the ruling party were both collaborators and antagonists, often 
simultaneously. Each sought to build power and privilege through mutual manipulation 
of the other…”87 In both time periods mentioned above the regime and the veterans 
collaborated for mutual gain in several ways: first, power mongering (purging of ZIPRA 
ex-combatants from National Army, monetary benefits and seizure of land); second, 
liberation war appeals (forcing legitimacy through divisive rhetoric on hero/dissident 
soldiers, authentic/fake veterans, and counter-revolutionary accusations); and three, use 
of violence and intimidation to bring about change (Matabeleland civilian massacres, 
youth militia threats, abductions, severe torture and killings).88            
The fast-track land reform programme enacted in the year 2000 is no less nuanced 
than the war veteran’s world of needs, interests and realities. In a study on the Zimbabwe 
land issue conducted by Bevlyne Sithole, Bruce Campbell, Dale Dore, and Witness 
Kozanayi,89 peasant narratives on the land are dissected and state-peasant relations are 
interrogated to provide a stinging indictment of political relations over land. Instead of 
making the peasants more receptive to the State, this study found that there are so many 
anomalies in the land redistribution effort (conflicted ownership over familial capital 
resources, contrary traditional communal practices and disputed processes around 
subsistence farming) that it has had the opposite effect; rural peasant communities have 
become increasingly disengaged as opposed to engaged with the State. Thus, despite the 
ZANU-PF’s recent sloganeering and the revived liberation discourse on ‘bringing the 
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revolution full circle by giving land back to the people’ the actual measured revolutionary 
satisfaction of the peasant masses appears to be waning. 
Another highly contested arena of ZANU-PF support and opposition has been 
among the women of Zimbabwe. Shereen Essof90 highlights the struggle of Zimbabwean 
women to define an agenda that is universal while at the same time critical of the cultural 
and political patriarchy which so often dominates liberation movements. Essof decries 
the manner in which feminist thinking in Zimbabwe has been dismissed as ‘counter-
revolutionary’, ‘anti-nationalist’ and ‘pro-imperialist.’ Essof outlines the tensions 
between attempting to develop a unified platform for political issues facing the women of 
Zimbabwe and the very political agendas and allegiances that each woman has cemented 
with the ZANU-PF or the opposition as their respective representing party. Three distinct 
camps and their respective narratives emerged from these conflictive apprehensions 
within the women’s movement of Zimbabwe. First, there are pro-ZANU-PF women who 
promulgate that the women’s agenda must remain ‘apolitical’ and not entail issues of 
opposition to the Revolutionary State. Second, there are women who want a relatively 
safe discourse as a means to critiquing current power promote a women’s agenda 
grounded in standardised, objective international instruments of gender, development and 
human rights. Third, there are those representing activist leanings who insist that the 
women’s agenda must be critical of all patriarchal power; demanding a holistic, 
contextual discourse that seeks total transformation of structures and relationships in 
society regardless of so-called revolutionary credentials or political rank and legitimacy. 
Grace Kwinjeh91 asks whether the current political settlement evolving in 
Zimbabwe is an ‘elite transition or people first?’ movement. She questions the popular 
notion of pubic processes being described as ‘people-centred’ when one half of the 
population, the women, are excluded from these processes. Kwinjeh states it quite 
categorically: “Women whose conspicuous absence I noted above at the Lancaster house 
negotiations are now demanding a place at the table as a right and not out of the largess 
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of fellow male comrades or the regional patriarchs”92. Furthering her argument, Kwinjeh 
draws from the voice of Everjoice Win: 
“Whatever ‘deal’ is worked out to resolve Zimbabwe’s crisis, women and their 
rights should be at the centre of it. We want feminists – women who care about 
the rights of other women and who are prepared to rock the patriarchal boat – to 
be in leadership positions and to be there when the deal is made. Women want a 
new and comprehensive Constitution that guarantees their rights. This includes 
provision which clearly states that customary law and tradition must not violate 
international human rights, norms and standards. We want to see a complete 
overhaul of a political system that has seen women reduced to political 
cheerleaders, or worse, sex workers with few economic prospects and the lowest 
life expectancy in the world.”93 
 
Hence, when one purviews the women’s literature on Zimbabwe, what emerges is an 
almost suffocated feminist narrative struggling to find its way to the surface under the 
clouded, heavy weight of a grand patriarchal narrative entrenched in both the political 
and cultural systems that dominate Zimbabwean society.  
2.2.6. A Critique of the Political-Structural Interpretation 
The political-structuralist approach has a tendency to view the collective 
narratives as the sum total of reality while disregarding the power of personal narratives 
to affect change in conflict situations. The glorification of collective action gives little 
room for the phenomena of serendipity (surprise factor) that springs from individual acts 
of transformation in the midst of public structural conflict. The actions of individual 
players within the system are normally described as resulting from the political loyalty 
and commitment to a greater ‘cause’ (the revolution), the party or the ‘people’ en mass, 
no matter how displaced those motivations may actually appear.  
Narrative discourse analysis provides the explanatory bridge between the 
individual and the structural question of agency. Embedded within social narrative 
discourse is the interplay and connection between the personal and the corporate agency 
of social thought and practice. On one hand, powerful individuals search for ways to act 
out and justify their personal narratives through collective expression and advocacy. On 
the other hand, collective narratives are buoyed by individuals of influence who give 
them voice and legitimacy, producing a living reality on its own. Thus, there remains a 
                                                




continual dance of mutual reinforcement between the private and the public narratives 
and the domains of power that they inhabit. The life-blood of the national story consists 
of the sum total of all the individual stories of the citizens that inhabit its boundaries and 
the nucleus of social change lies precisely in the synergetic, collaborative vision of both 
the singular and the plural narratives merging into a unified action. 
2.2.7. Historical-Ideological Interpretations 
The historical-ideological analysis is not so much preoccupied with the content of 
a good personal story or the in-depth description of political structures as it is interested 
in why a story is told or a structure is created to begin with, who presents the story or 
built the structure in question, and for what motives was the story recounted or the 
structure developed? In her captivating book on the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, 
Luise White articulates this narrative approach to history:  
“This book charts a different course of interrogation altogether. I’m in pursuit of 
history, of how narratives about the past are produced and reproduced by these 
narratives. I’m interested in the many confessions, why some fail and why others 
surface when they do. My question then is not who did it, but why do so many 
insist they did it…Texts compete by claiming (and proclaiming) their truth. 
Looking at how texts compete, at what they compete over, and what is at stake in 
their competition, is a way to articulate the relationships between them.”94 
 
Historiography then becomes an undertaking of discovering how and why narrative 
discourse is ‘massaged’ and managed so as to carefully erect a politico-ideological 
reality. Terence Ranger expounds on this practice with precision and eloquence in his 
writings on rise of ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe. Ranger takes precautions to 
extrapolate the distinctions between nationalist historiography (documenting the rise and 
chronicling the life-progression of nationalist movements), histories of nationalism 
(illuminating an interpretive turn or the critical dissection of nationalist movements) and 
patriotic history, defined for Zimbabwe as follows: 
“Patriotic history is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean 
revolutionary tradition. It is an attempt to reach out to ‘youth’ over the heads of 
their parents and teachers, all of who are said to have forgotten or betrayed 
revolutionary values. It repudiates academic historiography with its attempts to 
complicate and question. At the same time it confronts Western ‘bogus 
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universalism’ which it depicts as a denial of the concrete history of global 
oppression.”95 
 
Ranger describes how this ‘patriotic history’ is diffused throughout Zimbabwean society 
by the strident and consistent use (or abuse) of the visual and print media, educational 
institutions at all levels, the performance sector and almost all other forums of public 
space in which a particular political mono-narrative can be promoted. This multi-faceted 
and comprehensive strategy for dissemination of ‘patriotic history’ has resulted in what 
Ranger characterises as: “…a coherent but complex doctrine.96”  
The media as a conduit for ideological propagation has remained a bastion of 
political contention since the inception of independent Zimbabwe. Being fully aware of 
the tremendous influence the media wields as the narrative voice of a nation, the ZANU-
PF has exerted a magnitude of pressure, control and repression over the media which has 
lent itself to a tumultuous relationship between the ruling party, the state-run media and 
the ‘free’ independent press. Revolutionary strength has required a mastery of the 
national narrative through the machinations of re-education, indoctrination and the 
consistent barrage of ‘tailor-made’ affirmative images of the state through the media. 
Stanford Mukasa, quoting Noam Chomsky has called this state-sanctioned media 
message blitzing the creation of “necessary illusions”97. “Ultimately the press in 
Zimbabwe falls victim to being a propaganda machinery in the creation of necessary 
illusions necessary because ruling party elites need to create such illusions in order to 
stay in power.”98  
In a contrasting study on the press in Zimbabwe, N. Mathema99 argues for a 
balance in news reporting so as to counter the perceived or actual bias of Western 
countries that currently dominates the international media. Mathema attempts to measure 
the partiality of Zimbabwean newspapers by contrasting ten topics that clearly emanate 
from a socialist ideation with the international news articles that appeared in the national 
newspapers over a designated period of time. In the end, while seeming to prove an 
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imbalance in international news reporting (in favour of Western media partiality) in 
Zimbabwe, the article seems to be more captivated with promoting a socialist agenda 
rather than exploring the competitive clash of world-view narratives on the geo-political 
media landscape.       
 Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor100 expose an intriguing phenomenon in 
which narrative discourse is transmitted inter-generationally in such a way that the 
current generation has internalised the particular narrative passed on to them as if it was 
their own. The authors followed the media internet debate that erupted in 1997 after the 
release of ‘Breaking the Silence’101 a detailed report on the Gukurahundi massacres. Most 
of the internet users researched were youth who would not have experienced or 
participated in the Gukurahundi violence and many were self-proclaimed future leaders. 
Of interest was the degree in which those who were supporters of ZANU-PF confidently 
defended the ‘genocidal’ tactics of the government in Matabeleland as necessary for the 
security of the country. In many instances, the debaters subscribed almost verbatim to the 
official narratives of justification propagated by the ZANU-PF to explain the violence 
unleashed on the civilian population of Matabeleland. Beyond this, these young 
defenders of the revolution even elicited historical ethnic grievances of Ndebele raids 
against Shona peoples that occurred over one hundred years ago, inferring that the 
Matabeleland killings were a form of excusable if not permissible revenge. What was 
clear is that these non-Ndebele youth had so thoroughly imbibed the historical-political 
narrative of the ZANU-PF that they now internalised that script as the only reality: 
“…[these] debates demonstrated that discussion was only as free as the political views of 
the participants allowed, and showed the lasting and profound influence of the 
interpretations of the violence propagated in Zimbabwe’s media during the conflict.”102 
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Thus, in a highly contested historical environment, ‘patriotic history’ can take its defining 
place as the mediator of authenticity and in so doing it is able to rationalise and protract 
many forms of oppression, violent repression and the neglect of basic human needs and 
freedoms. 
2.2.8. A Critique of the Historical-Ideological Interpretation  
The historical-ideological interpretation takes its investigation backstage to the 
internal socio-political scaffolding (the how and why) of the personal-relational (the who) 
and the political-structural (the what) frameworks; answering questions of their existence, 
nature and functioning. However, while this deeper analysis uncovers new layers of 
intrigue about the expressions of conflict and violence, it often fails to predict the kind of 
legacies (either individual or corporate) that are likely to be part of the future 
consequences of certain decisions, words or actions taken in the now. Narrative discourse 
analysis, with its emphatic thrust on the ‘construction of reality’, fills in this predictive 
gap. Narrative discourse analysis not only produces alternative explanations of the 
immediate situation but it also predicts how those explanations may translate into future 
scenarios of reality and the necessary relationships and systems that may need to be 
created in order avoid or to prolong them. 
2.3. Section Two: Discourse - Narrative Construction of Preferred Realities103 
Narratology (the study of narrative), does not fit neatly into any particular 
academic discipline and is by nature a multidisciplinary pursuit. Narrative as a domain of 
theory and practice is primarily concerned with what might be termed ‘interpretative 
meaning’104. With the rise of globalisation, it is becoming increasingly apparent that our 
world is constructed as much from symbolic exchanges as from material transactions.105 
Discourse analysis becomes one of the most effective tools for unearthing the meaning of 
these symbolic exchanges. 
Discourse analysis sees every textual statement as embedded in a broader 
conversational backdrop. To demystify and unpack the language of violence, it becomes 
essential that every textual statement is analysed at two levels. First, one needs to ask 
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who are the social groups or organisations that are substantiating the conversation of 
violence and to then examine the particular contexts that validate this narration of 
violence. Understanding this interplay between the actual script and the social interaction 
that couches it is crucial to the deconstruction of the violence narrative. Richards states it 
clearly: “Understanding war as text and discourse is not an intellectual affection, but a 
vital necessity, because only when ‘war talk’ is fully comprehended is it possible for 
conciliators to outline other more pacific options in softer tones”106.          
In its broadest sense, the concepts and uses of narrative have been an integral part 
of our human experience since before recorded history. Age-old oral traditions of story, 
wisdom-sayings, proverbs, parable, poetry and drama have functioned to affirm and 
validate social configurations of human relationship for centuries. The pivotal role of oral 
tradition in the transmission and preservation of history, worldview, culture and religious 
values and practices among ancient pre-literate civilisations is well researched and 
documented. 
According to Jean-Francois Lyotard, narrative was the knowledge base of pre-
modern societies. Lyotard conjectured that narrative was considered knowledge in these 
ancient clan or tribal formations, not because it represented ‘facts’ but because it 
established and propagated social norms and structures, the rules of life that functioned as 
the glue to hold groups of people together in social cohesion. Thus, stories in and of 
themselves and the story-tellers alike, upheld a great authority as long as these 
‘traditions’ were defended in everyday living.107 
During the Enlightenment, dominated by the rise of the scientific revolution, 
narrative took the form of what have been termed, ‘meta-narratives’, self-contained 
structures of thought and values that set the boundaries and gave explanation to the 
natural and supernatural phenomena of the day and served to normalise and provide 
necessary understanding of the dominate and prevailing belief systems. Whether in the 
literary arts (such as the novel) or in historical annals, these overarching meta-narratives 
were the prevailing discourse up until the 1950s. Lyotard108 claims that the modern 
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scientific establishment, which so often disdained socio-religious narratives as fable or 
myth, in fact relied on meta-narratives to provide the necessary coherence to keep science 
as the foundational basis of all knowledge. While many of the socio-religious meta-
narratives of the past are now being methodically de-constructed, for individuals as well 
as whole societies, these remain a strong magnetic force around which to organise views 
of the world.  
Journalist Robert Fulford in his lively and entertaining discussion of Nostalgia, 
Knighthood, and the Circle of Dreams109, skilfully outlines the way in which many of the 
novels that were popular in the southern states of America (specifically Sir Walter Scott’s 
Ivanhoe) provided that society with the necessary framework to justify their struggle to 
valiantly preserve their meta-narrative of status quo religious, political and socio-
economic systems of pre-civil war ‘order’.110                             
More recently, narrative approaches have become a central organising factor 
around which many of the human sciences are now configured in theory, critical analysis 
and application. Since 1960, the study of narrative has gained great momentum in two 
ways: it has become an international subject of intense interrogation, and it has been 
established as a vital field of thought and action that spans across an interdisciplinary 
landscape.111 This contemporary re-birthing of the narrative approach spawned out of the 
disciplines of linguistics, mythology, literary criticism, new historicism and recent 
practice forms such as in therapy, mediation and ritual. This section will extrapolate on 
these above-mentioned disciplines and specifically on their intersection with narratology.     
2.3.1. Linguistics 
F. de Saussure argues for the meaning, not just the function, of linguistics. He 
gives descriptive depth to the system of linguistics by developing the notions of 
synchronic identity (how words form and define who we are), synchronic reality (how 
words are understood in the context from which they are spoken), and synchronic value 
(how words are given meaning within the relational transaction). Saussure emphasizes 
the importance of understanding language as defined by the values attached to it.  
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Linguistics is much more than the stringing together of specific letters and sounds; it only 
comes to life when units of value (meaning) are accredited to the different sounds and 
patterns of language.112    
Language serves as the intermediary between two chaotic masses of thought 
(ideas) and sound (phonetics). Thoughts remain hidden until given sound, and sounds 
remain arbitrary until connected to thought. Sound alone does not relay value until it is 
associated with meaning. Saussure methodically differentiates between ‘signification’ 
(ideas, concepts and meaning), and ‘signal’ (sound and word utterance). When 
signification and signal are combined, the result is a ‘sign’ which encompasses the 
phonetics and the value of the words intertwined together. Sign is the basic unit of all 
meaningful communication and when multiple signs are linked together, complex 
narrative results.          
For language to become a meaningful linguistic system, it requires the 
introduction of social values which emanate from human community.113 Of interest here 
is how linguistic value is determined. Saussure suggests that the formation of values is 
governed by a two paradoxical principles. First, the value of an object is assigned 
according to its dissimilarity from other objects, (e.g. a coin is dissimilar to the items it 
can purchase). Second, value is also relegated to an object in comparison to other similar 
objects, (e.g. coins are compared amongst themselves within a given monetary system 
with each one given different value).114 Accordingly, Don Cuppitt writes on the power of 
story narrative as embedded in its use of metaphors (comparison and contrast of the 
similar and dissimilar), which is a basic form of intelligence.115 
This ironic value comparison between that which is both dissimilar and that which 
is similar is at the core of ethno-cultural conflict theory that states that our social values 
and our identity formation are developed and refined in comparison to those who are 
different from us (often termed ‘the other’). This kind of identity competition is natural 
and need not be harmful. However, it can lay the necessary foundation for what has been 
termed ‘enemy formation’ in conflict theorisation. 
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However, this comparative identity construction is not only reserved for people 
who are geographically and/or culturally far away from us (those who are dissimilar); this 
same process feeds the genocide violence between close-knit people groups who may 
have co-existed for many centuries. For various reasons (historical traumas, revenge 
cycles, power struggles or protracted structural oppression) these inter-connected groups 
are now determined to divide and separate from each other. This kind of violent social 
‘divorce’ is peculiarly disturbing because many of these groups that are fighting for self-
determination share the same genetic, cultural and language heritage. The psycho-social 
theory in this matter rests on the central theme of similarity, not dissimilarity.   
Michael Ignatieff appropriately extrapolates on this notion in his writing on ‘the 
Narcissism of Minor Difference’ a term he borrows from Sigmond Freud.116 Igantieff 
substantiates that this kind of violent conflict can arise from a desperate attempt by two 
people groups to set themselves apart from each other. Division allows the antagonists a 
chance to dissociate from each other and the interdependencies that exist between them.  
This violent effort to extricate one group from the other is driven by the need to prove 
their essentialist, unique identities; their extreme differences in protest to the 
homogenization of their historical past.  However, to do this ‘successfully’ they have to 
exaggerate and magnify their minor differences. In Matabeleland, the Gukurahundi 
violence exasperated the minor ethnic and political grievances that did exist between 
Ndebele/Shona and ZAPU/ZANU to such extremes that Ndebele extremists are now 
calling for secession from Zimbabwe and the ZANU-PF stronghold of Mashonaland.  
2.3.2. Mythology 
As the nervous system plays an intermediary role between the human mind and 
experience, so myth according to Claude Levi-Strauss117 plays an analogous role in 
mediating between the human realities of reason and intuition. “This whole problem of 
experience versus mind seems to have solution in the structure of the nervous system, not 
in the structure of the mind or in experience, but somewhere between mind and 
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experience in the way our nervous system is built and in the way it mediates between 
mind and experience.”118  
Levi-Strauss maintains that science has only two paths to follow in its efforts to 
gain knowledge of the world, reductionist or structuralist. To Levi-Strauss, reductionism 
occurs when very complex phenomena on one level can be reduced to simpler 
phenomena on other levels. Structuralism occurs when phenomena are too complex to be 
reduced to a lower order and can only be approached by looking to their relationships, 
that is, by trying to understand what kind of original system they make-up.119 In sum, the 
‘structuralists’ are “…trying to find an order behind what is given to us as a disorder120”.   
What mesmerized Levi-Strauss and catapulted his work into the centre of rigorous 
debate was his notion of the universal themes and patterns (“mythemes” as Levi-Strauss 
termed them)121 arising from his comparative research of myths among many people 
groups across the world. Levi-Strauss justified the existence of these universal myths as 
follows: “So, if the same absurdity was found to reappear over and over again, and 
another kind of absurdity also to reappear, then this was something which was not 
absolutely absurd; otherwise it would not appear122”. Levi-Strauss came to the conclusion 
that there was an overarching structure to human myth, a kind of systemization that 
provided the centrifugal pull to hold the great diversity of myths together: “The common 
denominator is always to introduce some kind of order. If this represents a basic need for 
order in the human mind and since, after all, the human mind is only part of the universe, 
the need probably exists because there is some order in the universe and the universe is 
not a chaos”123.      
The ‘structuralist’ framework remains a definitive means by which to understand 
the culture of human violence. Major influence in this regards came from works by 
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French structuralist, Rene Girard124. In his study of human sacrificial systems, Girard 
builds a strong and complex case for the centrality of sacrifice through violence (often 
referred to as ‘scape-goating’) as foundational for the very existence of human cultures.  
Not only is this sacrificial violence privileged in the formational scripts of human 
organization but it is the under-girding script that sustains collective identity and unity 
among people groups or nations.125   
Another example of trying to code the universal myth of human violence comes 
in the more contemporary writing of feminist journalist and biologist, Barbara 
Ehrenreich126. Carefully weaving together the past with the present, the profane with the 
sacred, and the roots of predation with modern day war, Ehrenreich skilfully unravels the 
mythical script of violence that has become core to human civilization. This acting out of 
the violence myth manifests most obviously in forms of domestic violence, gangsters or 
organized war, but it is also appears in more subtle ways that are  reinforced in the 
collective psyche of society through religious dogma, media, national sports and gender 
role socialization. 
These matters are also the central thrust of renowned feminist author and 
anthropologist, Riane Eisler127. Contrary to the dominant myths of instinctual human 
violence, Eisler argues that humankind at its origins is a peace-loving species. She 
documents ancient configurations of social existence and concludes that they consisted of 
apparently peaceful groupings of vegetarian “gatherers” (as opposed to carnivorous 
“hunters”) living in harmony with the environment, the two genders, and among differing 
tribes. The contemporary dominance of violence is a result of eons of human 
socialization. Eisler maintains that we are now at an evolutionary crossroads of two 
alternatives;128 we can act out the present myth of increasing chaos and violence or forge 
a new one of transformation toward a “partnership future”.129 Likewise, pioneer peace 
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activist and academic Elise Boulding130 claimed that the most significant current research 
in the peace-building field was “the recognition that negotiation and conflict resolution 
are ubiquitous processes, going on all the time in daily life. This is the peace that already 
exists: the peace of the negotiated social order”131. Ehrenreich, Eisler, and Boulding’s 
findings highlight the power of dominating myths (in this case the myth of violence) and 
how these can permeate the narratives by which whole societies may end up living.132 
However, all three of these authors substantively agree this it is not only plausible but 
necessary to embrace the construction of alternative mythical-realities of peaceful co-
existence.  
Coming to the function of myth, Levi-Strauss argues that myth does not give 
humankind a material power over the environment. However, it does give humankind the 
illusion that they can, and do understand the universe.133 Mary Midgley purports that “far 
from being the opposite of science, myth is a central part of it. Myth is neither lies nor 
mere stories but a network of powerful symbols that suggest particular ways of 
interpreting the world.”134 Jayne Docherty, in her fascinating study on the violent stand-
off between the US government forces and the Branch Davidians religious cult in Waco, 
Texas, coins the term “world-making stories” to describe the ordering myths that govern 
the narratives of communities.135 In conflict, their stories become the central organising 
script that assists disputing parties to name the conflict, ascribe blame for the conflict-
causing breach and frame appropriate or inappropriate responses.136 World-making 
discourse becomes sacred as it stakes claims about ultimate truth and authority. When 
worldviews collide, Docherty suggests that the solution does not lie in engaging in ‘issue-
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specific’ negotiations but in actually negotiating reality, truth and authority.137 The 
dilemma is not how to reconcile parties to one real world, but instead, how to “manage, 
negotiate, or navigate through multiple worlds”138.   
In explaining the bridge between narrative discourse and its translation into social 
reality, Levi-Strauss139 draws a clear line between the ‘preconscious’ and the 
‘unconscious’ states of being. The preconscious is “as a reservoir of recollections and 
images amassed in the course of a lifetime”140. This is where the patterns and pathways of 
universal human myth reside. The unconscious is merely the container or framing that 
“imposes structural laws upon inarticulated elements which originate elsewhere – 
impulses, emotions, representations and memories”141. He then describes the relationship 
between pre and unconscious states as such: “We might say, therefore, that the 
preconscious is the individual lexicon where each of us accumulates the vocabulary of 
his personal history, but that this vocabulary becomes significant, for us and others, only 
to the extent that the unconscious structures it according to its laws and thus transforms it 
into language”142. The unconscious once it emerges as the conscious becomes the conduit 
for the myth to become an articulated and acted upon reality. The Matabeleland 
massacres were the result of ZANU-PF embracing certain chosen myths and then 
consciously embarking on a campaign to conspicuously articulate and act upon these 
chosen myths, despite their devastating reality.  
2.3.3. Literary Criticism 
Literary criticism as a discipline, although initially applied to the written text 
alone, is the parent to contemporary forms of narrative discourse analysis (frames and 
methods) being described in this study and generally utilised in social research. Narrative 
critic and author, Mark Allan Powell,143 suggests that literary criticism (as opposed to 
historical criticism) primarily concerns itself with the completed written text, emphasises 
the unity of the text as a whole, views the text as an end in itself, and is based on 
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communication models of speech-act theory.144 Powell proposes that there are four types 
of literary criticism: expressive (author-centred); pragmatic (reader-centred); objective 
(text-centred); and mimetic (centred on the evaluation of truth and accuracy in 
representation).145 
Out of these four foci have emerged various schools of thought around how to 
best approach the process of literary criticism. Literary structuralism (1950-1960s), 
explores the meaning of narrative in the deep and multi-layered, often hidden, scaffolding 
of the text rather then the intentions of the author or the interpretations of the reader. 
Rhetorical analysis urfaces how the literature achieves a particular effect on the reader. 
Does the narrative educate, entertain or transform (change) the reader? Reader-response 
criticism unpacks the role of the reader in determining the meaning of any given text.  Is 
the reader over the text, with the text, or in the text?146  
Literary criticism is concerned with unearthing meaning in narrative discourse 
and the literature text by concentrating on the: plots / events (u folds in order, duration, 
frequency, causation and conflict); characters (revealed through description or 
revelation, point of view and traits); settings (representing the spatial, temporal, and 
social environments in question); symbolism and irony (categorised as universal, 
historical, contextual, or cultural); and narrative patterns (the notion that deep meaning 
resides in the structural composition).147  
Powell differentiates between ‘story’ and ‘discourse’. Story is the content of the 
narrative; what the text is about. Discourse i  the rhetoric of the narrative; how the story 
is told.148  Of course, a large part of discourse analysis also involves the study of 
language. It would be improper not to mention a number of overlapping areas between 
language theory and literary criticism. Michael Forrester149 posits how language is a 
multidisciplinary field of study and positions his discussion about language in the context 
of meaning. Forrester works with five approaches to indirect meaning: meaning as 
reference; meaning as logical form; meaning as context and use; meaning as conceptual 
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structure; and meaning as culture.150 These approaches to literary criticism then become 
essential to the narrative research methodology utilised in this study (see Chapter Three).  
2.3.4. New Historicism 
A fourth narrative approach is that which has been termed “new historicism.”     
A leading voice in new historicism, H. Aram Vesser describes the movement this way: 
“New historicists have evolved a method of describing culture in action…eschew[ing] 
overarching hypothetical constructs in favour of surprising coincidences.” 151 Elizabeth 
Fox-Genovese proposes an alternative to conventional historicism which she calls, 
“structural” historicism meaning that “history must disclose and reconstruct the 
conditions [understood as systems of social relations] of consciousness and action.” 152  
Steeped in the post-modern experience of continuous suspicion and protest 
against the dominant social understandings and institutions, new historicists have taken 
on the self-appointed mission of re-writing or at least re-interpreting recorded history as 
we know it. These post-modern prophets have refused to accept a version of history that 
for them smacks of grand conspiracy from a unitary voice (white), gender (male), 
religion (Christian) and cultural (Western) standpoint. New historicists are highly 
sceptical of what has been termed, “objective” history; both in content and form. For the 
new historicist, history in its current form (analogue of events) is the scandalous offspring 
of a small group of the intellectual rich and powerful who dominate the religious, 
political and socio-economic spheres of the day.   
The work of the new historicist is both that of de-construction and re-
construction. They are first and foremost determined to deconstruct the dominant, elitist 
discourse of the bourgeois who have manipulated the representation of history for 
generations. Benedict Anderson, renowned for his deconstructive historical writing on 
nationalism and identity, captivates the reader by his expose of the instrumentalities of 
colonial power: “These three institutions…the census, the map, and the museum: 
together, they profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its 
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dominion – the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the 
legitimacy of its ancestry”153.  
After de-constructing, the new historicist re-builds on the platform of a new 
alternative story of history; one that advocates for justice, empowerment, tolerance and 
social change. It is a story that gives ‘voice’ to the poor, the marginalized, the socially 
outcast and the masses of people who represent, and daily live out, what Michel Foucault 
termed, “subjugated knowledges” 154. Foucault believed there were two kinds of 
subjugated knowledge, that which had been recorded and given credence, but then was 
later erased from view in great ‘historical revisionist projects’ that insisted on 
maintaining a unified, global knowledge system. The second kind of subjugated 
knowledge is that of the specifically contextualised or indigenous brand that is constantly 
being acted out in local communities everywhere. Foucault was consumed with the idea 
that unless these subjugated knowledges are surfaced, the dominant discourses of history, 
religion, and current socio-political vantage points will never be dismantled.155 
Abebe Zegeye156 of the University of South Africa, in writing on the identity of 
the Beta Israel (often referred to as the ‘Lost Tribe of Israel’), focuses on the narrator 
voice, or the one who speaks for history. Not only is it important to know who speaks and 
where they are situated in the context of the content of the history they claim to represent 
but, “it also involves identifying and critiquing the ideological motives of those historians 
whose version / imagery of the history…get[s] produced, legitimized or delegitimized 
and circulated for public consumption”157. Keeping with the theme of representation, 
Zegeye goes on to say, “…historians are in fact selecting, re-arranging and ordering facts 
that come to pass as valid but not incontestable sources of identity”158.   
Richard Hughes writes about a dialogue between those he terms the “historical 
mythmakers” and those who represent the “dissenting voices” regarding the narratives 
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that form the self-perception of a given nation. In a similar vein to Foucault’s definition 
of “subjugated voices”, Hughes suggests that a nation will only be able to “recapture the 
nobler ideals” if it is willing to look at its historic myths through the “eyes of its most 
potent critics.”159  Thus, like Hughes this study will argue that the most legitimate 
historical account for Zimbabwe is one that consists of a broad range of micro-narratives; 
local, contextual voices from Matabeleland as well as other regions who each bring a 
different perspective of experience to the common “mythico-histories”160 they may share 
as a nation.  
2.3.5. Therapy, Mediation and Ritual Practice 
The practice of narrative is about its application to everyday existence in what 
popular narrative terminology refers to as the ‘social construction of preferred realities.’  
New applications of narrative practice continue to multiply, putting into action the 
production of a narrative world (lived experience). Jacques Derrida161, one of the leading 
post-structuralists, surmises that all of what we call reality is nothing more than a fragile 
and loosely-attached set of linguistic and symbolic constructions. Three related practice 
areas that have emerged in the past decade are: narrative therapy; narrative mediation; 
and use of ritual and symbol in peace-building.  
Michael White and co-author David Espton, in their pioneering book on narrative 
therapy162 describe their work as follows:  
“…we make the general assumption that persons experience problems, for which 
they frequently seek therapy, when the narratives in which they are ‘storying’ 
their experience, and/or in which they are having their experiences ‘storied’ by 
others, do not sufficiently represent their lived experience, and that, in those 
circumstances there will be significant aspects of their lived experience that 
contradict these dominant narratives”163. 
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Key to their understanding of creative alternatives to the current problematic narratives 
that people seek help for is the concept of “lived experience”164. This idea, that each of us 
as individuals has a great deal of stored up ‘lived experience’ that has never been 
acknowledged or given a narrative space in our existence, opens up uncharted terrain in 
which to explore the formation of new life-story discourses. 
Another significant narrative practice to emerge more recently is the process of 
narrative mediation.  Leading the way in this arena are John Winslade and Gerald 
Monk165, who present a model for conflict mediation using narrative approaches and 
instrumentality. The salient ‘sign-posts’ on this mediation pathway are: dealing with 
dominant discourse; discovering alternative discourses; negotiating domains of 
engagement; deconstruction of conflict-saturated story; and constructing the alternative 
story.166 
Lastly, there has been recent research forged on the notion of narrative as ritual 
and symbol. Lisa Schirch167 gives voice to the profound place of ritual and symbol in the 
processes of peace-building: “[Her work]…underscores the importance of incorporating 
symbolic tools, including ritual, into traditional approaches to conflict. Ritual assists in 
solving complex, deep-rooted conflicts, and helps to confirm and transform worldviews, 
identities and relationships…that what truly bonds adversaries and helps achieve peace 
are the symbolic, non-verbal ritual acts…yet these are often overlooked as deliberate 
components of peace negotiations”168. In its systematic silencing of the subjugated voices 
of the Matabeleland massacres, the ZANU-PF has in essence suspended all efforts to 
open up the public space for corporate conflict transformation to be satisfied through 
therapeutic processes, mediation interventions or the innovative use of ritual and symbol 
as avenues of genuine justice and healing.     
2.4. Section Three: Performance - Narrative as Dramaturgical Theatre  
Performance theory infers that acts of violence are like a theatre production: a 
symbolic and public expression of deep-seated need and a drive to make a statement for 
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‘real-time’ recognition from those who are watching (the audience). Performance theory 
has its foundations in the science of stage management for large scale dramatic events or 
significant popular happenings (acts). When applying performance theory to conflict, the 
primary concern revolves around the production of power through the careful 
orchestration of violence as an expressive and generative resource.169 Belinda Bozzoli in 
her in her work around theatricality and social conflict phenomena in the South African 
township of Alexandra, describes this phenomena as follows:  
“The rebels in Alexandra used the spaces available to them by treating them as 
social and political ‘theatres’, places within which the varying dramas they sought 
to mount could be enacted and thus become the means to claiming greater power. 
This was a vital ingredient of the revolt, which involved not one ‘drama’ but 
several. These dramas acted as devices to magnify the revolt and thus to enlarge 
its claims upon the polity.”170 
 
According to Bozzoli, applying the conceptions of dramaturgical theatre to large social 
movements allows the social scientist the freedom and flexibility to move beyond the 
mechanics of political movements, their formations, ideologies and structural resources to 
the issue of power; its growth, development and influence over social transformation.171 
In this section, three primary frames of conflict theory will be explored in relation to 
narrative discourse: conceptions of conflict memory; intersections of temporal and spatial 
dimensions of conflict; and conflict as political theatre of struggle. 
2.4.1. Narrative and Conceptions of Conflict Memory  
Central to history and the analysis of narrative discourse from a dramatic angle is 
the dynamic of conflict memory. John Paul Lederach,172 one of the founding voices in the 
peace-building field, describes at least four layers of ‘nested’ conflict memory that 
constitute what it means to recall the past. All accounts of history carry with them deep 
pulses of narrative discourse, which he defines as the unspoken, value-laden meaning 
(world-view) that is ascribed to the social text (either written or spoken) by each different 
author, reader or actor often even sub-consciously. The next thread woven into memory 
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is that part of the ancient story that is passed on orally from generation to generation, this 
is called remembered history. From the repository of remembered history people overlay 
their rational and emotional memory of conflict with the reality of lived experience.  
Finally, all of these nuanced memories function as the bedrock for human interpretations 
of current conflict events. 
To better comprehend the illusive notion of a sub-terrain narrative discourse that 
can socially or culturally guide the values and actions of whole nations and people 
groups, social psychologist Vamik Volkan extrapolates on what he terms “chosen 
traumas and chosen glories”173. The word ‘chosen’ is deliberately employed in this 
instance to refer to the guise of corporate ‘selective memory’ whereby nations remember 
all that is valiant and heroic (historical glorification) and forget all that is despised and 
cowardly (selective amnesia) about their own past. Likewise, a glorified nation will 
position itself as victim by magnifying the most extreme traumas committed by other 
peoples or nations (enemy formation) in its history. According to Volkan, it is in the 
administration of this glorification of self and denigration of other that a nation is able to 
fabricate a patriotic state and hold their citizens together in unity. Dominick LaCapra 
refers to the “founding trauma” which, not unlike Volkan’s chosen trauma, evolves into 
the organizing principle around which personal and corporate identity is constructed.174   
On a similar trajectory, Dan Bar-On175, a Jewish social psychologist applies 
theories of ‘displaced aggression’ (an example of a certain type of narrative discourse) to 
the national security agenda and defence policies of Israel in relation to the Palestinian 
peoples. Bar-On was preoccupied with the socio-reconciliation dynamics between 
children of Nazi SS Officers and children of Holocaust survivors. Later in his career, Bar-
On facilitated rapprochement between Germans, Israelis and Palestinians by arranging 
for joint sustained dialogues among them. When containing these three groups in one 
space, Bar-On uncovered an uncanny tendency of the Israeli participants to associate with 
the German participants and continually disassociate from the Palestinians. At a surface 
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level, this is explainable as Israel and Palestine remain embroiled in a modern day 
conflict and many Israelis have their roots in Europe. However, from a historical account 
this loses its rationality as the magnitude of the current violence perpetrated by 
Palestinians against Israelis pales in the face of the genocide violence inflicted by the 
German Holocaust against the Jews. Coupled with this, from a psycho-social perspective 
the commonalities between Israelis and Palestinians in terms of land, culture, religious 
heritage, temperament and original DNA would seem to be far stronger than that shared 
between Israeli and German experiences. To Bar-On it appeared as if the Israelis were 
doing to the Palestinians what they could not or would not do to the Germans. In this 
case, the power of the immediate ‘enemy’ script (narrative discourse) seemed to trump 
the generational grip of deep historical identity divides, thus confirming Bar-On’s 
premise of ‘displaced aggression’ when applied to Israeli – Palestinian relations.176  
Michael Ignatieff names “honouring the dead” as the most potent motivation 
(another form of narrative discourse) for violent revenge: “But revenge – morally 
considered - is a desire to keep faith with the dead, to honour the memory by taking up 
their cause where they left off”177. This script, which dictates that people must account 
for the blood of their beloved (especially in death due to the unnatural causes), is a potent 
instinct; a culturally universal response residing in the mental and emotional architecture 
of the human soul. In poignant prose, African-American novelist Toni Morrison 
articulates this intimate but distressing link between victim and victimizer: “If you take a 
life, then you own it. You responsible for it. You can’t get rid of nobody by killing them. 
They are still there, and they yours now”178. According to Ignatieff, it is possible to 
satisfy the ‘honouring of the dead’ script: “Reconciliation can stop the cycle of 
vengeance only if it can equal vengeance as a form of respect for the dead”179. German 
theologian Geiko Muller-Fahrenholz saliently describes this kind of undertaking: “Evil 
acts create chains that lock perpetrators and victims together, usually in unconscious 
ways, producing a double history of effects which must be taken into account in 
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reflecting on the nature of forgiveness”180. These prominent narrative discourses 
(discussed above) of ‘chosen traumas and chosen glories’, ‘displaced aggression’ and the 
guttural call to ‘honour the dead’ will be rehearsed, applied and analysed in this 
unfolding study of Matabeleland violence.   
In approaching the stratum of remembered history, Mahmood Mamdani assists 
the reader by skilfully deconstructing the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic identities and carefully 
placing them within the context of colonial historical-political manipulations. Mamdani 
traces the roots of the ethnic meaning of ‘Hutu’, a Kinyarwandan word historically used 
to categorise someone who did not own cattle (so that a Tutsi who did not own cattle was 
referred to as a Hutu). It was a class label utilised by the wealthy elite (rulers) to identify 
the agrarian peasantry; the majority of whom were poor and functioning as indentured 
servants in a serfdom structure. As these oppressed masses became more aware and 
empowered they began to shed their different Bantu tribal delineations and took on the 
unifying label of ‘Hutu’ so that today generations of Rwandese know themselves to be 
‘born’ as ethnic Hutu.181 This form of identity conversion will be explored in more detail 
in the Matabeleland conflict, especially as it relates to the entrenched monolithic labels of 
‘Shona’ and ‘Ndebele’.  
Similarly, Rene Lemarchand maintains that Hutu-Tutsi ethnic identities are 
primarily moulded by a long history of genocide memory that has calcified into certain 
myths that are now held as objective truths about each other as ethnic groups. In this way, 
Lemarchand argues that ethnic identities in Burundi have been deeply shaped by (if not 
constructed from) the memories of genocide that played themselves out in vicious 
generational cycles of violence-shaping-narrative and narrative-shaping-violence.182 
Again, there is an analogous comparison between the establishment of Burundian 
identities surfacing through the recounting of historical genocide and the identity 
formations of Shona and Ndebele being twined together with a history of violent 
interactions; more specifically the continual recollection of Ndebele raids on Shona 
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peoples in the 1800s reinforced by the internal liberation movements faction-fighting 
along supposedly tribal lines. 
The fields of narratology and trauma healing meet at the crux of the apex of lived 
experience. Dr. Judith Herman183, in her benchmark work on trauma, speaks of the 
traumatic event as a life-shattering experience; a literal fragmenting of body, mind and 
spirit.184 For Herman, trauma recovery is situated in the concept of life-story; that is 
healing can only come when the victim of trauma has been able to sequentially piece 
together the emotional memory (recall) as well as its meaning (interpretation) and then 
successfully re-integrate (action) the newly formed story into their own life narrative.   
However, Dominick LaCapra sounds a cautionary note when working with 
trauma and the past: “But the indiscriminate generalization of the category of survivor 
and the overall conflation of history or culture with trauma, as well as the near fixation on 
enacting or acting out post-traumatic symptoms, have the effect of obscuring crucial 
historical distinctions…”185 LaCapra problematises this drive to perform (act out) trauma 
in the present which is actually historical in nature, as a “compulsive repetition of 
traumatic scenes…scenes in which the past returns and the future is blocked or 
fatalistically caught up in a melancholic feedback loop”186. LaCapra expresses his 
concern around the dilemma of “fidelity to trauma…one’s bond to the dead, especially 
with dead intimates may invest trauma with value and makes its reliving a painful but 
necessary commemoration or memorial to which one remains dedicated or at least 
bound”187. This trauma bonding becomes an obstacle that can potentially invalidate the 
symbolic and therapeutic narrative processes of trauma debriefing, healing and closure.188 
This study maintains that the Matabeleland violence is closely tied to the 
‘unfinished business’ of multiple and protracted trauma. Trauma is nurtured in the bowels 
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of the violence system, in its machinations and structures. This research challenges the 
revolutionary paradigm that refuses to acknowledge the trauma (both individual and 
collective) that is birthed in violence, even when violence is employed in the service of a 
just cause – the struggle for liberation from oppression. The liberation movements of 
ZAPU and ZANU and their leaders suffered severe trauma at the hands of their white 
Rhodesian oppressors. Progressively, this traumatic transmission from the oppressors 
began to violently manifest internally in the liberation movements as they struggled to 
keep order, loyalty and consistency within their own ranks.  
After independence in 1980, the division that had long existed in the liberation 
movements was cemented into categories of victor (ruling majority) and vanquished 
(minority opposition). Now locked in a bitter contestation for political power, the revenge 
cycle of victimisation-aggression189 (victim becoming killer) between the past colonial 
oppressor and the oppressed masses was re-enacted on the stage of Matabeleland, the 
base of the only African opposition. Former victims (ZANU) became perpetrators of new 
forms of violence and the supposed liberated (ZAPU and the Matabeleland civilians) 
once again were enveloped in the dark cloud of traumatic violence of which they were 
the focus. Likewise, it is not difficult to make application of this regenerative cycle of 
mimetic violence to the destructive conflict that Zimbabwe currently finds itself 
embroiled in.            
2.4.2. The Intersection of Temporal and Spatial Dimensions of Conflict 
New historiography and narratology have identified the importance of taking into 
consideration the spatial location; the actual geographical landscape of the setting in 
which historical and current agency takes place. The idea being that the natural 
environment in which conflict is played out is not neutral; a sterile, non-descript back-
drop in the unfolding drama of historical reality. The habitat has an intimate connection 
to the human performance.  Belinda Bozzoli190 speaks to the critical ingredient of 
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township enclosures (which in most cases were small areas of land in which large groups 
of people lived in over crowded and cramped conditions). Bozzoli makes the link 
between enclosure and rebellion motivating the notion that physical space actually 
engenders rebellion (an historical example being the city of Paris at the time of the 
French Revolution). Congruently, on a more opportunistic note, a tightly bounded space 
also provides a highly focused stage on which the acting cast can aim the ‘spot-light’ of 
violent performance for those who are watching from the outside. As Paul Richards so 
poetically depicts the wanton, destructive performance of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) rebels of Sierra Leone: “Their violence trashes a rotten set, flapping in the breeze, 
of a film epic in which they no longer believe”191. 
Richards places his spatial analysis of the Sierra Leonean civil war in the context 
of the rain forests of that country. Richards carefully weaves together the primacy of the 
rain forests where the mineral wealth (diamonds) were located and as a place where the 
RUF rebel movement could hide and train for the rigours of natural and human induced 
violence, forge out a new sub-system and create a sub-culture of values and norms that 
could justify their actual and ideological existence.   
Likewise, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger192, the authors of one of the most 
detailed accounts of the Matabeleland history, shape their spatial landscape around the 
‘dark forests’ (translated as “Amagusu Amnyama” in Ndebele) of Shangani Game 
Reserve; more specifically, the two districts of Nkayi and Lupane. The ‘dark forests’ of 
Matabeleland have become a symbol of resistance, the place of struggle against 
oppression. The Shangani Forests are rich with symbolisms of being hidden and 
unknown; chaotic places of fear and violence for those on the outside. However, for the 
inhabitants who reside there it engenders a place of refuge and protection. These ‘dark 
forests’ represent the marginal places (the backstage or the stage wings concealed by 
curtains) of the drama of conflict in Matabeleland. This articulated description of an 
isolated, alienating location runs parallel to how the people of Matabeleland position 
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themselves in the official political narrative that has been given undivided credence in 
Zimbabwe for many years.193 
Interrogating the intersection of spatial and temporal dimensions of conflict, John 
Paul Lederach espouses three overarching peace-building principles: ‘one must go 
backward, in order to go forward’ referring to the horizontal need to deal with the history 
of conflict in order to build a viable peace in the future; ‘one must go down, in order to 
build up’ referring to the vertical need to dig deep into the roots f he conflict in order to 
lay a solid foundation for peace to endure; and ‘one must create more in order to have 
less’ referring to the process of forming many conflict-containing structures in order to 
minimize violence.194 In this precarious movement on a horizontal level (between the 
past, the present and the future), on  vertical level (identifying the conflict at all strata of 
society, and on a process level (designing innovative systems to diminish violence), 
Lederach proposes utilising an analysis grid-system that lodges social conflict in a series 
of interlocking spheres consisting of symptoms, influenced by structures, which in turn 
are under-girded by processes of power (both informal and formal) which are motivated 
and propelled by visceral patterns of behaviour & identity formation.195 The key to this 
encompassing framework of conflict diagnosis is that it is simultaneously cyclical and 
linear in nature and progression.   
Robert Mandel dissects inter-group conflicts at the cross-section of the temporal 
dimensions (incorporating tensions between the past and present) and the spatial 
dimensions (incorporating tensions between self and others in relational proximity).196 
The mismanagement of these inherent conflict tensions can result in what Mandel 
delineates as the crucial elements of conflict: “distorted perceptions, inappropriate 
decisions, and severe conflicts.” The following chart summarises Mandel’s thesis 
exemplifying the dynamics of psycho-social forces at play in this conflictive time-space 
matrix:197 
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 Temporal Dimension: Spatial Dimension: 
1. Distorted 
Perceptions: 
Congruity and Dissonance: 
holding on to tensions between 
consistent and discrepant 
information about the other 
(both past and present). 
Ethnocentrism: viewing 
one’s own actions in a more 




Inertia and Rigidity : only 
acting within past knowledge, 
resisting change in the present, 
and refusing to entertain new 
ways of being in the future. 
Group-think: majority 
unanimity overrides 
realistic appraisal of 
alternative courses of action 
(inclusively internal focus). 
3. Severe Conflicts: Frustration-Deprivation: 
acting out past expectations not 
being matched by present 
achievements or future ideals.   
Rank Disequilibrium: 
assuming that all systems 
are stratified and contain 
inherent status differences 
that cannot be changed.  
 
Bozzoli, Richards, Alexander et al, open up new avenues of thinking about 
conflict and its intersection with historical-geographical landscapes. This historical-
geographical examination of space will be applied to Matabeleland as the ‘stage’ from 
which the violence was enacted. There are at least three keys underpinning the conflict 
fault-lines of the Matabeleland region: the ‘dark forests’ represent a strategic, yet 
marginal place for the opposition to incubate a rebellion, a safe place for the inhabitants 
but a dangerous place for outsiders; the natural mineral wealth of Matabeleland provides 
the battleground for contested scarce resources and the continual droughts, lack of water 
and food shortages produce convenient rupture points for the powerful ZANU-PF ruling 
party to ‘punish’ the opposition through developmental neglect; and the ZANU-PF, 
through its North Korean trained Fifth Brigade used containment tactics (roadblocks, 
curfews and media censure) and targeted symbolic public places (the stages) such as 
schools, missions, and buses to display their terror.  
   Lederach and Mandel reinforce this study by delineating frameworks that break-
down the systematic and categorical analysis of the patterns of temporal and spatial 
intersections in group conflict situations. These authors have assisted this research to 
identify the micro component parts of the macro whole of a given conflict scenario. 
These particular pieces of the scaffolding that fortify a national meta-narrative are amply 
evident in the Matabeleland conflict of the early 1980s. They illuminate and supply the 
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explanatory boundaries and containers in which the ZANU-PF’s narrative discourse was 
moulded and shaped into the forceful entity of social change.    
2.4.3. Conflict as Political Theatre of Struggle 
Mark Juergensmeyer in his seminal work on religious terrorism coins the term 
“theatre of terror”198. Juergensmeyer understands performance as both an event aimed at 
making a symbolic statement of protest, and also as an act aimed at trying to change 
reality.199 Terror campaigns then, represent more than just a crisis scenario, they provide 
the coherent habitat necessary to “mobilise power” 200  through the mask of violence. 
Juergensmeyer articulates his analogy further: “In looking at religious terrorism as 
theatre, the appropriate place to begin is the stage - the location where the acts are 
committed, or rather, performed”201.  
Novelist Don DeLillo describes terrorism as “the language of being noticed”202. In 
order for violent terror to accomplish its intended purpose it needs to be seen; it must 
have an audience, not just any audience but a target group of people who have been 
identified as intimately connected (politically, economically, emotionally or physically 
attached) to the aims of the terror campaign. In Juergensmeyer’s words, “Terrorism 
without its horrified witnesses would be pointless as a play without an audience”203.  
Bozzoli suggests that when theories of ‘dramaturgy’ are employed in the study of 
socio-political movements they follow certain rhythms and pathways of activity including 
“scripting, staging, performing and interpreting their definitions of power as counter to 
the dominant ones…”204 These dramaturgical practices are expounded on in more detail 
in Chapter Three (Research Methodology) of this study. Bozzoli spurs on imagination by 
identifying various unique ‘theatres of struggle’ in the context of Alexandra Township in 
South Africa, such as the actual geographical borders of the Township enclosure 
(including the stadiums), localised mob killings of informants on specific streets, official 
dramas of large public events such as funerals and protest marches, private, yet highly 
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theatrical people’s courts and the manufacturing of memory in the proceedings of public 
dramas such as criminal court and the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
hearings.205 Bozzoli thickens the descriptive text of dramaturgical theatre: 
“The verbal and symbolic script followed in each proto-theatrical performance 
during the rebellion – a riot, a funeral, a neck-lacing, a people’s court trial – 
revealed the varying power of signs. This rested in the ways in which old and new 
genres were used, developed, or mixed together, the processes of ‘script-writing’ 
and its relationships to powerful players in the rebellion, the availability of 
symbolic resources and the effectiveness of the props used to ensure that the 
space itself acquired symbolic meaning.”206  
 
This study will argue that the Matabeleland violence did not happen 
spontaneously but was instead the outgrowth of a convergence of constructed historical 
conflict memory and well-orchestrated socio-political manipulations manifesting in a 
prolonged performance (theatrical drama) of violence that was effectively utilized to 
appease the international community (audience) and force Matabeleland to conform to 
the meta-narrative of the ZANU-PF ideology. The Gukurahundi violence conveniently 
fuelled the official ZANU-PF interpretation of a populist patriotic history (particularly as 
it related to charge of counter-revolutionary activity), the ZANU-PF’s assumed superior 
status as representing the ethnic majority (initially backed up by mass election victories), 
and its keen interest to gain and retain power in the Zimbabwean political landscape 
(exhibited in the push for a one-party state). 
2.5. Conclusion 
 In summary, this literature review has attempted to reframe the notion of conflict 
to be seen through the lens of social constructivism; more particularly investigating the 
nature of narrative as experienced through practice, discourse and performance and as it 
relates to the Matabeleland violence of the early 1980s. Section one expounded the 
practice of social conflict theory and makes application (and critique) of four categories 
of explanation attached to the Matabeleland context: ethno-cultural; personal-relational; 
political-structural; and historical-ideological. The following points were emphasised: 
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• Ethno-cultural interpretation – Although ethnicity has played a role in the 
Matabeleland conflict, to ascribe this violence to a strictly essentialist ethnic-
based conflict would fall prey to reductionism and grave oversimplification. 
• Personal-relational interpretation – While there is certain merit to character 
studies, memoirs and autobiographies, they tend to be anecdotal in nature and in 
so doing they place an overemphasis on personal agency (neglecting structure) in 
conflict escalation.  
• Political-structural interpretation – In contrast to the personal-relational 
explanation, this category gives full weight to corporate agency ( eglecting 
personal) as the only legitimate force in conflict transformation. 
• Historical-ideological interpretation – This layer of analysis incorporates and 
translates the dynamics of both the individual and the collective narrative in 
conflict happenings. However with its focus on the past it often fails to predict the 
changes (either personal or corporate) that may occur in the future.  
The premise of this study is that narrative discourse becomes the bridging glue, the 
conduit through which the disparate threads of interpretation mentioned above can be 
held together and made sense of in a contained whole. 
Section Two of this Chapter introduced the reader to the field of narrative discourse 
analysis. This section highlighted certain tributaries of narratology such as linguistics, 
mythology, literary criticism, new historicism and various models of narrative practice in 
therapy and mediation. Each of these disciplines offers some necessary description of the 
instrumentalities through which this research was conducted. A number of significant 
conclusions were drawn: 
• Narratology understands that interpretive meaning is found in the content (what) 
the form (how), the authorship (who), the motivation (why) and the time (wh n) 
and place (where) of any given text (whether written or spoken).  
• Narratology is always sceptical of conventional historical accounting (annals of 
facts), rather it questions the objectivity claim of dominant meta-narratives that 
embody a ‘disciplinary’ function which often silences and subjugates all counter-
narratives that represent an alternative reality.    
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• Narratology gives interpretative legitimacy to how ‘scripts’ of conflict or peace 
become preferred social constructions that are produced by the relational-
behaviour interactions emanating from narrative discourse. 
Section Three of this Chapter explored the notion of conflict as performance; the 
manufacturing of power through a skilful manipulation of stage-managed violence as an 
expressive and generative resource. This section illuminates three integrated peace-
building frameworks: conceptions of conflict memory; intersections of temporal and 
spatial dimensions of conflict; and conflict as political theatre of struggle. The main 
findings were as follows: 
• Conflict memory is nested in societal narrative discourse (chosen traumas and 
chosen glories) remembered history (oral traditions of ‘enemy formation’ passed 
on from one generation to the next), lived experience (personal, actual traumatic 
events) and interpretations of current conflict events (confirming partisan 
perceptions). 
• The geographical landscape, terrain or actual location (stage) where conflict is 
enacted is the place where time and space intersect in conflict. 
• In the drama of violent conflict the antagonists are the actors, the public spaces 
are the stage sets, the rhetorical language are the scripts, and the symbolic 
paraphernalia utilised are the props required for an effective performance. 
• Theatres of terror are violent performances that are both events aimed at making a 
statement of protest and acts aimed at trying to change reality. 
• Terror campaigns are not just chaotic crisis scenarios, they provide a coherent 
habitat necessary to ‘mobilise power’ through the mask of violence. 
• Terrorism needs a horrified audience in order to accomplish its purposes; not just 
any audience, but it must be a targeted group of people intimately connected to 
the aims of the terror campaign. 
This literature review lays the groundwork to begin to comprehend how the narrative 
discourse used to justify the violence of Gukurahundi was socially crafted and politically 
reproduced by the ZANU-PF regime in order to solidify its power, appease the 
international community and at the same time impose a violent script of terror, fear and 
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intimidation on the psychological and experiential life stories (texts) of the Matabeleland 








































Chapter 3: Research Methodology – Surfacing Dominant and Subjugated Stories 
3.1. Research Summary 
The crux of this research study revolves around understanding the narratives (both 
dominant and subjugated discourses) surrounding the violence system as it was expressed 
in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe between the years of 1980-1988. This is accomplished by 
exploring the historical socio-political construction of five salient themes: ethnicity, 
nationalism, loyalty, legitimacy and unity. As a qualitative study it utilized an 
‘interpretive-critical’ epistemological lens through which narrative discourse was 
analysed with a focus on content (meaning), structure (form) and performance 
(interaction)207.   
The research engaged three different instruments of measurement: literature 
review; document analysis; and open interviews. The literature review explored the 
intersection between social conflict, narrative analysis and peace-building theory. In 
conducting document analysis a historical criticism frame was applied to review a broad 
range of historical-political documents from the time period in question. Thirty-five open 
interviews were conducted and drew from a purposive and peer-identified research 
sample as representative of eight sectors of society: political, ex-combatant, media, legal, 
education, church, women, and rural agricultural populations. These identified sectors 
featured most prominently in the literature review and document analysis inventory 
conducted around this conflict period in Matabeleland. The interview segment not only 
identified persons from these seven sectors, but they also represented a cross-section of 
social positions from former high ranking government officials to rural village farmers.   
Research validity and verification measurements were based on instrument 
piloting, reflexivity, peer review, and corroboration of findings. This study extrapolates 
significant themes that buttressed the meta-narrative of repressive violence constructed 
by the ZANU-PF Government in the 1980s, unearths various silent scripts of counter 
narratives that existed in Matabeleland at that time and makes linkages between the 
surfacing of subjugated narratives and the need for constructing peace in the context of 
current day Zimbabwe. 
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3.2. Epistemological Foundations of the Study 
3.2.1. Qualitative and Quantitative Considerations  
The substance of this study is the dissection of narrative discourse and its 
powerful influence on the “creation of preferred realities”208. Furthermore, this study is 
interested in how the clash of these contested, sometimes imagined realities is linked to 
the acting out of violence and the building of peace. Conflict studies are inherently 
complex because of the extremely unpredictable nature of human interaction in the midst 
of conflict situations. Thus, when researching conflict as social phenomena, great care 
must be given to the methodological plan. While many social conflicts have been studied 
with quantitative instruments, it is the bias of the author that qualitative research is the 
most appropriate approach to be utilised in the study of conflict phenomena. Quantitative 
research is effective when looking at units of statistical analysis such as the number of 
deaths in a certain locale209 or, when quantifying units of ideas held by certain segments 
of society (e.g. random survey methods that aim to test beliefs about particular forms of 
violence, or statistical incidence of specific violent acts in a cross-section of a nation, 
community, school or family).   
However, when research moves into the perceptual realm of how and why people 
speak about, attach meaning to, and act out conflict realities other methods of 
measurement are required. It is from this premise that this study embarked on a 
qualitative research design with narrative analysis as the core methodology. Narrative 
criticism, in general terms, concentrates its attention on the many points of view (implied 
authors, authorial narration, first-person author, third-person author, narrator, embedded 
narration, and voices) represented in the narrative text.210 The epistemological roots of 
narrative research (spanning from structured literary criticism frameworks211 to free-flow 
conversational analysis) thrive on patterns of inter-subjectivities, metaphor, symbol and 
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myth212. These qualitative realities of ‘knowing’ are not quantifiable in objective, 
measurable properties, nor are they independent of the observer (researcher) and his or 
her instruments213. Narrative research methodology inhabits an inherent qualitative bent.        
3.2.2. Interpretive-Critical Lens  
For purposes of narrowing the meaning of qualitative research, the underlying 
epistemology of this study is what may be termed an ‘Interpretive-critical’ approach to 
knowledge generation. The positivist approach to objective knowing asserts that there is 
measurable theory that stands alone waiting to be discovered outside of the practical 
application that transpires in subjective human interaction. In opposition to this, the 
interpretive-critical stance is concerned with two essential elements of learning. Firstly, 
the word ‘interpretive’ connotes a semiotic interest in the meaning of signs, symbols and 
metaphor.  Interpretive researchers presume that “…access to reality is only through 
social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared meanings”214.  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz called this rise of narrative research the “interpretive 
turn” in social sciences.215 Secondly, the word ‘critical’ denotes a hermeneutical interest 
in the meaning of texts. As in the words of Michael Myers, “Critical researchers assume 
that social reality is historically constituted and that it is produced and reproduced by 
people.”216 These two concepts twinned together in this study have become the conduit 
through which the contextual narrative discourse surrounding the Matabeleland conflict 
was researched and analysed. The narrative (story) invites us to the table of 
interpretation, and the discourse (the meaning attached to story) beckons us to critically 
unpack its ingredients.  
3.3. Research Analysis Modalities 
3.3.1. Narrative as Social Construction 
Peace scholar and author John Paul Lederach states that “…A constructivist view 
suggests that people act on the basis of the meaning things have for them. Meaning is 
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created through shared and accumulated knowledge”217. This study exposes the ‘storied’ 
scaffolding that under-girded the violence system constructed by the Zimbabwe 
government in its attempts to deal with the perceived threat of dissident rebellion in 
Matabeleland in the early 1980s. The implication here is that the violence system cannot 
stand without the props of a generative narrative discourse. This thinking cuts to the heart 
of the debate around language and meaning. Is meaning an essentialist concept, 
something that develops intuitively in the internal recesses of the human sub-conscious 
mind? Or is meaning a continuous external ‘work in progress’ constantly being reformed, 
re-configured and renewed through the social spheres of dialogue and human inter-
connectivity? Which of these two essential parts of human knowing (internal or external) 
comes first? The cognitive-dominance school of thought would promulgate that meaning 
is birthed internally and then externalised when people attach words to it (building 
language around meaning), while the proponents of the language-dominance camp would 
posit just the opposite sequence of origin. That is, the language comes first and then out 
of the expressive-act meaning is produced (building meaning around language).218   
Social constructionists maintain that there is a symbiotic relationship of inter-
subjectivity between meaning and language. In other words, language generates meaning 
and meaning generates language and that both are pivotal to the creation of our social 
reality. However, when coming to the question of origins, social constructivists would 
quickly add that meaning does not come to fruition until it is given expression either 
verbally, in written form, or in performative action. Meaning is imbued with its essential 
order, its influence to transform people, and its power to change situations only after it 
has been articulated or acted out. Don Cupitt believes that stories (language) come first in 
making the world intelligible and memorable. In his words, “Works of art, then, do not 
function merely to supply outlets for in-built and already determinate natural feelings. 
Their job is rather to produce our feelings, differentiate them and attach symbolic values 
to them”219. It is on this assumptive basis of generative-knowing and its linkages to 
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reality-formation that this study of the violence in Matabeleland was begun and narrative 
analysis became the operational choice for its research mode.     
3.3.2. Narrative as Meaning, Form and Interaction 
For purposes of this study narrative analysis has been defined as: “Analysis of a 
chronologically told story, with a focus on how elements are sequenced, why some 
elements are evaluated differently from others, how the past shapes perceptions of the 
present, how the present shapes perceptions of the past, and how both shape perceptions 
of the future”220. Expanding on this definition, this research embraced a three-prong 
approach to narrative dissection based on the functions of language as a whole. These 
three overall measurable segments of narrative are: content (semantics); structure 
(syntax); and performance (discourses).221 Narrative content has to do with what story is 
being told.  Story-telling can be accomplished in two ways: one is to describe past events 
chronologically, the other is to evaluate the meaning of those events and experiences in 
the lives of the protagonists. The structural dimension of narrative has to do with how e 
story is told, the manner it is put together and the form it is packaged in. The performance 
ideation has to do with why the story is being told and the responses it elicits in the 
process. In the words of Elliot, performance is the “interactional and institutional contexts 
in which narratives are produced, recounted, and consumed”222.   
The overall research aim of this project was to better understand the narratives 
surrounding the violence in the Matabeleland conflict: what did they mean, how were 
they formed, and why were they used?  The specific questions emanating from this 
interrogation were: 
1. What were the contents (meanings) of the narratives (both dominant and 
subjugated) that were created around the violence systems in Matabeleland 
between the years of 1980-1988? 
2. How were these narrative discourses constructed (structured or formed)? 
3. Why (performance) and how (interaction) were these narratives used and 
manipulated to accomplish certain ends? 
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As is clear from the above summation of the research questions and investigations, all 
three of these elements of narrative analysis (meaning, form and interaction) were woven 
into, and provide a cross-cutting function across the gamete of research methodology 
strategies.  The below matrix gives clarity to this cross-sectional function of the three-
prong analysis grid-system that has been under discussion:   









1.) Content (Meaning)    
2.) Structure (Form)    
3.) Performance (Interaction)    
 
3.4. Research Approaches 
3.4.1. Literature Review 
The literature review explored the intersection between the fields of social 
conflict theory, narratology and peace-building practice. The literature review was 
conducted in a tri-partite structure. In the first section, the research overviewed the 
available literature published on the Matabeleland conflict and categorised it according to 
the most salient social conflict theories. In the second section, the research introduced 
and explored the study of narrative; its ‘root’ origins, its theories and its application to the 
topic at hand. In the third and final section, the research highlighted and gave credence to 
a number of pivotal theories from the peace-building field that combine the analysis of 
conflict from the material, social and symbolic223 lenses.      
3.4.2. Document Analysis 
Narrative analysis must take cognizance of both the verbal scripts and written 
texts of history that are available. Due to the politically sensitive nature and logistical 
hurdles around accessibility in Matabeleland during the time of this study, it was 
imperative that this research plan included a careful document analysis as a critical piece 
of its method of data collection. The atmosphere of restrictions, limitations, and 
                                                




repercussions that currently pervades the Matabeleland region did impede the gathering 
of data from living sources. Thus, this study ensured that data collection came from 
multiple sources, both oral and written.  
Conventional historical research is based on certain objective assumptions that 
take an “evolutionary approach” (cascading development) to the recording of history.224 
It is believed that objective views of history can be realized when one can trace the 
historical events from actual experience, to oral transmission, to written documentation, 
after which various interpretations can be arrived at. Sourcing, dating and the 
corroboration of facts are all part of this traditional historical reconstruction effort.  
In regards to the interplay of narrative and history, Don Cupitt defines history as 
“a great tangle of competing stories”, or “the provisional outcome of a contest of 
stories”225. In his terms, “Truth is the state of argument, truth is the story on top at 
present, truth is a precarious and always shifting consensus”226. His concern is around the 
conception of “original documents” by which many historians claim their validity. After 
all, no matter how ancient the original source may be, it is already inter-textually laced 
with the interface of many earlier stories. Adding further complexity to the concept of 
“historical records”, Cupitt exclaims:  
“If being ‘constrained by evidence’ means only of borrowing bits of material from 
the public record, in the right chronological order and joined up by plausible 
casual links, then I fear that life in a modern pluralistic democracy shows that it’s 
not sufficient to establish a common ground of agreed objective public 
knowledge”227. 
   
Almost making jest of the debate swirling around the perspective character of 
history-writing, Cupitt expresses his amazement at the idea of the existence of fact and 
declares that all we really have and all we will ever have are two or more conflicting 
angles or viewpoints on a matter of history. In his mind, the real issue is how much 
dialogue is produced from these contrary portrayals of history, and how many new stories 
emerge as a result. In summary, Cupitt is clear on his stance: “Indeed, one might usefully 
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define the historian’s purpose in writing as an attempt to raise the level of public debate 
about a contemporary issue, by telling a parable set in the past about it”228.   
As this study is not aimed at a historical revisionist experiment, it will not employ 
a conventional historical analysis but instead will work within a historical criticism 
framework.229 Historical criticism is about the work of deconstructing and reconstructing 
history. The critic of history takes seriously the subjectivity and agency of the author of 
history, their worldview, values and beliefs, and the place or status they hold within the 
setting they are writing from. The historical critic is also fully aware that history is never 
written about in a ‘vacuum’, meaning that the context in which the historian is writing 
from is crucial. What is the nature of the socio-political climate in which this historical 
account is being recreated? What are the internal and external factors of influence that 
may be affecting the perceptions of the author(s) as they produce history? What are the 
‘agendas’ of historians? The student of historical analysis must not only ask questions of 
what (subject matter) and when (dates and times), but they must also ask the questions of 
who, how and why are people writing history.        
To this end, this study determined to gather and analyse evidence from four types 
of historical texts: primary sources (data from archives, museums, libraries, or personal 
collections); secondary sources (the work of other historians writing and commenting on 
history); running records (documentaries kept by private groups or NGOs); and 
recollections (autobiographies, memoirs, and oral histories). Unfortunately, materials 
from the time period under consideration were limited for at least three reasons. Firstly, it 
has been documented that certain records of ZAPU and ZIPRA were destroyed during the 
violence of the 1980s. Secondly, the independent and international media (some of which 
represented dissenting voices230) were severely restricted from freedom of expression and 
publication of any information contrary to the state-supported viewpoint during that time 
period. Thirdly, critical archives of sensitive material from that era have been put under 
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lock and key until such a time as they are deemed to be instrumental in reconstructing 
that historically tumultuous period.231    
The document analysis of this study revolved around primary sources such as 
newspaper clippings, investigative reports, internet postings, political communiqués, 
published speech scripts, and other personal narrative writings of ex-combatants and the 
civilian population in Matabeleland.232 Secondary sources involved historical books, 
research dissertations and statistical research reports on the Matabeleland conflict from 
the specific time period of interest.233 Recollections data was extracted from the 
numerous published biographies on the persons of Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, the 
ZANU, ZAPU and Zimbabwe as a nation.234 The document analysis processes ran 
congruently and carried a cross-sectional function throughout the research time-fame.   
3.5. Open Interviews: Story Analysis 
3.5.1. Story as “the organising principle for human action”235 
“Human Rationality needs to be seen as embedded in our language, our social 
interaction, the play of our feelings and the temporally-extended stories of our 
lives…And this narrative kind of rationality is active, passionate, and practical, forming 
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and producing life.”236 Story narrative is not just a means to find out about the world; a 
descriptive conduit for information. It is a producer of data, and a creator of interpretation 
and meaning.237 Narrative is about people making sense out of their experience. Narrative 
stories are told to make a point not just to share information. The ‘constructivist’ 
approach seeks to discover how a sense of social order is created through talk and 
interaction.  In the words of research methodology author, Jane Elliot: “Stories are…life 
as well as about life”238.  
The open interview process brings certain unique advantages over other 
instrumentalities of research. The open interview is more personal in nature, it allows for 
a more free-flow conversational style, it provides the freedom to explore issues in more 
depth, and it can at times reveal data that participants would otherwise not be willing to 
disclose in a in a more public group environment. The disadvantages of this interview 
instrument are that because of its intensive personal focus participants can sometimes feel 
intimidated or uncomfortable, which could lead to an unnatural, formalised or stilted 
expression of data. Also, interviewing can often err on the side of subjectivity bias, an 
issue that is of paramount concern in the qualitative research arena. 
  For this research effort, an open interview format has been selected precisely 
because of how it lends itself to the narrative analysis aims and objectives of this project.  
In order to build on, and compliment the literature review and the document analysis, 35 
open individual interviews were conducted with representatives from each of the earlier 
identified sectors of society; political, ex-combatant, media, legal, education, church, 
women, rural agriculturalist populations. The goal in this interview process was to gather 
individual story narratives about the experience of violence in Matabeleland during the 
time in question. Out of these personal stories various themes used to describe and give 
shape to the dominant and subjugated narratives of Matabeleland were examined. These 
story highlights and discourse landscapes were then transcribed, compiled and compared 
with the findings from the literature review and document analyses processes. The 
interviewees were also encouraged to reflect on any possible connections between their 
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experiences of violence during the Matabeleland conflict and the crisis being faced in 
Zimbabwe at present.      
Steiner Kvale239 espouses to a thorough interview ‘life-cycle’ that entails seven 
distinct phases.   
• Thematising (setting an aim / goal for the interview),  
• Designing (giving ample time to developing the appropriate questions),  
• Interviewing (timing, venue, atmosphere, recording and managing subjectivity)  
• Transcribing (detailed conversational format /‘units of discourse’ uncovered),  
• Analysing (form, substance and performance),  
• Verifying (authenticity, reliability and validity), and  
• Reporting (writing up and / or publishing the findings). 
These phases provided a general ‘map’ followed in setting-up, conducting and analysing 
the findings of the interviews, and served as the back-drop context in which to place and 
‘track’ the particular interview sessions as they progressed.   
3.5.2. Story as structured narrative flow 
The interview component of this research concentrated on gathering raw data of 
uninterrupted (as much as possible) story scripts and converging themes describing the 
experience of the Matabeleland violence from various societal sectors. The challenge was 
then to find the terms, strictures and boundaries of analyses that lent themselves to the 
effective and integral interpretation of story meaning. It is the belief of this author-
researcher that in using the mode of narrative analysis one is compelled to take seriously 
the constructed as well as the free-flowing elements of the story discourse. Thus, in the 
process of analysing the interview data in this section, all efforts were made to highlight 
the recognizable patterns evident in the process of building a story. While at the same 
time, the research tools attempted to expose and explore the themes of symbolism, irony 
and deep meaning that emerged along the pathway of discovery.    
In general terms, there are six kinds of knowledge topics that can be pursued in 
the interview process: facts, beliefs about facts, feelings and motives, standards of action, 
                                                




present and past behaviour, and conscious reasons.240 However, in order to manage the 
flow of data that came from the interview sessions, it was critical to choose a specific 
frame of reference that was utilized for the deconstruction of the narrative discourses that 
were gathered. The dominant structural narrative analysis frameworks are found in the 
works of Labov (1972), Gee (1986), and Burke (1945).  Kohler Reissman summarises 
these three models of narrative analysis as follows: 
1. Labov’s model “includes six common elements: an abstract (summary of the 
substance of the narrative), orientation (time, place, situation, participants), 
complicating action (sequence of events), evaluation (significance and meaning of 
the action, attitude of the narrator), resolution (what finally happened), and coda 
(returns the perspective to the present)”241. 
2. Gee’s model “analyzes changes in pitch, pauses, and other features that punctuate 
speech that allow interpreters to hear groups of lines together.  Using poetic units, 
stanzas, and strophes to examine the talk… [Gee] shows how organized, coherent, 
and senseful…speech is.”242 
3. Burke’s “classic method of analyzing language – dramatism…is contained in a 
pentad of terms: act, scene, agent, agency, purpose.  Any complete statement 
about motives will offer some kind of answer to these five questions: What was 
done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he [or she] 
did it (agency), and why (purpose).”243   
This study utilised the Burke framework of narrative analysis as the ‘guiding questions’ 
for unpacking the interviews. Thus, while the interview data contained large portions of 
free-flow scripts of the personal experience of violence in the Matabeleland conflict, the 
mode of analysis was guided by Burke’s markers described above. The following 
questions assisted in teasing out Burke’s paradigm:   
• Act:  This has to do with the plot-formation – What are the issues involving order, 
duration, frequency, causation and / or conflict embedded in the events and 
actions of the story? 
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• Scene: This has to do with settings – What are the spatial, temporal and social 
dynamics surrounding the story? 
• Agent: This has to do with the characters – How are the actors described?  What 
is revealed about their points of view and traits?  Do they draw out empathy, 
hatred or apathy? 
• Agency: This has to do with symbolism and irony – What are the universal, 
historical, contextual or cultural threads that are used, articulated, manipulated 
and woven through the story in order to convey meaning? 
• Purpose: This has to do with narrative patterns – What deeper meaning may be 
able to be unearthed in the structural composition of the narrative itself?244  
Each interview narrative was broken down into manageable bits of script that were then 
categorised under the Burke rubric of analysis. In this way the research analysis findings 
were ‘thickened’ and yielded the narrative discourse cross-pollination necessary to shed 
new light on the questions surrounding the formation and interplay between the dominant 
and subjugated narratives surrounding the violence system in the Matabeleland case. 
3.6. Narrative Analysis as Reflective of Political Theatre 
“I attempt to illustrate a third, cultural ontology of war – the concept of war as a 
drama of social exclusion…War itself is a type of text – a violent attempt to ‘tell 
the story’ or to ‘cut in on the conversation’ of others from whose company the 
belligerents feel excluded.”245 
  
In recent years, narrative analysis has given rise to the application of 
dramaturgical studies within the social sciences. This interdisciplinary study (socio-
dramaturgy) combines knowledge from the performing arts with the study of social 
phenomena. In essence, dramaturgical studies propagate the idea that unfolding social 
activism can be compared to, and understood by applying the frames and processes that 
drive a theatrical performance.   
These dramaturgical narrative lenses provided the overall ‘brushstrokes’ in which 
the Matabeleland conflict of the early 1980s was analysed. However, similar to the 
narrative story analysis, it was important that the dramaturgical analysis process be 
                                                
244Powell, M. 1990. What is Narrative Criticism? Minneapolis: Fortress Press,  29-33. 
245 Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest – War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. 
International Africa Institute: Oxford: Curry & New Hampshire: Heinemann Publishers, xxiv. 
93 
 
broken down into more manageable, specific frames of measurement. To accomplish this, 
the research turned to the work of Belinda Bozzoli246 who recently published on a 
dramaturgical approach to the political violence in South Africa. Bozzoli applies a grid-
system of various stages required in the implementation of ‘political theatre.’ These 
stages are: Planning, Preparation, Scripting, Staging and Performance.247 Th  research 
data gathered concerning the Matabeleland conflict narratives was then scrutinised with 
these five stages of political theatricality in mind:   
• Planning: What are the possible linkages that could be uncovered between the 
actual performance and the subsequent references to, or verbal evidence of an 
orchestrated violence that was unleashed on the communities of Matabeleland? 
• Preparation: In the same vein, what patterns of action may be unearthed that 
reveal an association between the eventual performances of violence to the 
strategic planning that led up to its public presentation? 
• Scripting: What scripts were used, and how were they communicated by the 
different actors in the Matabeleland conflict?  Who played key roles in the 
conception and writing of these narrative scripts and what might the various 
ideological, political or psycho-social motivations have been? 
• Staging: Who designed the stage settings and how were these spaces managed? 
Where was the staging arranged, and what was the significance of location?  For 
example, Bozzoli248 and other interpreters of political theatre have often analysed 
the use of public spaces for protest (e.g. the ‘streets’, night vigils, protest funerals 
and political rallies and gatherings). What were the overall backdrops in these 
dramas?  What were the symbolic props and costumes utilised (e.g. weapons, 
uniforms, posters, placards, t-shirts, hats, advertisements, poetry, and song) and 
how were they used in this theatrical story?  
• Performing: What were the genre (broadly defined as patterns of narrative and 
imagery)249 of the performances?  Examples of genre are tragedy, comedy, 
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romance, satire, and horror or any given combination of these.250  How did the 
performances unfold? What were the primary themes and purported meanings of 
these dramatic enactments?  What were the unexpected twists and turns in these 
dramatic scenarios? Who were the intended audiences and how did they respond 
to these various dramaturgical performances?          
These five stages of political theatre provided the sign-posts for the narrative analysis that 
was generated from the data gathered in the literature review, document analysis and the 
open interviews. In the conclusion of the thesis, the inter-linkages of these historical 
performances to the current conflict rupture points in Zimbabwe today are highlighted. 
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reveal an association 
between the eventual 
performances of 
violence to the strategic 
planning that led up to 
its public presentation? 
* Scripting – What 
scripts were used, and 
how were they 
communicated by the 
different actors in the 
Matabeleland conflict?  
* Staging – How were 
















                                                







questions of what 
(subject matter) 
and when (dates 
and times), but 
they must also ask 
the questions of 
who, how and why 
are people writing 
history.        
woven through the 
story in order to 
convey meaning? 
*  Purpose – What 
deeper meaning may 
be able to be unearthed 
in the content and 
composition of the 
narrative itself? 
 
and protest arranged and 
managed? What was the 
significance of location?  
What were the symbolic 
‘props’ & ‘costumes’ 
and how were they used?  
* Performing – 
What were the ‘genre’ of 
the performances?  What 
were the unexpected 
“twists & turns” and the 
primary themes and 
purported meanings of 
these dramatic 
scenarios?  Who were 
the intended audiences 
& how did they respond? 
 
3.8. Research Sample and Justification 
 
3.8.1. Sample Choice - Sector Representation 
As has been mentioned in the beginning of this document, the research sample 
choice was based on representation from eight sectors of society: politicians, ex-
combatants, journalists, legal advocates, teachers, church leaders, women’s groups, rural 
agriculturalist populations. This cross-section of society was chosen because of their 
significance as the ‘publics’ (communities) who represented the primary protagonists in 
the context of the Matabeleland conflict of the 1980s. The following chart motivates the 
sample choice further: 





This community could be argued to be the primary 
antagonists (masterminds) in this conflict drama – both ZAPU 
and ZANU representatives are assumed to carry the ‘official’ 
dominant and ‘unofficial’ subjugated counter-narratives that 
perpetuated the violence in Matabeleland. Traditional Leaders 
also embrace counter-narratives to the political status quo.     
2.) Ex-combatants This community could be argued to be the secondary 
antagonists in this conflict drama – both ZANLA and ZIPRA 
representatives will be sought out.  Especially, significant are 
the narratives surrounding the fierce fighting that broke out 
between these two demobilisation camps in Entumbane in the 
city of Bulawayo.  Also, critical to this discussion will be the 
rhetoric that swirled around the labels of ‘hero’ and 




3.) Journalists This community represent the ‘messengers’ of the 
Matabeleland conflict narrative.  However, their script is 
complicated by the degree of interference from the central 
government at the time.  Perspectives from independent as 
well as state-sponsored media personnel will be solicited.  
4.) Legal Advocates This community represents two voices: those who carry the 
legal narratives that were interpreted in such a way as to 
justify the violence perpetrated by the government, and those 
legal activists who advocated for narratives of human rights 





This community appears to have been targeted in the 
Matabeleland violence by both sides to the conflict (both 
government forces & the supposed dissidents).  Teachers were 
an important sector to manipulate into assisting in the re-
education and or the ‘acted-out’ intimidation of the children.  
One of the ‘civil’ activities of the notorious 5th Brigade was 
the controversial building of schools in Matabeleland.  
6.) Church Leaders Matabeleland as well as Zimbabwe as a whole is highly 
Christianized and churches have played prominent roles in 
development and community life of the society.  While some 
church leaders chose to defend the actions of the central 
government at the time, many of the Church leaders played 
the role of activist and advocates for the cause of those 
communities who suffered under the violence in 
Matabeleland.  It is the Catholic Church that authored the 
most detailed research report of the atrocities committed 
during the Matabeleland conflict era. 
7.) Women Academics 
and Activists 
The women of Matabeleland carry a script of victimisation in 
the drama of war – not only are they the community who feel 
the great loss of their men-folk (fathers, husbands, and sons) 
in the fighting, they also suffered under rape and loss of 
livelihoods as a result of violence.  For the most part the 
women’s voice for peace and reconciliation has long been 
silenced or suppressed in Matabeleland for decades. 
8.) Rural Agricultural 
Populations 
This community consists of many of the primary and 
secondary victims of Gukurahundi as well as representing the 
seedbed for the political-ideological contestations over land. 
 
While this representation of primary protagonists was not based on quantitative research 
findings, these were the categories of ‘actor-agents’ engaged in the conflict issues that 
emerged in the initial literature review and document analysis conducted by the 
researcher from that period of time. Also, these sectoral categories represented pivotal 
segments of society that carry the dominant or subjugated narratives of the time under 
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study.  It is at these governmental and civil societal ‘points of reference’ where the 
creation, consumption, mediation and dissemination of narratives were promulgated. 
3.8.2. Sample Selection Process – Purposive and Peer-Identified 
The sample selection process for this research project was a two-fold strategy: 
purposive and peer-identified. Purposive sampling is the process whereby the 
“Researchers rely on their experience, ingenuity and/or previous research findings to 
deliberately obtain participants in such a manner that the sample obtained may be 
regarded as representative of the relevant population.”251 In the context of this study, 
purposive sampling as opposed to random sampling is the chosen mode of sample 
selection for three reasons. Firstly, the researcher has been travelling and working 
(facilitating community conflict training and intervention) in Matabeleland region since 
1995, and thus has a strong network of partners to draw from in this endeavour.  
Secondly, the researcher’s office and residence is located in Johannesburg, South Africa 
to which many Zimbabweans have immigrated since 2000. A portion of the research 
samples came out of the Zimbabwean Diaspora now located in South Africa. Thirdly, 
because of the current socio-political environment in Zimbabwe, there was a high level of 
suspicion around a research topic of this nature and therefore a considerable degree of 
non-participation. To explore a sensitive topic of this kind from within a volatile, 
politically charged setting one needed a high level of trust with those participating in the 
research.   
In regards to peer-identified sampling, as the research progressed those who 
were interviewed recommended others to make contact with. Especially in regards to the 
interviews, the researcher relied on his already established contacts to direct him to 
further leads within the particular representational sectors identified.      
3.8.3. Sample Size 
The sample size for this research was 35 individual interviews in total.  This 
sampling size is justified on three fronts: 
                                                
251 Huysamen, G.K. 2001. Methodology for the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 44. 
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1.) Most narrative analysis research samples are smaller in number than other 
research analysis modes with a wide range of 5-6 (units of life stories) to 25-30 
(samples of interviews). 
2.) The open interview format utilised in this research study was more in-depth 
than a structured interview arrangement. 
3.) A substantial amount of data was gathered from the literature review and the 
document (textual) analysis conducted.  
The following chart summarises the research sample and justification for this study: 
 
Method & Sample Size: Distribution of Sample Group: 
1.) Literature Review  
• 2-year process   
• 300 book sources, 
200 articles cited  
Scanned the fields of: 
1. Social Conflict Theory 
2. Narratology 
3. Peace-building and Conflict Transformation  
2.) Document Analysis 
Cross-cutting   
• 1,000 pages,  
• 200 news 
clippings,  
• 4 video / DVD 
items 
Research drew from Zimbabwean newspaper archives, 
British Libraries & Archives, News Magazines, e-
Newsletters, personal journals of persons living in 
Matabeleland, writings of Matabeleland political prisoners, 
recent victim’s statements, political speeches, song lyrics, 
advertisements, and historical video/DVD footage. 
3.) Open Interviews   
• 35 open interviews 
between 2006 and  
2008 
• 4 Field Visits – 60 
pages of field 
notes 
35 interviews in total representing the following sectors: 
1. politicians / government officials and 
traditional leaders (8 interviews),  
2. ex-combatants (2 interviews),  
3. journalists (3 interviews),  
4. legal advocates (3 interviews), 
5. teachers/educators/academics (6 interviews),  
6. church leaders (6 interviews), and  
7. women educators / activists (3 interviews) 
8. rural agriculturalist populations (primary or 
secondary victims) – (4 interviews)  
 
3.9. Research Validation and Reliability 
“Oral sources…are not always reliable in point of fact. Rather than being a 
weakness, this is however, their strength: errors, inventions and myths lead us 
through and beyond facts to their meanings.”252 
                                                
252 Quote from Italian Researcher Portelli who completed an Oral History project in 1991 based on the 




Finding clear guidelines on how to ensure the authenticity and integrity of 
qualitative research is a task of great contestation. This is due in part to the difficulty of 
dividing qualitative research into measurable units of analysis. It is also due to the very 
nature of qualitative research that often steps outside of the boundaries of formula and 
systematic predictions. Thus, in most situations of qualitative research the validation 
process needs to be ‘tailor-made’; uniquely designed in combination and flexibility to fit 
the measurement goals and objectives laid out in the original research proposal.   
In dealing with verification of narrative analysis research, Reissman suggests that 
there are at least four legs that give stability to the stand of validation:  
1.) Persuasiveness: involves the plausibility degree to which any theoretical 
claims are substantiated by participants’ accounts and when alternative and/or 
comparative explanations for the data being studied are taken into account in the 
analysis. 
2.) Correspondence: has to do with the procedure of taking the research findings 
back to the communities being studied in order to secure what has been termed 
‘member checks’253 or participant review or feedback processes.  
3.) Coherence: Agar and Hobbs speak of three kinds of coherence cross-checks: 
global, local and themal.254  Global coherence refers to the overarching aims, 
intentions and meanings that emerge from the narrative research.  Local refers to 
the particular ways, frames and mannerisms that the narrative discourse utilises to 
put forward its points of meaning.  Themal has to do with the consistency of 
content configurations and the ability to integrate the strands of interpretation in a 
cogent whole.  
4.) Pragmatic Use: the extent to which one’s research is applied in praxis or 
becomes the basis for other people’s work.255 
Having these foundational pillars of validity in the background, this study utilised four 
practical verification processes as the ‘yardstick’ for valid measurement of the 
accomplishments of this research effort. 
                                                
253 Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 314. 
254 Agar, M. & Hobbs, J.R. 1982. Interpreting Discourse: Coherence and the Analysis of Ethnographic 
Interviews. Discourse Processes, 5, 1-32. 
255 Reissman, 1993: 65-69. 
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3.9.1. Research Instrument Piloting (audit) 
The research interview protocol was tested on a group of masters and doctoral 
students (from Zimbabwe, DRC, Rwanda, Zambia and South Africa) studying at the 
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies programme at University of Kwa-Zulu Natal in 
Durban, South Africa. Also, the researcher relied on a number of close Zimbabwean 
colleagues (Diaspora) who live in the greater Johannesburg area to provide feedback on 
the interview instrument. The choice to audit the research instrumentation in South Africa 
was for practical reasons, it was in close proximity of the researcher and his office and it 
was a much less expensive option than travelling to Zimbabwe to pilot the instruments.  
Following these pilot tests, some adjustments were made to the tool. 
3.9.2. Reflexivity (Field Journal) 
In line with the narrative research aims and objectives of this project, the 
researcher kept a running field journal for all data collection processes both locally and 
when travelling to Zimbabwe. This journal was utilised for personal reflection, to record 
particular details and critical pieces of story or narrative discourse, and to summarise 
book/journal or document readings. The field journal also provided a container to track 
the research learning along the way, as well as to capture any pivotal changes made to the 
research design as a result of unsuspected variables that arose in the midst of the data 
gathering activities. In essence, the field journal represented the narrative discourse of the 
researcher; a way of documenting or telling the story of the research journey. 
3.9.3. Member Checking and Peer Review  
As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs of this section on validation, one of 
the key assessment markers of qualitative research is correspondence. Correspondence 
can be defined as the evaluative ‘feedback loop’ of the analysis findings by the research 
participants themselves. This study has built in three expressions of member checking or 
peer review activities. Firstly, the transcribed data from the recorded interviews will be 
made available to any participant who requests a copy of them. This information was 
included in the introduction phase of the interview research instrument. Secondly, as the 
researcher has an on-going collegial relationship with a number of the interview sample, 
he has intentionally opened-up a dialogue around the validity and significance of the 
findings. It is believed that out of the research findings will come certain practical 
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applications and recommendations around narrative peace-building that will also be 
empowering and supportive to the research communities that took part in this initiative.   
Thirdly, a copy of the final passed thesis document is available to those participants who 
request it. All of these measures have provided sufficient ‘checks and balances’ to ensure 
a high degree of credibility from the research constituency itself.  
3.9.4. Triangulation: Corroboration of Analysis Findings 
The last critical ‘plumb-line’ of measurement utilised in monitoring this research 
project was the process of corroboration of analysis findings through triangulation.  
Triangulation refers to the comparative counter-reference of data analysis findings 
spanning two or more distinct methodologies of research but that are all testing the same 
thesis questions. Triangulation involves comparing different methods of research within 
and across quantitative or qualitative lines and instrumentalities. By conducting a 
combination of literature review, document analysis and interviews, this research project 
intended to maximise the opportunity to cross-tabulate data in order to confirm analysis 
findings and highlight analysis contradictions.    
3.10. Ethical Considerations 
The ethical concerns that require highlighting in this research endeavour revolved 
around two primary tensions. The first tension was related to the highly charged 
repressive socio-political context prevailing in Zimbabwe over this time. This tension 
multiplied a number of critical risk factors that could have endangered or at least greatly 
restricted the life and liberty of those who choose to participate in this research. To deal 
with this, each research participant was well-briefed on any security hazards that they 
may face in joining the research effort. In addition, voluntary consent was required from 
all participants confirming their awareness of all possible risks and waiving all rights to 
take legal action against the researcher in terms of any liabilities that may be the result of 
their participation in this project.   
At the same time, the researcher made all efforts to provide a ‘safe space’ in 
which persons could participate in the research without inhibition or fear. This required 
constant safety ‘checks’ to be made with the local host organisations and participants that 
the researcher worked with. The researcher undertook to take decisive action to suspend 
any research proceedings where there was suspicion of Central Intelligence Officers 
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(CIOs) sent by the government to ‘spy’ and report back on the meeting content and 
attendance, or where immanent physical violence was threatened. Finally, would it have 
become too dangerous for either the researchers or the local constituent communities to 
continue with the research in the local context, this study would have continued its 
investigation by engaging the Zimbabwean Diaspora in South Africa as its primary 
research community. 
The second ethical consideration was connected to the inter-subjectivity biases 
that can often arise between researcher and research participants. These subjectivity 
tensions can distort patterns of interactions and consequently the outcomes of the 
research can be compromised. All efforts were made to design methodological tools that 
would guard against some of these pitfalls. The combination of literature review, 
document analysis, and open interview processes was deliberately chosen to 
accommodate the narrative approach as well as to mitigate against researcher-researched 
subjectivity entanglements. From a narrative analysis position the concept of ‘pure’ 
objective research is a misnomer. Denying subjectivity in the research interface does not 
lend integrity to the process. Instead, it is the opinion of this author that the most honest 
posture of integrity for the researcher is that of naming and owning one’s own prejudices 
and biases upfront. In this way, the researcher’s story became ‘part and parcel’ of the 
whole narrative research flow; sometimes engaging with, sometimes critically dissecting, 














Chapter 4: Ethnicity – Identity Narratives of the Shona and Ndebele 
 
4.1. Introduction 
“You should hear what Ndebeles say about Shonas,   
you should hear what Shonas say about Ndebeles.”256 
 
Human identity has multiple facets that determine and give meaning to the 
formation of individual and community awareness; including such identifiers as race, 
nationality, culture, language, religion, social and family roles, and educational or 
professional qualifications. However, for purposes of this research chapter those elements 
that shape ethnic-identity257will be the focus of attention. Ethnic identity-forming 
narratives are stories that people tell in order to describe and explain who they are. These 
ethnic-identity stories are transmitted from generation to generation and most often 
function as a stabilising source; grounding the individual as ‘self-in-community’ with a 
sense of belonging and recognition.  
Yet these same stories can also be motivated and fashioned by traumatic violence, 
historical bias, political machinations as well as the natural morphing of memories that 
become increasingly exaggerated with each subsequent ‘telling of the tale’. As ethnic-
identity discourses imbibe a life of their own they contribute to the social construction of 
reality; producing either a positive or negative sets of outcomes. If they are acted on in a 
destructive manner, they quickly overshadow the perceptions of the current reality and an 
imbalance in socio-political relations ensues. This phenomenon of negative identity 
evolution is exemplified in the following transcriptions describing the contrasting views 
of the Ndebele-Shona ethnic divide as a result of the Matabeleland violence. From one 
Ndebele perspective: 
“The whole conflict was a historical one. Shona speaking people have never 
forgiven the Ndebele for years of humiliation and domination through Lobengula 
and others. The fact that the Ndebele speaking people are perceived as foreigners, 
and the fact that for years – up to 1963 – the liberation struggle was dominated by 
Ndebele leadership in the person of Joshua Nkomo. There are historical reasons 
                                                
256 Interview: SM1, Durban, South Africa – 07/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher, researcher and university 
lecturer). 
257 This study intentionally uses the terms ‘ethnic/ethnicity’ in place of ‘tribe/tribalism’. While these words 
can and are often used interchangeably in circles of academia, reference to ‘tribal’ or ‘tribalism’ especially 
in the African context still carries derogatory connotations; reminiscent of the not-so-distant colonial past 
where phrases like ‘native’ and ‘tribal’ were laden with prejudicial intent meant to dehumanize the African.        
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why the majority has always had this sense that ‘we must sort out those people’, 
‘we must get our own revenge’…”258 
 
From one Shona perspective: 
 
“I don’t think its something that really carries weight to the extent of wanting to 
influence the events of today. I don’t think it got as far as that, but in some circles 
you’ll find that those are just stories that are thrown around, if not to ridicule the 
people of Matabeleland, they are also used by some people to say ‘well, this is 
being used by Shona people to get back to Ndebele people because they are still 
bitter that we took their cattle or we took their women’ and things like that. But 
honestly speaking, I don’t think that it’s anything that can be used to interpret 
events of today or of the 1980s…”259  
       
In the case of these two narratives, danger looms when the ethnic conflict story of 
the past is maximised (overshadows) or is minimised (disappears) in the unfolding story 
of present relational interactions and in so doing eliminates the shared or preferred future 
view of a meaningful co-existence among diverse ethnic groupings. To avoid distortion 
in the current reality, the narrative scripts of the past and the future must be integrated 
with an equitable and complimentary grip on the story of the present. Indeed, these ethnic 
identity-formation texts (both past and future) do influence and can transform present 
conflict stories for better or for worse.   
 The role of ‘ethnicity’ in the Matabeleland conflict is complex and nuanced. 
Accordingly, in certain corners ethnicity has been privileged as a central organizing 
factor in the analysis of the 1980s massacres. In other corners, the position of ethnicity 
has been relegated to a marginal, if not dismissive position in the scheme of the state-
sanctioned violence that unravelled at that time. In short, there are three categories of 
theories that attempt to explain the prominent, yet contested role that ethnicity has played 
in the Gukurahundi disturbances of Matabeleland in the early 1980s. 
 First, there is the idea of ethnicity as a functional instrument utilized to attain 
political recognition and status. Proponents of this theory would argue that the ethnic 
division plaguing Zimbabwe today did not exist in the past and that it was contrived by 
opportunistic politicians who played the issue of ‘ethnicity card’ as an effective tool of 
                                                
258 Yap, K. 2001. Uprooting the Weeds – Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict 1980-
1987. Stockholm: Elanders Novum, 276 – (An excerpt taken from an interview conducted by the author, K. 
Yap with Paul Themba Nyathi, Director of Zimbabwe Project, Harare, 1 December 1993).  
259 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer). 
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mobilization assisting them in the solidification of their power, the silencing of their 
opposition, and the justification of heinous acts of violence.  
“It has come to be understood in this country that that’s how we have used ‘tribe’. 
Not for tribe’s sake…let us go further and say ‘tribe for what?’ That’s the 
question. Power, it’s all about power - everything must be reduced to one word – 
power and probably wealth because power begets wealth.”260 
 
“ I think the whole thing to my understanding was basically mostly contorted as 
tribal…I hesitate to say ‘tribal’…but I think it was tribal yet at the same time…I 
understand the tactics that Robert Mugabe was using, you know, in as far as 
achieving his own political [ends]. Yes, it was manipulated tribalism, if I can put 
it that way, or tribalistic wars.”261 
 
“ I strongly believe it’s the politicians that deliberately divided us or make us 
aware that we come from two different major tribal groups. Like in our suburbs 
here, a number of my neighbours are Shona-speaking, I’m Ndebele-speaking. We 
relate very well, we share salt, we share sugar; I go away and leave my keys to 
my house to my neighbour. They go out and tell me they are going out for so 
many weeks – ‘you are in charge’. They have weddings, they involve us…But it’s 
only when the politicians comes that we suddenly realise ‘I come from a different 
tribal group; they come from a different tribal group.’”262 
 
Second, a contrasting notion purports that actual, ancient ethnic animosities have existed 
for over one hundred years now and that these bitter generational grudges were duly 
aroused, surfaced and heightened by the unfolding political events of violent power-
struggle in the liberation movement and the subsequent independence period from 1980 
to the present. This ethnic-conflict view insists that there is an ingrained historic 
incompatibility (albeit it somewhat inexplicable) between Ndebele and Shona that dates 
back to pre-colonial times.   
“…for me when I go back and look at it and read about it – it’s not different from 
the genocide in Rwanda. It was some kind of attempt at ethnic cleansing. So that’s 
the issue. I think it goes back to…it probably goes back to the 1800s.”263 
 
“…and I believe that even to this day, ZANU-PF believes that the Matabeleland 
people are a nuisance in Zimbabwe. But let me go back to the origins of this 
                                                
260 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (Ndebele historian, author, researcher and 
archivist). 
261 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO worker facilitating trauma 
healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi violence). 
262 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader and Peace activist). 
263 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 - (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
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brutality, this animosity…I think during the course of the struggle it was never 
made clear that Mashonaland and Matabeleland which made Rhodesia then, 
Southern Rhodesia if you want to call it that – were never one country. And whilst 
the people were busy, the two forces fighting, they never really emphasized the 
fact that we are dealing with a pre-colonial era where there are two states and that 
they didn’t really reconcile the facts of history. So when Mugabe came to power, 
he was aware that in Matabeleland he had no mandate to rule them; they were 
supposed to resort back to their pre-colonial era status and govern themselves.”264 
 
Third, there is the conception of natural ethnic cleavages that exhibited along the lines of 
geographical location (Mashonaland / Matabeleland) and political party affiliation 
(ZAPU / ZANU). These ‘natural’ ethnic fault-lines are not perceived to be instinctual or 
intentionally constructed and as such could be understood to be neutral. However, they 
were capitalized on and accentuated for socio-political and economic gain leading up to 
and throughout the Matabeleland conflict. 
“Unfortunately there was the overlap between the political party and the ethnic 
group. It wasn’t an absolute overlap because there were Shona people who 
supported ZAPU leaders. But that is the problem that many people saw it in 
ethnic terms rather than on political ideological terms. In other words they didn’t 
see that Mugabe's intention was to establish a one-party state, they saw it as the 
intention being to try to wipe-out Ndebeles.”265  
 
“ It’s very unfortunate that the events of the 1980s took place in the Matabeleland 
and the Midlands province, which happened to be a place which was 
predominately occupied by people of a particular ethnicity. But if you want to 
read too much into that…to want to label it or want to equate it to an ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, I think to my knowledge it is far-fetched. I wouldn’t want to add too 
much into that. I think that the…at that particular time, the majority of the people 
who then were in ZIPRA – were from the Matabeleland region and even when the 
destabilization took place – that is the place that they retreated to.”266
 
To this end, it matters little which theory one may gravitate towards to explain the ethnic 
quagmire emanating from the Matabeleland massacres, the resultant outcome has been 
the production of a narrative of conflicting identities whereby the Ndebele and Shona 
populations are imagined to be irreconcilable.  
                                                
264 Interview: CM1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 - (Ndebele Traditionalist and Cultural Activist 
advocating for a separate Ndebele nation). 
265 Interview: DC1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 13/09/07 (White Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer and 
politician). 
266 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer). 
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 The ethnic-based conflict narratives that surround the Matabeleland massacres are 
nested in four primary historical contexts: the pre-colonial era; the colonial period; the 
liberation struggle years; and the state-sanctioned Gukurahundi violence of the early 
1980s. Within each of these time periods certain salient themes have emerged pertaining 
to, and fuelling the discourse of ethnic relations in Zimbabwe. The recounting of pre-
colonial history surrounding Shona-Ndebele relations has reinforced a divisive mentality 
of clear ethnic distinction between the offended an  the offender. Capitalising on these 
apparent fissures, the colonial rule appropriated its empirical agenda by enforcing certain 
racial and ethnic prejudices which laid the foundation for a clear policy of splinter and 
subdue along tribal delineations. At the onset of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle a 
season of reprieve from ethno-politics surfaced with Shona and Ndebele linking together 
in pursuit of independence from white colonial rule. However, this unification was short-
lived when the liberation movement experienced a number of tragic internal divisions 
with each subsequent formation bolstering their support base along the edges of ethno-
geographical demarcations. Finally, under the siege of the Operation Gukurahundi the 
fatal fusion between narratives of ethnic hatred and narratives of traumatic violence was 
solidified as a predominantly Shona-speaking Fifth Brigade unleashed a reign of terror on 
a primarily Ndebele-speaking civilian population residing in the Matabeleland region.       
4.2. Ethnicity: pre-Colonial Era – Narratives of ‘Victor and Vanquished’ 
In reference to social psychologist Vamik Volkan’s pivotal work on the 
phenomena of “chosen traumas and chosen glories”267 on the psyche of a nation, this 
section on pre-colonial narratives explores the emergence of ethnically assigned scripts of 
‘victor and vanquished’ between the Ndebele and the Shona. By weaving together 
historical accounts, selective memories and dominating myths, this research highlights 
the propensity of both ethnic groups to locate their identity in texts that validate their 
sense of being the ‘offended’ (Shona) or their justified rationalization for being the 
‘offender’ (Ndebele). However, the research transcriptions also reveal the complications 
and intricacies inherent in attempts to compartmentalize these categories of perpetrator 
                                                
267 Volkan, V. 1994. The Need to have Enemies & Allies – From Clinical Practice to International 
Relations. New Jersey and London: Jason Aronson Inc. Here Volkan refers to the magnification of a 
nation’s historical biography where certain events of humiliation or triumph become ‘larger-than-life’; 
locked in the minds of the citizenry and creating myths of heroes and enemies that shape that nation’s laws 
and policies, institutions and structures, and its corporate character.     
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and victim along ethnic fissures. Additionally, this study illuminates the ironic ‘ebb and 
flow’ of historic agency as both Ndebele and Shona actors perform the dual roles of 
aggressor and aggrieved; sometimes consecutively and other times congruently. This 
paradoxical dance of ‘aggression-victimisation’ flows in a cyclical fashion infusing the 
thinking and behaviour of one generation to the next.         
4.2.1. Stories of Shona Origins 
 The Bantu descendents of the modern day Shona people268 ar  believed to have 
migrated into what is now central Zimbabwe (between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers) 
sometime between 300-1000 A.D.269 While not much is known about this time period, 
the Shona populations that inhabited the area are frequently described as co-existing 
peacefully in small extended familial clans, with informal governance structures, and 
organised around informal formations of feudalism. Eliakim Sibanda characterizes the 
Shona living in that time as follows: “…[the] AmaShona people lived as decentralized 
agriculturally based chiefdoms.”270  
These extrapolations of the Shona’s early existence have led to a number of 
contested historical interpretations of this era. For some historians this period of time has 
been ‘glorified’ in an attempt to paint the ethno-cultural and political ‘roots’ of the Shona 
people as pure; almost pristine in nature. David Chanaiwa defends the ancient Shona 
culture as a peace-loving, egalitarian network of villages’ cohabitating in harmony 
without the use of violence and war.271 However, most socio-historians and 
anthropologists alike would classify these Shona populations in conjunction with any 
other agrarian subsistence groupings (herders, hunters and gatherers) dwelling in that 
same developmental timeframe (the Iron Age). This would include the natural, inevitable 
                                                
268 The identity delineation of ‘Shona’ as a homogeneous ethnic grouping is a relatively contemporary label 
that encompasses a range of historically distinct ethnic groupings including the Korekore, Zezuru, 
Manyika, Ndau, Rozvi, Kalanga, and Karanga who now share the common language of modern-day Shona.    
269 Great Zimbabwe. Retrieved from the web 19/02/09. http://www.dmbinns.com/zimbabwe.htm  
270 Sibanda, E. 2004. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87 – A Political History of Insurgency 
in Southern Rhodesia. New Jersey: Africa World Press, 12. 
271 Chanaiwa, D. 1976. “The Army and Politics in Pre-Industrial Africa: The Ndebele Nation, 1822-1893”. 
African Studies Review, 19 (2): 53.  
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tendency toward inter-group feuding and conflict clashes over competition for essential 
forms of livelihoods.272    
Between the 11th to 15th Century A. D., a trading centre called Mapungubwe 
located on the banks of the Limpopo River expanded into what was called the ‘Great 
Zimbabwe’ which translated in Shona means ‘houses of stone’273. By the 13th Century the 
Great Zimbabwe (a series of chieftaincy dwellings dotting over 100 hilltops), became the 
dominant power in the region; its Kingdom extending to cover the Limpopo and Zambezi 
basins.274 This Shona ascendency to power is accredited to two prominent theories. The 
first is tied to a religious system (ancestral cult) that held a strong sway over the ordinary 
people who were required to perform mining labour services and a complex set of 
sacrifices to appease the ancestors in exchange for tributes of ivory and gold granted from 
the Chieftains storehouses of wealth. The second theory is linked to the exponential 
increase in trading business and subsequent wealth accumulation that occurred among the 
Shona over that time period as the Arab trade routes became an established network 
throughout the inland river ways of the region.275 According to Martin and Johnson 
(1981), “…considerable quantities of gold had been mined and exported from the 
area.”276   
One of the most controversial narrative debates of this pre-colonial epoch 
revolved around the origins of the Great Zimbabwe ruins. The first European explorers to 
visit the ruins were the Portuguese in the early 16th century. Following that various 
British colonists and hunters rediscovered the ruins; Adam Renders in 1867 and Karl 
Mauch in 1871. Archaeologist, J. Theodore Bent published a book on The Ruined Cities 
of Mashonaland in 1891. Unable to deviate from the racial evolutionist worldview of the 
white colonial mind-set, all of these figures promulgated the theory that the Great 
Zimbabwe must have been built by outsiders, not those of Bantu ascent. Bent believed 
                                                
272 Fagan, B.M. 1997. The Zambezi and Limpopo Basins 1100-1500, in Ki-Zerbo J. and Niane, D.T. (eds) 
General History of Africa – IV- Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century, Paris, France: UNESCO, 
James Curry, University of California Press, 209-11.   
273 Fagan, B.M. 1997: 213-218. 
274 History of Zimbabwe – Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: 11th - 5th century AD. Retrieved from the 
web 19/02/09.  http://www.historyworld.net/textonly/printpg.asp?type=histories&nid=ad28&pcount=4  
275 Fagan, B.M. 1997: 212-13.   
276 Martin, D & Johnson, P. 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Johannesburg: Raven Press, 36. 
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“that the ruins revealed either the Phoenicians or the Arabs as builders”277, and “Mauch 
favoured a legend that the structures were built to replicate the palace of the Queen of 
Sheba in Jerusalem.”278 The first scientific archaeological excavations were embarked on 
in 1905-06 by David Randall-MacIver and later in 1929 by Gertrude Caton-Thompson at 
which time, aided by the use of radiocarbon dating, the Great Zimbabwe ruins were 
finally proven to be the handiwork of the Bantu peoples of that time: 
“The famous Great Zimbabwe ruins near the modern town of Masvingo have 
fuelled the sometimes extravagant imagination of writers who sought its origin 
outside Africa. The reality is that is was an essentially African development, built 
of local raw materials and according to age-old architectural principles.”279 
 
“Portugal’s tenuous hold on the area was broken at the end of the century by the 
expanding Shona Empire of the Rozwi Mambos who developed a complex and 
stable political and economic system, permanent evidence of its great 
sophistication being the stone structures around the country, including Great 
Zimbabwe.”280 
 
For political purposes, the Great Zimbabwe represented a pivotal Bantu people’s 
accomplishment and was celebrated as a dynastic showcase of critical significance to the 
advanced governance and economic prowess of the Shona Empire: “To black anti-
colonialist groups, Great Zimbabwe became an important symbol of achievement by 
black Africans. Reclaiming its history was a major aim for those wanting 
independence.”281 Not only were these ruins proof of African ‘civilisation’ in the face of 
white colonial racism, but in the competitive ethnic relationships between the Ndebele 
and the Shona, Great Zimbabwe became a ‘trump card’ for Shona triumphalism (proof of 
past nationhood and ‘empire building’) in the face of the Ndebele domination to come. 
By the 15th Century, the Great Zimbabwe diminished in stature and magnificence as its 
towering stone structures were abandoned and left for ruin. Cascading from the fall of the 
Great Zimbabwe, the Shona established a number of other less potent conflicting state 
                                                
277 Great Zimbabwe National Monument – History of Research. Retrieved from the web 09/03/09. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Zimbabwe, 2. See endnote No. 3: “Vast Ruins in South Africa – The 
Ruined Cities of Mashonaland”. The New York Times. p.19. 1892-12-18. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Fagan, B.M. 1997: 212. 
280 Martin, D & Johnson, P. 1981: 37. See also Ranger, T. 1967. Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97. 
London: Heinemann. 




formations arising from the clans of the powerful Rozvi (Mambos); the more prominent 
states being the Mwenemutapa, the Torwa and the Changamire.282  
Explanations for the demise of Shona ‘empire’ remain a mystery to historians 
even up to the present. Some experts explain this fall of the Great Zimbabwe as a result 
of the migration of its chiefs and their inhabitants in search of unspoiled grazing and non-
depleted woodlands.283 Other historians would point to the destructive influence of 
European settlers (Portuguese followed by the British) who through deception and violent 
force overtook trading routes, mining rights, and most of the land leaving the Africans to 
eek out a bleak existence in reservations, functioning as cheap labour to the colonial 
masters.284 Still others account for this decline as a result of the ‘Umfecane’; the 
marauding, unruly bands of Zulu renegades under the leadership of Shoshangane, 
Zwangendaba and Nxaba who raided and pillaged in waves across the Zambezi plains 
from the 1820s until they eventually fought against each other in 1831 and thereafter 
scattered before the arrival of Mzilikazi in 1837.285 Curiously, these roving Zulu off-
shoots were not the only migratory raiders in search of land, cattle and other goods; 
various Shona clans also participated in the piracy and looting that spread across the 
region in the 18th Century. According to AmaShona expert and historian, David Beach:  
“The eighteenth century Shona were beginning to pay more attention to raiding 
and warfare as a means of making a living. There was a definite increase in the 
level of violence in society, and the Rozvi of the late seventeenth century were 
soon to be joined by the Nyai bands of the Mugapa, the bands of Chikunda in the 
lower Zambezi Valley, the raiding Heya of the 1760s…”286 
 
The fact that there was wide-spread engagement in migratory raiding in the 18th Century 
by different regional ethnic groups is important to note, as it assists in ‘thickening the 
plot’ of historic Ndebele-Shona relations by deconstructing the narrative myth that only 
one particular ethnic group (Ndebele) exercised this form of violence over the other 
(Shona). This issue of raiding will be discussed in more detail further on in this Chapter.  
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4.2.2. Stories of Ndebele Origins 
This section will concentrate on the narratives describing the more recent pre-
colonial history and the arrival of the Ndebele ‘nation’ to settle in Southern Zimbabwe 
under the kingships of Mzilikazi (1820-1868) and his son and heir to the throne 
Lobengula (1870-1893). In 1821, after a falling out with all-powerful King Shaka of the 
Zulu nation (located in what is now Kwa-Zulu Natal Province, South Africa), one of 
Shaka’s key generals, Mzilikazi (also spelled ‘umziligazi’) broke away and travelled 
northward with his band of followers (approximately 300 persons of the Khumalo clan) 
eventually settling in an area that is believed to be the Northwest Province (former 
Transvaal, South Africa). It was in this location that Mzilikazi is believed to have started 
his incorporation plan (either by force and/or through voluntary repatriation) in which he 
grafted in other ethnic groups, notably the Sotho and Tswana into his Ndebele Nation.  
In 1837, Mzilikazi and his people found themselves at war with the Boers287 who 
had set out on their ‘Great Trek’ (Vortrekker) from the Cape Region seeking release and 
refuge from what they perceived as the tyranny of British rule. To avoid further war and 
to escape continued bloodshed, Mzilikazi then migrated into Southern Zimbabwe and 
there established the Matabeleland Kingdom by 1840.288  
The Ndebele kingdom maintained a dominant rule in the region under King 
Mzilikazi and his successor and son King Lobengula until his defeat at the hands of the 
British in 1893. The Kingdom of Matabeleland was established through tactics of 
volunteer assimilation, coerced integration a d an extensive taxation system l vied 
against Shona chieftaincies. The Ndebele kingdom (traditionally referred to as 
uMthwakazi289) was actually a conglomerate of many different ethnic groups290 bound 
together by a dominant language, customs and governance structures:  
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“We are a nation, we are not a tribe - we are made of over ten different ethnic 
groups. We are a nation created by King Mzilikazi, we are Mthwakazi, we have 
our own way of life, we have a culture, we have a very clear history in this 
country, and we want government to recognize things like that and accept that 
those belong to us as those relate to ‘ubuntu’ or what we call humanity, and we do 
not want those to be interfered with.”291   
 
“And the state of Mthwakazi of Matabeleland was created by all our ancestry 
even in…in agreement, in liaison, because you’ll [find] the Venda, the Sotho, the 
Kalanga, the Tsonga, whatever – had their own input in creating this state of 
Matabeleland. That is the reason why you’ll find we still co-exist today. We know 
so-and-so is Nguni, so-and-so is Tonga, so-and-so is Venda, and so on but – those 
differences don’t really matter to us – we know as a nation we are all 
Matabeleland and nobody has really imposed that on us.”292 
  
For the Ndebele people, the identification of being one nation but consisting of 
many ethnic variations is a source of paramount pride. The above quoted speakers seem 
to believe that there is a unified, collective consciousness of what it means to be 
‘Ndebele’ that is shared by all its members and has emerged voluntarily, not because of 
imposition.  
“In all instances force was not a priority action. Where it was used it was designed 
to align behaviour to facilitate integration into the Nguni group…On the 
Zimbabwe side King Mzilikazi met minimum resistance and the integration was a 
diplomatic process based on persuasion and recognition of the local people’s 
religion.”293 
 
 However, the Ndebele kingdom may not have been as gloriously unified as is often 
portrayed in history. In his fascinating study of the internal sub-divisions within 
seemingly unified Ndebele Nation, Bjorn Lindgren makes the case that the Ndebele 
ethnic identity, far from being uniform is layered with a complex social ranking system 
that clearly places certain internal Ndebele groupings into certain class categories. 
Lindgren extrapolates on the three classifications of clan names (izibongo) in the Ndebele 
culture that connote a separate position or ‘caste’ order within the socio-economic web of 
                                                                                                                                                
was known to have incorporated persons from Nguni, Sotho, Shona, Kalanga, Tonga, Tswana, Venda and 
Lozwi extraction. 
291 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 - (A prominent member of the Ndebele Royal 
Family). 
292 Interview: CM1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 - (Ndebele Traditionalist and Cultural Activist 
advocating for a separate Ndebele nation). 
293 Khumalo, P.Z. 2006. Background on Local Cultures – An unpublished paper presented at the Bulawayo 
Agenda Conference on Ethnicity, Holiday Inn – Bulawayo, 30/06/06, 3.  
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intra-clan relationships. According to Lindgren the Zansi represent royalty, the Enhla 
represent other incorporated tribes, and the Lozwi/Holi represents the slave or servant 
class294. Royal Prince Khumalo disagrees with the notion of ‘caste’ and prefers to 
describe this asymmetrical stratification of people as necessary ‘social order’: 
“Once they joined Mzilikazi the conquered fitted into a structure based on status; 
Abezanzi, Abenhla and Amahole. At the time it was used it had no derogatory 
implications but it has been greatly abused by some of us who are bent on 
destroying this magnanimous Nation.”295 
 
Like Khumalo, Professor Ndlvou-Gatsheni also disagrees with Lindgren’s ‘caste’ 
analysis, but for different reasons. Ndlovu-Gatsheni suggests that Lindgren has been 
overly simplistic in his assumptions of a ‘ranking system’ as opposed to a ‘geographical’ 
categorization of the various Ndebele ethnic branches: 
“The discourse of castes just like that of izibongo ignores historical factors of 
social fluidities within the Ndebele state. For instance, the term Zansi literally 
meant the South in geographic sense while Enhla literally means the North. It also 
denotes direction. But Lozwi is a form of ethnic identity of a branch of Shona 
people who belonged to the Rozvi state that dominated the south-western part of 
the Zimbabwean plateau prior to the arrival of the Ndebele.”296 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni continues by identifying at least four versions of Ndebele identity. The 
first being restricted to those direct descendents of the Khumalo clan (the ruling elite), 
which would reduce the Ndebele kingdom to a small handful of Nguni clans. The second 
identity demarcation revolves around linguistic commonalities; meaning all who speak 
Ndebele as the mother tongue. The third version of Ndebele identification has 
geographical connotations as represented in anyone living in Matabeleland or the 
Midlands regions. The fourth and broadest attempt at defining the Ndebele nation opens 
the boundaries to be inclusive of all ethnic people groups (ten or more already 
mentioned) that amalgamated into the Ndebele (Mthwakazi) Nation over time. The fifth 
and more recent Ndebele nationalist identity was a projection of the nationalist project 
after independence in which Ndebele and ZAPU as a political entity became 
synonymous. Finally, the sixth and maybe most lethal of all identifications came as a 
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result of the Gukuranhundi violence where the Ndebele and the ‘dissident’ (counter-
revolutionary) became twinned together. 297 The latter two identifications will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter five (on Nationalism) and Chapter six (on Loyalty) of 
this study. All of these versions of Ndebele identity serve to complicate what it currently 
means to ‘be’ Ndebele thereby debunking the over-simplistic notion that the 
Matabeleland violence was the symptomatic display of a bifurcated ethnic-essentialist 
conflict between ‘Ndebele’ on one side and ‘Shona’ on the other. 
Despite these careful attempts to demystify and increase the complex variation 
around the context of ethnic conflicts in Matabeleland, pre-colonial history has produced 
a meta-narrative defined by a highly antagonistic relationship between the general 
groupings of Ndebele and Shona. This distorted interaction often only allows two voices 
to speak, two echoes to be heard across the chasm of the canyon of ethnic conflict; that of 
the ‘offended’ Shona and the justified ‘offender’ Ndebele. 
4.2.3. Narratives of Shona as ‘Offended’  
The dominant Shona narrative arising out of this epoch in history resounds with 
the voice of the offended; those who have been living under forced oppression or who 
have been invaded and overwhelmed by a foreign or alien force (the Ndebele ‘offender’). 
A cursory review of popular historical scripts298 describing this time period reinforces 
this sense of the Shona being the subjugated people: 
“In the nineteenth century, the Shona were disturbed by Nguni migrations from 
the south, particularly by the Ndebele who, possessing superior military 
techniques, settled in and dominated the southeast of what is now Zimbabwe.”299 
 
“ In 1834, the Ndebele people arrived while fleeing from the Zulu leader Shaka, 
making the area their new empire, Matabeleland. In 1837-38, the Shona were 
conquered by the Ndebele, who arrived from south of the Limpopo and forced 
them to pay tribute and concentrate in northern Zimbabwe.”300  
 
“The Shona confederation gradually disintegrated, and Zimbabwe was 
abandoned. During the 1830s, another Bantu people, the Ndebele, conquered and 
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settled the western half of the region and began exacting tribute from the Shona of 
the eastern half.”301 
“As warriors and cattle-breeders the Ndebele easily subdued the agricultural 
Shona, long resident in the region.”302 
Literarily loaded wording such as the Ndebele ‘possessing a superior military’, and the 
Shona “disintegrated’, ‘abandoned’, ‘forced to pay tribute’, and having been ‘conquered’ 
and ‘subdued’ only served to accentuate the Ndebele as victor on he one hand and the 
Shona as vanquished on the other. Present-day Ndebele patriots have attempted to 
solidify this position of power by describing the historic Shona in condescending and 
derogatory terms such as disorganized, demilitarised and not unified as an ethnic or 
national entity. Whereby, the Shona are then cast as a people group that is easily 
conquerable and vulnerable to manipulation by external forces. This view is accentuated 
in the following transcripts: 
“Do you know, when Mzilikazi came here, Mzilikazi had a regiment. Regiments 
are soldiers, well-trained people. But that side [Shona] they had no chiefs, they 
had no commanders, they only had Inyangas only. But here in Matabeleland, the 
chief, the commanders of the battalions, in fact Mzilikazi – everyone well 
organized and well disciplined, but that side [Shona]…totally nothing.”303      
 
“…I don’t mean to insult them but as a fact, I believe this…whether one calls it a 
nation or a group called Shona, is something that was created by the Colonizers as 
late as 1930. Because I recall reading through history that around 1927-1928 the 
colonial masters then said, ‘Look, people in Matabeleland, we found them as a 
nation – Matabele or Mtwakazi; but these people up here we don’t know what to 
call them’. They had to institute a commission to come up with suggestions as to 
what to call these various groups of people that lived up there, up until 1930 
where they agreed to call them ‘Shonas’. And by so saying I don’t mean to insult 
them…”304  
 
While it is clear that the delineation of ‘Shona’ came into existence relatively 
recently in historical terms, research refutes the above distortion of the origins of the 
Shona ethnic label by dating its initial evidences of usage almost 100 years earlier: “The 
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term Shona first appeared in writing in 1835 according to David Beach…”305  Bjorn 
Lindgren occupies considerable time in discussing the origins of the ‘Shona’ 
identification which is historically an isiZulu verb that was used by Mzilikazi and his 
followers to label those people that they had defeated. The term Shona can be translated 
as ‘sink’, ‘go down’, ‘go out of sight’, ‘disappear’, ‘setting of sun’, moon going down’, 
‘die’, ‘lose heavily’, ‘become poor’, ‘bankrupt’ or ‘ruined’.306 This interpretation of the 
Shona term was summarised in the following interview transcription:  
“Yes, it can be interpreted that way. But I don’t know whether it originated with 
Ndebeles. Otherwise, the Ndebeles have called them ‘AmaChona’, which ‘Chona’ 
is to go down…I mean Ndebeles would say ‘AmaChona’, and then they are just 
looking down upon them.”307  
 
Thus, those Ndebele who inherited a Shona-origin name were prejudiced against as part 
of the lowest caste (Lowzi/Holi) and often took great strides to try to distance themselves 
from this Shona identification.308  
4.2.4. Narratives of Ndebele as justified ‘Offender’ 
The dominant Ndebele narrative emanating from this historical period speaks 
from the voice of the rationalized and justified offender; a proud and established 
Kingdom that successfully assimilated many disparate ethnic groupings including some 
Shona (the offended) living in their resettled territories. The kidnapping of young Shona 
men is explained as recruitment for their advanced army structure and the abduction of 
Shona women is justified as necessary to provide wives for the newly recruited Shona 
soldiers. Likewise, the raiding of cattle is dismissed as a cultural misunderstanding 
whereby the Ndebele King had ownership of all property of his subjects, including cattle. 
The apparent reality that there was little known or recorded rebellion of Shona peoples 
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against the Ndebele Kingdom over this time (except for a few exceptions of Shona chiefs 
refusing to pay taxes to Lobengula), provides the necessary fuel for the prevailing 
narrative that under the reigns of Mzilikazi and Lobengula there was a highly united 
kingdom with a sustained peaceful diplomacy and an encompassing benevolence toward 
the cultural and religious practices of the assimilated foreigners in their midst.   
To better comprehend the textual make-up of this triumphal Ndebele script, it is 
critical to interrogate the centrality of the narrative theme of Ndebele raiding in Shona 
territories that was supposedly sustained throughout the rule of Mzilikazi and Lobengula. 
The rhetoric surrounding this ‘raiding’ script follows a predictable pattern without much 
variation: Ndebele warriors regularly penetrated into Shona locations stealing cattle, 
abducting women as wives and kidnapping young men to be conscripted as soldiers. The 
discursive repetition of this ‘raiding’ narrative throughout the research interview samples 
was striking, but even more intriguing was the relative dearth of printed research or 
historical-political evidence providing a descriptive account of the actual nature and form 
of these ‘raids’ which feature so prominently in both Ndebele and Shona ethnic 
narratives. Most available characterisations of these ‘raiding’ expeditions are often 
veiled, draped in the tactical language of strategic military and diplomatic exercises: 
“Using his two-pronged method of nation-building, voluntary assimilation and 
forcible incorporation, which he had perfected in Transvaal, Mzilikazi built a 
formidable nation out of the residents of his newly found haven in Zimbabwe, and 
created a new state…”309 
 
“Mzilikazi employed such strategies as raiding, conquest, assimilation and the 
incorporation of individuals, groups and communities. It included inculcating 
Ndebele values and language over people of different ethnic groups.”310 
 
“ I think what happens is, if you go back into history as well, if you go back into 
the 1800s, you discover that when the Ndebeles first crossed the Limpopo and 
entered present-day Zimbabwe, what happened is – you see they are coming from 
a military background in Zululand where…I mean, they were warriors on the 
move, and what these guys did is they were like following the Zulu notion of how 
the Zulu kingdom was built. Because from a small clique they conquered and 
integrated, conquered and integrated, so you find that today, they are all Zulu, 
they speak one language but they come from different areas. So what happened is 
when Mzilikazi won present-day Zimbabwe, he was following that plan of 
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conquering and integration. So what he did is when he settled there, the people 
who were there were integrated, and they easily integrated because they had no 
where to run to. And then as the empire started growing, that’s when the raids 
started, you know, going elsewhere. They went and took cattle, and whatever, the 
women and the young men, some were integrated into it.”311
 
When dissecting these narratives, the first observation is that the descriptive 
wording employed is exceptionally generalist in nature, thus providing little detail of the 
undertakings of these ‘raids’. The second observation is that the reader is immediately 
drawn into a performance of linguistic sanitization of war. Barring the vocabulary of 
‘conquering’ and ‘forcible incorporation’ the reader is almost lulled into believing that 
the cultural traditions and values of the Ndebele nation appeared so attractive and 
stabilizing for the ‘outsiders’ that they willingly flocked to join the movement.  
There are pieces of evidence312 that would indicate that Mzilikazi did experience a 
measure of voluntary assimilation by Sotho and Tswana peoples during his encampment 
in the Transvaal of South Africa between the years of 1826 to1838, described as such: 
“…a period of ambiguous peace rather then devastation. The Ndebele managed to push 
out the Griqua, Kora and other brigands that subsisted on raiding the Sotho and the 
Tswana. This atmosphere attracted some of these communities to join the Ndebele on 
their own volition.”313 It may be reasonable to believe that certain groups (like the Sotho 
and Tswana) who were experiencing a high level of threat (physical and material 
insecurity) may have willingly been incorporated into the Ndebele nation for purposes of 
protection. However, beyond these pragmatic motivations it seems highly unlikely that 
any distinct ethnic people group would voluntarily submit itself to another out of simple 
goodwill.  
What is often missing is the uncensored script of the brutal reality of war, 
conquest and the ‘necessary’ repression that must be enforced by any advancing nation if 
they are to expand at such a gallant pace. Glass captures a glimpse of this raw text of war 
crusades in the following description of the raids in the latter years of the Ndebele rule:  
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“In order to maintain his state, Lobengula has to continue raiding, the raids soon 
became mere expeditions of robbers seizing cattle, tribute and youths, fighting 
being limited to the slaughter of women and old men. When the pioneers arrived 
they looked upon the gloomy Mashona faces on which the stamp of bondage 
clearly showed.”314 
 
Therefore, a more apt and realistic description of the Ndebele policy of incorporation 
(also called integration or assimilation)315 is captured well in the words of the third 
transcript paragraph above: “…and they easily integrated because they had no where to 
run to.”316  
To better understand the significance of the narratives enveloping this ‘raiding’ 
history, it is critical to explore the psycho-social implications of these scripts and the 
evolution of counter discourses that have been manufactured in order to provide a 
‘corrective’ view of the past. This first set of interview excerpts lends credence to the 
processes of collective internalization and inter-generational transmission of emotive 
trauma and revenge that these historical ‘raiding’ narratives evoke:  
“The history is because of Mzilikazi, he ran away from Shaka. Then he went to 
Zimbabwe, he killed the Shonas and took their cattle, and their wives maybe. And 
that ‘grudge’ is still there, yes. That grudge between Shonas and Ndebeles is 
because of Mzilikazi.”317 
 
“You see because Ndebeles were warriors, they used to raid the Shona people. 
Now, tribalism in Zimbabwe centres around that - that the Ndebeles came to raid 
the Shona people. So there’s always been a yearning in the heart of the Shonas to 
revenge for that.”318 
 
“…when the combatants were travelling around during the war, if Shona ones 
came around the talked about Ndebele people having taken cattle from their 
grandparents and so on, their great grandparents. And they were saying ‘you are 
now paying for it. You were not there, you don’t know anything about it but it 
still stands. And you have to pay for that. So when we come around, you feed us – 
                                                
314 Glass, S. 1968: 6. 
315 The use of the word ‘incorporation’ is intentional as it denotes a more militaristic or forceful process, 
whereas the words ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ tend to connote a degree of free-will choice and 
volunteerism.     
316 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 – (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
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you butcher cattle because we cannot carry them to Mashonaland. But you people, 
your grandparents, took many cattle from this end and so you’ve got to pay for 
that.’”319 
     
In the minds, and daresay for some even in the hearts of these respondents the blight of 
those ‘raiding’ events from antiquity (the 1800s) still hold sway as plausible explanations 
for the current generational grievances and grudges (perceived or actual) being clung to 
by Shona people today. 
 The second set of interview extractions question the assumptions that underpin 
the historical and psycho-social grip that these ‘raiding’ narratives can (or should) have 
on the psyche of a people: 
“But it was like a history and a nice story to hear – not like inciting you to avenge 
or…it was nice during school time to hear that Ndebeles were powerful, used 
spears, pushed…took away wives of Shonas, what-what. But that I don’t think 
created more hatred than the Liberation Struggle coming to atrocities.”320 
 
“But, of course if any person is going to be perpetrating that kind of history or 
teaching, it is a misguided teaching and it is meant to achieve a particular agenda 
– and that agenda is to seek to divide the people of Zimbabwe to say they are not 
the same, there’s a historical grudge which dates back to that period of time, and 
they were sworn enemies, and they used to raid and subjugate the Shona people 
and that kind of thing. I think, to some extent, if someone really wants to exploit 
that kind of line and perpetuate it – it does in a way also perpetuate that kind of 
culture or form the general understanding and shape that relations between people 
if is perpetrated in a particular manner to drive a particular agenda.”321 
 
“What I believe is the ethnic dimension to the problem helped to sooth the 
conscience – people could do it…people they know they are doing wrong things – 
but they need something that soothes their conscience. And to say ‘these people 
are Ndebele’ and then you can say historically ‘they used to kill our forefathers’ 
or ‘they are going for our ladies, they kept our children and cattle’ – that sort of 
becomes a good excuse for something that you know is wrong.”322 
 
 This cluster of respondents explain the ‘raiding’ discourse as a form of seemingly 
harmless children’s stories (although this explanation could be highly suspect depending 
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on which side of the conflict one finds themselves), as a manipulative, subjective re-
writing of history, and/or as an ancient political alibi used by present day political leaders 
to mask their agency and probable implication in acts of severe violence. 
This final set of interview respondents question whether the ‘raiding’ discourse as 
it is publicly articulated and currently presented actually occurred and some venture to 
offer alternative narrative explanations to the ‘raiding’ story:  
“No, no – that’s a distorted history sometimes. We learnt in different schools, but 
I myself, I always disagree with people…So when Mzilikazi came here, these 
Shonas they were there also, they said, ‘no they’re going to fight’…The only 
thing is ‘let’s make an army’. They went there to collect the boys from that side; 
that’s the pure history. They came to this side and trained them. After training 
them they said, ‘no – you, you come from a certain ethnic group, us we come 
from a certain ethnic group, but we can’t marry each other – go and marry’. They 
went back those boys, to get their wives. They haven’t come back. So, the people 
say they took their wives. That is the purest this one, the pure history.”323 
 
“A divergent view that I heard was that, you know, in the process of these 
raids…Lobengula, Mzilikazi would capture young Shona men whom he would 
bring over and integrate them into his army. After the training they would have to 
go back to their homes and, you know, raid women for them…to fetch wives for 
themselves, as it were. So that’s the version I’ve heard.”324 
 
“ If it’s the issue of cattle being stolen, we know that the Shonas also stole cattle 
from the Ndebele people. If it’s the issue of women, we need them to come 
among us and tell us ‘this is the woman that never voluntarily got married to 
Ndebele’ and because traditionally, among the Ndebele people, people were 
restricted on who to marry. And that restriction is still strong, even today. It is 
really very difficult now to imagine that we can [be] accused of having taken 
other people’s wives when in actual fact we have that rule and restriction among 
our people, as far as marriage is concerned. It is remotely possible even now to 
get an Ndebele to marry a Shona because of that cultural background, that cultural 
difference.”325   
  
These interviewees present an Ndebele counter narrative to the aggressive ‘raiding’ script 
proffered by many Shona nationalists. Inferring that possibly this ‘raiding’ discourse 
provides a convenient disguise for the violent revenge of a vanquished people (as played 
out in the Matabeleland massacres of the 1980s). From a linguistics point of view, it is 
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striking to hear the first speakers use of polarising language; such as ‘these Shonas’,  ‘that 
/ this side’, ‘you / we come from a certain ethnic group’ and ‘those boys’. This literary 
bifurcation represents the ‘us/them’ thinking that plagues conflicting parties caught in a 
cycles of enemy-formation and internalisation.  
These alternative stories also suggest that the so-called ‘raids’ may have been 
more benign than portrayed; possibly even being implemented by the same Shona young 
men who had earlier been captured and forcibly conscripted by the Ndebele military 
structures. The reasoning follows that these young Shona men were in pursuit of women 
to marry as they had been culturally forbidden to wed Ndebele women, so they returned 
to their communities and took wives for themselves.  
A variation of this narrative is that the Ndebele warriors went on their own to 
abduct Shona women, not for themselves but on behalf of the young Shona men whom 
they had captured and forced to become soldiers in their army. This narrative assumes 
that the Ndebele had plenty of women from their own nation and therefore were not in 
need of Shona women except for purposes of supplying women for the newly 
incorporated Shona soldiers. Either way, this discourse is a rigorous effort to rationalize 
away the devastation of the Ndebele raiding that was conducted; giving an excuse that it 
served a higher purpose, that of ethnic purity in that the Ndebele and the Shona were not 
allowed to inter-marry due to cultural stipulations. Whether inter-marriage was forbidden  
in the past or not is debatable, however in the present circumstances it certainly appears 
to be negotiable: 
“But now I have a Shona, I stay with her…we are together here [South Africa]. 
But these dynamics, I have battled with it and tried to show my parents that no, 
Shona people they are people…The sins of those people cannot be brought into a 
whole grouping. Our sins we have to carry them individually, they are not 
communal. And I’ve reasoned with my parents and they have come to understand 
it that; there are also good Shona people…But, to be honest, when we sometimes, 
you know, have our own conflict, she sometimes makes those statements that 
‘aha, my parents told me that Ndebeles are like this and this and this’, you know. 
Then I would be like ‘no I’m not like that.’”326  
 
However, at least two other questions remain unanswered: First, if the Mthwakazi 
nation was so capable of assimilating external ethnic groups their strategy must have 
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included inter-marriage, so why would this policy not apply to these young Shona 
soldiers? A possible explanation for this restriction could be that the Shona were 
considered to be part of the lowest class in the Ndebele nation: “A more popular term for 
these tribes was ama-Hole (Maholi or Mahole) which Lobengula generally used to imply 
his ‘slave-people’. The Holi formed a servile caste that was denied full membership 
(including inter-marriage) of the tribe.”327 Second, if it was indeed young Shona men 
who were the ‘agent provocateurs’ in these raiding events why would they need to kidnap 
their own Shona women by force? Surely, their communities would have been pleased to 
welcome home their ‘lost’ sons and would have readily assisted in arranging brides for 
them. 
 Various other cultural extrapolations are utilized to explain the cattle wrestling 
and ‘abducting’ of children/youth practiced by Mzilikazi and Lobengula. As far as stock-
theft is concerned, once the Ndebele king had subdued the surrounding people (whether 
by physical occupation or taxation by extension) it was culturally accepted that he was 
the sole owner of the kingdom under his jurisdiction.  
“The entire area [Mashonaland], as we have seen, was claimed by the Matabele, 
although it was not actually occupied by them. Umziligazi had started the practice 
of raiding the Mashona tribes. His economic power had largely depended on his 
controlling the available resources of the country. According to custom the herds 
of cattle belonged to the nation – that is, the Matabele nation – and in his hands, 
as king, their possession was vested.”328 
 
Thus, under traditional law and practice the king was entitled to any of the livestock (and 
other natural resources) in the kingdom as this was his source of wealth and inheritance. 
Hence, some have attempted to explain the cattle theft performed by Ndebele warriors as 
a cultural clash of Ndebele and Shona perceptions of traditional kingship, authority and 
ownership. 
 There is yet another parallel text that incorporates an explanation for both the 
cattle and the youth/children. This script avoids the usage of any phraseology that would 
suggest force or violence. Instead, it employs the language of ‘bartering’ claiming that 
cattle (something the Ndebele had plenty of and the Shona needed) were exchanged for 
Shona children/youth (supposedly a clever way to fashion faithful subjects for the future 
                                                




of the Ndebele Kingdom).329 The ethnic and cultural-language identification with the 
Ndebele only came later once the Shona has been assimilated into the Ndebele Kingdom 
for a considerable amount time.  
With the categories of the Shona as the ‘vanquished’ and the Ndebele as the 
legitimated ‘victors’ packaged in these textual, binary forms of pre-colonial historical 
recount, the plot was established for the next generation to internalize and take 
‘ownership’ of these designated identities for themselves. After appropriating these roles 
through the oral and written production of patriotic history the future generations were 
poised to begin to live by them (consciously or sub-consciously) with the commensurate 
level of emotional intensity as their parents or grandparents had before them.330    
4.3. Ethnicity: Colonial Period - Narratives of Splintering and Subjugation     
During the colonial era, the British ‘masters’ (a rogue band of explorers, gold 
hunters, entrepreneurs, and missionaries) exerted large amounts of energy around 
manipulating the Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities through prejudiced perceptions and 
the common instrument of ‘divide and conquer’ pitting one ethnic group against another 
in an effort to justify the white man’s rule over the ‘ungovernable black man.’ Upon 
contact with the Ndebele peoples, the white settlers almost immediately observed and 
wrote about what appeared to be a unified social order, advanced military structure and a 
powerful leadership polity in contrast to the Shona peoples who were characterized as the 
opposite. These stereo-typed notions only served to substantiate the already dominant 
narrative of victor and vanquished as discussed in the above section. Of interest is to note 
that the residue of this prejudicial contrast between the fierce Ndebele and the meek 
Shona remains even up to the present-day.  
“I don’t know whether it was from ZANU-PF people or not but you always had 
the notion that Ndebele people were higher…because after all they were the 
descendents of Zulus…that might have been a little boy’s world of talking but 
that certainly was the sense that ‘Ndebele people, you don’t mess around with 
them, they’ll knife you or whatever’, and Shona people always seem peace-
loving.”331 
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4.3.1. The Matabele War of 1893 
 
In his historical research on the Matabele War of 1893, Stafford Glass documents 
the military organisation and prowess of the Matabele people and how the colonial 
powers not only feared and respected them for this power; they subsequently behaved 
opportunistically toward them.332 Upon realizing that they could not subdue the Ndebele 
through treachery, they proceeded to pit the Ndebele in opposition to the Shona in hopes 
to convince the Shona to side with them against the Matebele kingdom. The British, who 
initiated the Matabele War under the administrative leadership of one Dr. Leander 
Jameson, considered Lobengula as a hindrance to their access to the land and mineral 
wealth; particularly that of the Shona territories: “[The British]…finally made it clear to 
the Matabele King and his people that Mashonaland was being lost to them without an 
assegai being raised.”333 
In a bid to appear civil and diplomatic in posture, the British, represented by Cecil 
Rhodes and the notorious British South Africa Company, as well as a number of Boer 
frontier groups purportedly signed a series of land and mineral extraction and ownership 
treaties with Mzilikazi and Lobengula between 1836 and 1888. However, aside from the 
obvious linguistic-cultural barriers between the Ndebele royalty and the British settlers, 
the legitimacy of these agreements is highly suspect. Many of these treaties have been 
carefully researched and interrogated and there lingers a great deal of scepticism 
surrounding the signing and implementation of these agreements. Even today, they 
remain shrouded in doubt, deception, and multiple instances of cunning manipulation by 
the British and Boer colonial representatives as well as the clergy who assisted them in 
this intrigue.334  
After signing the Rudd Concession under great pressure and duress in 1888, King 
Lobengula later realized he had been deceived and backed out of the agreement: 
“Lobengula renounced the Rudd Concession early in 1889. In a letter to Queen 
Victoria, Lobengula said that what he now learned was contained in the 
Concession were not his words and that he had been tricked into believing that 
they were.”335 
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These Matebele treaties with the ‘white man’ have provided the incubating source of a 
number of well-nursed Shona narrative grievances that accuse the Ndebele of selling 
Zimbabwe into the hands of the colonizers: 
“Because if you remember Zimbabwe’s history there was talk of how Lobengula 
was the King of Matabeleland after 1863 it was after Lobengula died, so people 
were saying ‘he sold the country’…that the country was sold by Ndebeles.”336   
 
The Matabele War commenced on the 5th of October, 1893 and ended a month 
later on the 4th of November when Lobengula fled and the British marched into 
Bulawayo. Official British historical records blamed the war on Ndebele insurrection, 
increased Matabele violence (Ndebele raids on white settlers) and sabotage (the cutting of 
the telegraph wires and settler infra-structural destruction)337 and the supposed need to 
protect the Shona from the oppressive rule of the Ndebele. This notion of ‘Shona 
protection’ was seized upon in 1891 when a particular Shona chief named Lomaghundi 
was summarily killed by Lobengula’s warriors for refusing to pay the tax levies the King 
demanded. 338 When questioned by the British on this assassination, Lobengula’s 
reported response was curt and seemingly harsh (as paraphrased in a letter written by a 
colonial representative named Colenbrander in 1892): 
“I sent a lot of my men to go and tell Lomagunda [Colenbrander’s spelling] to ask 
you and the white people why you were there and what you were doing. He sent 
word back to me that he refused to deliver my message and that he was not my 
slave – this is why I sent some of my men to go and kill him. Lomagunda belongs 
to me. Does the country belong to Lomagunda?”339  
 
At the same time as the colonial leadership mischievously ‘demonised’ the 
Matabele (whom they had initially praised) they increased their furore over the severe 
plight of the Shona who they painted as being viciously oppressed by the Ndebele and in 
desperate need of rescue. After a raid by Ndebele warriors who had passed through a 
camp of the Mashonaland Agency where approximately 150 Shona workers were 
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employed, the colonial representative (a Mr. Wrey) described the Shona workers reaction 
as follows:  
“…these were absolutely paralysed with fear and announced their intention of 
leaving directly. It was only with great trouble and persuasion that they were 
induced to remain, and our position was a most false one; for as the natives very 
plainly said: ‘When you white man came into Mashonaland, you promised that if 
we worked for you, you would prevent the Matabele from raiding us. Here we are 
working for you and here are the Matabele killing our wives and children and 
raiding our homes.’”340  
 
In response to the above accusation (that the Matabele were brutal oppressors over the 
Shona) the Ndebele have nurtured a counter-narrative that draws attention to how quickly 
Mashonaland ‘fell’ to the white settler rule (implying that Shona are traitors) as opposed 
to the Ndebele kingdom that resisted white colonial rule up until its bitter military defeat 
in 1893: 
“But there’s always been this discussion that Shonas have brought all the disaster 
to this country. After 1819, 10 September 1819, Salisbury, the Union flag was 
raised in Fort Salisburg. But down this side it was still Ndebele-led kingdom until 
1893 when Lobengula disappeared somewhere in the Shangani and not to be seen 
again. So, Ndebele’s are saying ‘just hold it; we were not part of this bigger 
picture called Rhodesia – we are actually an independent state. We are short of 
being called a Protectorate.”341 
 
This narrative not only reinforces the script of the Shona being weak and easily 
susceptible to being defeated or engaging in treacherous behaviours, but it reinforces the 
proud, independent strength and the military stature of the Ndebele nation. Additionally, 
the interviewee speaks in ethereal, almost sacred language about the disappearance of 
Lobengula into the Shangani Forests, a geographical location that holds a rich and 
powerful space in Matabele mythology as a magical place of retreat, protection and 
renewal for the Ndebele fugitive when under threat.342 In all this there lies a mysterious 
insinuation that maybe Lobengula is in someway immortal; a man who cheated death and 
is to be revered as part of the ‘glorification’ of Ndebele history and nationhood. 
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4.3.2. The Matabele and Mashona Uprisings – 1895-1897 
 Not long after the Matabele War of 1893, the Ndebele followed by the Shona led 
a series of uprisings against the British colonial rule between the years of 1895-97. In 
December of 1895, the British-Rhodesian administrator Dr. Leander Jameson led a failed 
military raid into Transvaal, South Africa leaving the Rhodesian settler communities 
exposed. With only forty-eight European mounted police to protect the Rhodesian 
territories, the Matabele under the inspiration and leadership of their high priest 
Umlugulu and an induna named Mpotshwana, decided to seize the opportunity and 
attack.343 In describing the causes of this Matabele uprising colonial writers extended 
their inevitable narratives of prejudice: 
“It was not natural for a nation of savages who had taken so much pride in their 
former strength and tribal greatness to discard the cloak of racial independence for 
the sackcloth of servitude without a struggle.”344        
 
As opposed to the naïve colonial notion that the Ndebele uprising was a result of 
Ndebele being sore losers from the War of 1893, more recent scholarship has identified 
the Ndebele grievances as many-fold. Firstly, the large number of cattle confiscated by 
the colonial authorities was unacceptable. Secondly, the forced labour and horrific 
working conditions placed on the Ndebele by the British South African Company became 
unbearable. Thirdly, an outbreak of drought, famine and pestilence was causing great 
hardships on the Ndebele who believed that these natural disasters were curses from the 
white rule. All of these factors in combination fomented the Ndebele revolt.345 
The Matabele uprisings ended in a stand-off with the British who finally opted for 
a diplomatic settlement, much to the chagrin of a number of settler soldiers who were 
hankering for a military victory.346 The facilitated compromise contained a British offer 
to reverse some of their repressive policies toward the African populations and peace was 
negotiated after holding four indabas (i iZulu for Councils of Elders) held at Matapos 
Hills and attended by both British representatives (including Cecil John Rhodes) and 
Matabele indunas (isiZulu referring to traditional leaders). Part of the facilitated 
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agreement entailed the British providing seeds for farming and the restoration of some of 
the cattle that they had previously taken from the Ndebele.347 
The Mashona uprisings followed on the heels of the Matabele initiative in June of 
1896. The impetus for the Mashonaland attacks was partly due to the opportunity created 
by the Matabeleland insurgency and partly due to circumstances characterizing the 
authoritarian colonial rule, such as an imposed British ‘justice’ system, forced labour, 
increased control of all economic trading and livelihoods, land seizure and the unjust 
institution of an annual hut tax. This Shona insurrection lasted for over a year (according 
to the British it was concluded in October 1897) and was partially instigated by two 
Shona spirit mediums: Gomporeshumba, who was purported to be possessed by the 
Shona spirit Kagubi, and an elderly woman who was possessed by the Shona spirit 
Nehanda. This Shona uprising was clearly a surprise and as such, raised the ire of great 
indignation on the part of the colonial rulers as to the ‘utter and dastardly insolence’ of 
the whole occurrence. Yet again, the colonial rhetoric surrounding this Shona uprising 
was barbed with denigrating ethnic slurs meant to undercut the human dignity and 
disposition of the Shona: 
“Cowardice was their besetting sin. A sjambok [a whip made from flexible tree 
branch] in the hand of a determined man was sufficient to send them scurrying in 
all directions. As a race they lacked courage and spirit, and from the White man’s 
point of view, possessed few redeeming qualities. Any suggestion that so 
spineless a people could have perpetrated the outrages they committed during the 
rebellion would have been laughed to scorn.”348     
 
Unlike the negotiated settlement offered to the Matabele, the Shona uprising was not 
afforded the same level of respect from the colonial authorities. Instead, through a series 
of captures and public executions of key Shona leaders (including the two spirit 
mediums) the insurgency was stamped out. These uprisings called ‘Impi YoMvukela’ (in 
Ndebele) and the first ‘Chimerenga’ (in Shona) both roughly translated to mean uprising, 
revolt, war, riot or revolution349 became notorious in the patriotic history of both the 
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Continent. Health Communications, Inc., 335 (see endnote no. 2), and also struggle in Goliath Business 
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ZAPU and the ZANU revolutionary movements as they marked a starting point of 
African nationalism and the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence.350  
 Throughout this period of Matabele and Mashona uprisings, the colonial settlers 
maintained an on-going strategy of attempting to splinter and subdue both the Ndebeles 
and Shonas. Numerous Ndebele and Shona voices have countered these contentious 
narratives with dignity and pride, pointing to these joint uprisings and the collaborative 
resistance against the British in the late 1890s as evidence of the tangible unity that does 
exist between Ndebele and Shona. Hence, an alternative narrative to the opaque racially 
divisive rhetoric of the colonial dispensation arose. An empowering, cooperative 
narrative of idyllic unification and purpose between the Ndebele and Shona against a 
common enemy was developed: 
“In time, the whole of Zimbabwe was under a general African uprising in both 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The uprising of AmaShona shattered the 
stereotype by the white settlers that the AmaShona were a cowardly people, and 
also that they viewed whites as their benefactors.”351  
 
In his influential 1967 study on the Matabele and Mashona uprisings, Terrence Ranger 
argues that the revolts were instigated and motivated by a historic partnership of 
solidarity between Ndebele traditional leaders (indunas) and Shona religious leaders 
(priests) representing the Mwari cult: “The [Ndebele] alliance against the whites was 
cemented by the Mwari or Mlimo cult, part of the ancient Shona religious system.”352 For 
Ranger, this was a pivotal point in the ascendance of African liberation and the 
awakening of Zimbabwean nationalism.353 
However, traces of the splintering arratives of the colonial era have also left a 
negative imprint on Ndebele and Shona relations with threads of contrary narratives 
emerging that re-think the perceived unity and coordination (between Ndebele and 
Shona) against the colonial oppressors. These alternate narratives imply that the Ndebele 
                                                                                                                                                
News. Retrieved from the web 16/03/09.  goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-8652905/Boys-with-the-jit-
bug.htm  
350According to the ZANU-PF, the ‘second Chimerenga’ refers to the armed struggle from 1965-1980 and 
the ‘third Chimerenga’ refers to the fast-track land occupancy / redistribution programme instituted in the 
year 2000. 
351 Sibanda, E. 2004: 23 
352 Martin, D. & Johnson, P. 1981: 48. 
353 Ranger, T. 1967. Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-1897: A Study in African Resistance. London: 
Heinemann Press.  
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exercised the leadership in the resistance and the Shona only followed later, and that in 
some cases the Shona remained committed to the colonial leaders and functioned as 
traitors amidst the resistance movement. The critical interrogations seem to intersect with 
two major questions swirling around initiation (who instigated and gave direction to the 
uprisings, the Ndebele or the Shona?) and coordination (h w closely in tandem did the 
Ndebele and Shona actually work?). E. Sibanda highlights these contested issues: 
“Modern history scholars, however, are becoming increasingly sceptical of this thesis of 
[unified resistance] and its attendant position that the rebellion was a well-coordinated 
national effort by Africans.”354 Sibanda continues by citing research by Julian Cobbing355 
that indicates that the Matabele uprising was both planned and executed independently of 
the Shona and research by Shona specialist, David Beach356 suggests that although the 
Shona uprising was considerably wide-spread, it was not highly strategic or well-
coordinated. 
While the historical details of these uprisings remain contested, the crucial 
question for the study of narrative is: What is the significance of the discourse that 
emphasizes the points of initiation a d coordination in the scramble for political power? 
For the triumphal nationalist these competitive positions of leadership (initiation and 
coordination) insinuate superiority in collective intellect and developmental organization 
of a nation, both of which have been laid claim to by the Ndebele and the Shona at 
different points in history, and both of which occupy centre stage in the political theatre 
of Zimbabwe today.  
4.3.3. Urban Violent Clashes of 1929 and 1960 
Hints of ethnic hostilities spilled over in two different events in more recent 
colonial history. The first incidence was the faction fighting that broke out in Bulawayo 
City in 1929 between what appeared to be Ndebele residents and the new influx of Shona 
migrant workers. The second occasion surfaced in the urban gang violence that subsumed 
the city of Bulawayo and its surrounds in 1960. In an attempt to deflect the classic ethnic 
divide theories (usually subscribed to by the colonial regimes), both of these incidences 
                                                
354 Sibanda, E. 2004: 25. 
355 Cobbing, J. 1977. “The Absent Priesthood: Another look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-7”.  Journal
of African History, 18 (1). 
356 Beach, D.N. 1986. War and Politics in Zimbabwe, 1840-1900. Gweru: Mambo Press.  
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were initially cast in terms of economic injustices exploding into violent ‘class 
struggles’.357 However, more recently there has been renewed credence given to the 
xenophobic ingredient of this urban violence358 coupled with a deviation in the direction 
of explaining this violence as the collision of ethnic antagonisms and the contestation 
over control of social capital. In this case, ‘control of social capital’ means the power to 
influence social infra-structure, relational networks, trends that mobilize the people and 
public recognition or status definition in society at large. 359 
In summary, colonial narratives were continually being constructed and 
deconstructed; evolving around shifting alliances and imagined betrayals between the 
whites and Africans and between the Africans themselves; Ndebele and Shona. The result 
was a constant flow of intrigue concerning who was loyal to whom, and who was not. 
The Colonisers became masters at breeding suspicions and subsequent accusations of 
traitors and informants, of rebels and rabble-rousers. This primordial tactic of ‘divide and 
rule’ returned with a vengeance in the form of labelling ‘dissidents’ and ‘heroes’ during 
the Gukurahundi violence in the 1980s. Hence, this research asserts that the colonial 
narratives of ‘splintering and subjugation’ (which were nested in the pre-colonial meta-
narratives of Ndebele as ‘victor’ and Shona as ‘vanquished’) were partially successful as 
they effectively heightened the ethnic competitiveness that set the stage for actual inter-
ethnic violence to be perpetrated. The ‘stage’ of ethnic superiority complex was not only 
set, the ‘actors’ were now armed with the necessary ‘scripts’ and ‘props’ to act out their 
convictions and grievances. It was this posture of ethnic polarization or ‘combat 
readiness’ that catapulted the violent clashes that transpired internally between 
ZAPU/ZIPRA and ZANU/ZANLA during the time of the Liberation Struggle.  
4.4. Ethnicity: Liberation Struggle Years -‘Sons of the Soil’ - ‘Sons of Segregation’ 
 At the inception of the modern-day liberation movement, there was a unified story 
verbalised in the hearts and minds of both the Ndebele and the Shona vocalising a dream, 
                                                
357 Phimister, I. and van Onselen, C. 1979. “The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case Study of 
the 1929 Bulawayo Location ‘Faction Fight’”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 6 (1): 1-43.  
358 Msindo, E. 2006. “Ethnicity, not Class? The 1929 Bulawayo Faction Fights Reconsidered”. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 32 (3): 429-447. 
359 Ranger, T. 2006. “The Meaning of Urban Violence in Africa: Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, 1890-
1960”. The Journal of Cultural and Social History Society 3 (2): 218. 
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a future view of freedom from white oppression for the African peoples living in 
Southern Rhodesia. As the African nationalist movement took root and formalized its 
organizational structure under the initial banner of the African National Congress (ANC) 
in 1957360, they referred to themselves as the ‘Sons of the Soil’.
“…[in] an article which was written by or they interviewed James Chikerema, 
who was ZAPU vice president, and I agree with what he says – ZAPU has 
become very powerful as a Nationalist movement by 1962, it was formed in 
December 1961. By 1962 it was very powerful and there was unity, you know, 
‘the son of the soil’ was the slogan.”361 
 
This patriotic, revolutionary slogan invoked a visceral sense of African 
nationalism at two levels. At one level it spoke of a deep sense of ‘belonging’, of a 
people formed out of the dust of the earth with an intimate connection to the soil of 
Africa. This spoke volumes to a people who felt dislocated, displaced in their own 
country of origin. At another level, it was a nuanced referral to the African’s rightful 
claim to the land, which had been stolen from them by the coming of the white man, 
resulting in the issue of land redistribution becoming a central pillar to the pan-African 
politico-economic platform. This was an alluring vision, a mobilising call to action that 
drew both Ndebele and Shona to join forces in the Liberation struggle.      
“Yes, true. They would fight in union and they were doing that in union, until 
something happened somewhere. Because…each group that came, it didn’t 
matter, Shona or Ndebele, I mean each group of fighters – they wanted to 
eliminate the enemy who was the white man…the Smith regime. Until in the end 
when we had our independence, than then they talked about eliminating Nkomo. 
But before that, they were in a united front against the White man – that’s what 
we experienced in the war.”362 
 
However, this rallying battle cry of unity, the ‘Sons of the Soil’ soon became a lament of 
the ‘Sons of Segregation’ as the struggle movement split apart (between ZAPU and 
ZANU) in 1963.  
                                                
360 Martin, M. 1979. The Past is Another Country – Rhodesia 1890-1979. Glasgow, UK: Andre Deutsch 
Publishers, 11. The ANC, which was banned in 1959, morphed into the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
in 1960. After the banning of the NDP, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) was birthed in 1961 
only to be banned in 1962.  
361 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 30/03/07 – (Ndebele historian, author and archivist).  
362 Interview: NM1, Mtshabezi, Zimbabwe – 28/06/06 – (Female Ndebele Peace Activist working with 
rural Matabeleland women). 
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“ZAPU was for everybody. We had Chinamano…we buried Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
with Chinamano, a Shona, ZAPU was not like that. ZAPU has Shonas, Ndebeles, 
Karangas, all the types in Zimbabwe. Only ZANU was for Shona.”363   
 
This separation would remain a ‘thorn in the flesh’ of the nationalist movement for 
decades to come. The reasons for this political divorce range from conflicting leadership 
styles, divergent political strategies to personality jealousies and vendettas:  
“Dissatisfaction with Nkomo was rife. His opposition urged a more 
confrontationist approach to the Rhodesian government and wanted a new 
political party; they were tired, too, of what they regarded as Nkomo’s vacillation 
over the years.”364   
 
“Obviously they [Rhodesian government] know Nkomo has no foresight, no 
plans, and so they will prefer to deal with a muddle-headed opponent. It is much 
easier…Nkomo sat around and waited for some sort of outside help. We want to 
teach our people to be dependent on themselves…Nkomo is weak, cowardly, 
evasive, corrupt…”365    
 
“  His [Nkomo’s] ideas came under heavy criticism from Robert Mugabe his 
Secretary General, Julius Nyerere, then president of Tanzania, and his once 
trusted friend, Ndabaningi Sithole, who it seems were now becoming alarmed by 
Nkomo’s popularity at home and abroad. ZAPU split along ethnic grounds a year 
after its formation…”366 
 
This prevailing antagonism between ZAPU and ZANU was not only contained in 
the upper echelons of political leadership, it overflowed into the rank and file members of 
both political camps. In October of 1963, it was reported that “there have been vicious 
threats and some fighting between ZANU and PCC [the organization that formed after 
the banning of ZAPU]”367. Then again in November of 1963, an angry violent throng of 
PCC supporters numbering up to 4,000 surrounded the Barbourfields Sports Stadium in 
Bulawayo shouting insults at the small group of ZANU supporters who had huddled 
together inside the Stadium to wait for the arrival of their leader, Rev. Ndabaningi 
Sithole. Sithole did eventually appear accompanied by heavy security and police 
protection: 
                                                
363 Interview: JD1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 15/09/06 – (Female Ndebele activist advocating for 
women and refugee rights) 
364 Couzens, T. (ed.) 1981. Zimbabwe: The Search for Common Ground Since 1890 – From the pages of 
DRUM Magazine. Harare: NatPrint, 101.  
365 Couzens, T. (ed.) 1981. (Interview with Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole - October 1963): 187. 
366 http://www.bulawayo1872.com/history/nkomoj.htm - (17/03/09). 
367 Couzens, T. (ed.) 1981: 93.  
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“Sithole arrived with a formidable police escort, with all the windows of his car 
smashed and with one of his lieutenants in bandages. The little band [of 
followers] gave a ragged but jubilant cheer. Sithole explained amid the cheers that 
he had been stoned by ‘Nkomo thugs’ but in the true spirit of dedication had 
pressed on regardless.”368   
 
4.4.1. Narratives of Externalisation: The Enemy from Without 
 Both Ndebele and Shona alike subscribe to a narrative of unity that existed in the 
early years of the liberation struggle before the split of ZANU from ZAPU in 1963.369 
The Executive committees of each of the Nationalist Movement formations including 
ZAPU consistently included a mix of Shona and Ndebele, and the soldiers were recruited 
from both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Dr. Joshua Nkomo, the founder and head of 
ANC, NDP, and ZAPU (as well as the PCC), was bequeathed with the title of ‘Father of 
Zimbabwe’ and was known to travel anywhere in the nation and draw large crowds in 
those early years. 
“ But you know, I’ve heard a Shona name that they called him with. They called 
him “Chibwechitedza” or something like that. I think it is supposed to mean ‘a 
rock that slides’, you know, ‘a slippery rock’ basically. I’m not sure how he got 
that. You know, from my understanding it was that he was viewed as a national 
leader, and I think that’s how he viewed himself until his death. And he had a lot 
of support even from Mashonaland. My understanding is that the start of the 
Nationalist Movement, as I read his biography and all the other guys - it really 
was not based on tribal issues.”370 
 
Thus, the bifurcated ethnic divide between ZANU (as Shona political party) and ZAPU 
(as an Ndebele political party) in their origins is for the most part discredited by 
historians. The evidence that there were both ethnic groups represented on the leadership 
of ZAPU and ZANU at the time of the divide and for many years afterwards speaks 
volumes. 
“A lot of people would like us to believe that ZANU is a party that was formed 
for largely Shona people and that ZAPU was a political party for the 
                                                
368 Ibid: 194-195. 
369 After the formation of ZANU in 1963, Nkomo responded by launching the People’s Caretaker Council 
(PCC) that same year. However, ZAPU remained the primary reference point as the counterpart political 
party to the ZANU throughout the liberation struggle and up to 1987 with the signing of the Unity Accord 
between ZAPU and ZANU. 
370 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 




predominantly Ndebele people. But a clear reading of history, which is not 
distorted, will tell you or will indicate that it was in actual fact ‘not like that’ – in 
that you actually had prominent people, some of them actually became prominent 
heroes, who occupied very senior positions in ZAPU but who not Ndebele. One 
name which quickly comes to my mind is James Chikerema. There were also 
people who occupied very important positions in ZANU-PF who are not Shona, 
but who were Ndebele. So, there was a deliberate effort to try to distort history to 
say – ZANU is for Shonas, ZAPU is for Ndebeles, which I find to be a distortion 
of history.”371   
 
However, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni; the author and expert on African nationalism, 
Masipula Sithole suggests that there were some indications of ethnic conflict surfacing in 
the Nationalist movement as early as 1957: 
“[Sithole] noted that at the formation of the first mass nationalist organization, the 
Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957, the Ndebele-
Shona axis emerged, manifesting itself in the words exchanged at the founding 
congress as well as in the structure established to lead the party. Conscious effort 
was made to achieve ethnic or regional balance between the Ndebele and 
Shona.”372 
 
4.4.2. Narratives of Internalisation: The Enemy from Within 
 While the organizational scaffolding of the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle was 
founded on a platform of unified ethnic representation, after the split of ZANU from 
ZAPU in 1963 a ‘natural’ ethnic rift began to occur. Most researchers speak of this as an 
unintentional consequence that unfolded as each of the two main liberation structures 
began to recruit and operate almost exclusively within the geographical locations of their 
own ethnic boundaries. 
“…which leaves ZAPU now even more predominantly Ndebele than it happened 
in 1963; the few Shona that are there you see them moving out. This is not to say 
all the Shona moved out, no, but I think it’s a process of ‘Ndebele-isation’ of 
ZAPU. And so even when you have this Patriotic Front, its two parties, but what 
are they in essence? One is representing Shona side of things, the other one 
Ndebele. And even the infiltration itself. You’ll see ZAPU infiltrating largely 
from the North, from the West, and South-West, but ZANU perhaps enjoying a 
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372 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2008: 43. See also, Sithole, M. 1995. “Ethnicity and Democratization in 
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bigger border. I know some people now don’t even realise that ZAPU was there 
in Chimoio, all that area.”373 
 
However, other views are much less forgiving on this ‘organic’ ethnic parting of ways 
and instead paint this split as a decided acting out of historic ethnic factionalism:  
“So, the issue of the fact that the Ndebeles conquered the Shonas when they 
arrived…it was something brought on by the Shona intellectuals in the 60s. 
Because now it was okay, ZAPU has been formed, and they had recruited, it was 
both Shonas and Ndebeles who said, ‘okay, we need to fight the settlers. 
And…some among them said ‘no, are we going back to the 1800s now, being led 
by the same Ndebeles?, I mean come on. Let’s form our own party’. So they did 
split and form there own party.”374  
 
Differing ideological and training allegiances (ZAPU/ZIPRA trained by the Russians and 
ZANU/ZANLA by the Chinese), with conflicting modes of operation in combat (ZIPRA 
emphasized conventional warfare and ZANLA guerrilla tactics) and opposing styles of 
relating to the rural peasant support base all fed the appetite of the ever-widening gap 
between the modes of operation of ZAPU and ZANU: 
“…but for me, I hate ZANLA forces…even if I was very young. And even the 
whole village they used to kill. They used to burn the homestead, you know, they 
will burn the whole homestead. ‘So you people, you are supporting ZIPRA 
forces?’ They will burn, they will kill people. Even Ndebele-speaker being killed 
by someone who is a Shona. The wall of my property being burnt by a Shona. 
Sometimes they used to kill even the cattle, you know, these cows, they shoot. So 
you’ll come to the extent of thinking that ‘why does these ZIPRA forces not doing 
the same thing?’, ‘why is it this people that speak this other language, doing this 
to us?’ So to me that hatred…I think the ZANLA forces started by harassing, 
forcing people to speak their language, torturing people, forcing people to cook 
for them, beating old-aged people. So I think from there…I think I grew up with 
that.”375  
 
“But the military which came from Mozambique and Zambia, we could tell that 
these people are not united, the ZIPRA and ZANLA. ZANLA forces will ask for 
food, especially meat, they wanted special food. But the ZIPRA forces will at 
anything that you have…if they found you had cooked something, they will eat 
with you there. And the ZANLA, they will have bases in the bush, in the 
mountains, then there children…young girls were raped. Because in the bush 
                                                
373 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07- (Ndebele historian, author, researcher and archivist). 
374 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 – (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
375 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government).  
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there; they will have sitting rooms, bedrooms, kitchens. So in the bedrooms, only 
young girls will go to the bedrooms. Only girls, just imagine…young girls were 
raped. And with ZIPRA forces, they were not for bases, to take people 
from…eating with the girls, no. So we realized that this training is different; the 
ones coming from Mozambique…they used to torture people…destroying 
schools…ZIPRA was not destroying anything. And ZIPRA, they had discipline, 
they would ‘propose’ a girl, rather than ZANLA forcing.”376 
 
Within the above narrative paragraphs above, the reader uncovers traces of 
political ideologies that endorse fear and terror (force) as means of modifying the 
collective behaviour, the resultant production of ‘enemy’ mind-sets and a display of the 
gripping, emotive power of traumatic memory (including gender violence). This raw 
discourse begs the question, how can two closely aligned groups who supposedly share a 
common cause fall from the heights of unity (if ever attained) into the abyss of factional 
hatred and hostility? Ngwabi Bhebe captures a glimpse of the longer view in regard to the 
disordering effects of historical rivalry between the armed wings of both political 
movements even during the time of exile. 
“The reader saw how ZAPU and ZANU followers started killing each other when 
they were dumped together at Mboroma by the Zambian authorities. The ZIPA 
[Zimbabwean People’s Army] experiment in Mozambique collapsed for just that 
same reason. In Libya, ZAPU and ZANU were put in the same training camps 
and they killed each other. The reason was very simple. These young men and 
women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who wanted to justify the 
separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own Commissariat 
Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how the 
party was different from each other, who the leaders were and how they were 
different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, 
the cadres were brought up to hate.”377  
 
The open hostility between ZIPRA and ZANLA did not remain confined to the 
battlegrounds of exile. It resurfaced with a vengeance after the 1980 Independence in the 
military demobilisation camps. 
“The first crisis that hit the post-colonial nation-building project had to do with 
ethnicity and integration of military forces. A crisis which began in the ranks of 
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the military, involving open exchange of fire between the triumphant and Shona-
dominated ZANLA and the Ndebele-dominated ZIPRA in Connemara (Gweru) 
and Entumbane (Bulawayo)…”378 
 
These flash-points of violence in the demobilisation compounds will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5 of this study as part of the ‘Nationalist project’ of the ZANU-PF. 
This tragic ‘tale of two brothers’, ZAPU and ZANU who ended up becoming arch 
enemies beguiles a bitter story full of textual parody and irony.  
4.4.3. Narratives of Introspection: The ‘Narcissism of Minor Difference’ 
This research suggests that the supposed Ndebele-Shona ‘ethnic’ fault-lines 
become even more blurred when inspected from the view of the sub-ethnic splintering 
that occurred within the respective Liberation movements. In her book on the 
assassination Herbert Chitepo379, Luise White outlines a series of internal ethnic power 
struggles (sometimes fatal) within the ZANU structures prior to independence in 1980. 
Speaking of the 1976 Report of the Chitepo Commission, set-up to investigate Chitepo’s 
death, White describes how this report served to debunk the image of a patriotic, unified 
political organisation that the exiled ZANU wanted to project itself as: 
“But the Report of course described a very different  ZANU, one that was a 
breakaway party itself, fractious, polarized, and distrusted by much of its 
leadership…the text itself depicts a time when ZANU was fragmented and weak, 
a party with at least one account of its own history that problematizes its ability to 
claim the blind obedience of voters.” 380
   
The intra-ethnic power-mongering for representation and the intense vying for political 
positions among the Zezuru, Manyika, and Karanga on the ZANU leadership has become 
a political sub-text that rivals any inter- thnic conflict between Ndebele and Shona. 
“I don’t think he of all, in his wildest dreams, could ever think that he would 
actually get away with wiping out an ethnic group. I would say that Robert 
                                                
378 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2008: 44. 
379 Herbert Chitepo was the popular ZANU Chairperson and head of the High Command (Dare), who was 
killed by a car bomb in 1975 while living in exile in Lusaka, Zambia. It is not clear to this day who was 
actually responsible for this assassination as at least three different sources have been implicated at 
different times. The official line blames his death on the white Rhodesian and South African secret service 
while others have attempted to place the blame on Zambian government mercenaries and still others on 
internal factions within ZANU.   
380 White, L. 2003. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo – Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe. Cap  Town: 
Double Storey Books, Bloomington: Indiana University Press and Harare: Weaver Press, 101. 
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Mugabe is more unhappy, more worried of Karangas, Manyikas, than he is of 
Ndebeles.”381  
 
“And as I went on in Zimbabwe I realized you can’t just group the Shona in one 
group, you had to look at the Manyikas, Karangas, Zezuru. But that took me much 
longer. I didn’t want to view things in an ethnic way but I realized that that’s just 
the way things are. And to understand things, ‘why ZANU-PF is acting this way’, 
you have to understand …the rivalries between those different groups.”382 
 
“ If you have a look at the organogram of the Zimbabwean government, those 
pillars that matter most - there is Robert Mugabe, president, he’s a Zezuru and 
he’s the head of defence, and then there are the three most influential pillars, they 
are headed by Zezurus; Perence Shiri heads the air force…They are all Zezurus, 
and there is only one Karanga – Sibanda…”383 
 
“Zimbabwe’s top hierarchy in the defence force is exclusively dominated by 
Mugabe loyalists that included General Solomon Mujuru, General Vitalis 
Zvinavashe, Air Marshall Perence Shiri and General Chiwenga…The most 
disturbing issue is that the majority of these men also hail from the Zezuru sub-
Shona ethnic group where President Robert Mugabe comes from. This amplifies a 
worse form of ethnicisation of the military which is even more dangerous that 
politicisation.”384 
 
Thus, while the socio-political meta-narratives of inter-ethnic conflict attempt to uphold a 
stark contrast between the Shona and Ndebele classification, the subjugated narratives of 
intra-ethnic conflict reveal a great deal of heterogeneity from within each particular 
ethnic grouping; a diversification of purposes often fraught with competing interests. 
Research now indicates that these intra-ethnic tensions can feed violence even between 
close-knit people groups who may have co-existed for many centuries, but for various 
reasons (historical traumas, revenge cycles, power struggles or protracted structural 
oppression) are now determined to divide and separate from each other.  This kind of 
violent social ‘divorce’ is peculiarly disturbing because many of these groups that are 
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fighting share the same racial and cultural-linguistic heritage. In such situations one finds 
the conflict nexus rests on the central theme of similarity, not dissimilarity.385  
Michael Ignatieff most appropriately extrapolates on this notion in his writing on 
‘ the Narcissism of Minor Difference’ a term he borrows from Sigmond Freud.386  The 
idea being that this kind of violent conflict can arise from a desperate attempt by two or 
more sub-ethnic groups to set themselves apart from each other. Forced division allows 
the antagonists a chance to dissociate from each other and the interdependencies that 
exist between them.  This violent effort to extricate one group from the other is in order 
to try to prove their essentialist, unique identities; their extreme differences in protest to 
the homogenization of their historical past.  However, to do this ‘successfully’ they have 
to exaggerate and magnify their minor differences. In the words of Luise White, 
“…mutinies are born of intimacy, not the intervention of outsiders.”387 
 In order to disguise this intra-ethnic splintering within the ranks of a supposed 
unified political movement, ZANU had to mask its own disintegrating internal ethnic 
relations by creating an outside enemy (in this case ZAPU)388, which was a form of 
collective ‘displaced aggression’389. This was not only effective in refocusing ZANU’s 
energies externally; it temporarily brought about new levels of unity within the political 
organization, and prepared the way for ZANU to become the ultimate ruling party. 
“For someone who is from the Matabeleland area, who is not a tribalist – like me, 
I am not a tribalist. I value the Shona and the Ndebele equally, I don’t see 
someone who is lesser or second class, like that. So, it’s very painful. I think 
Mugabe created the enemy between the two tribes so that he can keep on ruling; 
selecting few Ndebeles who are sympathetic to him, whom he can use to diffuse 
the situation in Matabeleland.”390    
 
                                                
385 Mann, M. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy – Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge Universtiy Press. 
386 Ignatieff, M. 1998. The Warrior’s Honour – Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. New York: 
Viking Publishers, 48. 
387 White, L. 2003, 37. 
388 While it would be important to mention that at least two major efforts were initiated to bring about 
ZAPU-ZANU unification (the formation of ZIPA - Zimbabwean People’s Army in 1975 and Patriotic 
Front (PF) in 1976), both of them were imposed by pressure from the frontlines states, both were rather 
quickly sidelined by the international stakeholders, and both were afforded only ‘lip-service’ by their top 
leaders and as such they failed to provide the scaffolding for a unified liberation struggle movement.  
389 See Bar-On, D. 1999. The Indescribable and the Undiscussable – Reconstructing Human Discourse 
after Trauma. Budapest: Central  European University Press. 
390 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
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4.5. Ethnicity: Gukurahundi – Fatal Fusion of Ethnic Hatred and Severe Violence 
There is amassed evidence from countless Matabeleland victims and survivor 
statements that the security forces (Fifth Brigade, ZNA, PISI and CIO)391 deployed by the 
ZANU-PF ruling party crafted a well-articulated ethnic hate-speech to accompany and 
justify the severe violence unleashed on Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi period 
1980-1987392. What is not as clear is whether this special force (Fifth Brigade) was 
expressly trained to use ethnic hate speech as a tool of repression, fear and terror, or 
whether it was a ‘natural’ outgrowth of the highly divisive politicization that the ZANLA 
freedom fighters (now turned Fifth Brigade soldiers) had been ‘brain-washed’ to believe 
during the time of the Liberation Struggle.   
“I really believe they were trained. What you normally do or need to understand 
about ZANU-PF is that; what basically happened in this particular instance is that 
they took anti- or racial-oriented people, who were anti-Ndebele, and made them 
the Commanders of this particular battalion that was supposed to go…that went to 
Matabeleland. And so we also believe that they had major prejudice against the 
Ndebeles.”393  
 
“And I strongly believe the idea was to widen the gap between the Shona and 
Ndebele, because by-and-large the majority were Shona boys. In the ordinary 
mind of the Ndebele person, a Matabele person is, ‘it is the Shona who killed us’. 
Basically that is the thinking without really taking into cognizance of the setup of 
this Army, maybe even against the will of some of the Shona people. So, basically 
my views are; this was meant to divide, continuous divide and rule, because 
knowing well we are far more Shona people in the country than Ndebeles, without 
that ZANU-PF would not survive, as far as I’m concerned.”394 
 
“And Gukurahundi itself, its command structures did have Ndebele people. There 
is one that I went to school with who was there, I think he was Captain Nyati, I’ve 
interviewed him and others. But, when it came to the deployment generally, they 
were using…there were no ZIPRA components, then they went as former-
ZANLA police and highly politicized, and reporting directly to the President, he 
wasn’t reporting to the Army.”395 
                                                
391 ZNA (Zimbabwe National Army), PISI (Police Internal Security Intelligence), CIO (Central Intelligence 
Officers). 
392 In October of 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe entered into an agreement with North Korea to train the 
special Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean Army, and by December of 1987 the Unity Accord was signed by 
Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.  
393 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
394 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader and Peace Activist). 




“The perpetrators of violence, if I may put it that way, the soldiers, the 5th 
Brigade, what they were saying on the ground was to the effect that; they are 
‘dealing with Ndebeles’, and killing them, and avenging what Ndebeles did to 
their own ancestors. So you can’t run away from that, you see. When people are 
killing you and saying ‘we are killing you because you are Ndebele’. Surely, how 
can you say there is no ethnicity issue there. It is there, because of what is 
happening, and therefore it has to be addressed, in a sense.”396  
 
Operation Gukurahundi was defended by the ZANU-PF regime as a necessary 
means in defence against the national security threat posed by the counter-revolutionary, 
ex-ZIPRA/ZAPU ‘dissidents’ who having lost the elections were bent on overthrowing 
the newly elected democratic government of ZANU-PF. The resulting counter-narratives 
to this articulated official meta-narrative of ethnic conflict are myriad, complex and 
dangerous in implication. These various narratives of defiance will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter (five) of this study. What surfaced from this 
research is that many people on the ground in Matabeleland who were the direct or 
secondary victims / survivors of the violence of the 1980s refer to this as “genocide” or 
an exercise in Ndebele “ethnic cleansing” by the Shona.  
 “So it [ZANU-PF] was just saying ‘the Ndebeles are bad; and this was an ethnic 
minority, they wanted to take over the country, they are bad.’ So all that they were 
being told that ‘these are to be hated, they are animals’. So the term 
‘Gukurahundi’…it means in Shona ‘you are weeding out the chaff’ or something 
like that.”397 
 
“Now some of the things that happened, you see obviously the whole issue was to 
destroy the population of Matabeleland, which was part of an ethnic cleansing 
that was being done by the Shona people who had now come to power…So there 
fore it has been a ZANU feeling or the Shona feeling, expressing it through 
ZANU-PF, through the platform of ZANU-PF, because they are in power, to 
eliminate anyone who is not Shona…So it’s the Shona mentality of trying to 
eliminate anyone who is not Shona.”398 
 
“Because the hatred between the Shona people and the Ndebeles is…we can 
concentrate on the Liberation Struggle to the early 80s…Mugabe sending in the 
                                                
396 Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed 
by 5th Brigade soldiers in 1984). 
397 Interview: GS1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 17/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer and survivor of 
severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
398 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 




North-Korean-trained 5th Brigade, I think that’s where most of the Ndebele 
realized that Mugabe is really serious about finishing us off.”399 
 
“…they [Shona] were here and they meant to kill all the Ndebeles. Why they 
didn’t finish us, we don’t know…no one was supposed to be alive at the end of 
the day, they all were supposed to be killed. So stories like that, when people hear 
them or when a soldier comes to you who speaks Shona and tells you that ‘I’m 
here. I’ve been sent to kill you who’s Ndebele’. Obviously, you believe that, 
that’s where they are, they’ve come to kill you because you’re Ndebele 
primarily…”400 
 
“…they came, meaning the ZANU-PF 5th Brigade, and said, ‘we are Shonas 
wanting to destroy the Ndebeles’. That language in itself was couched with such a 
violent ethos that the people themselves understood it to mean that the Ndebeles 
as a nation, were threatened, and they are going to be annihilated.”401    
 
Viewed within the historic context of multiple, protracted trauma, ethnic hate-speech 
coupled with severe state-sanctioned violence, restricted movement through the use of 
curfews and the denial of food aid during an intense time of drought402, t e gravitation by 
many Matabeleland civilians toward embracing a genocide ideation as the motivational 
explanation for the ZANU-PF-sponsored Operation Gukurahundi is not surprising. 
However, of even more concern are the ripple effects of consequences flowing out of this 
‘genocide’ ideology. In the rest of this section, the following four ramifications of the 
enactment of cyclical revenge, the production of the language of hate, the undermining of 
ethnic origins and the inter-generational transmission of ethnic antagonisms will be 
debriefed. 
4.5.1. Revenge Full Circle 
 After its landslide Election victory in 1980, ZANU-PF, although speaking the 
language of reconciliation initially, quickly resorted to the attitude of the ‘winner takes 
                                                
399 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
400 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence).   
401 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
402 Matabeleland is an arid environment which is prone to drought. In 1983 when the Gukurahundi violence 
was in full force the Region suffered a severe drought, however, due to the supposed security threats and 
the subsequent curfews and road blocks set up by ZANU-PF food aid was denied (or withheld) from the 
people of Matabeleland for in ordinate periods of time. 
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all’ when rumblings from the opposition in Matabeleland began to stir. With the onset of 
‘dissident’ activity in Matabeleland, the Fifth Brigade hastened to solidify its position of 
power by flexing its muscles of military and structural rule over Matabeleland. This 
adoption of a forceful system of hierarchical ranking (ZANU-PF over ZAPU) easily 
translated into a role-reversal (Shona over Ndebele) of the historic (Ndebele over Shona) 
‘victor and vanquished’ narrative of the pre-colonial past. By resurrecting the ancient 
narrative of Ndebele raids of the 1800s as justification for killings of thousands of 
Ndebele civilians in the 1980s (estimated at 20,000), the Fifth Brigade sealed the long-
held Ndebele suspicion that the Shona have always held a grudge and were awaiting the 
opportune time to strike back in revenge. In the eyes of the ordinary Ndebele civilian this 
resuscitating of the age old ethnic animosities of Ndebele injustices by the Gukurahundi 
violence (regardless of its intended or actual motivation) effectively brought Shona 
vengeance full circle. The insinuation (both spoken and unspoken) is that the 
Matabeleland massacres represent a revenge of ‘genocide’ proportions exercised by 
Shona malcontents who resent that historically they have been ruled both politically and 
militarily by the Ndebele.  
4.5.2. Production of the Language of Hate 
 In order to eliminate the ‘dissidents’ and undercut the rural peasant support base 
for any dissident activity, the Fifth Brigade employed a language re-education 
programme that forced Ndebele civilians to speak and sing in Shona or they would be 
punished or even killed. The Ndebele peasants were coerced to sing and dance to Shona 
songs and to declare their allegiance and praise of the ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe, 
while at the same time to denounce ZAPU and Joshua Nkomo in the Shona language. 
“This imposition of the Shona language is designed to kill other minority languages and 
language is a vehicle of a people’s culture. It simply means Shona culture is…imposed 
on us.”403  The residue of language oppression and its social constructivist power is 
evident in the following interview transcriptions: 
“We were saying this has been very, very successful in many ways; that the 
Ndebeles actually believe that Shonas are their enemy. They also believe that 
Shonas actually hate the Ndebeles. So, they actually believed it even though the 
majority of Shonas could be innocent. It has also been successful in that sense that 
                                                
403Khumalo, P.Z. 2006:9. 
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it has created animosity between two tribal groups…Without any doubt. The 
language itself…Let me give you a general world view. If you are in 
Matabeleland today and somebody shouts or speaks from the top of his voice, 
they will say, ‘why do you speak like a Shona?’ You see that in itself carries and 
it tells you what it is that they did.”404 
 
“ I’m not sure whether it will be fair for me to quote my friend…when he went out 
preaching in the rural areas of Matabeleland, when some people suddenly realized 
that he was Shona, they kind of switched off. Until he began to check what 
exactly the problem was; they said ‘the people who killed our parents, our 
relatives, spoke the language you are speaking.’”405 
 
“Before this economic problem we never had a lot of Shonas crossing the border 
illegally, it was mostly people from Matabeleland, because they couldn’t stand 
going to Harare and listening to Shona, the language that killed them. They’ll 
rather be eaten by a crocodile in the Limpopo [river border crossing into South 
Africa], than be reminded of the people that killed your father or mother. So that’s 
why I was saying we need the Shonas, you know, to understand and to believe 
and to respect our story.”406 
 
“ It was something that was unfortunately taught ‘at home’, you know, it was in 
the home whereby you where told not to play with Shona kids, you know, that 
almost ‘the people are killing us’ you know, ‘they want to wipe us out.’ So that 
unfortunately was the issue that how we were taught. It was tough – it was tough 
for you to survive. I mean people could…I mean I remember you could be beaten 
up for speaking Shona. Because I think what happened is; there’s lots of people 
who probably suffered a lot, who lost of their relatives, so what happens is – they 
hate the Shona. The Shona language maybe just evokes those memories, you 
know, they become emotional and just beat up a Shona-speaking person.”407  
       
The efficiency of this social production of the ‘enemy’ through the perpetration of 
ethnic-hate speech combined with severe violence is quite clearly exemplified above. The 
first speaker notes that the tone of voice (in this case shouting) is culturally associated 
with the Shona. Although the ‘shouting’ was the dominant manner in which the 5th 
Brigade soldiers most likely would have interacted with the Ndebele civilian population, 
                                                
404 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
405 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader and Peace Activist). 
406 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
407 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 – (Ndebele Journalist and business editor for a 
prominent  newspaper). 
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it is now a trait (representing rudeness) equated with all Shona. The second and third 
speakers connect the hearing of the Shona language being spoken with the trauma of past 
violence. In one instance, the content of the Shona speaker (preacher) may have been 
harmless, even constructive, but for the traumatized rural peasant the actual sound of the 
language conjured up intrusive memories of pain. The fourth speaker builds the case for 
the socialization of hate starting with the language used within the family. In this 
situation because many Ndebele children were forbidden to speak the language of the 
‘oppressor’ (Shona) and for that matter travel to Mashonaland, the language itself was 
cloaked in mystery and internalized as a foreboding evil linked with the horrific violence 
of the past. In this way language was twinned with hatred scarring the socio-cultural 
landscape of unity among the diverse ethnic groups living in Zimbabwe today. 
“The most persistent charge against the brigade was that it dealt ruthlessly with 
people who could not speak Shona…this anti-Ndebele image of the Five Brigade 
took a firm grip of the imagination of the peasants.”408 
 
4.5.3. Undermining Ethnic Origins 
In his writing on the genocide of Rwanda, Mahmood Mamdani409 situates the 
ethnicity debate of that context not so much on the cultural or ethnic differences between 
Hutu and Tutsi, but squarely on the binary, politicized identities of origins – who is the 
native of the soil, and who is the settler (foreigner in the land)? This politicized, identity 
bifurcation between the ‘indigenous’ and the ‘alien’ did not spring up suddenly, it was a 
mind-set that was born out of, and incubated in the power-class struggles of the pre-
colonial era, it was nursed and reinforced by colonial rule, and it was nurtured and 
solidified in the genocide memory of the past forty years.410   
 Likewise in Matabeleland, a consequential outgrowth of the use of hate language 
during Gukurahundi was the fundamental undermining of the Ndebele origins and their 
sense of ‘rootedness’ as a people in the nation of Zimbabwe. The Fifth Brigade soldiers 
continually questioned the citizen status of the Ndebele and verbally reinforced the notion 
that the Matabele were foreigners, aliens in the land.  
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409 Mamdani, M. 2001: 14-15.  
410 Lemarchand, R. 1995. Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center 




“The Ndebeles [were] the minority group that was almost defaced from this 
planet. So the use of coming…from, originating from South Africa…the psyche 
was that ‘these are not Zimbabweans, these are people who have come from 
somewhere else.’ So, either they die or they go back to South Africa.”411 
 
“Like there’s always been this thing that ‘okay, okay, you guys come from South 
Africa, you’re not from here; so why should you rule this place. So that was the 
thing. The way it was done, it kind of all started in school maybe, whereby 
teachers were sent…they sent Shona teachers to Matabeleland, you know…”412  
 
“But somehow, I think it was thought that the Ndebele cannot rule Zimbabwe, 
because we are coming from the minority, one, the minority tribe. And then 
secondly, we are originally coming from South Africa, we are viewed as coming 
from South Africa. So therefore you see, you cannot have foreigners who are in 
the minority coming to rule this country.”413 
 
The bombardment of fierce interrogation in the past (1980s) and the cynical speculation 
in the present by the Shona regarding the Ndebele origins has contributed to two socio-
political phenomena. Firstly, the Ndebele have constructed a socially imagined 
association with their Zulu origins and South Africa as a surrogate ‘motherland’. As one 
interviewee plainly states it, “I’m sure you know this that we actually consider ourselves 
to be part of South Africa in our minds…more than part of Zimbabwe.”414 These 
sentiments have also fuelled the current debates in Matabeleland regarding federalism, 
secession and the ‘need’ for a separate Matabele nation state. 
 Secondly, the Ndebele identification with South Africa and their Zulu heritage has 
lead to a plethora of ethno-political conspiracy theories and analyses of Zimbabwe-South 
Africa relations. Commenting on the close relationship between Nelson Mandela of the 
ANC and Joshua Nkomo of the ZAPU one interviewee puts his analysis forward: 
“…it’s an ethnic relationship that has always been there. You see it’s a 
relationship, although we are talking about Xhosas and the Zulus not getting hand 
                                                
411 Interview: GS1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 17/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer and survival of 
severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
412 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 11/08/06 – (Ndebele Journalist and business editor for a 
prominent  newspaper). 
413 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee with the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s). 
414 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa - 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 




in hand, although Mandela is a Xhosa, but there was generally an expression, you 
see, that we are Nguni’s all of us and then we share a common language.”415  
 
Further, this same interviewee describes supposed links between the Zulu Chief Buthelezi 
of South Africa in relationship to the Matabeleland massacres in the early 1980s and the 
current prospects of a Zulu (Jacob Zuma) as the president of South Africa: 
“However, you see what the Shonas are afraid of, it is the prospect of the 
Ndebeles discussing with their South African counterparts here and the Zulus 
coming together now to destroy the Shona people…You know Buthelezi is a 
Zulu. Buthelezi was totally against the things that Mugabe was doing, the 
atrocities that he was doing…During the atrocities then, Buthelezi was bitter and 
he then at some stage suggested he was going to train Ndebeles to give them…to 
arm them with arms to go and fight against Mugabe. Mugabe got to know this and 
he was very, very angry against Buthelezi. Now the prospect, you see of Jacob 
Zuma coming into power here in South Africa, him being a Zulu, is a thing of 
serious concern to the Mugabe government and the Shona people, because he is 
Zulu.”416    
   
This paragraph transcript opens up a glimpse into an Ndebele worldview that not only 
associates with South Africa and the Zulu nation but venerates Chief Buthelezi as the 
Zulu political leader by portraying him as an Ndebele ally who has taken the 
responsibility to protect the Ndebele nation and use his influence to shape the political 
power equation between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Above and beyond this, this 
speaker seems to equate ZANU-PF with ‘all’ Shona people, a generalization that often 
accompanies ethnic-essentialist thinking. This interviewee seems to indicate that by the 
mere fact that the ANC’s then presidential candidate Jacob Zuma is Zulu in ethnicity, the 
alliance between the current governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe will be 
seriously altered in favour of the Ndebeles over the Shona, and that the ZANU-PF will 
need to fear reprisals from the new South African government as due compensation for 
their past treatment of the Ndebele people.        
4.5.4. Inter-Generational Transmission of Ethnic Antagonism 
 Of grave concern for those researching the impact of the Matabeleland violence of 
the early 1980s, is the apparent transmission of these ethnic animosities in both the 
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Ndebele and Shona communities to the next generation with an unwitting degree of 
emotional veracity and fervent antagonism. This inter-generational transfusion of hate is 
even more alarming when it is discovered to be emerging in diverse social sectors outside 
of the parameters of politics, such as in the media and entertainment industry, the arts and 
culture (music, drama and dance) and sports arenas. 
“I was amazed the other day on the 22nd of January which has now been officially 
declared by the victims to be the Gukurahundi Day; the people organizing that 
occasion were very young people, very, very young people who never really 
experienced Gukurahundi. If they were there, it was when they were still [young] 
they’ve been hearing the stories. So if they are the people who are going to 
spearhead the commemoration, then what does that mean to the future generations 
that will remain; the unfinished, unsolved curse.”417 
    
This narrative of ethnic animosity surfaced with a vengeance (from young 
patriotic ZANU-PF members) during the internet debates that resulted from the 1997 
release of ‘Breaking the Silence’418, a detailed documentation of the violence unleashed 
on Matabeleland in the 1980s. What was surprising to the researchers who were 
analyzing this Internet debate was the degree to which people were willing to emotively 
justify the overriding narrative interpretation propagated by ZANU-PF ten years earlier, 
and not only that, express deep sentiments of ethnic prejudice and hatred in the process. 
One must bear in mind that many of these respondents were young professionals and self-
consciously saw themselves as future leaders in Zimbabwe.419 A vivid case in point 
follows in a direct quote from a Shona respondent: 
“The extermination of the support base, although unfortunate, was one of the 
alternatives that worked.  I sympathise with the victims, but for the victors it was 
a question of life and death as well…Was dissidentry necessary?  Was it 
anybody’s fault that you [the Ndebele] lost elections?  Was that the only option?  
Now…the strategies…decided to hammer the support base and you cry for a 
human rights inquiry.  Do you want us to also cry for a human rights inquiry for 
the [nineteenth century] warriors (thieves) who roamed Mashonaland?...Our [the 
Shonas’] only sin was that we toiled the soil and had better produce.  Don’t the 
                                                
417 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice – CCJP in the 1980s).   
418 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and Legal Resources Foundation (LRF). 1997. 
Breaking the Silence – Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the 
Midlands 1980-1988. Harare: CCJP / LRF. 
419 Alexander, J & McGregor, J. 1999. Representing Violence in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe: Press and 
Internet Debates, in Allen, T. & Seaton, J. (Eds.) The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and 
Representations of Ethnic Violence,  London & New York: Zed Books, 248. 
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Matabeles beat their chests with pride for having stolen Mashona produce, women 
and children[?].”420 
 
The insinuation here (both spoken and unspoken), being that the Matabeleland massacres 
perpetrated by the ZANU-PF (Shona majority) government in the 1980s represent a 
justified revenge for the Ndebele raids in Shona territories in the 1800s.421 
For the Ndebele youth, sporting events (in this case soccer) have functioned as a 
public place in which they could diffuse their pent-up malcontent on their Shona 
counterparts. The sports field and stadium provide a bounded area yet one that supplies a 
sufficiently physical and competitive space in which to express and find release from 
explosive emotions of rage: “An inherited hatred of the Shona people is portrayed in 
soccer matches through songs that make reference to the 1980s genocide. A popular one 
goes like, ‘Curse the Shonas who killed my father.’”422 Other interview transcripts agree: 
“But unfortunately the politics of Ndebele and Shona, it still haunts everyone in 
every organization in Zimbabwe. It’s everything. It even goes to the sports…So 
what they have done in Matabeleland is they have just turned to the soccer team, 
Highlanders. I mean for them, you know, they will tell you it’s an arena where 
they are able to express their anger, because if you sit in the crowd you’ll hear all 
sorts of obscenities against the Shonas.”423  
 
“Well, (sigh) what I have discovered is that soccer matches actually present 
Ndebele people with a safe environment to vent their frustration and anger 
towards the Shonas…They would be singing songs that are insulting to Shonas, 
you know. They turn to traditional songs and one of them is…I think it used to be 
a war song but basically part of the lyrics go like, ‘here are the Shonas killing 
me’… ‘Please intervene, here are the Shonas, they’re killing me.’”424 
 
Refusing to be confined to the spheres of diplomatic intrigue or the annals of historic 
archives, the angry voices of the next generation of secondary victims from the 
Matabeleland massacres persist in seeking out other social settings of mutinous 
expression.  
                                                
420 Alexander, J. & McGregor, J. 1999: 249. 
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“…because the way you sit, what I’ve seen them do is; maybe the Shona guys 
would support the other team, sit on the other side, and they will just be a 
minority. And all they can do is just hope maybe ‘it’s a draw, or their team loses’. 
Cause if their team wins, then coming out of there is going to be war, it’s going be 
war. I mean [they] just vent their anger on you. So it’s been elevated to the status 
of a count, it’s like a rallying point for Ndebeles now that ‘okay, we’ll rally 
around this team because we have lost faith in all political institutions.’”425 
 
“  So yes, so I’m saying it’s paradoxical in the sense that they’re singing about 
Shonas, but there are Shonas that they know are playing for Highlanders, they 
don’t really regard them as Shonas…As far as the Ndebeles are concerned, 
Highlanders is the last institution that they have, you know, that belongs to them 
as Ndebeles. Everything else has been taken away from them including their jobs, 
including their country, or should I say the part of their province because, you 
know, you will find Shonas in all the positions and they are subservient to them. 
So, it’s all tied in to, you know, to the issues…into history, particularly after 
Independence.”426 
 
Here, in the above treatises one sees the irrationality of ethnic-hatred when Ndebele fans 
of the Highlanders can be aroused to sing songs of prejudice and violence against the 
Shona people, while at the same time being fully aware those Shona players make up part 
of that team.  Also, when dealing with the issue of ethno-sports, it is of interest to note 
that the polarizing narrative of the Ndebele-Shona segregation is exceptionally caught up 
in the discussion of ownership or ‘faith’ in a political process and its institutions. For 
Matabeleland, as long as there is no public political domain made available for the 
collective emancipatory venting of historical pain, the children of the survivors of 
Gukurahundi will continue to nurse their rage; allowing vengeance to simmer just 
underneath the tentative veneer of social sensibilities.  
4.6. Conclusion: Ethnicity – Disentangling Identity Formation 
Placing ethnicity in the context of political-economic currency, Masipula Sithole 
argues for four hypotheses that heightened ethnic salience in Zimbabwe: First, if the rate 
of economic growth declines, ethnic identity will become more salient. Second, if 
political change becomes more likely, then the salience of ethnic identity will increase. 
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Third, if spatial mobility of one ethnic group into the territory of the other increases, then 
ethnic salience will rise. Fourth, if social mobility of one ethnic group into the 
occupational domain of the other rises, then ethnic salience will rise.427 All four of these 
principled dynamics are recognisable in the historic time-line of ethnic-identity relations 
and formations outlined in this chapter.   
 Summarizing the work of leading anthropologist John Comaroff, Professor Ndlovu-
Gatsheni posits five theoretical propositions to better understand the nature and formation 
of ethnic identity: 
1. Ethnicity is constructed by specific historical forces which are simultaneously 
structural and cultural. 
2. Ethnicity is never a unitary phenomenon because it describes both a set of 
relations and mode of consciousness that is ever changing. 
3. Ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally 
dissimilar groupings into a single political economy. 
4. Ethnicity tends to take on the ‘natural’ appearance of an autonomous force 
and a ‘principle’ capable of determining the course of social life. 
5. Ethnicity could be perpetrated by actors quite different from those that caused 
its emergence and could also develop a direct and independent impact on the 
context in which it arises.428   
Bearing in mind Sithole and Comaroff’s propositions on ethnicity above, certain streams 
of Matabeleland ethnic-identity narratives reveal and confirm a number of essential 
points which are well-substantiated in the interview transcriptions and the document 
analysis engaged in for this research. These are as follows: 
• Ethnic Identity is not static, it is often in flux – For example, a Zulu Clan of 
approximately 300 persons referred to as the Khumalos' evolved into a 
conglomerate Kingdom of the Umthwakazi (now referred to as the Ndebele 
people) and consists of over ten different incorporated ethnic groups including 
Sotho, Tswana, Shangaan, Venda, Tonga and Shona ethnicities. Likewise, the 
Shona delineation is a relatively recent ethnic classification as a canopy label 
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which covers at least seven other historically distinct sub-ethnic formations 
including Korekore, Zezuru, Manyika, Ndau, Rozvi, Kalanga, and Karanga.     
• Ethnic Identity is pluralistic, not monolithic  – For instance, both the Ndebele 
and Shona ethnic groups historically consist of networks of diverse linguistic 
dialects, clearly defined cultural classes and internal ‘ranking’ structures. Through 
language disassociation, inter- or cross-clan marriage, name change or certain 
economic rituals and transactions one could ‘move’ among and between these 
various class and ranking systems.429 During the Gukurahundi period, some 
Ndebele took on Shona names as a form of protection and of political survival in 
the face of direct violence perpetrated against the Ndebele as the ‘opposition’ 
(ZAPU).  
“And all the sudden Uncle Joe and ZAPU were persona non grata, and all of a 
sudden we were concerned as a family that ‘are we gonna be connected to 
Uncle Joe?’, because he was called Msika. He chose to keep the original 
Shangaan name, my dad and his older brothers decided to keep the Shona 
version of it – Musikavanhu – which is the version I use to this day out of 
respect for my father, but the real name is actually Msika. And…so that kept 
us safe because not everyone made the connection between Msika and 
Musikavanhu.”430 
 
• Ethnic Identity is often manipulated by historical conflict memory and 
political opportunism - The dominant ‘colonial narrative’ was founded on 
evolutionary prejudice and dehumanizing contempt toward the African 
populations in general (both Ndebele and Shona) as well as through a system of 
ranking the different African peoples by privileging (through special treatment 
and relationship assumptions) between certain ethnic groupings; in this case 
Ndebele over Shona. This ‘white man’s’ narrative has been refuted by the voices 
of new historicism and through the continuation of rapid changes in the geo-
political landscape (both relationally and structurally) as independent Africa 
positions itself in the global scene across a myriad of racial and ethnic lines. 
However, the post Independence African government (ZANU-PF) and its security 
forces have carefully crafted the same instruments and tactics of inter- and intra-
                                                
429 Lindgren, B. 2004: 179. 
430 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government).  
156 
 
ethnic conflict, stereotyping and hatred in order to subdue any threat (either 
political or military opposition) from whomever they perceive as their political 
enemy. 
• Conflict identity is often formulated around the psychology of victor 
(‘legitimated’ offender) and vanquished (the offended) For instance, there is a 
distinctly proud Ndebele association of ZAPU with the military prowess of its 
armed wing, ZIPRA when it successfully shot down the Viscount, a Rhodesian 
tourist airplane coming from Victoria Falls. This incident, which required the use 
of state-of-the-art Russian weaponry (ground launched anti-aircraft missiles) is 
used as indicative ‘proof’ that ZANU-PF and its armed wing ZANLA were 
actually militarily threatened by ZIPRA which serves as another tangential 
explanation for the Gukurahundi violence of the 1980s. This military 
sophistication of ZIPRA is in turn is linked historically to the Ndebele being a 
military nation, superior in the strategies of war to the Shona.431  
• Overemphasis of one dimension of identity can exacerbate conflict - In 
neglecting the many facets that make up identity one runs the risk of narrowing 
identity to one salient feature of crucial importance. When this singular yet 
overemphasized identity collides with the singular yet overemphasized identity of 
the ‘other’ (the enemy) conflict escalates. For example, the ZANU-PF label of 
‘dissident’ became associated with Matabeleland, the geographical area where the 
Gukurahundi violence was concentrated resulting in the notion that being an 
Ndebele is equated with being a ‘dissident’.  
“That’s what they were told. ‘Ndebeles are dissidents’. So if Ndebeles are 
dissidents, get rid of them. I’ve heard of stories of the Fifth Brigade ripping 
open women’s bellies who were pregnant and they want to see this dissident 
inside.”432 
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“My wife has been a member of the Zanu (PF) village committee, the lowest 
level of Zanu. You know that everyone in the area has been forced to join 
Zanu… I am Ndebele, of course.”433 
 
This latter quote above vividly illustrates this identity confusion and politico-identity 
fusion whereby the Shona ethnic identity is so deeply equated with ZANU-PF political 
party that the speaker disassociates from the ZANU-PF by referring to himself as an 
Ndebele, not a member of ZAPU, the opposition political structure to ZANU-PF. 
In summary, this exploration of the narratives of ethnic identity indicates that the 
ethnic distinctions assigned to Matabeleland are not by nature essentialist scripts. The 
pre-colonial and colonial ethnic definitions and demarcations between the Ndebele and 
Shona were frequently blurred and remain as cloudy logics throughout Zimbabwe’s 
history up to the present.  Likewise, from its genesis the nationalist liberation movement 
of Zimbabwe was not an ethnically purist project.  It was for many years a configuration 
of different solidarities coalescing around pertinent issues of resistance. However, in the 
advent of the symbiotic blending of unbridled power-mongering, militant exclusivity and 
the manufacture of the ‘enemy’ along the existing natural ethnic cleavages of 
geographical and political associations, an ethnic segregation was produced in 
Zimbabwe. This divergent ethnic construction crystallised when the narrative texts of 
ethnic hatred and severe state-sanctioned violence fused together in the ZANU-PF’s 
disastrous management of the ‘dissident’ and Gukurahundi violence in the early 1980s. 
For the vast majority of victims and survivors of the Matabeleland massacres (1980-87) 
the following historic orations of Robert Mugabe ring hollow: “Our war must teach us to 
forget our tribal affiliations. If it fails in this regards, it will have achieved nothing.”434 
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Chapter 5: Nationalism – Ordering and Disordering Narratives  
 
5.1. Introduction: Betwixt and Between – The African Nation-State in Limbo 
 
 “Power corrupts in a thousand details of hypocrisy and indifference.”435  
 
Defining the contemporary African nation-state is a fluid exercise both 
conceptually and practically. Since the beginnings of independence from colonial rule, 
the formulations of nationhood in the African context remain highly contested terrains. 
The historical evolution of Africa’s nation-state development reads as a continuous 
analogue of the ‘rise and fall’ of empires across the continent. Ali Mazrui compares the 
African nation-state to a political refugee: 
“The African state shares characteristics with the refugees it helps to create. Most 
African states are artificial, and both the states and the refugees are fundamentally 
without roots. The rootlessness and artificiality of the African state are 
attributable to its colonial origins and its artificial boundaries. The rootlessness of 
individual refugees is based on the postcolonial political traumas of disruption 
and displacement.”436  
 
For sure, the nation-state project in Africa has been riddled with peculiarities and 
complexities. In her stimulating work on ‘theatres of struggle’ in South Africa, Belinda 
Bozzoli spoils the hegemony of the call to a unified nationalism in Africa and 
significantly infuses it with thickening stratification: 
“Unable to resort to the ethnic romances or religious legends which underlie many 
other nationalisms, African nationalists have variously identified the nation as 
synonymous with other things. One is ‘blackness’, a quality said to be innate but 
requiring purification and emancipation from the white contamination and control 
(as in Black Consciousness and Black Power movements). Another is a 
primordial ‘innocence’, which requires liberation from modernity’s corrupting 
influence (as in Africanist movements). A third is ‘martyrdom’, which is said to 
lead to a suppressed and barely contained anger, and which requires violent 
retribution (as in militaristic revolutionary movements, often with Fanonist 
influence). Another is ‘rightlessness’ (as in most anti-colonial franchise-based 
movements) and another ‘populism’, in which large and intractable forces (the 
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state, money, Jews, whites) control and manipulate the small man and must be 
brought down (also present in anti-colonial movements).”437 
   
 Africa carries an uneven share of the unique challenges and diverse struggles 
attached to the creation and maintenance of modern nation-states. First, the shedding of 
direct colonial oppression is a relatively recent history as compared to many other parts 
of the world. Second, the demarcation of ethno-political, economic and geographical 
boundary-setting438 was an externalised, detached phenomenon masterminded by far 
away European colonialists, fraught with dubious motivations and ill-gotten gain, and 
most important of all with no markings of the organic evolutionary process of 
‘ownership’ in the national consciousness experienced in other locations. Third, in the 
colonial race for the ‘spoils of Africa’, a comprehensive exploitation of land439, mineral 
reserves440 and human resources was undertaken leaving in its wake a landless peasantry, 
a depleted natural wealth and a disenfranchised people locked in a semi-feudal system of 
class struggle and elite cooption.441 Fourth, in the fragility of its newly born 
independence, Africa’s vulnerable nation-states were quickly embroiled in, abused and 
discarded as pawns in the posturing and brinkmanship of East-West geopolitical Cold-
war politics. Zimbabwe’s nationalist movement grew out of the turmoil and torrent of all 
of these obstacles, land being but just one nascent example: 
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“Even before the settlers and imperial troops put down the uprisings of 1896-7 
some 15,000,000 acres of the country’s total of 96,000,000 acres had been 
expropriated from the Africans without any form of compensation. By 1898 an 
estimated 38 per cent of the total population of Matabeleland had been forced into 
reserves.”442 
 
“ In April 1980, when independence was won, close to 6,000 white commercial 
farmers owned 15.5 million hectares or 45 percent of the most productive land. 
Small-scale, mainly black farming families (8,500) had 5 percent in the drier 
regions, and 700,000 black families owned the remaining 50 percent in low 
rainfall areas with very poor soil fertility.”443   
       
There is a stream of ‘afro-pessimist’ thinking that approaches Africa’s precarious 
nation-building condition as a failed project. Unable to understand why Africa has not 
embraced the so-called ‘universal’ neo-functionalist (neo-colonial) agenda of western 
politico-judicial democratisation, progressive development and free market economies, 
these doomsday prophets have abandoned Africa to what they predict as a dangerous 
slippery slide into the dark abyss of chaos and disorder.444 However, in contrast to this 
view there are the ‘afro-optimists’ who maintain that Africa has not had a genuine 
opportunity to truly take full control of its own destiny and development as a continent. 
These Africa-advocates do not see the current nation-state crisis as a sign of apocalyptic 
demise. Instead they interpret this time of upheaval and rapid social change as a 
transitional phase, a new birth from the ashes of colonial structures that were never truly 
demolished in the mad rush for independence across Africa. Certain scholarship has even 
suggested that a new paradigm of “the political instrumentalization of disorder”445 as a 
governance model is emerging in Africa.   
For while the independence struggles brought varied degrees of social freedom, 
colonialism remained in the vestiges of economic and governmental-political structures 
that were imported, self-serving and in multiple ways un-African in value. It has taken a 
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generation (30-40 years since independence) to realise that these inherited governance 
systems will not work in Africa, and so the dragon of colonial, structural violence rears 
its ugly head as it heaves its last breath over Africa.446  For the afro-optimist, out of this 
seeming quagmire arises a Phoenix; a re-birthing of all that is truly African in the public 
and private realms of life. In the words of Ali Mazrui: 
“The question that has arisen recently is whether real decolonization is not 
winning formal independence but the collapse of the colonial state itself.  It is not 
changing the guard, raising the flag, and singing the new national anthem while 
leaving the old structures intact.  Rather, it is the cruel and bloody disintegration 
of colonial structures.  Decolonization should no longer be equated with political 
liberation.”447 
 
Hence, it is the firm belief of many Africa scholars that unless or until the nation-state 
scaffolding imposed on Africa by the colonial powers and embraced by most of the 
African independence leaders (either in word and/or in policy action) is intentionally 
deconstructed, and then reconstructed in alignment with innovative African-sensitive 
structures of political governance and social collaboration, post-independent Africa’s 
forays into replicating Western nationalisms will continue to fail.448 The proof of 
‘nationalism’ is tested at the intersection of a shared collective identity affiliation 
(common values) and its fusion with the socio-political structures institutionalised by the 
nation’s decision makers in order to reinforce that particular corporate identity and 
values.    
5.2. Managing the Nationalist Discourse: From Revolt to Rule  
 
The rhetoric of revolutionary nationalism is powered by guiding narratives of 
political ideology and world-views (how the world is seen to be ordered). World-view 
narratives serve the purpose of giving their adherents a congruency by delineating a 
vision for the future, a strategic direction in the present, and clarity of meaning from the 
past. In her fascinating study on the violent stand-off between the US government forces 
and the Branch Davidians religious cult in Waco, Texas (USA), Jayne Docherty explores 
the components of ‘world-viewing’ narratives. Docherty proposes five questions that 
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form the basis of our world-views: what is real and true? (ontology), how is “the real” 
organized? (logic), what is valuable or important? (axiology), how do we know about 
what is or exists? (epistemology), and how should we act? (ethics).449 Worldviews spin a 
necessary web of coherence for life. Thus, the power of the liberationist-nationalist 
scripts used in Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence is precisely in their provision of 
the critical function of ordering reality for those living under oppression.  
However, when conflicting world-views collide Docherty expresses caution, “As 
long as the focus is on order, there may be a built-in bias toward the assumption that 
order involves the imposition of a single, hegemonic worldview.”450 In Zimbabwe, the 
ordering script of revolutionary freedom provided a binding vision with centrifugal pull 
for all the various interests represented in the Struggle movement. However, with the 
peace negotiations brokered by international third-parties the ordering nature of the text 
was beginning to blur, and when independence was realized and ZANU-PF entered the 
elections independent of ZAPU, the ordering script of liberation splintered. Catapulted 
into political power through a sweeping victory in the polls, ZANU-PF as the ruling party 
desperately needed an ordering narrative that would translate the revolutionary rhetoric 
into a national narrative and thereby hold together the diversity of national interests being 
expressed in the democratic space that opened up after independence. Unable to 
differentiate between ‘ordering’ as the unquestioning obedience required in waging a 
successful military revolution and ‘ordering’ as a form of containment that is able to co-
exist with a variety of viewpoints, the ZANU-PF hoisted its own world-view (mono-
narrative) on the nation: “ZANU-PF has set itself the task of establishing a hegemonic 
project in which the party’s narrow definition of the nation is deployed against all other 
forms of identification and affiliation.”451 
5.2.1. The Tidiness of Revolutionary Scripts 
 
The ZANU liberation movement had relatively tight control on the ‘ordering’ 
ideological narrative which gave them discipline and guidance throughout the struggle 
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movement. A descriptive appeal for the ‘ordering’ narrative is well-articulated in the 
words taken from a speech delivered by Robert Mugabe in 1979:  
“…political and ideological consciousness must, as it enhances our great 
understanding and appreciation, also invoke in us unswerving loyalty to the Party 
and the just cause it champions. The Party charts the political and ideological line 
which must provide us, if we are its loyal and faithful members, with the only 
correct direction worth following and the only valid basis on which we can all 
become united as fighters with a common cause…[this] prompts within each true 
member an inner sense of order and orderliness that dictates conformity in 
behaviour and regulates our inter-actions and relationships with each other as 
revolutionaries bound by the same objectives.”452    
 
This rhetoric was not only in words, it was acted upon wherever there appeared to be any 
mutiny within the ranks of ZANU / ZANLA: “Through the war, we have submerged 
whatever minor contradictions have existed among us and we have done so out of our 
recognition of the need to completely destroy the common principle enemy in pursuance 
of our immediate common objective – the establishment of a national democratic 
state.”453 In this script one immediately identifies the contradiction between the ‘means’ 
(to submerge by force any minor differences) and the ‘ends’ (in order to build a 
democratic nation). Also, here is a phraseology that is bound by the discourse of a 
monolithic enemy assuming that all the oppressed masses comprehend and agree on a 
hegemonic image of their ultimate foe (in this case the white Rhodesian government and 
its people).    
The notion of a tidy revolutionary script is not to insinuate that there were no 
deviations of thought or defiance in action against the dominant ZANU narrative during 
the time of the struggle. It is to say, however, that the management (cause and effect) of 
the public and private scripts was notably different. The public narrative expounded by 
the ZANU leadership not only attempted to propagate one text (one way of thinking for 
all) it demanded solidarity both in word and deed from the popular domain (among the 
masses) in order to fortify its ‘united patriotic front’. Writing about the Geneva 
Conference, a failed attempt at a negotiated Zimbabwean peace settlement in 1976, David 
Moore states: 
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“In fact the conference served only to help the relatively unknown Mugabe. In the 
hotels and halls of Geneva – paid for, of course, by the imperialists – he patched 
together an alliance of Zimbabwean nationalists and convinced the west he 
controlled ZANU’s soldiers. In 1977, with the failure of the conference and the 
newly elected Carter regime [USA] in confusion about matters Zimbabwean (they 
thought Muzorewa was worthy of support) the British tried to start an election. 
However, Mugabe was busy eliminating his perceived opposition within the ranks 
and was hard to find.”454    
 
Yet, the public narrative from the top-down was unable to completely control the 
private narratives which were known to spread rapidly through the on-the-ground socio-
political networks, communities and prison cadres in exile, as evidenced in the Nhari 
uprisings discussed in Chapter 4. However, these uprisings were short lived and the full 
weight of revolutionary-sanctioned violent retribution was utilised to quell all 
insurrections. Speaking to these internal ZANU splinter movements, David Moore 
contends that: 
“Mugabe appeared to be working hard to gain American educations for the 
‘Marxist’ soldiers over whom he was trying to gain control. Yet when he returned 
to the Mozambican front, wherein these youth were training, he and then 
Mozambican president Samora Machel – not a very old man either – agreed to put 
the leaders of these youth in Mozambican prisons, where they remained until the 
1980 elections for Zimbabwe…The Mugabe regime was only starting at this 
moment (some might say in hindsight that this was the beginning of the end), but 
it seems it has remained true to its origins today.”455 
 
In relation to the Nhari rebellion in the ZANU military camps in Zambia, the following 
texts summarise its violent and subjugated closure as such: 
 
“By all accounts, the party executed Nhari and Mataure and several others at 
once. Hove, Mutambanengwe, Sanyanga, Mukono, and Madekurozwa were 
sentenced ‘to death in their absence’. Sanyanga and Dziruni went into hiding in 
Lusaka; others sought police protection…What is known is that many ZANU 
officials who had left Zambia, like Mukono and Mutambanengwe, did not 
return...”456 
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“A few people were arrested and some were killed actually, some were killed. So 
I think there’s always a problem, I think there has always ‘been’ a problem with 
liberation movements, especially those which participated in a bloody war, you 
know, because for them, the ‘process of elimination’ was to them solving a 
situation. So they carried over even when they’re in government that ‘okay, we 
don’t want to have too many voices so we’ll silence these ones.”457 
 
Thus, it is clear that these internal ‘treacheries’ which frequently erupted into violence 
were carefully contained within the structures of military disciplinary procedures (‘tidy’ 
systems); although highly punitive in nature they had an ordering (albeit forceful) effect 
nonetheless. 
5.2.2. The Untidiness of Negotiation Texts 
 
In the prelude to independence however, another text was introduced through the 
Lancaster House agreement and in many ways, enforced on all the parties involved in the 
struggle for Zimbabwe’s freedom. The tweaked revision of the left-over Rhodesian 
Constitution combined with a hastily-convened British-American initiated peace talks, 
resulted in a jagged and at times irrelevant set of scripts aimed at bringing an end to a 
protracted and bloody liberation war. The Lancaster House talks embodied an inherently 
scattered narrative with divergent and contradicting interests that were imposed on the 
negotiated settlement.  
“On the contrary, major compromises had been forced upon us at Lancaster 
House. Just to mention two of its particularly controversial features, this 
agreement provided for entrenched parliamentary seats for whites, and for so-
called ‘willing buyer/willing seller’ policy clearly intended to block or at least 
obstruct the redistribution of land.”458 
 
The call to peace negotiations was met with varying degrees of ambiguity. A clear 
sentiment among the more militant elements of ZANU and ZAPU was the conviction that 
independence should be gained through a military victory. Robert Mugabe in particular 
expressed strong resistance to the peace talks. However, he eventually succumbed. 
“Robert Mugabe, who opposed both the unity agreement and the ceasefire, was 
instrumental in surreptitiously organizing new [military] recruits. He was hostile to the 
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whole idea of détente and bitterly critical of Kaunda’s role; the solution in Rhodesia, he 
believed, lay only in a violent struggle.”459 Even with the hesitant cooperation of 
Mugabe, there remained a fractious agenda to discuss. Martin and Johnson’s description 
of the fray of issues follows: 
“ The Lancaster House conference was a tortuous cliff-hanger, a fitting finale to 
the Rhodesia saga…The Patriotic Front fought against constitutional provisions 
they regarded as racist (such as reserved seats for twenty whites), against 
restrictions on constitutional changes, the retention of the Rhodesian forces, the 
restriction placed on the ability of a new government to redistribute land that had 
been taken from the Africans over the previous ninety years, the length of time 
given for a ceasefire, and many other issues.460 
 
Although agreement was finally reached, most scholars and stakeholders involved in the 
Lancaster House talks would agree that it was a procedure riddled with compromise on 
many fronts. 
The remnants of the former Rhodesian constitution that were carried over into the 
independence dispensation had at least two significant consequences. First, during the 
Gukurahundi violence of the early 1980s, many pieces of the oppressive legislation 
enacted to repress the black liberation movements during the time of white Rhodesian 
rule were still enshrined as law and were quickly revitalised and forcibly justified against 
the ZAPU opposition and the civilian populations of Matabeleland. Second, this 
revamped Rhodesian constitution has been frequently cited as the reason or excuse why 
the ZANU-PF continually amends the constitution. However, most of the constitutional 
addendums since independence have served to entrench the ruling party’s power. The 
efforts at constitutional reform have been a dismal failure which has fuelled the current 
opposition and civil society demands for a constitutional re-write with broad-based public 
participation.461     
Within the gamut of discourse and social construction, a constitution represents a 
kind of meta-narrative that serves as a collective reference point for guiding the 
governance of a nation. A constitution functions as a reinforcement of the collective 
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polity, as the backbone to the social contracts that are corporately negotiated in order to 
ensure peaceful co-existence as one nation or people group. To this end, the following 
interview respondent poignantly argued: 
“…the old ANC [African National Congress] used to say ‘the trouble with 
Zimbabwe it that it didn’t have the Freedom Charter’. The Freedom Charter tied 
human rights to sovereignty. In Zimbabwe the two are separated, so ZANU stands 
for sovereignty and the MDC [opposition] stands for human rights, and what they 
need is a Freedom Charter…I mean the Nationalist movement of which I was a 
member in the late 1950s and early 1960s didn’t do anything like the Freedom 
Charter, but its rhetoric was certainly for democracy and human rights, it saw 
itself as an emancipatory movement. And I can remember George Silundika, 
week after week of those astonishing mass rallies; it went on forever so they had 
plenty of time to talk about those things. Well Silundika used to give a continuous 
lecture on democracy to his audience, starting with Athens and working his way 
through.”462   
 
The key argument in this transcription is that the original utterances (in this case a 
Freedom Charter) of a nation’s political narrative beginnings form the basis of all 
subsequent construction of its collective values and socio-political governance structures. 
Therefore, not only did independent Zimbabwe inherit a faulty constitution (a relic of the 
Rhodesian colonial powers), it failed to ratify a corporate consensus on the foundations 
of its understandings of nationalism that would serve as a kind of directional compass, a 
legitimate reference for its future as a nation-state.  
5.2.3. The Multiplicity of Independence Narratives 
 
After independence in April of 1980, the democratic momentum of that 
transitional moment released a plethora of narratives that ZANU could not contain. First, 
there was an exuberant international narrative of ‘African black liberation from white 
minority rule’ heralded by the most unlikely bedfellows - both the communist and 
democratic global communities (albeit for different ideological reasons). So enamoured 
was the world by the newly independent status of Zimbabwe that it was unable to accept 
any evidence of trouble within the country’s borders. 
“Sadly also there was a lot of deliberate silence or looking the other way by the 
West because the West was virtually desperate that Zimbabwe should be a 
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success story. And they were really hopeful that Robert Mugabe was, you know, a 
W.O.G…a Western oriented gentleman.”463 
 
“But the Britain Zimbabwean Society was caught in the same dilemma as the 
other groups like the Catholic International Relations were caught in. We existed 
to say, ‘Hooray, here’s a brand new Zimbabwe’. You didn’t want to have to say, 
‘Oh my God, it’s not.”464 
 
Second, initially the ZANU-PF embraced a platform of reconciliation, ffering a 
narrative of peace and seeming willingness to dialogue with the various external and 
internal antagonists involved in the independence struggle. In his inauguration address, 
Mugabe extended a hand of collaboration to his former ‘enemies’, calling the nation to 
adjust and:  
“…relate to each other as brothers bound one to another by a bond of national 
comradeship…We are being born again not as individuals, but collectively as a 
people, nay, as a viable nation of Zimbabweans. If yesterday I fought you as an 
enemy, today you have become a friend and an ally with the same national 
interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you 
cannot avoid the love that binds me to you and you to me.”465 
 
Enraptured by the euphoria of the inauguration, the masses who gathered at Rufaro 
Stadium in Harare on the 17th of April 1980 most likely only heard what sounded like 
benevolent overtures from their new Prime Minister. However, with the hindsight of the 
Matabeleland massacres, it would seem that this pontificating about reconciliation was a 
form of political-correctness; a disguised nationalist discourse demanding conformity and 
driven by the dynamics of ‘ethnocentrism, group-think and rank disequilibrium’466.  
Third, above and beyond the international and national rhetoric, a myriad of 
provincial and local alternative social formations (political, church and civil society) 
emerged after the all-inclusive elections and rapidly filled the available democratic space 
with their particular narrative interests. “The government that came to power in 
Zimbabwe at independence in 1980 inherited a state apparatus that was relatively 
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developed in African terms and, in turn, confronted an array of coherent interest groups 
capable of putting the country’s new leaders under varying kinds of conflicting 
pressures.”467 Whether in the realms of media, health, or victims of demobilisation 
violence, finding one’s democratic voice seemed to be the order of the day: 
“The Bulawayo Chronicle wasn’t responsible to any political party. It had not yet 
been taken over by the State; it felt free to interview who and whoever you like. So 
it was still a real newspaper. It still had journalism anyway. And reading the 
Chronicle in 1980-1981, you had interviews of the ZIPRA women who were 
brought back into the assembly point, you had reports of the dissidents in 
Manicaland and remarkable broad coverage.”468 
 
“My research was in the east, in Makoni and as I told you before, there were 
rumours of events in Matabeleland about prior Entumbane [demobilisation camp] 
insurgents and dislodged Manica people were going back home, fleeing 
Bulawayo because they had been made victims of these stories. They had been 
made victims of the Ndebele. They’d been asked to say this word which you have 
all the clicks possible and if you were Shangaan you can’t possibly say…So in 
Manicaland, in Makoni, you have the extraordinary situation where old ladies 
who’d never been in Matabeleland, who’d never seen an Ndebele, calling for 
vengeance on them and so on.”469 
 
“And you had this dramatic record of the meeting in Kupane [in 1983] where 
Mugabe has come to have reports on development. And all the people there are 
bringing up…’seventy schools were built’. This is right in the middle of the 
Gukurahundi and nobody says anything at all about the security situation until the 
German doctor…at St Luke’s Hospital, she was there. And they ask her whether 
she has anything to say about the medical situation. And she says ‘my hospital is 
full of terribly wounded and dying people who have been beaten up by the Fifth 
Gang’. They’re absolutely shocked because she is saying this to Mugabe.”470 
 
In the above recollections, it appears evident that early on in Zimbabwe’s independence, 
a wave of transitional freedom swept across the nation and its citizens. The protagonists 
of democracy felt empowered to pursue a course of uncensored speech and freedom of 
association, ideals that most black Zimbabweans felt they deserved and had fought hard 
for. For the ZANU-PF, the cacophony of this democratic palaver of contrasting ideas and 
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colliding values seemed to threaten their newly acquired power and represented more 
ambiguity than they were willing to absorb. “The play of conflicting interests in a 
framework of shared purposes is the drama of a free society. It is a robust exercise and a 
noisy one, not for the fainthearted or the tidy-minded.”471  
Amidst this democratic disorder, ZANU-PF needed an ordering or controlling 
script. The disgruntled, fledgling groups of ex-ZIPRA and other third force ‘dissidents’472 
in the regions of Matabeleland and Midlands represented a counter-narrative which 
provided just the sustaining plot ZANU-PF needed to re-write its own nationalist meta-
drama from. ZANU-PF as a political organization, riding on its Liberation credentials 
and its sweeping Election victory in April 1980, took the risk of singularly attempting to 
define and dictate the nationalist agenda which resulted in a crisis of grave proportions.  
5.3. Ideological Nationalism: Manufacturing a Regulatory Memory 
 
In this study ‘ideological nationalism’ is understood as a set of socio-political 
logics that are superimposed on a group of people who possess various natural and 
created historical affiliations. It is characterised by a particular grid-system of beliefs or 
mind-sets of group-thinking that are meant to explain the corporate life and the reality of 
socio-political relations. Outside of the specific norms prescribed by an ideological 
nationalism, those populations who have been drafted to exist under ideological 
nationalisms have little room for diverse ways of being or doing. Ideological nationalism 
relies on its ability to carefully craft, if not outright control social memory. Pamela 
Machakanja expounds on this notion further: 
“From a socio-cultural perspective, social memory is conceptualised as a tool for 
social control and domination. While such control may be contested, it is typically 
managed by powerful groups to serve their own purposes as an imposed 
consensus. From this perspective, the core proposition put forward is the creation 
of hegemony through domination of cultural and political meanings of selected 
past events in the interest of a few.”473 
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“Scholars have observed that the writing of history [social memory] has often 
been used to ‘legitimate’ the nation-state, both in an attempt to ‘naturalise’ it as 
the central principle of political organisation, and to make it the ‘subject and 
object of historical development.”474  
 
In conceptual contrast to ideological nationalism, there exists what one might call 
‘values-based nationalism’ which is characterised by a more organic, people-centred 
nationalism that is based on sets of shared social contracts that have been rehearsed, 
contested and negotiated by a group of people who possess various natural and created 
historical affiliations. Mugabe’s government chose to construct a nation-state based on an 
imposed ideological frame of reference, and as such forfeited the longitudinal strength of 
a nationalism that is born out of a people-driven consensus on common agreed upon 
values of co-existence. The ZANU-PF nationalist project was precariously balanced on 
three foundational pillars of political machinations: National Sovereignty, One-party 
Statism and Leader Veneration. 
5.3.1. The Sovereign Nation-State: ‘The Emperor has no Clothing’ 
 
The ZANU-PF nationalist meta-narrative was shaped around the rhetoric of a 
unified, sovereign nation-state with a powerful central government and ‘socialised’ 
structures that were assumed to provide protection and boundary to a set of peoples 
connected by a shared political ideology, controlling legal system and distinct set of 
geographical borders. ZANU-PF’s nationalist agenda was rapidly subsumed by the 
inherited structural relics of the Colonialist rule that it carefully imitated n , like so 
many other independence governments in Africa, the revolutionary transformation 
seemed to stop short of genuine, durable transformation at a national level. This notion of 
post-colonial mimicry is piercingly articulated in the powerful writing of Franz Fanon: 
“The programme [colonial mimicry] consists not only of climbing out of the 
morass but also of catching up with the other nations using the only means at 
hand. They reason that if the European nations have reached that stage of 
development, it is on account of their efforts: ‘Let us therefore’, they seem to say, 
‘prove to ourselves and to the whole world that we are capable of the same 
achievements.’ This manner of setting out the problem of the evolution of under-
developed countries seems to us to be neither correct nor reasonable.”475   
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Literary critique and cultural theorist, Homi Bhabha gives descriptive parlance to post-
colonial mimicry as such: 
 
“…mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of 
colonial power and knowledge…then colonial mimicry is the desire for a 
reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, 
but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around 
an ambivalence: in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its 
slippage, its excess, its difference…mimicry emerges as the representation of a 
difference that it itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus the sign of a 
double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 
‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualises power. Mimicry is also the sign of the 
inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant 
strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an 
immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers.”476   
 
In independent Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF systematically applied post-colonial 
mimicry not only in its use of brutal force but also in its inability to incorporate 
difference into its meta-narrative of nationalism. In so doing, ZANU-PF reinvented and 
internalised the same ethic of fixed intolerance that was so pervasive in the Rhodesian 
colonial rule. Thus, in the Matabeleland violence, ZANU-PF acted out the very bigotry it 
had proclaimed to hate as characterised in the oppressive Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith. 
The following interview transcript argues that ZANU-PF’s post-colonial mimicry (an 
insatiable appetite to appropriate all control of power) was not based on it being a weak 
state, but instead it is about it being an irresponsible state: 
“We can’t talk, we can’t do anything. It [the state] monopolises radio, it 
monopolises heroes, it monopolises mountains; everything. As long as it is able to 
do that, then it is still strong, it is not weak. The crisis to me is that it is an 
irresponsible state which is too strong. It is irresponsible in that it is no longer 
serving anybody. Generally, you can’t penetrate it [the state].”477 
 
Stated another way, the Gukurahundi violence was not the response of a fragile or 
vulnerable state under attack, as the ZANU-PF attempted to make the masses believe. 
Rather, it was the reaction of an insecure, egotistical state that insisted on fortifying itself 
by eliminating all potential and actual threats to its ‘sovereignty’ in order to solidify its 
pervasive control of power over the nation. 
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What the ZANU-PF could not have predicted was that their independence would 
arrive on the tail-end of a climax in the glorious era of the ‘nation-state’ experiment 
globally. Within a decade the world would witness the demise of the Soviet Union (a 
prime example of ideological nationalism), setting in motion an era marked by serious 
questions about the coherency and functionality of the nation-state as a political 
organizing system especially in the wake of the exponential multiplication of demands 
for succession by minority groups across the globe. Writing on the crumbling of the 
nation-state façade, Eric Hobsbawm suggests that: “Nation-states and nations will be seen 
as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new 
supra-national restructuring of the globe”478. In multiple ways, the continuous public 
discourse of the ZANU-PF government leadership regarding its sacred national 
‘sovereignty’ wanes in its clinging attempt to hold a nation together that is tearing apart 
at the seams. Commenting on Zimbabwe’s sovereignty obsession from the present 
looking back, David Moore speaks with wit and precision: 
“If patriotism is the last refuge of scoundrels, sovereignty may be the last fig-leaf 
of emperors of ‘quasi-states’ with very few remaining clothes. Mugabe uses the 
rhetoric of sovereignty unrelentingly. It seems to have some resonance with his 
peers in equally nearly naked states, although it is hard to judge whether the 
people of these states are as patriotic as their leaders would like. There is no 
doubt, though, that such rhetoric is full of hypocrisy and serves mostly to justify 
tarring opposition with the brush of ‘imperialist puppets’ and to make every effort  
to stop foreign funding of human rights and democracy promotion.”479   
 
In the extreme, one interviewee depicted the ZANU-PF nationalist-sovereignty agenda as 
being a ‘smoke-screen’ for the on-going perpetration of severe human rights abuses: 
“Nationalism means kill your own people without being discovered; without 
being accountable to the world community. So, our nationalism and our 
sovereignty is about killing, raping, without being accountable to the world at 
large. So, that’s our nationalism, so that’s our sovereignty…So, basically my 
understanding of nationalism in terms of Mugabe’s lexicon is ‘kill your own 
people without being accountable’”.480 
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Whether planned or not, the ‘dissident’ oppositional voice that reverberated from 
within Matabeleland acted as a forerunner to the many secessionist movements that 
spread like wild fire in many parts of the world after 1990. During the 1980s, ZAPU-
ZIPRA occupied the stage of minority protest (both as the formal opposition represented 
in parliament and the informal opposition in the form of regional resistance to the 
Gukurahundi violence), thereby, creating an ethno-political counter-narrative; a 
‘revolution within a revolution’. This persistent defiance had two major effects on the 
ZANU-PF nationalist project. It resulted in what Delanty and O’Mahony term the 
‘decoupling of nation and state’ and the ‘decoupling of citizenship and nationality’.481 
The ‘decoupling of nation and state’ refers to the ethno-cultural sense of identification as 
a nation (a people group) verses the actual programmatic services, systems and 
instrumentalities of the state structures. When the state apparatus no longer delivers a 
valuable or tangible service to the people it purports to serve, it delinks itself by default 
from the expected loyalty it demands. This rift between the state and the nation of 
citizens it claims to be serving began to occur in Matabeleland within the first two years 
of independence as the ZANU-PF determinedly instituted repressive measures against the 
region and ultimately this disconnect was sealed with the unleashing of the Fifth Brigade 
violence in 1982. This clearly defined separation between the subjects and the state that is 
supposed to govern them, surfaces in the following interview transcripts: 
“I think …this president was not sure how he was going to make the Matabele’s 
obey him. I think that is why he did that, so that to make a fear…so that these 
people fear so that they can follow him, and he achieved that …”482 
 
“ In fact, my father…my parents were…they never value ZANU-PF members. So 
I had that hatred of ZANU-PF, so I was like waiting for anything which might 
come ‘opposing’ ZANU-PF in an effective way. So, I am ready to join anything 
that’s serious about opposing ZANU-PF. So, it s not a matter of ‘my’ parents only 
but the ‘whole’ area where I stay, many people don’t want to hear anything about 
ZANU-PF. Because they [did] a lot of bad things; bad things which ZANU-PF 
did, in the 80s, early 80s.”483 
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It would be important to note the language employed in the first transcript paragraph in 
which the interviewee refers to “this” not ‘our’ president inferring a distancing or a 
refusal to acknowledge the person who holds the title or function of state president in 
one’s own nation. This is a matter of ownership; in essence the speaker is saying 
‘Mugabe may be ‘the’ president, but he is not ‘my’ president. Also, in this transcription 
the speaker refers to the ‘Matabele’ in juxtaposition to the ruling ZANU-PF government. 
This reference exemplifies a form of ethno-political identity confusion in that the line 
between the ethnic differentiation of ‘Matabele’ and the oppositional political party 
‘ZAPU’ is blurred; insinuating that they are one in the same. However, more importantly 
it illustrates the ‘decoupling’ of the national affiliation (the nation of Matabele) and the 
state (the ZANU-PF political regime). In the second paragraph, the speaker fails to 
describe the kind of opposition to ZANU-PF that he desires in any substantive way 
(except to offer the descriptive words of ‘effective’ and ‘serious’). What is more 
prominent is the emphasis on the word ‘anything’ (which is repeated three times) to 
describe the kind of opposition worthy of joining. For this speaker the needs to 
differentiate self, family and community from any association with the ZANU-PF state 
were in the extreme.   
The ‘decoupling of citizenship and nationality’ refers to the ‘global citizen’ 
phenomena where transnational affiliations and allegiances can and do supersede the 
national and geographical boundary constrictions of the past, verses the idea of citizenry 
as defined and contained within the parameters of certain prescribed duties or obligations 
performed in the service of the single nation to which one belongs. This global citizenry 
is made possible through new technologies of digital communication and access to 
transport that allow these affiliates to instantaneously communicate to large numbers of 
people anywhere around the world at any time. It is a citizenry of cyber-choice that 
coalesce around common issues and interests and who often use their technical suave in 
advocating for global social change.484 Unable to fathom a world of global citizenry, 
ZANU-PF clung relentlessly to the formations of past nationalisms where citizenship was 
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restricted in locality, in thought, belonging and focus of activity. This was a nationalism 
which demanded that ‘good’ citizenry serve its government and its ideologies instead of 
demanding that ‘good’ governance serves its citizenry. In practical terms, this form of 
self-serving nationalism empowered the ZANU-PF government to bestow and revoke 
citizenship on its people at whim. The following interviews highlight certain concerns 
whereby citizenship in Zimbabwe has been questioned on the basis of race, ideology or 
affiliation outside the state’s prescription whether that be on issues of land redistribution, 
economics or western ideational leanings: 
“And what justification are you using? And are [you] not actually rethinking the 
issue of citizenship? Are you not…saying that who is the authentic subject, what 
would be the criteria for admission into citizenship? We say the admission 
depends on being ‘a son and a daughter of the soil’…And secondly they [ZANU-
PF] are saying ‘no, in terms of economy; it must be owned by the ‘sons and 
daughters of the land’. And that to me is actually something which already played 
inside the nationalist thought. It was there inside the nationalist thinking from the 
beginning.”485 
 
“My feeling about all of this is it’s a really pathetic and sad cause that if you look 
at the common thread; the common thread was, to butcher many women and 
children, and their husbands and brothers who tried to defend their lives, in the 
pretext of protecting the masses of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean people, that 
was the cause. Today, the butchering of White farmers and their labourers, and 
the killing of the MDC [opposition] is done again in the cause of defending the 
people of Zimbabwe. But nobody stops to think ‘Wait, hang on’. MDC people 
were also Zimbabweans, the White farmers were also Zimbabweans – they just 
happen to be Zimbabweans with a different opinion. But, you see in the whole 
social order of Zimbabwe, having a different opinion is as good as not being part 
of the masses. So butchering you is fine… So you become less than human for 
having a different ideology or a different principle to me. The worst thing in 
Zimbabwe, worse than even murder is to be a puppet of the West. If you are a 
puppet of the West you deserve to die. If you’re sitting there with views that 
support what Mugabe calls the ‘Western Hegemony’, you deserve to die.”486 
 
Whether one is analysing the Matabeleland violence of the 1980s or the more 
recent violence of the last decade in Zimbabwe as cited above, the national ‘decoupling’ 
being discussed in this section rests continually on the notion of location; where the 
citizenry of the nation are being partitioned into the categories of the ‘included’ and the 
                                                
485 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
486 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
177 
 
‘excluded’, both literally in their right to be attached to the legal, geographical 
boundaries and production of the land, and figuratively in their sense of identification and 
belonging to a certain people with common ancestry, roots and values. 
“In this narrative of liberation, a common African history and Pan African 
solidarity, the land has played a determining role as the key marker of a common 
struggle. It has formed the centrepiece of the ruling party’s construction of 
belonging, exclusion and history. The official discourse on the liberation struggle 
has been marked by the translation of a multi-faceted anti-colonial struggle into a 
singular discourse designed to legitimate the authoritarian nationalism that has 
emerged around the land question…”487 
 
Thus, while the ZANU-PF pushed ahead with its unyielding pursuit to build a monolithic 
nation-state in the 1980s, all around them a wave of nation-state disintegration was 
occurring at the global and continental level and the fractious voices of dissent within 
their very own borders were gaining volume, accent and momentum at a local and 
national level. Unbeknownst to the ZANU-PF the emperor, represented by the 
machinations of nation-state hegemony, was slowly being exposed; without the clothing 
of a legitimate, voluntarily-bounded, and reflexive nation-state agenda to cover its 
nakedness.   
5.3.2. A One-Party State: A Conversation with Self 
 
This study argues that ZANU-PF had its sights on establishing a one-party state 
from the time of Robert Mugabe’s rise to leadership in exile during the 1970s if not from 
its original existence as a party, although this is a much less quantifiable premise. This 
research highlights visible patterns that serve as pointers along the pathway of ZANU-PF 
becoming a one-party state sourced from the political ideological articulation as well as 
the behaviour of the ZANU-PF in refusing to reconcile or unify with ZAPU-ZIPRA 
throughout the liberation struggle despite numerous attempts by frontline states to 
facilitate this process488, refusing to jointly go to the polls with ZAPU in 1980, and then 
systematic eradicating all opposition parties and voices of dissent in the 1980s.  As the 
ZANU-PF determined to march toward the distant horizon of a one-party state, the socio-
                                                
487 Raftopoulos, B. 2004. “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics”. A paper presented at the 
University of Edinburgh’s Centre of African Studies International Conference on States, Borders and 
Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa. May 2004. 




political narratives that were once actively engaged in the production of the vision of the 
new nation of Zimbabwe became faint and eventually fell away until ZANU-PF was left 
alone having a conversation with self.   
In its first two decades of independence, the ZANU-PF maintained an uneasy 
alliance between its autocratic and democratic pulsations. However in time, this 
flirtatious posturing faded away and the more dominating, dictatorial tendencies took 
root. 
“We have heard Left rhetoric from Mugabe most vociferously when forceful 
popular challenges arise…Mugabe’s radical rhetoric included regular accusations 
of ‘counter-revolution’ and even a late 1998 promise to resurrect ‘socialism’, 
repeated vociferously in October 2001.  The oratory may have amused – but at 
this stage, no longer confused – the urban masses whom it was meant to 
intimidate.”489   
 
The official government call for a one-party state, although often discussed was only 
opened to a popular debate in the latter 1980s (after the signing of the Unity Accord) and 
was followed by an intensive public dialogue around its merits and demerits in 1991490. 
However, this one-party verses multi-party state spectacle appeared to represent yet 
another one of ZANU-PF’s democratic charades more than a forum of genuine popular, 
participatory dialogue in the public domain. Traces of one-party statism linger throughout 
the recorded pre-independence narrative of the ZANU political formations. Only in 
hindsight did it become evident that the ZANU pre-independence revolutionary rhetoric 
of one-party statism was to become the foundation of the ZANU-PF post-independence 
governance principles and policies. Broadcasting on the radio from Mozambique in 1976, 
Mugabe’s infamous words have echoed through time: 
“Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have, shall 
have been the product of the gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain 
its security officer – its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s guns are 
always inseparable twins.”491 
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In almost direct contrast to Mugabe’s declaration of the symbiotic relationship 
between votes and guns, ZAPU’s leader Joshua Nkomo publicly pronounced his 
diplomatic intentions as follows: “We can either get there by negotiation or by the gun. If 
it is through negotiation, then everyone will have a say. By the gun – well, dead people 
are unable to make up their minds.”492 
 This only served to accentuate the divide between ZANU and ZAPU, reinforcing 
Mugabe’s contention that Nkomo and ZAPU were ‘sell-outs’ who had betrayed the 
nationalist cause by continuing to compromise with the ‘enemy’(the white Rhodesian 
regime). In turn, ZAPU pointed the accusing finger at ZANU as a divisive, competitive 
party with violent, power-mongering tendencies.     
At the celebration of Chinhoyi (Sinoia) Day, April 30, 1978 Robert Mugabe 
exhorted his ZANU followers as such: “Let us also derive inspiration and courage, 
loyalty and commitment from the Battle of Sinoia and its seven heroes and continue to 
adhere to the Party lines as the only correct line for all of us.”493 Again, along a similar 
vein at the ceremony of Chitepo Day, March 18, 1979, Mugabe exerted the role of 
ZANU-PF as follows:  
“These events [détente] put us off balance. We thus needed to reorganise and 
readjust ourselves so our party could once more reassert itself as the only 
revolutionary movement in the country…We just had to wriggle out of the 
clutches of the ANC and its complete lack of revolutionary concern and re-
establish the Party as the overall planner and director of the national struggle.”494  
 
Political difference was never acceptable to the ZANU pre- or post-independence: 
 
“So, the idea of violence [in ZANU-PF’s dealings with opposition] has always 
been there, it’s not new, it’s not; there has been continuity. We don’t know what 
happened before ’77 but, if you read Tekere’s book you will see there was this 
rebellion against Mugabe, you shouldn’t imagine that he was easily accepted, he 
wasn’t. Then how do you deal with those dissidents within ZANU? So, you see 
violence. There were people who were sentenced to death, they were going to be 
hanged here after independence; apparently they were not. You see Nyati, the 
fellow who led the forces to Nyadzonia; they killed him after independence.”495 
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In the after-glow of independence and what seemed to be the dawning of 
democracy, the ‘one-party’ sloganeering subsided for a season until the challenging 
voices of ZAPU as an oppositional political party emerged and the clamouring incidences 
of ‘dissident’ violence came to the fore in 1981-1982. 
 “Yes. I think, having immediately come from an armed conflict in terms of which 
both the ZIPRA and the ZANLA armies were involved in a single agenda ‘to 
remove the colonial government and establish, you know, majority rule in the 
country’, at that particular time it was easy to distinguish the enemy from the 
then-liberators at that particular time, but then once the enemy that time have been 
removed, there was then a contestation of space; between ZANLA and ZIPRA. 
And the ZANLA having had won an election in 1980, it actually sort-of put them 
in an advantage position, and it was then viewed in their own perspective that 
they should consolidate their position if they were going to survive. Next, the 
country was going to relapse into a civil war, something that had been noted in 
some other African countries immediately after independence. So that could have 
been the motivation of the government to say that... ‘we have to quickly establish 
our self and suppress any form of dissent’, and probably that could have been the 
thinking of the government at that time that could explain the way they reacted 
and tried to use every single, you know, situation at their disposal to their 
advantage so that they could establish themselves. The primary motivation then 
that becomes very clear is that they wanted to ‘quash’ the ZIPRA, establish 
themselves in authority, and it is very clear that the government of the day at that 
time had very strong intentions of establishing a one-party state. So they were 
very intolerant of ‘any’ opposition whatsoever…”496 
 
“…I understand that Mugabe has always wanted a one-party state he’s never 
been happy with the opposition f any sort that’s why they were having problems 
that we have at the moment. So the issue of ZAPU being an opposition and being 
there, he thought he would finish it off, you know, by killing I suppose as many 
ZAPU officials as he possibly could.”497  
 
“ It was like Nkomo wanted to topple the government. And they [ZANU-PF] were 
singing and wanting [a] one-party state. And I remember in one video-clip they 
were saying: ‘We want the whole world to know that Zimbabwe wants a one-party 
state in Zimbabwe…”498 
 
This discussion necessitates an interrogation into the seedbeds that nurtured this 
thrust toward one-party statism as a legitimate form of governance in Africa. For one 
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interviewee, the notion of a one-party state is embedded in three root governance 
systems: in African traditional customs, in the imposed colonial systems, and in the 
Eastern European and Asian countries that supported the revolutions on the continent.  
“You have to understand the dynamics of ‘African succession’; how it happens. If 
I am king there is no king until I die, that’s how it happens, that’s as simple as all 
that. And when I die, the next king is my son. So this is the legacy, people 
shouldn’t imagine that Africa has no legacy of political governance and stuff like 
that, they have. For a current leader there are probably two or three sources of 
ideas on governance. One, is the African past itself, because we used to govern 
ourselves; then you have the colonial period, and it’s the most recent; then, where 
white Westerners were intransigent, necessitating the taking up of arms, and the 
arms came from the East. And so these people began to have contact with the East 
but as you know, the East was one-party dictatorship. So you have three sources 
and all three sources from a governance viewpoint were disastrous.”499 
 
Although the one-party state rule may seem to correspond with the traditional 
hierarchical chiefdom model (respect for age, authority and leadership for life), the 
inherited colonial expression of nation-state was often stripped of the ancient ‘checks and 
balances’ of accountability that were part of many well-ordered African societies in the 
past500. Absolute power and the greed that accompanied access to the accumulated wealth 
of the modern nation-state overwhelmed many of the independence African leaders. 
Stepping down or letting go of an official function such as Head of State, relinquishing 
the power, honour, dignity, respect and wealth afforded to these positions was virtually 
unheard of. In certain ‘face-saving’ traditional African worldviews to be removed from 
leadership would represent being publically shamed and disrespected in one’s old age, a 
humiliation barely imaginable for many. Added to this were the exposure to, and the 
often blind imitation of the colonial rule which by its nature was hierarchical, power-
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hungry and economically greedy and corrupt. Finally, compounding this all, many of the 
global sponsors of African liberation struggles were countries entrenched in the 
ideologies of socialist-communist, one-party state regimes themselves.    
“…I think its roots were found in Marxist Leninism, you know. I think that 
Mugabe in 1980 was committed to that ideology. I think he was committed to, at 
the very least a de facto one party state, and possibly a de jure on  party state. 
And Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU party stood in their path. And they were a lot 
harder to attack because they had been a guerrilla … they had their own guerrilla 
army. And they were the liberators in their own right so they couldn’t just be dealt 
with in the way that they dealt with …certain officials like Muzorewa had been 
dealt with. But I think that the motivation was to create a one party state.”501 
 
“ I think there’s a very Socialist-Communist ideology that belies all of this. And in 
there the most clear and most important thing is the ideology itself. So you’re 
taught in class and history and school to accept that there is the empowerment of 
the masses. But the strange paradox no-one ever asked is: How can the masses be 
empowered by killing the masses, for the cause of empowering the masses?  So 
it’s a sort-of self-defeating exercise where no-one ever questions it. So only now 
when you stand back do you realize ‘no, no, no, there’s not empowerment of the 
masses; it’s empowering those who ‘claim’ to represent the masses. And that’s 
why you can butcher the masses because the masses don’t really count. The key 
thing is: masses must realize that the only way forward is to support the leader of 
the masses. And if you don’t realize that then you’re not part of the masses and 
they wanna butcher you. So theoretically that means that you can actually kill the 
masses right down to the last person, as long as the leader of the masses stays on 
top, then the ideology is preserved.” 502 
 
In the unwavering race to ensure that Zimbabwe became a one-party state, the 
ZANU-PF had to declare all formations that propagated alternative national scripts as a 
threat or even an ‘enemy’ to the State including the media, civil society organisations, 
unions, legal fraternities, religious institutions and as a matter of urgency any political 
opposition parties. As long as these formations kept pace with the official ZANU-PF 
meta-narrative they were afforded fairly expanded freedoms. However, once they began 
to speak in opposition to ZANU-PF governance and official policies they were quickly 
declared a menace to Zimbabwe. 
“The ‘issue’ of one-party state in Zimbabwe can actually be seen from the actions 
of the present government, right from the very day that it took over power: from 
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the way it crushed dissent, from the way it nationalized the media, from the way it 
consolidated its power and trying to stake the majority representation in 
government, and from the way it tried to push its own agenda, whether or not that 
was popular or generally acceptable to the country. And even to the extent that 
where very prominent people in ZANU-PF itself, went out, you know, the likes of 
Edgar Tekere, to come ‘out of’ the ZANU-PF and try to fight the imaginations of 
Robert Mugabe to try and emasculate the whole country into a one-party state. 
And even the tampering and the panel-beating of the Constitution to ‘suit’ these 
goals of trying to create a one-party state. So you can actively discern from the 
actions right from the beginning, that there was this desire, which was frustrated 
in the way to create a one-party state.”503 
 
In the end, the ZANU-PF bowed to the will of the people and aborted its efforts to 
officially declare a one-party state. However, ZANU-PF did not curb its politically 
ambitious behaviour and maintained its unswerving march toward securing an indefinite 
tenure as the ruling party of Zimbabwe, and in so doing the unidirectional conversation 
with itself continued.  
5.3.3. Leader Veneration 
 
The nationalist agenda of the ZANU-PF encouraged a ceremonial form of ‘leader 
worship’ where its populist figures were reverenced as demigods. In general, 
revolutionary leaders are often imagined as untouchable (to be feared and given 
unquestionable respect), unable to do wrong (and if they do offend the blame is placed on 
other persons surrounding them), and the conduits for understanding and interpreting the 
truth for the masses (they become the voice for all the people they lead). Their credentials 
rest on having fought in the struggle, surviving imprisonment, educational qualifications, 
intelligence, personality charisma and public speaking abilities. In short, their goal is to 
establish themselves as the only person fit to rule the nation which in turn evolves into a 
form of ‘personality cult’ often shrouded in mystical intrigue regarding the mortality and 
supernatural prowess of the individual leader involved. In 1982, Robert Mugabe’s 
credentials were articulated as follows: 
“With selfless determination and single-minded dedication of purpose, the first 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe has been in the forefront of the 
struggle for political justice in this country for nearly two decades. Detained and 
                                                





imprisoned by successive Rhodesian governments for long periods, he overcame 
the attempts of the authorities to break him by the sheer force of his commitment 
to the struggle, and his conviction in the justice of the cause and the inevitability 
of victory. He led ZANU(PF) through the armed struggle to the overwhelming 
election victory in February 1980.”504 
 
In this paragraph, the discourse of ‘selfless determination’, ‘single-minded dedication’, 
‘sheer force of his commitment’ and ‘his conviction in the justice of the cause’ indirectly 
elevate Mugabe above his cohorts in the struggle, and establish him as the only person 
deserving to lead Zimbabwe. Seemingly, after independence, Mugabe had to be justified 
as the only possible leader of the new nation:  
“It was during this time [1975] that Robert Mugabe was confirmed as the 
unchallenged leader of ZANU and the fighting forces…In the historic ZANU 
Congress at Chimoio in Mozambique in 1977…His ascendency as head of the 
political and armed struggle in Zimbabwe was complete.”505 
 
Here we find an explicit script ascribing unreserved finality to Mugabe’s accepted 
leadership through the use of definitive phraseology such as ‘unchallenged’, 
‘ascendency’ and ‘complete’. However, in this paragraph the all-encompassing narrative 
of ZANU-PF nationalism is exposed as it unwittingly (or wittingly) equates the ‘political 
and armed struggle in Zimbabwe’ with ZANU-PF as a movement thereby, completely 
overriding the role of ZAPU in the revolution. This text not only closes the door to all 
oppositional leadership challenges, it consolidates Mugabe’s leadership in the present
leaving scarce room for any kind of metamorphosis in the national needs for different 
trajectories of leadership in the future.    
The combination of ethereal fate, influential oratory skills and the singular loyalty 
from the liberation soldiers are all given credence to in the narrative depiction of 
Mugabe’s rise to power.    
“His return [from Ghana] to Rhodesia [in 1960] at a moment when the African 
intellectuals were, for the first time, showing a willingness to become involved in 
politics, was a perfect example of unconscious timing…Robert Mugabe, as a 
distinguished visitor, was then asked to speak: he won the support of the crowd by 
stressing the need to blend together all classes of men in the nationalist movement 
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and the importance of graduates and professional men accepting the chosen 
leaders ‘even if they may not be university men.’”506 
 
 “…and it was widely believed that he [Mugabe] was playing an active part in the 
recruitment and training of guerrillas for further incursions into Rhodesia. 
Certainly documents smuggled out of the training camps described him as the 
only political leader in whom the guerrillas still had trust and through whom they 
were prepared to communicate with the outside world…Although the validity of 
Mugabe’s claim to have political control over the bulk of the guerrillas has been 
queried in certain recent newspaper reports, there is little doubt that his power in 
this quarter is greater than that of any other top nationalist.”507 
 
In the first script above one is stuck by the terminology of ‘unconscious timing’ which 
insinuates some level of supernatural destiny in Mugabe’s leadership ascent. The author 
writes of Mugabe’s ‘distinguished’ ability to win ‘the support of the crowd’ as a way of 
enshrining his populist appeal in the Liberation movement. In the second script Mugabe 
is glorified as a war strategist, promoted as the only channel through which the freedom 
fighters would willingly speak to the world and revered as possessing the dominant 
power above all other leading nationalist figures.     
When a leader is afforded this level of public awe combined with appointed or 
elected power two mutually co-dependent processes occur: the masses develop a 
disproportionate fear of the leader and the leader develops a disproportionate arrogance. 
These two faces of leader veneration are well exemplified in the interaction between 
Catholic Bishop Karlen of Matabeleland and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in 1983 
when the Fifth brigade violence had heightened significantly: 
“The other ones [Matabeleland Church Leaders] said, ‘It is terrible, terrible what 
is going on. We have to pray and pray’. I told them ‘Why do you have to pray? It 
is not enough. We have to act’. Then I had a proposal: three African bishops from 
whatever churches – it did not matter – should go to Mr. Mugabe. A delegation 
from Matabeleland. Not one volunteered. They were too scared.”508  
 
“We do not respond to scriptures, but according to given political principles. It is 
not when the Bishop sneezes that we all catch a cold. No, we are a government 
and we run our affairs as we see fit and if bishops speak it does not mean that we 
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should all stop working because their holiness have spoken…[Bishop Karlen and 
some of his priests] they are supporters of Nkomo and they are the ones who go to 
the other bishops and say what is happening, and the other bishops merely listen 
to them and accept what they say as the word of God, which cannot be denied 
because it is a man of God who is saying it. But they don’t know perhaps that a 
man of God is worshipping mammon instead of the real God, so the poor bishops 
are mislead into believing that what Bishop Karlen is saying is the holy truth and 
nothing else but the holy truth.”509  
 
Bishop Karlen’s remarks highlight the grip of fear on the masses when it came to 
confronting Mugabe, even in the face of being witnesses to the atrocities happening all 
around them. Mugabe’s condescending response patronised the ordinary citizen and the 
on-the-ground Church (representing a large network of civil society) by suggesting that 
they had no say in the governance of the nation and beyond that their convictions were 
false (‘mammon’) and linked to the political opposition (‘supporters of Nkomo’) and that 
somehow his government (ZANU-PF) was more closely aligned with the ‘real God’.   
ZANU-PF was not the only nationalist party to revel in acts of leader worship. 
ZAPU also placed its leader Dr. Joshua Nkomo on a pedestal of grandiose repute, 
professing life-long loyalty to Nkomo as their leader even in his post-humus state as 
evidenced in the following transcriptions: 
“Like I was saying…you won’t separate the people of Matabeleland with Joshua 
Nkomo because they perceived him as their leader. And up to now, some still feel 
that Matabeleland should have its own administration, they feel it should be 
another state. Because they still feel they are not ‘free’ under Mugabe and the 
Shonas. They even feel that...there was some times when they proposed that they 
would rather be part of South Africa rather than the Shonas, because they still feel 
their group...they’ll feel they would be much safer being part of South Africa than 
part of the ZANU-PF government. And you are rightly saying when you are 
saying it’s part of...this war was like an ‘ethnic’ war. Because people of 
Matabeleland, no matter how the ZANLA Forces had operated in some parts of 
Matabeleland, they still believed ‘we are for ZAPU’, and we can not be separated 
from Nkomo, because they knew Nkomo as their saviour. The man who had really 
preached this gospel of freedom.”510 
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“Yes. I was saying that the people of Matabeleland, as long as Joshua Nkomo had 
advised them to take a certain direction, they would follow it. And I was saying… 
even up to this moment there are some people from Matabeleland who are now in 
the leadership positions in ZANU-PF. They will tell you that ‘we are doing this 
because Nkomo left us here’. But if anything would happen that really would 
necessitate the breaking, they still identify themselves as ZAPU and not ZANU-
PF. And they are saying ‘we are here just because Nkomo left us here’. They are 
still saying they are doing this for the sake of Nkomo, and I still believe some of 
them still see the injustices that are being done in Matabeleland. And maybe 
because they are feeling weak they cannot stand against Robert, they say ‘okay, 
for the sake of peace, we will be here’, but they still identify themselves as ZAPU, 
as a group of ZIPRA.”511 
 
One interviewee speaking from personal encounter, paints a candid picture of the 
egotistical volatility, ambiguity and parody that accompanies this kind of leader 
veneration:  
“I can tell you how I view Joshua Nkomo. He’s a towering figure, but he was 
emotional, he was valuable, he was vain. He would say ‘no, no, no’. I learned 
this, we learned this, he would say ‘no interviews, no, no’. And then [we’d] say 
‘oh but Dr Nkomo, you are the one who can speak and you’re the leader ... the 
father of the nation and da-da-da’ and he would puff up as you were speaking and 
he would ... then, he would talk. In other words he was very susceptible to 
flattery. It wasn’t as a strategic decision. So I would say that he probably…was no 
more of a democrat than Robert Mugabe. He didn’t like other people to question 
his authority, he was a dictator too. If he had been put into full power, I don’t 
know how much better the country would have been run. However, he was aware 
that he was representing a minority group, the Ndebele. So he had to make 
accommodation for the Shona. But when you look at the Shona who were his 
deputies, they   were   his   deputies. They didn’t like anybody taking the limelight 
from him.”512 
 
While this leadership rhetoric is not unusual for revolutionary-liberationist 
ideology, it is necessary to understand that packaged with this kind of leader veneration is 
an automatic cancellation of the space for multiple leaders who carry different 
perspectives and/or who could govern the nation through a power-sharing arrangement. 
Regardless of Nkomo’s faults and weaknesses, there appeared to be a consensual 
agreement among the interviewees on both sides of the Mashonaland and Matabeleland 
divide that Nkomo should be commended as a genuine nationalist leader in that he 
                                                
511 Ibid.    
512 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
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appeared to favour diplomacy over force, he was willing to share power across political 
divides, and he had the whole nation’s well-being in mind.  
“I think he was a genuine leader, and I think Mugabe... to be honest, I wouldn’t be 
surprised if it all boiled down to personal jealousy by Mugabe. But even though 
Nkomo had a smaller percentage, if he was allowed genuine opposition politics, 
Mugabe would have to be kept on his toes and I don’t think Mugabe liked that. 
He wanted a one-party State anyway. He kept on talking about a one-party 
State.”513  
 
“ I don’t think the Zimbabwe Gukurahundi situation is that simple. I don’t think 
so. I think it had to do with power, with building a one party state, it had to do 
with who Joshua Nkomo represented, and how Robert Mugabe looked like a 
midget in the national psyche, visa-vie, Joshua Nkomo. That’s how I summarise 
it.” 514 
 
“Joshua Nkomo was not like Mzilikazi who was basically a leader of the Zulu-
Ndebele people. And Lobengula was not like Joshua Nkomo, he was a leader of 
the Ndebele-Zulu people. Nkomo was a national leader, this is why you’ll find 
even around him here,  he surrounded himself more with Shona people cause it’s 
the majority taking the positions there, than the Ndebele people. So, it was all in 
good faith but, because of poor governing skills, poor management skills, purely 
from Mugabe and his henchmen and the excitement of being in power, and using 
the old historical false reasons, then they decided they’re going to discipline the 
Matabeleland people... and Joshua Nkomo, and that to us was not right. He could 
not be justified.”515 
 
“…it’s interesting who is a hero. Because, I think a lot of people, even from 
Mashonaland, have admitted that Joshua Nkomo was a hero. Because he was a 
‘nationalist’ guy. You know, you will find that even within the ZIPRA leadership, 
he will pick people from Mashonaland, because he wanted to unite the people of 
Zimbabwe. And in that sense, people really understood Joshua Nkomo as a hero. 
That’s why they ended up calling him ‘Father Zimbabwe’, because he was a 
father of all the people of that nation. And in my point of view I’d say Joshua 
Nkomo was a hero.”516 
 
This could explain why ZANU-PF and Dr. Joshua Nkomo were unable to find a 
satisfactory role arrangement between themselves from 1980 onwards despite Nkomo 
                                                
513 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
514 Interview: JM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/02/08 – (Shona Professor of Political Science in 
Zimbabwe). 
515 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
516 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 -  (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 
with Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s).     
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being offered and given various government portfolios (President, Minister of Home 
Affairs, and Minister without Portfolio) over that time. Some analysts and indeed Nkomo 
himself argued that these portfolios were mostly in name only and had little to do with 
meaningful function. The position of President which was eventually filled by Canaan 
Banana was ceremonial in nature. And it was during Nkomo’s tenure as Minister of 
Home Affairs that the Fifth Brigade was trained and deployed in Matabeleland without 
his knowledge. This he considered a great affront and an undermining of his authority to 
oversee the internal security of the nation. 
“Minister of the Patriotic Front and Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Joshua 
Nkomo complained over the weekend that he had not been consulted about the 
formation of the brigade. He charged that the unit would be used to impose a one-
party State in Zimbabwe. But the Prime Minister reiterated that one-party state 
would only be introduced if the people wanted it.”517 
 
ZANU-PF’s rituals of leader worship entrenched the political power of a few solitary 
leaders by widening the chasm between the broad-based citizenry and the unattainable 
positions of a small cadre of revolutionary leaders. Coupled with this, it also bred a spirit 
of fear in the peasant masses and spirit of arrogance in the leadership. In essence, this 
leader veneration left no space for substitutability of leadership which would explain the 
continual tension between the ZANU-PF and ZAPU and the well-harnessed drive of the 
ZANU-PF regime to monopolise the national political landscape as a one-party state.  
5.4. Constructed Nationalism: Producing a Normative Experience 
 
In this research ‘constructed nationalism’ refers to the collective bonding that 
occurs in the psyche of a nation when its citizenry share in a set of common experiences 
of reality (perceptions of ‘life as it is’). Joint observation and encounter when 
experienced in a group setting can lead to an agreed upon analysis and subsequently a 
normative interpretation of reality. This sophisticated phenomena of ‘group-think’ (or 
more derogatorily referred to as ‘majority rules’ or the ‘mob-mentality’) is further 
complicated when there is strong, autocratic leadership that asserts itself as the tr nslator 
functioning as a filter of the meaning of reality for the group (nation) it is mandated to 
lead. In the ideal, an organic evolution of nationhood would surface these sorts of 
experiential affiliations of reality in the natural flow of the nation-state development. 
                                                
517 ‘Why fear new army brigade? – Mugabe’, (1981) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 27 August. 
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However, if the national leadership has aligned itself to a particular preferred reality of its 
own devising (ideology), it can use its socio-political power coupled with the state 
resources and instrumentalities at its disposal to produce a normative national experience, 
thereby imposing a ‘favourable’ constructed reality from which it can govern out of. 
According to this study, it would seem clear that ZANU-PF was engaged in this strategy 
of ‘producing a normative national experience’ from the time of independence through to 
the 1980s, if not beyond. 
This section will argue that there were three pivotal yet highly controversial 
events that gave the ZANU-PF the framework to hang its nationalist narrative upon: the 
violent clashes that erupted between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in Entumbane 
demobilisation camps, the ‘discovery’ of arms caches in a number of ZAPU-owned 
farms, and the supposed ‘dissident’ kidnapping and murder of a group of six white 
tourists. At the same time these particular events were also the nucleus from which 
counter-narratives were being incubated and eventually birthed. These multiple, 
oppositional narratives set in motion a disordering function imbibed with an intrinsic 
sense of resistance and propelled by a determination to hold up an alternative truth to the 
dominant narrative of Zimbabwean independence sweeping the country and the world at 
that time. 
These three incidences served a number of critical purposes for ZANU-PF’s 
nationalist agenda. Firstly, these events provided the public with the necessary ‘evidence’ 
that ZANU-PF needed to motivate for the implementation of Operation Gukurahundi. 
Three major streams of narrative discourse surfaced around Operation Gukurahundi with 
each one vying for the public’s attention: ZANU-PF maintained that the Gukurahundi 
exercise was a justified response to a state emergency, an issue of state security under 
threat. For oppositional formations and many members of civil society, it represented a 
means for wiping out the opposition (ZAPU’s) support base and enforcing a one-party 
state. Lastly, for the masses on the ground in Matabeleland it appeared to be a violent 
revenge of genocide proportions; retribution for historical ethnic grievances and 
‘punishment’ for the Matabele majority who did not vote for ZANU-PF in the polls in 
1980 or in 1985. Certain conspiracy theorists link the 1980s massacres in Matabeleland to 
the printed mention of ‘Gukurahundi’ found in ZANU political documents dated in 1979, 
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thereby claiming that this onslaught against the Ndebele people was motivated by and 
planned for even before the events of dissidence that conspired in the post-independence 
era518. Despite the official pronouncements of justification given by ZANU-PF, many 
questions remain as is clear from the below transcription: 
“Maybe I’ll begin by saying what led to the Gukurahundi as narrated in the book 
[Breaking the Silence]’; the training of the Fifth Brigade by the Koreans, it wasn’t 
just by accident, it was done quietly. One would have queried if it was integration, 
the British were also the integrating force of the training. Why was Britain not in 
charge of this brigade, what was so special about it being trained by the 
Korean[s]? Who was this enemy whom they are supposed to have fought 
[against]? Why then now when it is unleashed, it is unleashed to this people 
[Matabele]? Then, the issue of the weapons being discovered, arms cachesbeing 
discovered on the farms. One would have said that was common knowledge 
because they were armies. They could still be hiding some of the things. I don’t 
know whether the independence of religion in the forces would actually leave 
them where they were, I don’t know. Or alternatively some of these arms caches 
could have been actually planted, I don’t know. But these are areas people could 
have actually dialogued. But the way it was handled was like it was... they 
[ZAPU/dissidents] were already enemies and they did not weigh it out. And it 
also talks about ... I mentioned the run-up to the Brigade coming to existence 
under cloudy reasons, and then when it actually came out, it was deployed in the 
rural areas where food distribution was stopped. Those who had been injured 
could not go to the hospitals…And there was a clampdown on news from that 
particular area, why was there such a clamp-down?  I was also not allowed in so 
that I can make an independent report.”519  
  
 Secondly, these three events produced the shadow screen behind which to hide, 
or at least distract from the severe violence being meted out by the ZANU-PF-sponsored 
Fifth brigade. A cloud of mystery surrounds the origins of this special task brigade that 
was devised outside the parameters of the already established police and military 
strictures in place at that time, trained by North Koreans before the ‘dissident’ violence 
erupted in Matabeleland, and was mandated to account directly to the Prime Minister’s 
(Mugabe’s) office alone.  
                                                
518 Ndebele, Z. 2007. Gukurahundi: A Moment of Madness, a DVD production. While the ZANU document 
in question has been established by date and is photographed in the DVD the context in which the phrase 
‘Gukurahundi’, a Shona word which means ‘the early rain which washes (blows) away the chaff (dirt or 
trash) before the spring rains’ is used is not clear. From a reading of text it would seem to indicate that 
ZANU was using this same phrase as a code name for its general offensive against the white Rhodesian 
regime. There is no definite articulation linking this reference to the Ndebele people at that time (1979).     
519 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice CCJP in the 1980s). 
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“[T]he events leading up to the establishment of the Fifth Brigade weren’t really 
uncovered fully until ironically the publication of the Zimbabwe Defence Force’s 
magazine in 1992, which recounted the history of the Fifth Brigade, and showed 
that Mugabe had gone to see Kim Il Sung as early as I think August 1980 and 
signed the agreement which led to the deployment of North Koreans here in about 
October 1980. Now, we didn’t know that until 1992. And we also didn’t know the 
details of the graduation, the training of the Fifth Brigade. And indeed we didn’t 
know what Mugabe had said at the pass-out parade in November 1982. So we 
have the benefit of that, that hindsight which mitigates, I suppose, to a certain 
extent the West’s failure to intervene.”520  
 
“From hindsight it would seem to me that this was a well-planned activity that 
probably didn’t just happen by itself. Cause if I understand it correctly, the 
contract for the North Koreans to train this particular brigade was signed 
somewhere in the ‘80’s, I mean somewhere in 1980, thereabout or before …of 
course implemented a bit later than that. But it looks like the plans were already in 
place, you know. So for me it seems to be something that was well-
orchestrated…” 521 
 
“ It [Fifth brigade] was in fact conceived before 1982, but as what? Which means 
there is missing information. The missing information in my view has to do with 
ZANU PF or with Robert Mugabe’s perspective of a post-Independent 
Zimbabwe; a socialist one-party state, or in the mould of North Korea, really. So, 
you are seeing the beginnings of putting up that project in the form of the Fifth 
Brigade. But then matters overtake him in Matabeleland as the dissidents come in. 
We also need to look at, in fact, who were the dissidents?”522 
 
Robert Mugabe insisted that this special ‘crack’ force was solely for internal 
security measures initially defining its existence as protection from outside invasions of 
Zimbabwe’s borders:  “The brigade it should be noted, is being trained and equipped 
purely for the purpose of defence and not for any external use”523. To extrapolate on this 
further ZANU-PF played on the people’s fear and paranoia of attacks from the 
Mozambican ‘rebel’ movement RENAMO and incursions from the white South African 
Apartheid regime and their known destabilisation policies in the region. 
                                                
520 Interview: DC1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 13/09/07 (White Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer and 
politician). 
521 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
522 Interview: JM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/02/08 – (Shona Professor of Political Science in 
Zimbabwe). 
523 ‘Koreans here to train a brigade’, (1981) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 14 August. 
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“The location of the training ground has given rise to speculation that the brigade 
will be involved in defending the area along the sensitive Mozambique 
border…The Post quoted an unnamed source as saying local Africans told him 
that the Koreans claimed they were sent not to train the army but to ‘wipe out’ the 
Mozambican rebels.”524 
 
“So you got this sense that there was a culture of terror. And if you dared oppose 
whoever was in charge, something really nasty could happen to you, and you 
could disappear…So all of those things happened, so you got a sense of real fear 
of a number of things; you feared upsetting the ruling party, you feared an 
invasion by the dissidents, and you feared racist South Africa, or as they called it 
the Pretoria regime.”525   
 
Other sources would point to the resistance to the formation of the Fifth Brigade from 
within the ZANU-PF government ranks as evidence of the dubious motivations of this 
undertaking: “No, No. It was also part of the resistance of people like Solomon Mujuru. 
Solomon Mujuru refused the Gukurahundi project, and he was the Commander of the 
Army. So the Fifth Brigade were not part of the Zimbabwean National Army. They were 
recruited specifically for that project.”526 Nkomo as an oppositional minister in the 
ZANU-PF protested the creation of the brigade on numerous occasions: 
“The Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, yesterday criticised the 
creation of a Fifth Brigade that will deal with internal troubles, saying Zimbabwe 
had adequate and efficient forces of law, including the civil police to handle any 
internal problems… ‘It cannot be for anything else [one-party state], because we 
have an established army with instructors accepted publicly by all our government 
organs. The so-called Fifth Brigade is obviously a separate army, since it has 
different instructors from those we all publicly know,’ he said.”527 
 
Thirdly, these three events furnished the plot, stage, actors, props, audience and 
script necessary for ZANU-PF to manufacture a set of well-rehearsed performances that 
reinforced their grand drama of national dominance that they so desperately wanted to 
secure (see Diagram 1, page 54). In spite of the official discourse to the contrary, a host 
of counter-narratives are thriving today, infused with suspicions that ZANU-PF had its 
hands in, if not actually orchestrated each of these happenings to ensure the outcome they 
                                                
524 ‘Korean troops set a riddle’ (1981) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 18 August. 
525 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
526 Interview: JM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/02/08 – (Shona Professor of Political Science at a 
prominent Zimbabwean university). 
527 ‘Nkomo queries fifth brigade’ (1981) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 25 August. 
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desired: “Yeah, I mean, it’s a clever way of eliminating your opposition… But we know 
for certain that the emotions of the people have always been raged by creating incidents 
by ZANU-PF.  ZANU-PF has survived like that; it creates incidents… Purely from a 
community analysis point-of-view, yes, there’s quite a lot that is also stage-managed.”528  
 In his insightful work on the Sierra Leone civil war, Paul Richards describes 
violence as both a practice and a performance529. As practice, violence and counter-
violence responses are not thought out or planned in advance, but instead are ‘discovered’ 
along the way as violence is acted out. In the words of Richards, “Practice theory takes 
the standpoint that knowledge…is a product of context and action as well as of cognition 
and training.”530 In other words, there is not a strategy, the violence learning evolves and 
morphs as it is practiced. As performance, violence is seen as a well-orchestrated event or 
a series of events aimed at simulating a specific experience that in turn produces a desired 
response from those involved and affected by the violence. Richards clearly states it: 
“…performance theory tries to understand how people make power through violence and 
terror as expressive resources.”531 In the Matabeleland context, the three national events 
being studied in this section (Entumbane, arms caches, and the tourist killings) are 
conceived as possessing dramaturgical significance (theatrical acts) and displaying both 
the dimensions of violent practice and performance at play. The narratives swirling 
around these events indicate that both the ZANU-PF and the various forms of resistance 
evident in Matabeleland were reactive (a form of practice) to events as they unfolded in 
the wake of independence. However, it is also clear that ZANU-PF who had control of 
State resources harnessed these instrumentalities to invent scenarios of violence in order 
to substantiate their nationalist agenda for the future; represented by an undeterred 
claim and scramble to solidify life-long power.      
5.4.1. Act I: Entumbane Clashes: ZAPU/ZIPRA as ‘Sore Losers’ 
The first of these incidences was the combat skirmishes that broke out between 
ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA soldiers at the Entumbane Assembly Points in Bulawayo in 
                                                
528 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
529 Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone. Th  
International African Institute, Oxford: James Curry & Heinemann Publishers, xxi-xxii. 
530 Ibid: xxi. 
531 Richards, 1996: xxii. 
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November 1980 and again in February 1981.532 These outbursts of violence were 
condemned by both the ZAPU and ZANU leadership and were understood as an 
unfortunate yet possibly ‘expected’ complication in the administration and 
implementation of the demobilisation process.  Being that this was the first hint of 
problems in the newly acquired independence of the nation, both ZAPU and ZANU 
leaders kept a public presence of cordial calm. However, the word on the ground was 
different. For ZANLA supporters this was seen as ZIPRA wanting to settle the score after 
losing the Elections. For ZIPRA supporters the counter-narratives questioned the 
demobilisation process and birthed numerous conspiracy scripts of suspicion. A cloud of 
mystery shrouds this historical event compounded by the fact that the Dumbutshena 
Report, a government-instituted commission of inquiry mandated to investigate the 
Entumbane incidents has to date never been made public.533 The national and regional 
press explained Entumbane to the public as follows: 
“The first shock to the nation came in November, when riots in Bulawayo turned 
into full-scale battle between ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas housed in the city’s 
Entumbane Township.  For days, thousands of heavily armed men rocked the city 
with machine gun, mortar and rocket fire.  About 60 people were killed, and more 
than 400 hundred wounded, before the National Army managed to regain control 
of the area. Most of the casualties were civilians. At three National Army bases – 
one in the Midlands and two in Bulawayo – former ZIPRA guerrillas turned on 
their ZANLA colleagues, and defied government orders to surrender. The fighting 
once again spread to Entumbane, and in what Mr. Mugabe claimed was ‘the 
sinister pattern’ of a master plan, armoured ZIPRA brigades converged on 
Bulawayo. The country seemed on the verge of civil war.”534 
 
In the above media discourse, the blame for Entumbane is clearly laid at the feet 
of disgruntled ex-ZIPRA combatants. Already, early on in the news coverage, the reader 
will notice that Mugabe, speaking for the ZANU-PF, identifies what he terms a ‘sinister 
pattern of a master plan’. Contrary to most evidential research conducted since that time, 
this utterance by Mugabe appears to be the first of many aimed at shaping public opinion 
to serve the dominant ZANU-PF narrative which coloured the ZAPU-ZIPRA opposition 
                                                
532 There were also incidences of violence that erupted at Assembly points in the Midlands area over this 
time. For purposes of this study, the Entumbane clashes will be the focus as they represent the most serious 
of these outbreaks in terms of casualties and duration of time. 
533 Breaking the Silence, 1997: xv. 
534 Motjuwadi, S. 1981. Zimbabwe’s First Traumatic War, in Couzens, T. (ed.) Zimbabwe – The Search for 
Common Ground, From the pages of Drum Magazine, Harare, Zimbabwe: NatPrint, 317-321. 
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as a dangerous enemy of the State bent on destroying the newly formed Zimbabwe. In 
contrast, Joshua Nkomo and a number of ex-combatant voices describe the same scenario 
from their perspectives, placing the fault squarely on the shoulders of ZANU-PF leaders 
such as Enos Nkala (a provocative, fiery Ndebele politician who was a staunch supporter 
and founding member of ZANU-PF) and the ex-ZANLA military contingents who were 
stationed in the demobilisation camps:  
“The first fighting occurred in Bulawayo early in November 1980.  Zanu 
organized a party rally at the White City stadium in the western suburbs of 
Bulawayo. The speakers, including several Zanu ministers, insulted Zapu, 
insulted me as its leader, and said that all minority parties should be 
crushed…Immediately afterwards rifle shots were fired into the Zipra camp at 
Entumbane nearby.  Zipra fired back into the neighbouring Zanla camp.  The 
soldiers of both forces had been allowed by agreement to keep their personal 
weapons.  But Zanla now brought out and used heavy weapons, mortars and 
rocket-launchers, which they were not entitled to possess.  Civilian lives were lost 
and much damaged in the firing.  Sixty people on all sides were killed.”535 
     
“The fighting at Entumbane – well, the whole thing was provoked by politicians. I 
wouldn’t say it was provoked by the comrades themselves. Because I remember 
on the day when the first incident occurred, there was a rally which was organised 
by Enos Nkala at the White City Stadium, where he actually made some very bad 
remarks about Zapu and Zipra. And then, after that rally, some ex-Zanla 
combatants came back to the camp. They visited a local beer hall at Entumbane 
where civilians were drinking. The started beating up the civilians. So these 
civilians ran away and came to our camp, that is the Zipra camp. And they said, 
‘No, these people are at Entumbane, they are beating us.’ Some were bleeding. So 
when we went to the beer hall to actually check what was happening, that’s when 
the shooting started. People still had their weapons.”536  
 
“Right, right, I‘ll tell you the story. My father’s house is in Jube, I was off. Then 
this man, Enos Nkala, made a rally. He only announced that ‘everyone who 
belongs to ZIPRA is going to be finished today. Anyone who follows under 
Nkomo is going to be suffocated today. All small ethnic groups, I’m going to wipe 
them’. ZANU has got Youth, also ZIPRA, the Youth came direct to us. I was in 
the house, just a small boy. They said ‘ah, do you know what Nkala said today?’ I 
said ‘no’. ‘He is going to beat you today, go to the camp!’ I went to the camp. 
Unfortunately these ZANLA boys started to fire guns. It was a terrible time. So 
many people disappeared. I almost lost my younger brother. I lost him. So the 
British [Rhodesian soldiers] did the same thing, I’m just worried about these 
people, Mr Man. They deployed their Army along this road to defend Mugabe 
and the city, they were waving heavy weapons to us, instead of defending us.  
                                                
535 Nkomo, J. 1984. Nkomo – The Story of My Life. London: Methuen, 219. 
536 Yap, K. 2001: 136.  
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Yes, they fired heavy arms, to us. But they were supposed to just fly over air, 
don’t fight, the war is over. But instead, they supported the ZANU-PF 
government; destroying us.”537  
 
In the above transcriptions, while reductionist thinking would tend to focus on the 
inciting words of individual politicians (like Enos Nkala) and / or the issue of instigation 
(who shot first and who brought in the heavy artillery), the deeper concern appears to be 
what the implications of these accusations represent. If ex-ZIPRA fighters can be 
assumed guilty, ZANU-PF has the necessary ‘evidence’ to maintain its narrative of being 
under siege. If ex-ZANLA fighters can be assumed guilty, ZAPU has the necessary 
‘evidence’ to cling to its convictions that ZANU intended to destroy all opposition, or in 
the extreme to destroy all Ndebele people. Of interest is to note that all of these scripts 
bemoan the magnitude of civilian casualties with all sides assuming a defensive posture 
in an attempt to exonerate themselves from this violence. The last interviewee speaks of 
his sense of betrayal as the ex-Rhodesian and ex-ZANLA forces united against the ex-
ZIPRA fighting units. In the minds of some Ndebele (ZAPU-ZIPRA supporters) this 
apparent ‘treachery’ has evolved into a conspiracy theory that musters up a preferential 
portrayal of ZIPRA as the ‘scapegoats’ in the scramble for power after independence: 
“Actually I couldn’t know because I was not a soldier. But what I heard; I was in 
my house at Mpumla East, I heard the sound of a gun during the evening and the 
whole night, till the next morning, it was firing from Entumbane. And I saw some 
of the soldiers …there was mielies [corn] that was planted all over and they were 
hiding in those mielies. And actually I did not see them shooting each other but I 
heard the sound. What I saw was the plane. I think Dabengwa was inside that 
plane telling people that you are surrounded by the soldiers so ‘keep in your 
houses, don’t move’, that is what I heard. And many people told me that the Army 
that was stationed, I think in Esgodini... I think even the Army for Smith helped 
this people, helped the people of Mugabe to kill those people. I think they 
ambushed them next to this University [of] Technology. Many people were killed 
there...I think the ZIPRA Forces.”538  
 
In this text, ZIPRA is characterised as the innocent victim, ‘ambushed’ by the traitorous 
ZANU-PF in collaboration with the white Rhodesian military. What is less evident, is the 
embedded sense of marginalisation that seeps through this script as the speaker clearly 
                                                
537 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 
538 Interview: MS2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 11/09/07 - (Ndebele male, rural farmer from Tsholotsho, 
Matabeleland and primary survivor of Gukurahundi violence). 
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distances himself from any nationalist project by using the language of ‘us/them’ when 
referring to the ‘Army for Smith’ (ex-Rhodesian soldiers) and the ‘people of Mugabe’ 
(the ZANU-PF political party). 
 However, in the psyche of the Ndebele people there is an ambiguous paradox in 
relation to this enabling label of victimhood. As if representing the two faces of the 
Roman god ‘Janus’539, the Ndebele nation continually struggles with the inherent tensions 
of embracing both victim and victor throughout their historical trajectory. When the 
opportunistic space avails itself, the posture of victim is easily endorsed, however, just as 
frequently, the patriotic Ndebele identity is resuscitated in order to salvage the ego of the 
fighting spirit of Ndebele pride and to re-establish the warrior’s honour. Instead of 
adopting the ‘Ndebele-as-victim’ perspective, the following respondents analyse 
Entumbane as a military and spatial contestation between ZIPRA and ZANLA: 
“But it happened that at that very time when the Freedom Fighters were now at 
Assemble points, there was this Entumbane incident where we heard that there 
was misunderstanding between these two camps; the ZIPRA and the ZANLA. 
And fighting erupted. It was a very tough fighting. And many people 
believe...these particularly from Matabeleland and from those that were 
sympathizing with ZIPRA, that that was the time the ZIPRA Forces were to take 
over from the ZANU-PF. Because the ZANLA Forces were really moved out of 
the camp and the ZIPRA Forces were really taking control but, Joshua Nkomo 
had to fly up with his plane and told ZIPRA Forces not to go on with that move. I 
think that really threatened the ZANU-PF and they saw that the ZIPRA Forces 
were very strong and they would in any case do something that really they were 
not expecting.”540 
 
“And...the skirmishes in Entumbane, the skirmishes in certain areas even in 
Harare, indicated that ZIPRA was even a stronger Force at that time than ZANLA 
was. If they wanted to do so, they could have done so. Thanks to people like 
Dabengwa and Joshua Nkomo from the ZANU-PF point-of-view that actually 
stopped that scenario otherwise the … one of the bitterness the Ndebele people 
probably have is that probably...probably with the augustly feeling that we 
shouldn’t have had too much blood spilling, everyone has no positive feeling for 
that, probably a war needed to have been allowed to occur between the Shonas 
and Ndebele at that time to its definite end, so that the people would be defeated; 
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and if Ndebeles were defeated, they would have accepted to be defeated, and if 
ZANU would have been defeated, they should have accepted to be defeated. But 
because those skirmishes were stopped, and there was no clear result at the end, 
then obviously you’ve got two bulls in one kraal. And that’s exactly why ZANU-
PF needed now to fight; this was a bull to the end and want[ed] to win the war. 
And win it in all sorts of ways by creating...they had more resources at that time 
because they were now in government. They had to create situations to try and 
make sure that they destroy ZAPU and ZIPRA.”541 
 
According to these texts, not only were ZIPRA and ZANLA locked in a contest of 
war, but ZIPRA had the military advantage and if these two fighting groups would have 
been afforded the opportunity to battle until the end, ZIPRA would have been victorious 
in driving out ZANLA. Of continual intrigue is to see the parlance of unconscious 
identity confusion being played out again. References are made to these Entumbane 
skirmishes being a battle between ethnicities as in the ‘Shona and Ndebele’, as opposed 
to political party rivals ZANU and ZAPU, and at one point the last respondent 
juxtapositions the Ndebele (ethnic group) to ZANU (political party) in relation to 
accepting defeat had this battle been allowed to take its full course. 
The discourse of ‘two bulls in the same  kraal’ found in the second paragraph 
articulates the traditional, hierarchical military ‘zero-sum’ thinking in which all order 
must flow from only one head and therefore there must always be a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ 
in every conflict. This ‘winner-takes-all’ mentality leaves no imagination for the 
conception of shared leadership; equal but multiple in nature. The latter respondent 
naively infers that if a ‘fair’ military competition had been allowed to take its full and 
final course, it would have neatly arranged the combating parties in demarcations of the 
‘victorious’ or the ‘defeated’ and each grouping would have accepted their lot thereby 
eradicating any confusion or competition between ZAPU-ZIPRA and ZANU-ZANLA 
and their respective followers. Yet others interpreted Entumbane as a territorial conflict; a 
contest over proximity and the control of location (in this case the city of Bulawayo). 
Reminiscent of the 1929 and 1960 urban riots of Bulawayo (see Chapter 2, Literature 
Review), this respondent promulgated a thickened and layered description of Entumbane 
laced with the politics of recognition: 
                                                
541 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
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“You see, Entumbane, again...there were mixed reactions to it. Of course the 
people are saying ‘Bulawayo is our city’, and if you put a ZIPRA here and 
ZANLA there, ZANLA will again [be seen as an] invasion force. This city 
Bulawayo is the city of Ndebeles, and of course when Entumbane broke out, I 
understand the people in the location actually celebrated. Had we told these 
people that it will happen this way and they are now pushing them [ZANLA] out. 
Again, it was copped in ethnic terms. Even if you talk to some of the people who 
participated there, they will tell you we were actually listening even if people 
were passing, what language they are speaking. So that thing was reduced really 
to sort of a mini-tribal conflict. But the cause, again it goes back to personal 
grievances between people within the ZIPRA or in those camps. There was 
always that feeling that we are being undermined, we are not being 
recognized.”542  
     
The researched explanations for this outburst of violence at Entumbane are 
multiple.  Firstly, the demobilisation process was becoming considerably extended in 
nature. Eager, idealistic ex-combatants were running out of patience with their ‘holding 
pattern’ existence in the demobilization camps.  High expectations for military 
reintegration, employment, education and prosperity heightened the intensity of interest 
and energy on the part of ex-combatants to experience the transformative change of the 
new Zimbabwe they had diligently fought for.   
“Having armed soldiers sitting around in buildings rather than in tents, in cities 
rather than mountains and valleys, did nothing to ease the mounting frustration 
and uncertainty we all felt. Indeed, it actually made things worse, for now we 
were mixing socially with Zanla comrades in a situation which sectarianism and 
recrimination had become part and parcel of everyday political argument. I am 
convinced that it was a serious mistake not to transfer us to barracks. The decision 
to shunt us from one assembly point to another was simply an opportunistic sop to 
the Rhodesians who naturally could not stomach the thought that we were 
disciplined soldiers and not a rabble of wild terrorists.”543 
 
Secondly, many ZIPRA supporters questioned how those in authority could 
position two competing liberation armies (who were known to still be armed and who had 
a serious history of hostility throughout the struggle) in such close proximity in a densely 
populated urban centre and yet not expect any trouble. Using an indigenous proverb, one 
interviewee described this dilemma as follows: “In Ndebele they say you don’t hit or beat 
                                                
542 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
543 Yap, K. 2001: 136.  
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the dog while you hide the stick (‘Awushayi inja ufihle umphini’).”544 By this the 
respondent was referring to what appeared to be ‘behind the scene’ manoeuvring by a 
third-force, either the former Rhodesian Army which was running the Assembly Points 
and wanted to make it appear as if the newly elected Black government was unable to 
govern the nation, or as an intentional set-up by ZANU-PF government in order to 
provoke ZIPRA to fight ZANLA, thereby giving them ‘justification’ to eliminate the 
opposition. In either case, what is generally accepted in much of the Matabeleland 
populace is that the circumstances surrounding Entumbane were arranged in such a way 
that overt conflict was bound to erupt between the ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA troops who 
were already well-entrenched in a relational legacy of suspicion and ill-feeling one for 
the other.     
“And during the time of ceasefire, when there was this Lancaster talks and the 
Freedom Fighters were asked to go to Assembly Points, most of the ZANLA 
Forces which were operating in Matabeleland, didn’t go to the Assembly Points. 
Because they were saying ‘they are still waiting, they just want to see whether 
Mugabe goes to power. If he doesn’t go, they are going back to war’. And people 
in Matabeleland were also saying ‘if Nkomo doesn’t go to power, we are going to 
war.’” 545 
 
“So it [Entumbane] was a way of trying to sort each other. You see this mistrust 
did not only start at Entumbane. It started in Tanzania some years back... So then, 
they tell us of an incident where there were two training camps in Tanzania, one 
belonging to Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU and then the other was Ndabaningi Sithole 
[ZANU]. However, you see, it is highly said that behind the creation of ZANU-PF 
was the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. So he favoured, you see, ZANU-
PF. But on the other hand you had Kenneth Kaunda [Zambia] which favoured 
Joshua Nkomo. So Nyerere then discussed with ZANU-PF…to say that Joshua 
Nkomo’s forces had to be eliminated. Hence the attack that was unleashed on 
Joshua Nkomo. And soldiers tell us, you see ZIPRA forces will tell us that they 
had to move on foot all the way from Tanzania all the way to Zambia. And how 
villagers would give them some food on the way…So therefore this mistrust that 
                                                
544 Interview: BK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 26/06/06 - (Ndebele ZAPU politician and professor in the 
1980s who fled into exile from 1983-1985 after surviving several death attempts during the period of 
Gukurahundi violence).    
545 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 
with Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s).     
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has been there is something that has developed over the years. And so as soon as 
the soldiers were near next to each other, such an incident would erupt.”546  
 
“ I understand there was a misunderstanding, and ZANU wanted … I don’t know 
how I can put it: … ZIPRA were not satisfied, yes they were not satisfied with 
everything and the fact [that] ZAPU must be swallowed, yes. So the ZIPRA 
Forces didn’t like it and they started a war, and a lot of people died. I remember 
when I went to hospital...why I had a shock, I saw corpses taken to the mortuary, 
dead bodies, and there was a smell which I still remember. And my husband was 
out there. And if Nkomo didn’t just fly to stop that fight, I don’t know what would 
have happened. And Nkomo had authority, he didn’t use torture, but his voice had 
authority: He just announced that ‘stop’. And because there was a [military] camp 
in the Gwayi, and they [ex-fighters] were coming in with those big machines…So 
Nkomo had to fly and stop that.”547 
 
Thirdly, the climate surrounding the nation-building experiment in Zimbabwe was 
highly politicised and emotionally charged with ZANU splitting away from the ‘Patriotic 
Front’ (a structural attempt to unite the liberation movements) and choosing to run 
against ZAPU in the National Elections in 1980. After the release of the Election results 
revealing a landslide victory for ZANU-PF, Joshua Nkomo narrated the mood of the ex-
ZIPRA soldiers and the climate in the Assembly Points: 
“The soldiers in particular were distraught: the Zipra commanders had used every 
ounce of their personal authority to persuade the men to stay quietly in their 
assembly points throughout the election campaign, despite many provocations. 
Now they would have to go back to those soldiers and tell them they had been 
cheated but must accept it. To my relief and gratitude I found that my colleagues 
accepted my bitter analysis: there was nothing for it but to swallow the result and 
trust that the alleged victors would use their triumph generously and in good 
faith.”548  
 
In 1982, Mugabe took it upon himself to publicly declare Nkomo’s ‘true’ intentions in 
direct contradiction to the above-mentioned sentiments expressed by Nkomo in his 
autobiography in 1984: “Now what Nkomo wanted to show you, the people of 
Zimbabwe, was that you had no right to reject him. These weapons were being amassed 
                                                
546 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee of the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s). 
547 Interview: JD1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 15/09/06 – (Female Ndebele NGO activist advocating for 
women and refugees rights). 
548 Nkomo, J. 1984: 210-211. 
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so that he would teach you he cannot be rejected. When you reject him, as you did [in the 
elections], he fights against you.”549 
 Thus, in theatrical language, Act I (Entumbane) of the ZANU-PF nationalist 
drama was now in place. Whether a well-orchestrated plan or an opportunistic response 
to a cascading set of events, the curtain was lifted. The plot was straight forward; in order 
to establish its nationalist agenda ZANU-PF needed to discredit ZAPU as a legitimate 
opposition. The stage became the Assembly Points (demobilisation camps) restricted 
spaces in cramped urban settings where historical ‘enemies’ were housed in close 
proximity to each other. The actors were the ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA fighters, 
exhausted, suspicious soldiers who were both apprehensive about their future and 
frustrated with the lack of integration progress in the present. Their army commanders 
played the role of drama coaches charged with exhorting, disciplining and cajoling the 
actors (ex-combatants) into an orderly performance of subservience. The national and 
regional level politicians (both ZAPU and ZANU-PF) played the roles of producers / 
directors translating each dramatic scene, blocking out the movements of each 
protagonist and managing the change of each stage set. The props they utilised consisted 
of their armaments on which they had become dependent; weaponry that was never 
surrendered, buried under shallow ground in case of any contingent emergencies. The 
audience was regional in scope; a captive population of Matabeleland civilians and the 
known base of the ZAPU oppositional stronghold. Finally, the script was well-rehearsed; 
punishing as it reprimanded ZAPU for being ‘spoil sports’ (poor losers) and stringent in 
its disdainful staging of a scene where ZAPU-ZIPRA were ‘exposed’ as renegade 
malcontents bent on destabilising the burgeoning national agenda of a free Zimbabwe.    
5.4.2. Act II: Arms Caches: ZAPU/ZIPRA as plotting a ‘Coup de Tat’ 
The second and most serious (as well as controversial incident) was the 
‘discovery’ of arms caches on a number of ZAPU-owned farms in February 1982. This 
revelation seemed to be all the evidence the ZANU-PF needed to confirm its claim that 
the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance through its ‘dissidents’ were treacherously plotting to 
overthrow a democratically-elected government. Joshua Nkomo and other top ZAPU 
leaders were dismissed from government, key ex-ZIPRA military commanders, Dumiso 
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Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, were arrested and held on treason charges and the 
ZANU-PF was swift to officially and publicly deploy the brutal Fifth Brigade in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands in order to secure ‘law and order’ again.  
“Then [after Entumbane] things generally settled down and Zimbabwe got on 
until February when there was the big split, I think it was February 1982, it was. 
February 1982 it was, when Mugabe claimed that Joshua Nkomo and others had 
arms caches throughout the country, and they were plotting to overthrow the 
government. I remember that very, very well because he made this...because 
Mugabe made these charges at a press conference, the national press and the 
international press. And I was there. And then he listed at great detail how many 
AK47’s, how many mortars, how many rounds of ammunition, I mean you know 
what-what-what has been found in the farms surrounding...outside Bulawayo. 
And then he said he had no recourse, you know, he was forced to dismiss Nkomo 
and other ZAPU...former ZAPU…cabinet ministers, there was no longer a 
government of national unity, and he had arrested Dumiso Dabengwa, Masuku, 
and they will be charged with treason. And that was the beginning then of what 
became the Matabeleland massacres really. I think that set off a chain of events 
which then led to the Matabeleland massacres.”550 
 
The performance nature of the events swirling around the so-called ‘discovery’ of these 
arms caches is considerably more striking than in the first ‘act’ of Entumbane. ZANU-
PF, by now completely intoxicated by its hold on power, had begun perfecting its ability 
to stage-manage its nationalist agenda by fixing the time-line by which the plot would 
unfold, by controlling the socio-political machinery (security, media, education) of the 
State and by successfully trumping any resistance with its eloquent oration of reality. 
Blurred and blinded by the emotive hype of their newly acquired independence, most of 
the public failed to see these events as constructed phenomena at the time; only in 
hindsight did this view surface. Joshua Nkomo illuminates this attempt by ZANU-PF to 
skilfully master-mind the propaganda and the outcomes deriving from this ‘discovery’: 
“Munangagwa [Minister of State responsible for Security], without mentioning it 
to me, went straight to Ascot Farm [located near Bulawayo], to which he had 
summoned the press, radio and television. Next day he and then the Prime 
Minister announced on the radio and TV that massive stocks of weapons had been 
found at the two farms. There was, they said, a plot to overthrow the government 
with the help of South Africa. The man responsible was Joshua Nkomo…I was 
not only a minister in the government, but a member of the cabinet committee on 
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security. If there were indeed suspicions against me, I had the right to be asked by 
the Prime Minister to offer my own explanation. If stocks of weapons had indeed 
been found on properties under my control, I would expect to be shown the 
evidence and asked to account for its presence…Instead I was told nothing about 
the allegations…until they had given the widest possible publicity by the state 
press and broadcasting monopolies…the discovery was exaggerated by the 
government, then exploited as a means of discrediting my party, Zapu and 
expelling me from the government.”551 
 
Other respondents exhibited a common assumption or interpretation of these arms 
‘discoveries’ as a manufactured set of events: 
“Yes. In fact… it was these defections, and you will remember or you will recall 
that initially there was an uprising which began I think 1980; ‘81 Entumbane, and 
’82 when this so-called discovery of this arms cache, it was actually said to be one 
of the things that exacerbated an already volatile situation which the government 
had already failed to address adequately. So there are some strong opinions that 
even this so-called discovery of arms cache in Matabeleland was…st ge-
managed. It is also known and there are some very strong opinions that effect...at 
that material time both the ZIPRA and ZANLA armies had not completely 
demobilized and some of them had in fact withheld or hidden some of their 
weaponry or military cache…It will not also be far-fetched to say that there ‘was’ 
a discovery of an arms cache in Matabeleland but ‘what’ might be disputed in 
some quarters is that the sincerity, the timing and the way the government reacted, 
and the manipulated discovery, to then descend on defenceless and unarmed 
people and cause such unnecessary loss of life and persecution.”552 
 
“You do have Robert Mugabe writing down the sins of Joshua Nkomo, really 
with the intention of eventually getting rid of Joshua Nkomo, getting rid of 
ZAPU. And then you do have the frontline states, mediating and, you know, and 
forcing the liberation movements to come and work together under the banner of 
Patriotic Front. But Robert Mugabe very quickly snaps that broken before the 
1980 Elections. And so, just like the current MDC [opposition party], they go into 
the elections separately and Robert Mugabe then is again persuaded, largely by 
the British, to bring back in not just Joshua Nkomo, but even elements from Ian 
Smith. And, you know, because of the carrot, which was badly needed, he agrees 
and has a government of national unity. But really, it was really pretence, be ause 
it was dominated by his own party. And then it lasts very short as the arms caches 
are found at the farms and all hell breaks loose, and Joshua Nkomo runs out of 
Zimbabwe, and so forth. It was really Mugabe saying [in] a major way, a very 
quick way of creating a one party socialist state is to get rid of ZAPU. Destroy 
ZAPU…”553 
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“Yes, yes, I think that was…Mugabe’s a cunning, just like a snake. I think it was 
his trick to…there were arms but I think they were all from outside, neh? But I 
think Mugabe was using that…I was not much in politics by then but I think it 
was a trick also, yes.”554 
 
Embedded in the above three interview extracts are clusters of phraseology from 
the voices of Matabele citizens placing a distrustful distance between themselves and the 
credibility of the ZANU-PF grand plot of uncovering major arms caches. Phrasing that 
questions the sincerity, timing and way that ZANU-PF handled this crisis coupled with 
descriptive words such as ‘pretence’, ‘cunning’ and ‘trickery’ speak to the dubious 
manner in which much of Matabeleland responded to these arms ‘discoveries.’ The 
critical issue in this scenario of remembered history seems to be less about whether or not 
arms caches existed, and more about the suspicious methodology employed by ZANU-PF 
to manage this chaotic situation.       
Once again, a host of explanative counter-narratives began to emerge from the 
ranks of ZAPU-ZIPRA. The primary narrative around the arms caches was that all the 
liberation movements (including ZANLA) had stock-piled weapons during the peace 
negotiations and subsequent demobilization of soldiers. Guarded scepticism among the 
politicians on all sides was extremely high and even higher among their leery, armed 
structures. The risks surrounding these transition activities were abundantly clear; anyone 
who had fought in this bitter civil war was now on full alert in case the call to pick-up 
arms was sounded again. Most respondents agreed that weapons stock-piling during this 
time was occurring: 
“You see, all ex-combatants whom I’ve talked to so far, they have their caches, 
either as individuals or as groups. Nobody was certain, you know, they are 
military-trained people, they are not certain about things. And everybody will tell 
you “ah, where I operated, if ever I go today, I will get my things as I know where 
they are”. So to me, I think Arms Caches were there, but not that massive thing 
that was uncovered. But I think it was actually a plot which was put, and it was 
uncovered at a particular point for particular purposes. Generally there were 
Arms Caches at both ex-combatants, be it ZIPRA or ZANLA, they were not 
certain about the future so they cached a lot of arms, throughout the country. 
Because I don’t believe anybody has gone around collecting all of them. And 
talking…lucky enough I have four brothers who have been ex-ZIPRA 
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combatants. And all of them will tell you ‘Where I operated, if I go today, I will 
still find my guns somewhere there’; everybody was caching.”555  
 
“Ja, the Arms cache … it ‘might’ be true. Some of the arms cache like for 
instance ones which were found in our area, those were ZAPU arms cache. I 
know because I really know the commanders of that. I think there was that 
mistrust within the ZANU-PF cadres to hand over the whole…There was that sort 
of mistrust. Some of the cadres didn’t trust Mugabe. So it might be true because 
even in my area I know where exactly those arms caches were found. And those 
who were found responsible for those were the leaders of ZANU-PF and they 
agreed.”556  
 
“The Arms Cache, yes it could be stage-managed, and ZIPRA could have had 
Arms Cache. Because they had ammunition, they had the batons, they had 
pashushka’s, they had AK’s, they had all sorts of sophisticated equipment, 
probably better than ZANLA had, like I indicated earlier. They are likely to have 
had Arms Caches because they had brought in their arms into the country. But the 
reason for having those arms caches may not necessarily have been to topple 
Robert Mugabe’s government. It was storage scenario’s that needed to be brought 
into government so that government rehabilitates those arms in a better way with 
the nation building exercise. Now, government was aware of those arms caches, 
they probably certainly belonged to ZIPRA, but the reason for them was not...I 
don’t think it was there to topple Robert Mugabe. Because if they needed to do so, 
ZIPRA was a very strong Force; they could have done that easily.”557 
 
ZIPRA defended itself by claiming the arms caches that were uncovered were due 
to be handed over to the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing 
Umkhonto we Sizwe in their struggle to liberate themselves from the Apartheid regime in 
South Africa. This was quite plausible in that the armed struggles in the region often 
assisted each other in training, financial and armaments resources and actual combat 
support. ZAPU was known to have had a close working relationship with the ANC for 
many years. 
“There is that theory that the arms belonged to the African National Congress 
because you know from the Matabeleland region, in order to access South Africa, 
you could move from Zambia and then come through, pass through Zimbabwe 
and then on your way to South Africa. So therefore the African National 
                                                
555 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
556 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
557 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
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Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe had been stock-piling arms and therefore it 
brought its arms over to Zimbabwe. There is that theory.”558 
 
 “Do you know, during the Liberation movement, ZIPRA and the ANC were ‘soul 
fathers’. Some of them operated together. The agreement was this: whether they 
want it or not, I’m going to make it clear, after Independence Mr. Man, it was 
agreed that the ANC Freedom Fighters they must get their weapons here, than to 
come from Zambia to here it was very difficult for them. So the weapons must be 
‘here’. So they crossed the Zambezi, so they must get the weapons from here then 
go to South Africa, for the MK, the Umkhonto-boys. So the government agreed to 
that, even Mugabe himself. He knew exactly there’s something like this. As 
Nkomo agreed to this, he didn’t know what was behind Mugabe’s mind.”559 
 
“Actually we heard that there were Arms Cache[s] there but when some of the 
people who knew about that, told us that those Arms were not for ZAPU, they 
were for the Umkhonto we Sizwe. I don’t know how truthful is that. But they 
were kept here just because, when we fought we used the Zambia…this was 
becoming base for South Africa but it was tended to be ZAPU caches. So they 
couldn’t say ‘no’ because it would be selling the brothers in South [Africa].”560  
 
In his autobiography, Nkomo explained that after independence ZAPU had 
embarked on a rigorous plan of land redistribution by purchasing as many farms as 
possible in order to spawn viable agricultural co-ops for the returning ex-ZIPRA soldiers. 
These farms then became the locations where arms could have been stored. More 
importantly, these farms represented the well-resourced base of ZAPU as a legitimate 
political opposition and were indications of a well-articulated and orchestrated political 
strategy of land reform and economic reintegration for the ex-combatants returning from 
exile.561 For all practical purposes, ZANU-PF as a party did not have a political platform 
of this calibre to offer returning war veterans and these farms thus, posed a threat to the 
post-independence ZANU-PF regime. 
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schemes with both ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA veterans across the nation.  
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“The other problem that could have created fear in ZANU-PF is that ZAPU had 
structures, political structures, which had enabled it to plan their future should 
they get into government. To an extent that economically they were more stronger 
than ZANU at that time. And then they bought farms. They had projects, you 
know the chicken project here in Bulawayo, the projects...the Snake Park in 
Harare, farms in and around Harare and Bulawayo; all those they wanted to use 
that economic base as a springboard should they come into government. But 
because these overlapped into a situation where they had lost the elections and 
ZANU-PF had got into control, then ZANU-PF captured that situation as negative 
to their scenario. But it had been a long-term plan, it had not been a plan for 
against ZANU, it had been a plan as far as the nation is concerned. And this is 
why you can see the distribution of those projects were not in Matabeleland only 
but they were nationwide.”562   
 
“And then, the big lie, where it is a lie or it is true, it has never really been proved, 
that arms caches were found at the twenty-five farms allegedly owned by ZAPU. 
And so the government moved swiftly to take those farms and to remove those, 
you know weapons. What we know for now is that what they really removed from 
some of those farms were ZAPU war records, you know, and a lot of invaluable 
material was lost to ZAPU because files and files which had just been brought in 
from Zambia were at one or two of these farms and disappeared without trace, 
yes, you know. There are reports that some of that material may be at the ZANU-
PF headquarters today. But nobody’s actually had any independent, you know, 
access to that information.”563  
 
The above-mentioned respondent suggests that the ‘discovery’ of arms caches served two 
purposes: not only was it meant to discredit and dismantle ZAPU as an opposition, but by 
also removing and supposedly disposing of vital ZAPU war records, ZANU-PF was able 
to effectively and in a somewhat clandestine manner subjugate and eventually erase the 
only other viable historical counter-narrative of revolutionary legitimacy that existed 
outside of their own. Thus, not only was ZANU-PF producing its own preferred 
nationalist script it was at the same time finding ways to eradicate the traces of alternative 
resistance narratives that would serve to expose their meta-narrative of reality that the 
nation was being obliged to live by.   
After the discovery of arms caches, Nkomo fled Zimbabwe into Botswana and 
eventually Dabengwa and Masuku were exonerated as the court could not find enough 
evidence linking the arms caches to a plot to overthrow the government. However, they 
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remained in prison custody four and five years respectively before they were released. 
Masuku was released on emergency health reasons and died shortly thereafter and 
Dabengwa was only released in 1987. There remains a cloud of scepticism around these 
events. Many ZAPU-ZIPRA supporters would say that these arms caches may even have 
been planted on the farms by Zimbabwean CIO agents in an attempt to utterly discredit 
and eliminate the opposition. 
“When we entered the assembly points in 1980 it was said that we would be 
demobilised and we did not know what the future held. As commissar of the Zipra 
unit, I got some people together to discuss our future. We decided to collect 
money – 50 [Zimbabwean] dollars from each Zipra combatant – to buy farms for 
agricultural projects. It was an apolitical thing. Dr. Joshua Nkomo was 
approached to help buy the farms with the $ 2.6 million that had been collected. 
So are we going to blame Dr. Nkomo for anything illegal that we find on these 
farms?...We [Zipra combatants] that raised the money to buy the farms want to 
know who planted the arms caches on the properties.”564 
 
In dramaturgical summary, if the Entumbane incidences discredited the 
opposition as ‘poor losers’, the plot of Act II (discovery of arms caches) attempted to 
entrench a characterisation of the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance as a deceitful, violent aggressor 
in the unfolding story of Zimbabwean nationalism. Uncovering stock-piled weapons in 
general would not do, because even ZANLA was guilty of this, the armaments needed to 
be linked to the infra-structural base of the ZAPU opposition. The network of twenty-five 
ZAPU-owned farms across the country hosted the perfect stage from which to act out the 
sinister expose of ‘supposed’ treachery. The actors for this performance were the 
political and military leaders (both ZANU-PF and ZAPU) overseeing the Zimbabwean 
transition to independence. The ZANU-PF politico-military command featured 
prominently as the defenders and protectors of Zimbabwe, the ZAPU-ZIPRA leaders 
faced humiliation; accused of traitorous activity, chased from the country, thrown out of 
government and imprisoned for high treason. The large caches of armaments once again 
served as the primary props meticulously counted and continually rehearsed for the 
feeding frenzy of the national and international media desperate for news to sell on the 
great Zimbabwe nationalist project. Moving from a regional production, the audience 
was now expanded to include the whole nation; incorporating an eager Shona majority 
                                                
564 ‘Who planted Arms? Asks Zipra Man’ (1982) The Herald (Harare) 16 February (printed interview with 
Riversand Mlilo, Zipra Commissar). 
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who had to date received restricted sound-bites of news on the ‘disturbances’ in 
Matabeleland through the highly filtered conduit of the State-sanctioned press. The script 
was layered with the most insidious of accusations that of being ‘counter-revolutionaries’ 
thereby undermining the revolutionary DNA of the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance and tearing at 
the core fabric of their motivation for garnering their noble identity as freedom fighters.     
5.4.3. Act III: Tourist Killings: ZAPU/ZIPRA as a threat to the International 
          Community 
 
The third incident was the mysterious abduction and subsequent killing of six 
foreign white tourists on 23 July of 1982 in Matabeleland. In the glare of the international 
media spot-light, ZAPU leaders blamed ‘bandits’ (criminal thugs) and the ZANU-PF 
government became more shrill in its response blaming this violence on the (supposed 
ZAPU-ZIPRA supported) ‘dissidents’ who according to ZANU-PF now posed a terrorism 
threat of international proportions. 
“There were statements from ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo throughout the year, 
appealing to the dissidents – ‘Whoever you are, stop it and stop it now.’ However, 
antagonism between the two parties hardened: such appeals were treated as mere 
‘showmanship’, as the belief that ‘ZAPU is responsible for this banditry and this 
is clear’, took an unshakable hold in Mashonaland. There were statements from 
various ZANU-PF Ministers during 1982, advising people in Matabeleland to 
cease supporting dissidents before ‘the wrath of the 5 Brigade’ was unleashed on 
them.”565   
 
“And I remember seeing that there were a couple of bus robberies in 
Matabeleland, on the main road, between Victoria Falls and Bulawayo. And I was 
reading about these on Ziana, the Zimbabwe state news agency. And they said 
that armed guys went and robbed the bus. Okay and that you know. And then they 
said ‘Zimbabwe is not yet free’. And I thought ‘oh, this is taking a political thing’. 
And then came the kidnapping of six foreign tourists on that road between 
Victoria Falls and Bulawayo. And they were kind of back-packer tourists and they 
were, if my memory serves me correctly, it was two Americans, two Australians 
and two British, six men. The girl... there were females in the group and they were 
released. But this was again, oh, we had a big news story, of international 
importance. And then, what I had noticed: before some odd bus robberies but 
now, this was the big deal. And it was clear, okay, there was a group of alienated 
deserters from the Zimbabwean army who were protesting violently against the 
Mugabe government. And specifically against Mugabe government’s sacking of 
                                                
565 CCJPZ & LRF. 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace – A Report on the Disturbances in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988. Harare: Legal Resources Foundation, 43.  
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Joshua Nkomo and charges of treason against the ex-ZIPRA. And so this could 
not be ignored, you know, and it became a big story.”566 
 
 “ I do remember a couple of stories of tourists going missing. I mean one of them 
was more mystique where there was a certain part of Nyamandlovu region where 
people weren’t allowed to go to apparently. And these tourists went missing in 
that area. I do remember vaguely also about tourists being attacked by dissidents, 
which is why travelling in that area made us very afraid. In fact what people used 
to talk about is a lot of White Zimbabweans still see South Africa as something to 
look up to. Friends of mine used to have toys from South Africa. And these 
people use to travel in convoy when going to South Africa. So you always heard 
about people travelling in convoy through Matabeleland…And in fact what I 
think is a Zimbabwean National Army or the Defence Force, and they then 
basically escorted people through the border. And there was really … there was a 
whole publicity of how he had to protect ‘you’ against the ‘dissidents’ type of 
thing. So that was generally resonated with society at the time.”567 
 
Hence, from the above respondent one realises that the ZANU-PF propaganda machinery 
capitalised on these tourist killings by playing on the confidence and striking at two 
‘sacred’ sentiments of the international community: its intense desire that the newly 
independent Zimbabwean nation taste of its full freedoms and that its interests (as the 
international community) in Zimbabwe not be threatened by security concerns. 
Eventually, a number of persons were tried and sentenced for this crime, but only 
after the government launched a comprehensive man-hunt to trace those ‘responsible’ for 
the kidnapping and killing. Accordingly, it was reported that seven hundred (700) 
suspects were held in a interrogation centre set-up in the Tsholotsho district, seventy-
seven (77) demobilised ZIPRA soldiers were arrested trying to collect their pay, and four 
hundred and fifty-two (452) supposed ‘dissidents’ were allegedly detained in Bulawayo 
over this time.568  
“The bodies of the tourists were discovered several years later, in March 1985, 
not far from the point of abduction: they had been murdered within days of their 
disappearance. Very few civilians in Lupane, or elsewhere, could in fact have 
come into contact with the tourists. Two ex-ZIPRA men, Ngwenya and Mpofu, 
were later tried and found guilty of having been part of the group of five which 
abducted and then murdered the tourists. In 1986, the two were hanged for the 
                                                
566 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government) 
567 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
568 Breaking the Silence, 1997: 43 
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crime. In January 1984 a man named Jeffrey Siwela, who was alleged to be part 
of the abduction group, was shot dead ‘while escaping from custody’ in Inyathi. 
The number of dissidents involved in the abduction was variously reported over 
the years as five, then eight, and then in January 1986, the gang had grown to 22. 
Press reports claimed that 18 of the 22 had by January 1986, been ‘killed in shoot-
outs with the security forces’, while two others (Ngwenya and Mpofu) had been 
hanged for the crime, and two more were still at large.”569  
 
However, certain counter-narratives in Matabeleland hold to the suspicion that 
this may have been the work of the Fifth Brigade (or some other branch of the security 
forces) in order to further ‘justify’ a heavy handed clamp-down on dissidence: 
“You see, the story of the tourists came in tandem with the story of this other 
‘terrorist’ who wanted to be arrested and who claimed that he was actually an ex-
ZIPRA combatant, and who claimed that he was actually the one who took those 
tourists and he won’t release them until Nkomo and Mugabe come forward or 
something like that. But if you read the narrative from now backward, you can tell 
that this narrative again... the idea was to implicate ZIPRA leadership into 
sponsorship of the dissidents. And secondly, Zimbabwe had a very good image by 
then internationally, originally. And one of the issues which was happening by 
then; Mugabe wanted to justify by all means to the international community that 
what he was doing in Matabeleland was right. If these people are now even taking 
the tourists, then the international community would be sympathetic to what he’s 
doing. This is as far as I understand it, because I doubt really that dissidents could 
have taken them.”570 
 
There is clear testimony and documented victim statements that describe recognizing the 
same Fifth Brigade soldiers by day acting as ‘dissidents’ by night both as a way to 
confuse the civilian population but also as a sophisticated dramaturgical strategy to 
construct an ‘enemy’ where one does not exist or is so weak that the current level of 
State-sanctioned violent repression is not justifiable.  
“On the issue of dissidents Gogo Mantini (she actually did most the talking with 
son chipping in occasionally), said they had never seen the dissidents before the 
soldiers came to their area. Her thinking was that some of the soldiers often 
masqueraded as dissident[s] during the night. She wondered how the soldiers 
often knew details of dissidents’ movement (i.e. time, place, day, etc. when no 
one had reported their presence to them).”571 
 
                                                
569 Ibid. 
570 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
571 Grace to Heal Ministries - Recorded statement from primary victim of Gukurahundi violence, Mrs. MN 
& her son – 18/08/04 - Siyabalandela village, Donda Line, Tsholotsho. 
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Many informants would subscribe to this argument (security force by day/dissident by 
night) as a plausible explanation for how these tourists were abducted and killed and why 
there were public claims of responsibility issued by supposed ‘dissidents’ at that time. 
“Yes, yes. Who did it? And you know, we still…I personally still think that the evidence 
is strongly against CIO [Central Intelligence Officers], Civil intelligence, and the Fifth 
brigade rather than [dissidents]…”572 
In Act III (Tourist Killings), the plot now thickened as ZANU-PF paraded the 
ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance as a destabilising force, not only to the people within the nation, 
but now the risk moved beyond Zimbabwe’s borders to include foreigners. Rural 
Matabeleland sparsely inhabited and mysterious in terrain, a landscape considered a ‘no-
go zone’ to many became the isolated stage from which to enact this ritual ceremony of 
sacrificial political violence. The cast of actors remained anonymous, hidden behind 
masks of fleeting identities from lonesome, adventurous tourists, so-called dissidents to 
ordinary criminal thugs. The props were uncovered back stage where the shell of the 
burnt-out vehicle allegedly used by the kidnappers was discovered and the shallow graves 
unearthing the few remains of the tourists conveniently surfaced almost four years (1986) 
after the event, when their properties were basically unrecognisable. Raising the stakes to 
new heights, the ZANU-PF opened up the theatre to an international audience, the 
waiting donor community, and to any prying eyes of the world that cared to look upon 
this drama of carnage. The script was imbued with a universal text of violent barbarism 
where the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance and their alleged campaign of dissidence now posed a 
terrorist threat to the international community at large.      
Diagram 1 below outlines the dramaturgical flow of these ZANU-PF ‘stage-managed’ 
Acts (I - Entumbane, II – arms cache, III- tourist killings) using the frames of plot, stage, 







                                                




Diagram 1: Dramaturgical flow of key Matabeleland events that shaped the ZANU- 
                    PF nationalist narrative 1980-1982. 
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5.5. Conclusion: ‘Worshipping at the alter of nationalism’573  
 
“The oppression in the country now is more oppressive than it was under Smith. 
Because the oppression now goes down to the grass roots. It is a sin not to belong 
to the ruling party. Under Smith it was only the elites who were in danger from 
the government. Now it is everyone. The youths can go to a church on Sunday 
and force everyone to attend the Zanu rally outside. The party is more important 
than the church. You cannot predict what the rulers will want. One is reminded 
that, both in Shona and Sindebele, there are no words for ‘rival’ or ‘opposition’, 
only ‘enemy’. In Shona it is ‘mwenga’, in Sindebele: ‘isita’.”574  
 
As the ZANU-PF garnered its energies to construct an ordering meta-narrative of 
nationalism, various key events (the clashes at Entumbane, the discovery of arms caches, 
and the tourist killings) whether strategically constructed or not, provided the forum and 
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574 Berkeley & Schrage, 1986: 115.  
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opportunity for an extrapolation of counter-narratives that had a disordering effect on the 
nation-building project as a whole. These disordering counter-narratives originated from 
at least three prominent sources: from ZAPU as an oppositional voice, from the 
‘dissidents’ as a counter-revolutionary force, and from the civilians of Matabeleland who 
were beginning to feel the scourge of hate-speech and the tacit support of violent 
repression by the government. The disordering effect brought on by this series of 
counter-narratives coupled with the increasing state-sanctioned violence perpetrated 
against civilians gave rise to the cathartic rupture ‘necessary’ for the ZANU-PF meta-
narrative of nationalism (composed of a powerful centralised government, one-party 
state, and leader veneration) to momentarily triumph through a presumed order over the 
narratives of resistance and dissent. The scripts representing dissonant texts were 
conspicuously deleted; erased from the discourse of possible alternative realities that 
could have potentially been more diverse and democratic in nature. 
“…whereas it was proving that Robert Mugabe could tolerate only a unity of 
supplicants worshipping upwards to him at the pinnacle. As Rugare Gumbo said 
on his release with other Zanu ‘dissidents’ from the Zanu pits in Mozambique 
early in 1980, Mugabe was in fact ‘totally opposed to unity’, as he and his small 





















                                                
575 Todd, J. 2007: 200. 
217 
 
Chapter 6: Loyalty – Narratives of Exclusion and Inclusion 
 
6.1. Introduction: The Contrived Other – An Illusive Enemy 
 
“Children of Revolution Eating One Another.”576 
 
Once the ZANU-PF felt satisfied that its nationalist text was established, it had to 
find a narrative that would produce a loyalty to its version of nationhood. The narrative 
script chosen was in no uncertain terms a polarizing frame that granted exclusive rights to 
the ruling ZANU-PF party to determine who was a dissident and who was a hero. These 
labels smacked of a strictly bounded, binary discourse that was imbued with the powerful 
mandate of deciding ‘who is in and who is out’ of the Zimbabwean national project. In 
his seminal work on the origins of nationhood, socio-psychologist Vamik Volkan builds a 
solid case for what appears to be a constant ebb and flow of relational construction that 
coalesces around the ‘need for enemies and allies’ and that this phenomena is 
foundational to the psyche of the modern state and its exercises in national identity 
formation and governance. Indeed, Volkan would surmise that the governments of 
powerful nation-states often create this need in order to secure a sense of group inclusion 
within their own borders and ‘other’ exclusion toward those outside their national 
parameters.577 While Volkan’s writing provides critical analysis for inter-personal and  
inter-state conflicts, the ZANU-PF was facing an even more complex dilemma of having 
inherited a national independence laced with the supposed ‘enemy’ emerging from within 
(intra-group conflict).  
In order to maintain a sense of patriotic loyalty to the ZANU-PF nationalist 
narrative an ‘enemy’ threat had to be clearly defined, identified and articulated in the 
public domain. While the traces of race-based third-force enemy ideations were close at 
hand, the ZANU-PF now had the ominous challenge of transforming its Black liberation 
‘comrades’ into the dreaded foe. External enemy formations that are clearly demarcated 
by race, class or geographical boundaries are much simpler to construct. However, the 
production of internal enemy formations where the insidious knife of hateful vengeance 
slices through those of the same race, creed or close geographical proximity embodies a 
                                                
576 Quote by Mohamed Kellou, Algeria’s first ambassador to Zimbabwe in Todd, J. 2007. Through the 
Darkness – A Life in Zimbabwe. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 93.  
577 Volkan, V. 1994. The Need to have Enemies and Allies. New Jersey and London: Jason Aronson Inc. 
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highly paradoxical, often compromising and troublesome plot. An internal implosion of a 
liberation movement like in Zimbabwe which was embalmed and decorated in 
revolutionary idealism is a blurred and messy ordeal. Even within the process of 
identifying and deciding on the labelling language of ‘dissident’ there were inherent 
tensions: 
“The government then started taking a really hard line. You know, these are just 
‘dissidents’ was the words used. They were dissidents, they weren’t terrorists, 
they [ZANU-PF] couldn’t use that word because that’s what they had been called 
by the Rhodesian government. They were dissidents; they were those [who] 
questioned the authority of the central government. And they did so violently, and 
the government was going to stamp them out. There was never any question of 
negotiating, of discussing, of reaching a compromise. No, they were dissidents, 
they were violent dissidents and they were going to be stamped out ruthlessly.”578 
 
In this transcript one finds a sense of ambiguity surrounding the identifying labels of 
‘dissident’ verses ‘terrorist’. ZANU-PF dared not use the label ‘terrorist’ as that would 
have drawn attention to the similarity of their revolutionary cause against the Rhodesian 
government and the cause of the resistance movement that was fomenting from within in 
their own borders. So, they chose to use another term - ‘dissident’- to indentify someone 
who questioned the central government. Herein lay the critical contradiction, that being 
that both the ZANU pre-independence liberation struggle and the ZAPU post 
independence oppositional stance were founded on the basis of a radical ‘questioning’ of 
the central government at that time (albeit one was a white minority-led and the other a 
black majority-led government).  
Manufacturing an ‘insider-enemy’ within the bowels of a particular collective 
configuration is a disturbing and diabolical undertaking. It involves deconstructing a vital 
trust and weaving a fatal web of deceitful machinations through an arsenal of socio-
political manipulation. In his incisive critique of the violent regime of the Chilean 
Dictator Augusto Pinochet, Catholic Theologian William Cavanaugh juxtapositions the 
ceremonial acts of state-sanctioned Torture and the religious sacrament of the Eucharist 
                                                
578 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
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as rituals of enemy-formation and enemy-transformation579 respectively. On torture, 
Cavanaugh writes:  
“A related effect of torture on the collective imagination in Chile was to produce 
enemies for the regime.  [Torture & disappearance]…simulated the atmosphere of 
war that the regime needed to justify its policies. Violence was used not merely as 
a response to threats to the state, but rather to create the threats from which the 
state offered itself as protector.  At issue was not ‘repression’ as such, since there 
was little to repress, but rather production of enemies and the scripting of people 
into a drama of fear.”580   
 
This quoted passage could have easily been lifted out of the scenario of Chile in the 
1970s and placed in the context of Matabeleland, Zimbabwe in the 1980s.  Acts of terror 
and severe violence perpetrated by the ZANU-PF and its security apparatus became the 
staged performance that incited the vociferous enemies that the oppressive system needed 
in order to justify their own existence, rule and brutality. Even more spurious, this state-
sanctioned violence provided the necessary facade to cast themselves (ZANU-PF) in the 
role of ‘protector’ of the people. In Cavanaugh’s own words: 
“Torture is part of the theatre of fear…Torture also helps to create the enemies 
that we need.  Torture is a kind of theatre in which people are made to play roles, 
and thereby reinforce a certain kind of social imagination…the prisoners become 
what terrorists are in our imagination: depraved subhumans.  The imagination of 
the War on Terror is inscribed on their bodies in a kind of ritual drama, or anti-
liturgy.”581  
 
Cavanaugh is particularly interested in interrogating the imagination of the State and how 
this destructive imagination is acted out on the bodies of the very people the State is 
supposed to serve and protect.   
“Torture is the ritual enactment of the imagination of the state on the body of the 
individual person. The effects of torture go far beyond the body of the tortured 
individual.  Torture is a social, one might say ‘liturgical’, enactment of the 
imaginative power of the state. Torture is both a product of – and helps reinforce 
                                                
579 Cavanaugh’s treatment of enemy transformation compliments the conceptions of the ethic of ‘enemy-
love’ which was promulgated by the late Martin Luther King, Jr. in his theoretical and practical 
formulations on non-violence in the US civil rights movement of the 1960s.  
580 Cavanaugh, W.  2006. “The Sacrifice of Love – The Eucharist as Resistance to Terror and Torture”. A 
Lecture presented at O’Shea Centre, Wilston. Melbourne: Catholic Communications, 10. See also 
Cavanaugh, W. 1998. Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics and the Body of Christ. New Jersey: 
Wiley-Blackwell Publishers. 
581 Cavanaugh, W. 2006: 11. 
220 
 
– a certain story about who ‘we’ are and who ‘our’ enemies are.  Torture can 
imagine the world as divided…”582  
 
In agreement with Volkan, Cavanaugh suggests that this ‘need’ of groups or nation-states 
to continually organize themselves around the postures of ‘exclusion and embrace’583 in 
relation to the ‘other’ is necessary in order to ‘demonise’ another and thereby justify acts 
of aggression that will in turn spawn the enemies required to continue propagating a 
systematic cycle of violence.  
“Wars are about the imaginary dividing of the world into friends and enemies.  
And enemies must exist in sufficient abundance and sufficient monstrosity if a 
war is to be sustained…The Global War on Terror would not exist without such 
de-humanisation.  In other words, this war is not simply about response but 
production…Torture is this drama of friend and enemy brought to its most 
heightened realisation.”584 
 
This myopic cycle of ‘violence and enemy-creation’ became the modus operandi of the 
ZANU-PF starting at independence in 1980 and has remained its strategy in order to stay 
in power even to the present.  
 6.1.1. Inventing the Enemy 
From its inception, the ZANU-PF government has continuously invented a d re-
invented its ‘enemies’ through ever evolving political narratives that mirror classic 
theories of enemy-formation and the rhetoric of categorical thinking (us/them mind-sets) 
in relation to any threats to political power. First, as was discussed in Chapter Four, the 
ZANU-PF utilized an ethnic-hatred conflict narrative to justify the Gukurahundi 
violence: “We the Shona (us) are killing the Ndebele (them) in revenge for the stealing of 
our cattle, wives and children by King Mzilikazi and King Lobengula in the 1800s”. This 
narrative was meant to mask ZANU-PF's determination to wipe-out the opposition, or as 
some would maintain to commit genocide against the Ndebele people which at that time 
were represented by ZAPU. Second, as indicated in Chapter Five, as it rushed to solidify 
its nationalist agenda, the ZANU-PF used a populist politically-leftist narrative against all 
opposition parties that defied the ruling regime: “We are the legitimate, popular people’s 
                                                
582 Cavanaugh, W. 2006: 7. 
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& Embrace – A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation. Nashville: Abingdon 
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government (us) dealing with the puppets of the Capitalist West (them)”. This veiled 
narrative threat gave cover to the ZANU-PF's determination to maintain a one-party state. 
“When they dealt with the Opposition political party, the MDC, they said, “We 
are nationals, Black Zimbabweans, fighting neo-colonialism”, when in actual fact 
it’s ZANU- PF that was trying to fight Opposition political party. So you can see 
how the language is used. Now there is a sense in which, critically important, 
there is an ideology behind it that is very critical.”585 
 
Third, when it came to the fast-track land reform programme of the year 2000, ZANU-PF 
revitalised a political liberationist ideological narrative: “We, the Black-consciousness 
revolutionaries are the genuine Africans (us) who are now taking back our rightful land 
stolen by the White colonizers (them)”. This disguised narrative gave license to ZANU-
PF's corrupt policy of parcelling out farms among a small group of government elites 
who supported Mugabe in power; a petit bourgeoisie benefiting from the wealth of the 
Land. 
“Let’s come to a current or to current examples; when they, ZANU-PF, took land, 
grabbed the land, they said to everybody, ‘we are bona fide Zimbabweans, the 
land belongs to us. And we need to take it away from the colonialists’. But if you 
look at the people who benefitted from the land, you will be very surprised that 
there is a core group that belongs to ZANU-PF who benefited, and they ended up 
with multiplicities of farms, but no opposition got farms. Even those that were in 
Opposition political parties, lost their land. And that’s critical for you to 
realize…so it’s the language that is used.”586   
 
Fourth, and more recently in 2005, ZANU-PF embarked on what it termed Operation 
Murambatsvina (translated as ‘clean out the rubbish’ or ‘take out the trash’) in which an 
estimated 700,000 urban poor had their informal housing and businesses demolished and 
were forcibly relocated into rural areas in the middle of the winter months. Here ZANU-
PF employed a legal, even moral legitimacy narrative, claiming that this drastic action 
was necessary as these urban dwellers were squatting and trading illegally on municipal 
land and that many were illegal aliens and were a criminal menace in these urban 
communities; “We decent, law-abiding, patriotic Zimbabwean citizens (us) have to get 
rid of ‘foreigners’ and criminal thugs (them) who have come from outside”. Once again, 
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ZANU-PF used an ‘enemy’ discourse to hide its clandestine efforts to directly 
disenfranchise the urban poor who were known to have voted in large numbers for the 
opposition in the presidential elections of that same year.587 
“The ideology that has been spread to a core group, that almost look at themselves 
as the [only people] who should be preserved, protected, benefit, and be 
privileged. But it’s important to always create ways and means of how to distract 
people from that, and yet the core group benefits from that… So they built the 
language around it. And therefore it’s without doubt that the language has 
become very much part and parcel of a weapon and a system to disenfranchise 
people, not only of their citizenship, but of their self-worth and belonging.”588 
 
Each of the four narrative scripts reconstructed and recited above were officially 
articulated by top national politicians, published in the state-run media and channelled 
through the government information networks of the ruling ZANU-PF party both locally 
and abroad. The rigorous debate that swirled around the legitimacy of these narratives 
among the political 'intelligencia' and exiled communities gave public affirmation to the 
strength of these ZANU-PF imposed meta-narratives. However, most of the rural masses 
in Zimbabwe have had no access to any other alternative sources of news media and as 
such, found themselves unknowingly entrapped in the twisted web of ZANU-PF 
propaganda. 
“[A]s a journalist [I] faced that because if we used any other term besides 
‘dissident’, they [ZANU-PF] would question that. And journalist[s] were called 
in. I was told to watch my reporting, during that time. As a journalist for The 
Guardian before Nick Wall was thrown out of the country for his reports on the 
Matabeleland massacres, then ‘I’ started writing for the Guardian, and I was 
called in and warned saying ‘these figures that you are reporting are not true, and 
you better watch it. This is a formal warning and one more formal warning and 
then you’re out.’ So the government took exception to any other…even for the 
foreign media to report it in their own terms. And we got sucked in and you know 
I had to consciously say ‘no, I can’t call them ‘dissidents’ that is accepting the 
vocabulary of the government. I had to call them ‘armed rebels’ or ‘violent 
protesters’, ‘guerrilla groups’ or ‘armed bands’. There were lots of different 
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things but I tried not to accept the government’s vocabulary for that because that’s 
what they ‘wanted’, you see.”589  
     
6.1.2. Performance Violence: Rank Discontent among the Freedom Fighters 
Before delving into the particularities of the hero / dissident narratives that 
dominated Zimbabwe in the early 1980s, it is important to take note of the context of 
widespread discontent that characterised the early period of political transition to 
independence.  The participatory space that was opened up along the pathway to 
increased political freedom in Zimbabwe sourced a breeding ground for silenced voices 
to emerge in protest and for subjugated narratives to be publically displayed in 
dramaturgical expressions, including performance violence. The performance violence 
enacted by ex-ZIPRA contingents is given descriptive aptitude by a veteran journalist 
interviewed in this research: 
“The way they acted, I mean it was, I think a kind of desperation. They deserted, 
generally they deserted from the army and they went off with a bit of arms, and 
they were angry and they were trying to protest. However there was a method to 
their madness. You know it started with the armed robberies, they realized they 
weren’t getting the kind of publicity they needed with that, then there was a 
decision made ‘let’s go for some tourists, we’re going to get big news out of that’, 
and boy [!] did they. There was also a strategic decision to go after white farmers. 
Again, they could kill twenty black Ndebele civilian or twenty Shona, it wouldn’t 
get big news. You know the government could play it down: you kill three white 
farmers; boom [!] it’s in the headlines; it’s in the international headlines. I mean it 
was a very cynical view, but I have to say as a journalist, they were right. I mean 
and I didn’t like that situation, I often tried to say ‘look at how many black 
Zimbabweans are dying’. But it was always the white farmers that got big 
headlines… the dissidents, the actual violent rebels, they did have a strategy. I 
don’t think it was...it wasn’t a strategy to overthrow the government; it was a 
strategy to create the most havoc and the most news. It was a bloody...to get as 
much attention as possible to get the government to negotiate with Joshua Nkomo 
to get, I’d say, the best.”590       
 
It is interesting to note that the designation of ‘dissident’ was not reserved for the 
ex-ZIPRA guerrillas. In its genesis, the dissident label referred to all or any unruly 
elements (both ex-ZIPRA and ex-ZANLA) not complying with the demobilisation 
process. 
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590 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
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“Joshua Nkomo was initially Home Affairs Minister after 1980. And you had 
those extraordinary scenes…where ex-ZANLA guerrillas were attacking Police 
stations and the word ‘dissident’ was being used in relation to themand the 
people in Matabeleland. And it was because Joshua had been put in charge of 
Home Affairs, the police were thought of as a legitimate object to attack… I had 
very, very interesting background stuff to the whole environment out of which 
Gukurahundi arose. And this fact which nobody now would think of, that the 
word dissident was invented to deal with that disobedient [element] all over the 
country. And in fact Nkomo used the well-armed ex-ZIPRA soldiers to deal with 
dissidents in Matabeleland during this period. And he was complaining that 
nobody is trying to deal with the dissident ZANLA attacking the police 
stations.”591 
 
Specific incidents of ex-ZANLA dissidence have been identified during the early years 
after independence, such as indicated in the following interview account: 
“It became restricted to Western Zimbabwe but it was in 1980 it had certainly 
been more widespread. I was not then researching in Matabeleland, I was 
researching in the perimeters and in Makoni District one heard echoes of the 
fighting between the army units in Bulawayo and so on. But also in Makoni 
District one heard about dissidents. There had been dissident ZANU guerrillas 
who refused to lay down their arms and who were attacking churches and so on 
and government helicopters dropping leaflets saying ‘Go to church’ in Makoni 
District. And indeed one of the earliest murders there were missionary murders. 
Two white missionaries, I’ve forgotten their denomination, but they were 
certainly Protestant, were murdered in Makoni District just before I got there to 
do research.”592 
 
In sum, testimonial evidence points to a considerable amount of unrest among the 
former freedom fighter populations on all sides of the equation (both ZIPRA, ZANLA 
and other rogue cadres) which in turn begs the question as to why the dissident label was 
later restricted to the combatants of only one liberation army (ZIPRA) and its civilian 
constituency (Ndebele) located in a particular geographical area (Matabeleland and 
Midlands). 
6.1.3. The ‘Dissident’ Reality: Form and Scope 
 
The ‘dissident’ reality in Matabeleland is contested ground. From the interviews 
conducted in this study and the published research on the matter, the numbers of actual 
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‘dissidents’ ranges from 40-50 on the low end of the scale and up to 400-800 on the high 
end of the scale.593  
“The numbers of dissidents were probably no more than 400 at their zenith. Their 
attrition rate was very high, with approximately 75% being killed, captured, 
injured or fleeing to Botswana. At their peak, dissident numbers in Matabeleland 
South were about 200, but by the amnesty they were reduced to 54. In 
Matabeleland North, dissidents numbered about 90 at most, but again, by the 
Amnesty, only 41 remained. In western Matabeleland, dissidents numbered 90 at 
their peak, and about 27 at the Amnesty. Ultimately, only 122 dissidents would 
turn themselves in, countrywide.”594 
 
Regardless of the disparity in the numerical count of dissidents, two critical issues related 
to the perceptions of how many dissidents actually existed are worthy to be highlighted in 
this section. Firstly, there are discrepancies around the expansive geographical scope of
their supposed activities in light of their numbers: 
“Dissidents had the ultimate counting, in a number, a great number…certainly 
maybe a hundred, even less than that. And yet we had a whole picture given that 
they were here and there and everywhere. It was the operation of a few, so we 
hear…It was a maverick band of bandits as we gathered, who hit and ran guerrilla 
warfare, which they had been taught to topple the previous regime… but it didn’t 
really take all that long, it didn’t last.”595 
 
“But if you get scales at which dissidents were operating, you really would 
wonder that how can one walk…even if you are an athlete, you really cannot 
cross from Matabeleland-South… if today you have abducted or you have killed 
someone at one point down in Matabeleland-South in a rural part of 
Matabeleland. And tomorrow we are told that you were seen right North of 
Midlands. And at that time the transport route…the movement of buses and cars 
had become so restricted, such that these dissidents are mainly dependent on 
walking. So it wouldn’t make sense to see one walking about five hundred 
kilometres in 24 hours.” 596 
 
Secondly, there is considerable argument for the law of proportionality when considering 
the number of dissidents as compared to the number of the Fifth Brigade forces 
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commissioned to deal with them, and the toll of civilian casualties that resulted from the 
severe violence unleashed at that time. Speaking of the dissident numbers in comparison 
to the force of the Fifth Brigade, the following respondents (a human rights lawyer and 
veteran journalist) ask the hard questions of proportionality with considerable clarity: 
“A hand full, literally no more than a handful. A tiny number [of dissidents], 
completely…, you know, the response was completely disproportionate to the 
threat. There are lots of hard facts, e.g. when the amnesty was finally declared in 
1988, I think only about 120 dissidents handed themselves in. Now some had 
been killed and some had been captured. But if there were 200 dissidents, 300 
maximum…even 400 dissidents, you kill 20,000 people for 400?”597  
 
“…I mean we didn’t know how many, was it a few hundred, was it a few 
thousand, but I mean, over that period from 1982 when their protest started, until 
1987,  you look at how many they…they ‘were’ violent. It started with the armed 
robberies of the buses, it then went on to the kidnapping of the foreign tourists, it 
also was the killing of White farmers, and they were quite a few that were killed, I 
forget how many. And then there was also at the very end of 1987, there were the 
beheadings of White…religious group that was farming near the Matapos pass, 
and I think it was 15 White farmers and their children who were beheaded. I mean 
it was pretty gruesome. So, I mean, they ‘were’ violent, there was no question 
about that. But, as it turns out, it was a very small group…I forget exactly how 
many but it was a small group and I saw some of them turn themselves in. And I 
mean they had been living rough, they had been sleeping rough, they had been on 
the run for years, they were a tough group, they’ve been murdering…tough, 
tough, tough, but this was a small group. You know, was it necessary to kill 20 
thousand people, you know, 20 thousand civilians?”598 
 
These transcriptions lend weight to the expressed concern that the means (the severe 
violence of the Fifth Brigade) utilised by the ZANU-PF did not justify the ends (defeating 
the dissidents). On the basis of a legal argument of proportionality, the ZANU-PF 
remains hard-pressed to explain why a specially trained army Brigade of 5,000 soldiers 
was required to ‘weed-out’ at the most 400 dissidents, and in the end 20,000 civilians 
were killed599. For the ordinary person on the streets of Matabeleland (many of whom 
experienced the trauma of a losing loved ones through violence or disappearances), the 
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227 
 
motivations for these mass killings remain precariously suspect. This discussion will be 
given more detailed attention in the concluding section of this Chapter.   
6.2. Explanations of Dissidence 
  
There are myriad explanations for the ‘dissident’ movement in Matabeleland in 
the 1980s. The official government statements continually touted the line of a national 
security threat wherein the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance was attempting to ‘topple’ the ZANU-
PF regime. In a radio address delivered on 10 November 1980 after the first Entumbane 
clashes, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe spoke these words to the nation: 
“The government will preserve law and order against disloyal, misguided and 
politically motivated armed hooligans and political malcontents whose final 
objective, according to the information before me, is to create chaos and 
lawlessness so as to pave the way for the eventual fall of my government.”600 
 
Yet the actual gradation of cascading motivations and interests articulated by these 
marauding bands of ‘dissidents’ was characteristically diverse. There were the politically 
marginalised soldiers, the ZANU-PF security forces parading as ‘dissidents’, the third-
force Super-ZAPU squads supported by South African Apartheid government601, a d the 
opportunistic criminal thugs and their ever-present gangs. The following respondent 
gives his summary of the variation of explanations for why the dissidents existed: 
“…obviously those that had been the ZIPRA guys or soldiers who had been 
disgruntled were ready to take arms and then they were viewed as dissidents. But 
you see in order to carry out ethnic cleansing, government pretended as if there 
were other dissidents who were its own creation so as to justify. I mean for 
example, if one was a Fifth Brigade during the day, he would come at night and 
pretend to be a dissident. And therefore government would say there are 
dissidents even though they were dissidents of their own creation. They were 
dissidents who were created by ZANU-PF. So that then it could justify the killing 
of Ndebeles because they were there. But there were also dissidents who were 
disgruntled by the way they were treated, you see, by the government of 
Zimbabwe who then said we are going to take up arms and fight the system. But 
whatever ways the dissidents were, you see, government justified their presence 
to carry out this ethnic cleansing.”602 
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Sifting through the research testimonies of ‘dissidents’ (ex-ZIPRA combatants), one is 
struck by the glaring gap in evidence of any clear and orderly plan to overthrow the 
Mugabe government.603 Most recorded statements of ex-ZIPRA soldiers who left the 
demobilization camps and went back to the bush armed, claimed they did so because of 
the threats (sometimes veiled in ethnic overtones) of death, violence, torture and abuse 
coming from ex-ZANLA and ZNA (Zimbabwe National Army) forces whom they were 
sharing camps with or who were participating in the oversight of the demobilisation 
campaign.  Consider the reflections of these ex-ZIPRA fighters: 
“On several occasions I was arrested, suspected of being a dissident; I was 
arrested, detained for some months, sometimes for weeks, sometimes for days, 
beaten up and things like that. Just because I was a former combatant and I 
belonged to the other party.  So most of the combatants were actually suspect…I 
was picked up, detained and tortured.”604  
 
“Because anyone could just arrive at your doorstep, whether a soldier, a 
policeman, or the CIO [Central Intelligence Officer]. Especially the CIO, wanting 
to find out what you were doing there, at home. ‘No, I have filled out my 
demob[ilisation] papers’, and you would bring them out to show them. Since you 
were a demobilised ZIPRA ex-combatant, they would immediately find you 
guilty and level you as a dissident.”605 
 
In reviewing ex-ZIPRA (‘dissident’) transcriptions, phrases such as ‘feeling unsafe’, 
‘under threat’ and ‘fear of disappearance’ were prevalent which would indicate that the 
dissidence in question may have been driven out of fear and deep-seated insecurity more 
than out of traitorous mutiny.   
“Our main reason to be in the bush was to defend ourselves, more than even 
defending ZAPU itself. We wanted to defend ourselves personally. We were 
threatened, our lives were threatened. If we did not do this [become dissidents], 
we did not think we would survive.”606 
 
In their respected research on ‘dissidence’, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger 
articulate a strong case for viewing the dissidence in Matabeleland as a defensive not an 
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offensive movement.607 As opposed to the official ZANU-PF narrative of a looming, 
well-planned coup d’état arising out of Matabeleland, there are at least four other major 
explanations for dissidence that have surfaced in recent research around this issue. First, 
there was a self-proclaimed contingent of ex-ZIPRA soldiers who were unwilling to 
accept the defeat of ZAPU in the 1980 election polls, claiming that ZANU either rigged 
the vote or intimidated the masses on a large scale and which unashamedly re-armed 
themselves to ‘continue’ the struggle. However, as has already been highlighted, there is 
no concise documentation to prove that this continued struggle had the approval of the 
top ZAPU leadership or that it was strategically well-orchestrated and as such it appears 
that this small group of ex-combatants was more concerned with a provocative display of 
performance violence (as a means of gaining necessary attention) rather than an actual 
scheme of government overthrow. In any case, it was these public and often symbolic 
acts of violence and sabotage undertaken by this small band of renegades that the ZANU-
PF clung to in order to motivate their deluge of state-sanctioned force.  
“As far as I’m concerned yes, dissidents were there. A very small portion of 
people must have been turned dissident. Because I’m of the opinion that these 
guys, they must have been really frustrated in the Army…But the majority as far 
as I’m concerned, it was purely created, by ZANU-PF, that’s my opinion, and I 
might be wrong but that’s my honest opinion.”608  
 
Second, there were ‘dissident voices’ that emerged in response to what they perceived to 
be the unfair or unequal treatment at the hands of the ZANU-PF government structures 
and their forcible attempts to consolidate power (especially in the process of 
demobilization and integration into the army). Third, others place the blame for 
dissidence on the third force activity of the South African Apartheid government which 
was strategically exploiting the Matabeleland conflict to meet their own interests and 
political gain. The motive was to prove that ‘black-on-black’ violence was inevitable 
under the newly elected black African leadership and therefore Zimbabwe was 
ungovernable. Fourth, there is a growing body of research that is gaining support 
suggesting that the ‘dissident’ insurgency was created, constructed by the violent 
activities of the Fifth Brigade and the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) in particular, 
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in collaboration with the other security branches of the ZANU-PF government in 
general.609 These various dissidence trajectories will be further discussed on in the next 
four sections. 
6.2.1. Disgruntled Ex-ZIPRA Soldiers 
 
This explanation claims that the dissidents consisted of a small contingent of ex-
ZIPRA soldiers who did take exception to the electoral victory of ZANU-PF and on 
principle determined in their minds to stage some form of ‘legitimate’ resistance action. 
They chose violence as their channel for legitimate protest, this being the familiar, 
internalised mind-set imprinted on their psyche throughout the liberation war. This 
dissident sub-group consisted of what could be termed the ‘intelligentsia’ soldiers who 
readily and thoughtfully articulated their ideological choice to continue an armed struggle 
on the basis of moral and ethical grounds. This resistance expression was the most 
publicised, well-known and documented of the various sub-groups of dissonance being 
discussed here. The first key to their argument was their unwavering loyalty (literally 
unto death) to their leader Dr. Joshua Nkomo. In the revolutionary worldview the 
liberation leader is placed upon a pedestal that entitles him to be the only protagonist to 
lead the movement and the nation that is being fought for. The revolutionary leader 
embodies vision, courage, the character of command and the function of establishing and 
maintaining order that is considered vital to the sustenance of the movement.   
“I found among the former ZIPRAs, there were some who accepted the new 
dispensation, the war is over [and] the Patriotic Front has won. But there were 
some who were actually saying ‘If Nkomo loses, then that means we’ve lost’. 
And those, I think they were the first group of dissidents. And bearing in mind is 
that some of the ex-combatants were not very educated people, to be honest. And 
if you tell them that ZAPU has lost and Joshua Nkomo is no longer going to run 
this country, a lot of them they were gripped by fear; ‘What will happen?’ And a 
lot of them then decided on their own volition without anybody leading from 
above, to actually say ‘No, let’s go back to our Operational areas and tell the 
people that the war is beginning’. And there were a lot of them, I think they were 
very optimistic that the ZAPU leadership was going to support what they were 
doing.”610 
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However, beyond the pull of leader adulation, this group of rebels fell victim to 
the unrealistic promises of revolutionary rhetoric. Under the guise of motivational reward 
for the soldiers fighting in the trenches, the ZIPRA commanders continually drilled into 
the minds of these subordinates that they were not only fighting to liberate the masses, 
but that there was a great deal of material (houses, jobs) and social recognition (political 
clout) awaiting them upon independence. These nebulous rewards failed to materialise 
fast enough after 1980.  
“I think the issue is connected to the historical precedence. The ZIPRA 
combatants operated there and they were all Ndebele-speaking. So, when Nkomo 
lost the Election the people of Matabeleland felt like they lost as well. So I 
remember the first time there were actually dissidents, or they were claiming to be 
dissidents, they actually told their parents that ‘No, we lost, the war is beginning’. 
This is how they put it because they were trying to say you must be prepared to 
actually continue to give food because we lost and the war is beginning. And I 
remember three people who came in 1981, they passed by and went there, and 
when they talked to my father they were saying ‘You know, old man, you know 
what happened in 1980, and we are also the former ZIPRA and the war is 
continuing’”.611 
 
Lastly, this contingent of dissidents did not see the realisation of the capstone of their 
ideological battle, that being the generous redistribution of land to them and their 
families. Of particular significance was the ZAPU-ZIPRA schema of buying up land to 
facilitate the ‘working of the land by Africans’ through co-operative farming projects.612     
6.2.2. Resistance to the Power Hegemony of ZANU-PF 
 
Contrary to the disgruntled ex-ZIPRA ‘intelligencia-soldiers’, this explanation 
would describe the dissidents as a cadre of disappointed fighters who did not chose the 
conduit of violence as their channelled expression of frustration. Instead they chose the 
way of least resistance, that being withdrawal from participation in the very structures 
they had diligently fought for. This cluster of dissident soldiers disengaged from the 
socio-political institutions of independence early on when it became evident that they 
were going to be disenfranchised from their dream of a better, more equitable society.  
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“But also, the government, they kept a consistent narrative with the dissidents. As 
I say, they had nothing to discuss, no compromise, these were violent dissidents, 
rebels and they had to be stamped out. And anybody that was associated with 
them had to be stamped out as violently as the dissidents, or even more so. 
Because they couldn’t catch the dissidents but they could catch the people who 
had served them dinner the night before. And the way to deal with them is to 
shoot them… Part of it also, okay ‘power’, ZANU-PF was going to be 
unchallenged within Zimbabwe, and also I think there was a message going out to 
the people of Matabeleland, to the Ndebele people saying, ‘Don’t mess with us’, 
you know ‘ZANU-PF, we Shona are ruling, and don’t mess with us’. ‘Get used to 
it and don’t question things because we can make life difficult for you and no-
one’s gonna do anything about it.”613 
 
This ex-ZIPRA faction identified what appeared to be a systematic marginalisation by the 
ZANU-PF and quickly abandoned all hopes of thriving in an equal, power-sharing 
arrangement in Zimbabwe. There is ample testimony that they were being blocked from 
holding political office, discouraged from employment opportunities, overlooked and 
disrespected in leadership promotion and downright threatened if they attempted to 
occupy space in the security structures of the new ZANU-PF regime.  
“But this disgruntlement came from the system of ‘demobilization’. The people 
that I remember well that were demobilized, I used to see most of ZIPRA people 
who were demobilized from the Army. And in any case, to look at statistics, 
ZIPRA just like ZANLA, they had educated military personnel, but ZIPRA had 
the greatest number of educated personnel because most of them had been trained 
in Russia. They were aircraft engineers and the like, but when it came to the 
joining of the Armies immediately after Independence, all the people from the 
ZIPRA, they were not given leadership positions. And rather, where one was, you 
would be given a ZANLA personnel to understudy you, and those people were 
demobilized and all the ZANLA military personnel took up all those leadership 
posts. And one of the issues was immediately after Independence, the government 
sent a lot of military people into China to learn some skills that were needed. And 
of all those that were sent out, they were all from ZANLA, and that disgruntled 
the ZIPRA personnel.”614 
 
6.2.3. Third-Force Elements 
 
A third explanation for the formation of dissidents points to those third-force 
elements that capitalised on the chaotic cloud of violence overshadowing Matabeleland in 
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the form of South African backed insurgents (Super-ZAPU) and collections of criminal 
vagabonds. These assemblies of bandits and thugs served to further confuse the 
Matabeleland masses and thwart any logical sensibilities of the other ‘dissident’ 
companies and their movements. The Super-ZAPU were a small unit of fighters allegedly 
made up of exiled ZIPRA members who initially crossed the borders into neighbouring 
states (Botswana and South Africa) in fear for their lives after ZANU-PF came to power. 
These recruits were then trained by the South African Apartheid secret services with the 
mandate to make Zimbabwe ungovernable.615 
“Super ZAPU was the group of South African backed dissidents, which operated 
in Southern Matabeleland from late 1982 until mid-1984. Super ZAPU consisted 
of probably fewer than 100 members who were actually actively deployed in 
Zimbabwe. They were largely recruited from the refugee camps and led by ex-
ZIPRA members who had been retrained in South Africa, in the covert operation 
known as Operation Drama.”616 
 
Dragon Mabuza, a former Super-ZAPU dissident, described his experience as follows: 
 
“Once we were in South Africa I found myself at eh Entambeni camp [Louis 
Tritchardt], and we did not get any money…We received four months’ military 
training at Entambeni before we deployed back into Zimbabwe. We had both 
black and white officers training us in English, Shona and Ndebele…Captain 
Calloway told us to take up arms because the country [Zimbabwe] was not yet 
free and needed to be liberated…He told us that even if we came across whites, 
especially farmers, these are bad people because they grow the food which feeds 
Mugabe’s dogs. He [Calloway] told us he had instructions from Nkomo and that 
he himself was a commander appointed by Nkomo…As initiation we were made 
to cut off the hands of two [ZNA] soldiers…We made one armed robbery and 
killed eight people.”617 
 
Super-ZAPU employed a tactic of infiltration by exploiting the common mistrust of 
ZANU-PF shared with ex-ZIPRA groups. They were met with a considerable degree of 
scepticism and at times outright disdain by the ‘genuine’ ex-ZIPRA dissident troops and 
the rural masses who found it repugnant that these soldiers would allow themselves to be 
                                                
615 CCJP & LRF, 1997: 30. According to the authors of Breaking the Silence: “Operation Drama was the 
South African code name for the undercover support of Zimbabwean dissidents…Precise numbers of Super 
ZAPU and the degree of material support offered by South Africa to Zimbabwean dissidents remain largely 
conjectural, although it is clear the Zimbabwean operation was far less extensive than those in Angola and 
Mozambique, which operated concurrently.” 
616 CCJP & LRF, 1997: 34. 
617 Yap, K. 2001: 192. 
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the sponsored and manipulated by the White enemy regime of South Africa. In the words 
of two ex-ZIPRA combatants turned dissidents: 
“We could never work with South Africa as the independence war was against 
such countries. We were not fighting to help South Africa. We were fighting to 
include everyone in the government of this country…We did not group with those 
people [Super-ZAPU]. They were moving around with their own part. We knew 
[they were not ZIPRA] because we knew each other…We were in that unit where 
people were trained before, in the first struggle. Those were from South Africa, 
we did not have them.”618 
 
“But, the problem now, there [we]re a lot of pseudo-dissidents, people who 
claim[ed] to be dissidents. Some of them with very clean camouflage and 
everything, who w[ould] come and claim to be dissidents. Some of them came to 
the school when we were still in Primary school in 1983, and they claimed to be 
dissidents. We were surprised, and they were carrying everything, they even [had] 
on the National Army uniform, and they asked people to cook for them, and the 
people would cook. So nobody was actually certain who [wa]s who during that 
period… You see, to the ordinary people of Gwanda, it was…very, very hard for 
them to actually separate Super-ZAPU with what. To us, we knew that he‘s a 
ZAPU dissident or a government … This other third element of Super-ZAPU it 
was only known in intellectual circles but among peasant communities nobody 
could make any difference. Because Super-ZAPU, as far as I understand their 
operations, they ‘claimed’ to be dissidents, so that they could not say that you are 
Super-ZAPU.”619 
 
The other major third-force dissident element in Matabeleland was that of the criminal 
opportunists, who took advantage of the vacuum left in the wake of the Gukurahundi 
violence in order to illegally garner material resources for themselves, often under the 
guise of political intrigue. 
“…[T]here is one who is in Vulabuza, I know him, he was just a ZANU-PF…he 
was stealing money…to me, like that one, he was just a criminal, who had an 
access to an AK47. And he robs, stole, kill other people, just to get money. But 
there are others in areas like Tsholotsho, Lupane, and those areas, those people 
were sent there, because some of them they couldn’t even speak Ndebele. They 
were sent there so that whenever they do something, the army will get a way of 
getting in. ‘We are looking for this person who did this and this’. It was funny 
because most of these so-called ‘dissidents’, you’ll hear that dissidents killed so-
and-so, he’s a ZAPU-PF senior member. If they were dissident from ZIPRA, they 
will support and respect other ZIPRA structures. If they were claiming that ‘we 
are with you Nkomo but we don’t understand the situation’, you were not 
                                                
618 Yap, K. 2001: 193. 
619 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
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supposed to kill other people, they can’t do that. So, to me, I really didn’t believe 
[the dissidents existed].”620 
 
“There was a final group of what has been referred to as ‘pseudo dissidents’, 
including the gang led by Gayigusu in Matabeleland South, which was 
responsible for the murder of 16 missionaries in November of 1987. This gang 
was allegedly the personal ‘hit squad’ of politically powerful ZANU-PF officials 
in this part of the country.”621    
 
6.2.4. Manufactured Insurgency 
 
The strongest argument in favour of a manufactured insurgency is encapsulated in 
the volumes of direct victim’s statements that verify a barrage of arbitrary acts of severe 
violence and random campaigns of terror enacted on the rural Matabeleland civilian 
populations in the 1980s. As discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, this tactic 
provided the surest way to create ‘dissidents’ whose rage was readily acted out in 
‘justified’, militant cycles of revenge. However, two other pieces of pivotal evidence that 
point in the direction of a manufactured insurgency revolve around the systematic 
purging of ex-ZIPRA soldiers from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the 
phenomena of ZANU-PF soldiers playing the role of ‘dissidents’. Both of these 
narratives have been continually subjugated by the ZANU-PF who maintain a deafening 
silence and complete disregard for the plausibility of these counter narratives of 
explanation.    
6.2.4.1. Systematic Purging of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) 
From the respondent testimonials in this research, the purging that occurred in the 
ZNA was clearly instigated against the ex-ZIPRA combatants by the majority ex-
ZANLA soldiers who had now taken control of the military structures.  
“Yes, but the dissidents were there few in number, but they were the creation of 
ZANU-PF. You see the dissident issue did not just erupt because people were 
disgruntled, or because people just wanted to fight the government. When it came 
to the integration of the army in independent Zimbabwe, those who were ZIPRA, 
followers of Joshua Nkomo, and those under the party of ZAPU, found themselves 
discriminated against in integration. But those few also who were integrated were 
victimised. I do have friends who tell us that it was very unbearable to stay in the 
army. They were told again and again that they were Ndebeles, they did not have 
                                                
620 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
621 CCJP & LRF, 1997: 35. 
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any country, so then there was no reason for them to serve in the army. Or at least 
they were supposed accept very inferior positions in the army as messengers and 
so forth and not do the real work of soldiers.”622 
 
“The stories that we’re hearing was that the ZIPRA Forces, those that were part of 
the ZIPRA Forces were being frustrated in the government. And some of them 
maybe were being killed unnecessarily, how - I don’t know…And therefore there 
was that dissatisfaction; they were not being given positions of power in the 
military and-so-forth, because they were former ZIPRA fighters. And therefore 
some of them, to escape what was happening in the Army, or maybe being killed 
in the Army, they left. Where they were going I don’t know. Whether they were 
going into the bush, I can not sit here and say I know there were dissidents. We 
only heard from the press that there were dissidents, some of them being named. 
So, it could be true that, there could have been one or two or three…there could 
have been a few. That could be true, but not warranting the genocide that 
happened.”623 
 
What is less determinable is whether or not this purging was a system-wide strategy with 
the endorsement of the top ZANU-PF politicians and military leaders, or it was an 
initiative of the newly integrated rank and file ex-ZANLA soldiers who were feeling 
particularly empowered in their status as the majority. However, evidence from the 
following transcripts does suggest that certain high ranking ZANU-PF government and 
military officials were implicated: 
“It was in 1980. Then in 1982, when the Gukurahundi went effective, they 
addressed by this man Enos Nkala [ZANU-PF minister]. He addressed us right in 
the Army. The first thing that came from his mouth: “I know here that [there are 
those]…of Joshua Nkomo. I am going to wipe all small ethnic groups, including 
you in the Army. Can you lift your hand who belong to ZIPRA?’ Nobody lifted 
his hand. We rediscovered the situation is now bad. We have started to point each 
other by the name: ‘John Nkomo, Albert Nyoni, Kenneth Phiri, you are now 
changing from this battalion to another battalion’. Then the person goes forever. I 
know so many disappeared. It started like that in the Army.”624 
 
“During that time when the disturbances were continuing, people were thrown out 
of the trains, and a lot of murdering was going around. We reported all the matters 
to the officer commanding. Even that could not help us. Because we were 
sometimes taken by the police even if we were within the army, taken to be 
                                                
622 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee of the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s). 
623 Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed 
by 5th Brigade soldiers in 1984). 
624 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 
237 
 
murdered. The Battalion commanders knew all that was happening but they could 
not say anything. They were just quiet. We did not know what was the 
problem.”625  
 
Another respondent recounted the story of his three brothers who were ex-ZIPRA 
soldiers initially integrated into the ZNA and two of which later defected. One brother 
departed from the ZNA because of the disrespect he felt being commanded by young, 
less qualified ex-ZANLA soldiers who abused their positions and started beating him. 
The other brother was accused of participating in the instigation of the Entumbane 
clashes and was forced to serve a six-month military prison sentence, after which time he 
left the ZNA. 
“…[My brother] was saying that they then found other people who were ex-
ZANLA combatants and they had a very low esteem of ZANLA combatants. So 
they were now their Commanders and starting to beat them so they thought it’s 
better to leave. Then the second one [brother] who left in 1983, his story is the 
same. His story is even more interesting because he participated in the Entumbane 
crisis. He was working at the Gwayi assembly point. And he said that he spent six 
months in detention for that particular participation.”626 
  
The experience of the third brother of this respondent who did stay in the service of the 
ZNA supplies a poignant argument for the idea that the dissidents may well have been an 
illusion, a figment of ZANU-PF’s political imagination: 
“And he remained in the Military up to today. But he says, in the Military, how 
did you cope in the Military when they were saying that your colleagues are 
dissidents? He says ‘I challenge[d] them every day to tell us where are the 
dissidents and we go and capture them’. There were no dissidents anywhere. So 
they were saying that there are dissidents out there killing people and now it is in 
doubt that they are there. So they never deployed them to go capture those 
dissidents that they were talking about every day.”627 
 
Apparently there was not only persecution from within the ranks of the ZNA, but 
even after many of the ex-ZIPRA deserted the army, they were continually hounded and 
hunted down by ZANU-PF security personnel, some were arrested and taken out of their 
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homes only to never be seen again. The following first-hand testimony bears witness to 
this harassment: 
“But unfortunately, when you enter in Zimbabwe National Army you were taught 
to write our CV’s, where you operated, in which wing you belong, ZIPRA, 
ZANLA. Stupid enough we didn’t know what was going to happen; we wrote 
exactly our background. They started to pick us one by one. So many disappeared 
up to now…I wasn’t in the Army during that time, I was on leave. They started to 
make road-blocks. They knew that we were on leave, we are going to the Army, 
they started road-blocks. We were given IDs of the Army and the card of photos. 
Then they wanted you to show your identity when you come to the road-block. 
They had information about that one… it was better to have nothing than to have 
something to identify yourself. So other guys that identified themselves…up to 
now we don’t know their whereabouts. Secondly, I went to the Army, I came 
back. Then one day they came…just having my name. I asked exactly what he has. 
‘Army no. 8314, just come outside’. I was hit like nothing. My arms broke here. I 
was tortured like anything. The only thing he asked me was this question: ‘Why 
did you go to Zambia instead [of] go[ing] to Mozambique?’ that was the only 
question. ‘Tell us how were you trained’. Third one: ‘As from today, as soon as 
possible, just tell us so that you can support your father Joshua Nkomo’. I was 
kicked in the stomach…my experience was that so many were killed.”628 
 
 
6.2.4.2. Protector and Perpetrator: The two faces of the ZANU-PF Security Forces 
 
Simultaneously, while ex-ZIPRA soldiers were being expunged from the ZNA, 
numerous accounts of Matabeleland victims indicate that ZANU-PF security forces (in 
particular the Fifth Brigade) would function as ‘soldiers-by-day’ and disguise themselves 
as ‘dissidents-by-night’. This strategy of double role-playing is not an unusual in times of 
war; in the recent civil war of Sierra Leone these imposters were called “sobels” a cross 
between the words ‘soldiers’ and ‘rebels’.629 The key point of this identity masquerading 
is that it served the dual purposes of causing considerable confusion in the civilian 
populace and it multiplied the energy of hate which was the fertilizer for the seed-bed of 
enemy-construction. As in the words of Bishop Karlen: “People had the impression that 
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the dissident problem was artificially forced on them, so as to give reason to smash up the 
people.”630 The following transcripts lend weight to this impression: 
“And then by the way, the issue of the Gukurahundi with the dissidents; I don’t 
know if it was a ploy to flush out the dissidents or if it was a deliberate way of 
ensuring that more people got killed, the same tactic was used by Smith…there 
would be people dressing up as dissidents, getting into a room and demand for 
food and then thereafter they come back and say ‘you see, there were dissidents 
here’. So I don’t know if it was a ploy to get information or it was a strategy to 
wipe out the people, I do not know, but those kind of tactics were also used.”631  
 
“But even up to now I still believe that it were not the dissidents. Yes, I do agree 
that there were dissidents, true, there were dissidents. There were people who 
were not happy with the ZANU government and they defected but, now also as a 
way to inflict violence into people in Matabeleland, the Army would use that 
pretext to come in the night as dissidents. So that the following morning they will 
find a reason to inflict pain on the people of those particular communities.”632  
 
While these deceptive tactics provided opportunity for ZANU-PF security structures to 
extract information from the rural Ndebele communities, most respondents seem to agree 
that this ploy was utilised in order to justify the extreme violence (killing, torture and 
disappearances) that was being carried out by the state-sanctioned security forces. 
Specific incidents of soldier-dissident role switching variations (including wearing non-
combatant uniforms) were also cited by both primary and secondary witnesses from the 
interview samples:  
“But what was very interesting is that in the evenings, not necessarily evening but 
late afternoon, before sunset you would then see them [soldiers] leave the Mission 
and going out into the villages out there. And, in the mornings you would then see 
people coming trying to come and make calls, or coming to report that ‘we had 
experiences with dissidents the previous night’. And having known that these 
people were there at Mwenezi, and having seen them leave the Mission going to 
the villages, I knew definitely that they were the ones who were going out and 
pretending to be what?...Dissidents.”633 
 
“You see, now I am reading back. To me, there was actually an attempt to 
manufacture dissidents, and there was a deliberate...the people from the National 
                                                
630 Yap, K. 2001: 232. 
631 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice CCJP in the 1980s). 
632 Interview: SM1, Durban, South Africa – 07/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher, researcher and university 
lecturer). 
633 Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed 
by 5th Brigade soldiers in 1984). 
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Army they would sometimes turn, and claim to be the dissidents. And I remember 
this other teacher who used to teach us (Grade 6), they [soldiers] came to their 
village during the night. And luckily enough they had [a] newly painted house, 
and these people stood and they leaned against the wall, and they asked them to 
cook for them. The following morning, they were there saying ‘we understand the 
dissidents were here’. And this teacher actually pointed to them that ‘no, but the 
paint is still on your shirt, you were the one[s] who were here yesterday’. But 
immediately he raised that issue, the result now is the violence. This is not to 
discount that there were dissidents. But personally, the people I saw, Ah! I still 
have doubts if they were dissidents.”634 
 
“Then secondly, there was a trip of nurses from Kai to St Paul. So these people 
called ‘peace’ people were the very same people who made a disaster. These 
‘peace’ people, they were very difficult to identify them, they are wearing 
uniform combat, support unit…police uniform. Their start is this: they come and 
pick a person in a police uniform, they go and report he was beaten [to] the 
Police, they make a [case] that he was present in the police, they pick a person 
who is wearing a military clothes and report in the Military camp, …So they say 
the soldiers are also vulnerable during the day. They made an ambush when the 
nurses were from St Paul to Kai, to say [ex]-ZIPRA only killed Ndebele 
people…that’s how these people acted.”635 
    
In summary, these statements indicate that while the ZANU-PF used overt violence to 
subdue any public opposition they simultaneously master-minded covert operations 
within the security structures at their disposal in order to systematically drive out the 
nodes of internal resistance that appeared to have the potential to diffuse their totalizing 
grip on national political power. 
6.3. Narratives of Disloyalty and Dehumanisation 
6.3.1. Stripping of Identity: The Polarising Labels of Hero and Dissident 
 
The myths that have mushroomed around the polarizing labels of ‘dissident’ and 
‘hero’ in the Matabeleland conflict have become larger-than-life.  Due to the overt 
negative and positive connotations of these titles, the mysterious layers of human motive 
and the veiled innuendos of intention within the context of the Matabeleland violence 
have often been lost. These popularized dichotomies represented an oversimplified 
‘either/or’ categorization of ‘good guy verses bad guy’ which was bound to truncate any 
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thorough analysis of the ‘root causes’ of the Matabeleland conflict. Even more disturbing 
is the rhetorical discourse around loyalty and disloyalty that has been attached to, and 
wrapped around these two identifications which is the concern of this Chapter. With 
striking consistency a majority of the interview respondents of this research described the 
ZANU-PF’s definition of a ‘hero’ as a highly politicised process that hinged on one’s 
loyalty to the ruling party ideologies and policies. 
“Well, for me, I understood government saying ‘anyone complying with what 
government was saying and accepting the new ruler, the new president, and also 
accepting the system of government was a hero, and heroes were not only those 
who had fought the war. It was all … even those rallying behind the new 
government they were heroes because they were celebrating the heroism of the 
new government; that was being heroic. But those who are still aloof like the 
dissidents, then for them, those were not heroes. They said those had different or 
hidden agendas when they went to war. It has come in the open now that they had 
hidden agenda’s. That’s how they put it.”636 
 
“ In Zimbabwe, ‘a hero’ as defined by the government, is somebody who supports 
ZANU-PF. If you do not support ZANU-PF you are not a hero. And you’ll find 
that, all those people who go to the Heroes Acre are only those who go in line 
with the thinking of ZANU-PF, and particularly Mugabe. I will take for example 
people like Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole played a very vital role in the Liberation 
Struggle of our country. And many people thought, even though he had 
differences with the ZANU-PF, he deserved to be at the Heroes’ Acre, but that did 
not happen. Because Mugabe felt he didn’t buy his ideas, and is therefore not a 
hero. And to the government at the present moment, the ‘heroes’ are only those 
that are in line with Mugabe’s thinking. And I can safely say that it’s Mugabe 
who determines ‘who becomes a hero’. Whether you fought in the Struggle for 
Independence, it doesn’t matter. But what matters is how he views you, if you are 
a threat to him, you may not be a hero.”637  
 
“So basically, I think it would appear to me that ‘a hero’ really is mostly defined 
by Mugabe. For me it does not make sense that when somebody dies whose 
credentials is well-known that a special priority meeting needs to be called to 
decide what status to confer upon him, it doesn’t make sense, a hero is a hero. If 
somebody has fought for the country, he is a national hero; what’s there to decide 
about him. It’s got to do with the commitment, with the sacrifice, and with the 
service that that person gave to the nation, more than some definitive parameters 
that have been set by a particular party. Because the other thing is, who is ZANU 
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to tell us who the hero is? You know. Are these ZANU-PF’s heroes or are they 
Zimbabwean heroes? Because if they are Zimbabwean heroes, then where are we 
in the whole situation?”638 
 
Aside from unwavering loyalty to the ZANU-PF party, other definitions of a 
‘hero’ rotated around association as former ‘liberation fighters’, those able to eliminate 
all potential threats, or those with the ‘status’ of carrying a gun. However, when asked to 
define ‘what was a hero’ in their own minds, the interview responses moved far beyond 
loyalty in party-politics and armed combatants of the past to include those who are 
disciplined on the job, who serve others and the nation selflessly, who contribute to 
society through the arts or agriculture, and those who fight corruption and advocate for 
life. The responses were both insightful and varied, providing creative alternative ‘hero’ 
narratives for the everyday Zimbabwean’s to live by: 
 




“The meaning of a ‘hero’ doesn’t mean a person who fought, no. 
Anybody who does his job, in a good manner, in a disciplined way, 
he achieves his goals, he’s called a hero.” 
DN3 
(Peace worker) 
“For me, a hero is not necessarily attached to the Struggle only. I 
would see a ‘hero’ as somebody that has given their service to the 
nation, you know.” 
JN1 
(Teacher) 
“To me a hero is somebody who has selflessly given his life for the 
service of other people without counting the costs on his 
person…that to me is a hero.” 
SD1 
(Journalist) 
“But if you ask me ‘who is a hero’, I will tell you that any person 
who gave his life to liberate the country, whether you’re a ZIPRA or 
ZANLA, whether you’re a Shona or Ndebele, whether you’re a 
Black or White’, any person who gave their life, who viewed the 
Liberation of the country as a priority more important even than their 




“[H]eroes are in people’s hearts, in my view…So national heroes in 
my view should not only come from the Liberation Struggle, per say, 
they must come from the contributions people make [in] society. Be 
it in music, be it in agriculture, be it in what-have-you, people that 
contribute mass[ive]ly to the development of this country.” 
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“So in reality, I think there is no hero in Zimbabwe, until we have 
one that can build nationhood…If you get that, where you eliminate 
discretion, eliminate corruption, and you bring in accountability and 
build up a nation where there’s respect for each other, then ‘that’ 




“Yes, before we had heroes, the ones who brought the Independence 
but from there, they turned to be monsters. I think…if you are a hero 
then you kill your people you are not considered a hero anymore, you 
are a monster now. We don’t have heroes in Zimbabwe. The heroes 
are those in the Diaspora that are trying to make noise for the 
situation in Zimbabwe.” 
  
On the other hand, to be given the identity label of ‘dissident’ was, figuratively, a 
kiss of death. The ‘dissident’ position was to be compared to a traitor or one who has 
betrayed ‘The Cause’. For liberation soldiers, this badge of dissonance meant one was 
stripped of all the identity, dignity and meaning that surrounded the sacrifice of being a 
freedom fighter. To be called a ‘dissident’ was tantamount to being accused and 
convicted of treason and for the noble revolutionary this was a capital crime punishable 
by death. For an Ex-ZIPRA or ex-ZANLA soldier to be declared unpatriotic was the 
highest level of betrayal to the Liberation movement and subsequently those who were 
marked as ‘dissidents’ would rather have died then be considered disloyal to the cause. 
Instead of following a path of introspection around their personal levels of loyalty and 
subsequent disloyalty to the ZANU-PF, the ‘dissidents’ turned their attention to 
questioning the essence of the Liberation movement as defined and represented by the 
ZANU-PF regime. 
As was noted earlier in this chapter, at the genesis of the post-independence 
violence in Matabeleland, there was a more cautious and nuanced use of descriptors that 
did not allow for this kind of divisive interpretation of ‘dissident’ and ‘hero’.  However it 
was not long before these titles where engraved on the template of the ZANU-PF national 
narrative.  With this entrenchment came a kind of imprisonment; a death sentence (both 
literally and figuratively) to those who were named as ‘dissidents.’  Literal examples 
would be the arrest and illegal imprisonment without trial of Dumiso Dabengwa and 
Lookout Masuku plus five other top ex-ZIPRA military officers in 1982. In another 
instance, in a lengthy personal letter addressed to President Robert Mugabe dated 7 June 
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1983, Joshua Nkomo protested the human rights and legal abuses of those accused of 
being dissidents:   
“Some 300 Zipra combatants and a few Zanla, who were arrested after the 
troubles in a battalion camp near Karoi, were detained secretly somewhere near 
Harare and taken in small batches to be court-martialled and executed with no 
right of appeal and without informing their next of kin.”639 
 
This is but one of many cases in point where this kind of arbitrary ‘life and death’ 
condemnation was transacted by the ZANU-PF regime in its determination to erect 
narratives of dissidence and to strip ex-ZIPRA combatants of their identity as liberation 
soldiers. 
6.3.2. Stripping of Ideology: The Drama of Social Exclusion 
 
          The Matabeleland dissidents were ‘marginalised belligerents left out of the 
conversation’640 of revolutionary struggle. In dramaturgical analysis, these so-called 
‘dissidents’ were being excluded from the curtain call, abandoned in the shadows of the 
stage wings although they felt that they had a major role in the unfolding drama of 
independence. They refused to be left out of the play, so they disrupted the encore. This 
‘hijacking’ of the grand finale bought them the label of dissidents. Once they were tagged 
‘dissidents’ (meaning those who were no longer on the side of a moral and just cause for 
struggle), their personal history as ‘freedom fighters’ was being erased. It was if all that 
they had fought for, all that they had sacrificed their lives for, was being blotted out of 
the historical narrative of liberation in Zimbabwe. This was not only conceived as 
unacceptable but more importantly, a matter of life and death. Thus, the ‘dissidents’ took 
the stage by force again re-enacting the roles they knew best; that of the drama of 
performance violence. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the redistribution and 
ownership of the land was pivotal to their ideological platform,  
“Because you will realize that the ZIPRA…they had bought a lot of farms. Joshua 
Nkomo believed that, like I said in the beginning, Joshua Nkomo believed that the 
empowerment of the people; is to giving them land. And he had bought quite a lot 
of farms, and in these farms he had sent some of the ZIPRA Forces to look into 
these farms. Because I was told and I believe that he had wanted the ZIPRA 
Forces to say after they had been demobilised from the Army, they should go and 
work in the land. And these guys [ex-ZIPRA] were saying ‘we do not want to go 
                                                
639 ‘Nkomo speaks from the grave’. (2005) The Zimbabwean, (Vol. 1, No 37) 21-27 October. 
640 Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest. Oxford: James Curry, xxiv. 
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to the Army [ZNA] because we are not satisfied’…Well, I’m not very sure 
whether they were taking this from Joshua Nkomo  but from their own point of 
view they were saying they were not happy and they were not really willing to 
join the ZANU-PF government along those lines.”641 
“Can you imagine that ZIPRA Forces up to Independence, they bought farms, 
they wanted to go into agriculture and farming and the like. They used their 
resources to buy the land to do the farming, but what happened later, he took that 
away. Bob took the land away and part of the equipment. And, many years down 
the road he continues to go and take some land from some other people and say 
he’s going to give to the people, the Blacks, when he took some lands from the 
Blacks himself again. I don’t accept that it was genuine. One time the Vice-
President Msika, some ex-combatant…not very long ago, [he] mentioned that he 
was not very happy with it [land redistribution]. He [Msika] used very strong 
words to kind-of tell the guys to keep quiet and never raise that up. That’s where I 
see hypocrisy, myself. If we had followed up that approach [ZAPU land policy], 
probably nobody could have been forced in the Land Redistribution Act. We 
wouldn’t have lost the lives in the process of the Land Redistribution, I don’t 
think so.”642  
     
6.3.3. Stripping of History: A Forgotten Past 
 
The ZANU-PF narrative around ‘Heroes and Dissidents’ effectively served to 
deconstruct the revolutionary vision of the ex-ZIPRA soldiers and the ZAPU as an 
oppositional political party. Whether ZANU-PF was intentional in this aim or not, it 
came as a by-product of the production of a meta-narrative, the resulting backlash was 
highly provocative and inciting for those named as dissidents. The ZANU-PF narrative of 
dissidents invoked a sense of innate dishonouring that was totalizing in its effect. In the 
context of Zimbabwe’s newly acclaimed independence, to be reviled as a dissident in life 
was a heavy burden to bear, and to realise that at death there would be no burial in the 
Heroes Acre, a place of historical national pride and patriotism, was a final blow to the 
warrior’s honour and dignity.  
“But it is defined in the context of what makes Ubuntu – ‘I am who I am by the 
people around me.’ Now if we as a people are attacked at the very centre of who 
we are, and we have no history, when our history is being attacked, and not only 
that, but we cannot identify ourselves with the country in which our ancestors 
died; my sense of belonging and self-worth is actually attacked. That point is 
where our African trauma comes in. Because to be a human being and you have 
                                                
641 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 
with Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s). 
642 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist). 
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no belonging, no history, no identity, no connection, to live like an alien in a land 
of your forefathers, and the threatening of your whole tribal group to a point 
where people were burnt or annihilated, was not only genocide or atrocity, but 
evil. Seriously evil that needs to be condemned with the harshest and strongest of 
words.”643 
 
By declaring the opposition as dissident, ZANU-PF had essentially written the 
ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance out of the national history and consigned them to a bleak 
existence of traitorous shame in both life and death. Early on, ZANU-PF embarked on a 
vigorous plan for the production of its revolutionary history which entailed both an 
official record of the Liberation struggle and a revised school curriculum covering the 
history of Zimbabwe. The Chronicle newspaper printed the following:   
“Meanwhile, Cde Mugabe announced that ZANU (PF) is working on his 
biography and a comprehensive chronicle of the liberation struggle. He said the 
ZANU (PF) secretary for information and publicity, Cde Nathan Shamuyarira, 
was ‘tasked with this detail of our revolution’.”644 
 
The rapid transformation of the country’s educational system was high on the ZANU-
PF’s priority list. The government vigorously built new schools across the nation. 
Ironically, in Matabeleland a number of schools were built by the Fifth Brigade soldiers 
in what appeared to be an exercise in ‘damage-control’ or an apparent show of goodwill 
through patriotic national service. However, after the building of schools, the ZANU-PF 
government began to fill the teaching posts with external assignments mostly from 
Mashonaland, leaving the Ndebele population unconvinced that this was a positive 
change. The newly posted Shona teachers presented Matabeleland with three concerns: 
First, because of the serious control of information by the ZANU-PF, many of them 
would have been uninformed about the Gukurahundi crisis. Second, many of these 
teachers would have been staunch supporters of ZANU-PF and therefore unsympathetic 
to the cause of the opposition party ZAPU and the victimisation perpetrated by the 
security forces against the rural communities. Third, many of them would not have been 
fluent in the regional language of Ndebele. On top of this, the teachers were required to 
introduce a new, uniform national history curriculum that according to many in 
                                                
643 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
644 ‘ZAPU has links with dissidents – PM’. (1987) The Chronicle, 1 October. 
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Matabeleland was distinctly biased toward the perspectives and interests of ZANU-PF 
alone. 
“But now when I go back to schools, the history has changed. They are teaching 
the children ZANU-PF history. It’s not a national history…but it’s a Party 
history. They are teaching children about the Party, and how they should follow 
the Party. To the general public and to educationists they feel it’s not the History 
of our nation, but it’s the Party History; which is very bad because as 
Zimbabweans we are not concerned about Party history, but we want children to 
know about the history of our country.”645  
 
“That history [currently taught] leaves a lot to be desired because it only claims 
that it was ZANU-PF and ZANLA who won the Struggle for Independence. They 
make some claims…that it was ZANLA which made first attacks on White 
settlements. Yet, what we know is that ZIPRA is older than ZANLA, in its 
formations and operations, in the country. And any ZIPRA activity is not 
highlighted anywhere, but what is highlighted is what the ZANLA did; which is a 
one-sided history, an incomplete history.”646 
 
In his critical work on the production of ‘patriotic history’ in Zimbabwe, 
Professor Terence Ranger differentiates between three processes of national historical 
interrogation. According to Ranger, Nationalist Historiography is “an attempt to trace the 
roots of nationalism and present narratives leading to its triumphant emergence.”647 The 
History of Nationalism on the other hand, is an attempt to outline the growth and 
evolution of a “movement and its ideology with a great deal of rigorous historical 
questioning.”648 Finally, Patriotic History as a process “is different from and more 
narrow then the old nationalist historiography, which celebrated aspiration and 
modernisation as well as resistance. It resents the ‘disloyal’ questions raised by historians 
of nationalism. It regards as irrelevant any history which is not political and it is explicitly 
antagonistic to academic historiography.”649  
Professor Ranger strikes at the core of the ZANU-PF grand narrative which is so 
dependent on the continual and consistent manufacturing of a monolithic stream of 
                                                
645 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 
with Orphans and Vulnerable Children, former Political Activist and Youth Leader for ZAPU in the early 
1980s). 
646 Interview: SM1, Durban, South Africa – 07/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher, researcher and university 
lecturer). 
647 Ranger, T. 2003. “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the 
struggle over the past in Zimbabwe”. Journal for Southern African Studies 30 (2). 2. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid: 5. 
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political consciousness in order to disregard if not obliterate any contrary investigations 
into history. Ranger’s stated position on the Liberation history of Zimbabwe is straight 
forward: “You could have too much history if a single, narrow historical narrative gained 
a monopoly and was endlessly repeated…Now it has become necessary to complicate 
oversimplifications; to offer a plural history.”650 The following transcript text gives 
examples of official efforts by the ZANU-PF to use the media to co-opt particular 
happenings in history for its own benefit and public prestige.   
“There were two incidents that attracted my attention; when the fuel tanks in 
Harare, then Salisbury, were bombarded, it was categorically stated it was ZIPRA 
forces, and those people are still alive. Two or three years ago on TV it was stated 
that it was ZANLA forces and those people are now either still alive. By then, 
being known to have done such damage would have actually discredited you. The 
Viscount [Rhodesian Tourist Airplane] which discredited ZAPU completely was 
downed by the ZIPRA forces. But now of late I’m told it was the ZANLA forces. 
Those who did it are still alive. Now who am I to believe? This kind of writing 
doesn’t come home well. From the little I have heard, I haven’t read, again this is 
more on the radio, on the TV, the contribution done by the ZIPRA has been 
played down so much that it would appear that it was only the ZANLA forces 
which fought the war…Maybe I need to go back to the History text books and find 
out what is coming and getting in. But my fear is there has been a distortion.”651    
 
At the core of this systematic ‘stripping’ away of the identity, ideology and 
history the ZANU-PF engaged in a visceral struggle with the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance 
around the deep socio-political inclinations of recognition and belonging. Both of these 
‘felt’ needs are sources of ‘meaning-making’ in the conflict transformation process and 
indeed in life as a whole. It is these conceptions of recognition and belonging that will be 
wrestled with in the subsequent section.  
6.4. The Politics of Recognition: Scripts of Belonging 
In liberation struggles where the tremendous trauma of war has been experienced 
by individuals and collectives, fierce patriotism and nationalistic pride become critical 
sources of hope and the foundation for healing in the future.652  To be guilty of disloyalty 
                                                
650 Ibid: 4. 
651 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice, CCJP in the 1980s). 
652 Grossman, D. 1995. On Killing – The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. New 
York: Back Bay Books - Little, Brown & Co. Military research since World War II has established that 
returning war veterans reintegrate into civilian society considerably more satisfactorily if they have 
received a hero’s welcome home; if the country has afforded them a warrior’s honour for their service to 
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as a soldier was to have failed, to be dissolved of one’s identity (disconnected), and 
dignity (disempowered).  This fundamental human need for belonging (affirmed by the 
transference of loyalty) was denied the ‘dissidents’ and their supporting communities by 
the overpowering monologue of the ZANU-PF.  As a result, it has become the pulsating 
undercurrent that remains the motivation for the present-day narrative expressions of 
resistance emanating from the repressed voices in Matabeleland. Speaking of the official 
narrative of explanation for the violence of Gukurahundi endorsed by the ZANU-PF 
regime, this interviewee links the language used by the state and the central issue of 
belonging. 
“The little I can still recall, cause it’s now a long time ago, it was more like the 
‘hate’ language; ‘the dissidents, the murderers, the rapists, people who are out to 
destroy development’, that was the kind of language. I do not recall specifically 
something I could pin down on and say this was it. But otherwise, you know…the 
word itself ‘dissident’ its connotation is like…‘you do not seem to agree, 
therefore you are not one of us; you do not belong.’”653    
 
This research effort is less concerned with the ‘strategies’ of the dissidents actions and 
more interested in the life ‘scripts’ behind their motivations and choices to become 
dissidents or not. Of importance here is to understand the politics of recognition654 within 
this context. In revolutionary ideology the politics of recognition is of utmost value in 
that it establishes a socio-political status of respect that is worth dying for and certainly 
on par with any transaction of economic currency (material) exchange that may 
accompany it. During the time of struggle in order to keep the young soldier recruits 
motivated, there was a glorification of ‘The Cause’ for the struggle and a grandiose 
valuation of the personhood and valour of a freedom fighter. Those who gave up family, 
education and other privileges to sacrifice themselves on the front-lines of war were 
magnified in their standing as valiant warriors, leaders and even ‘saviours’ of the people. 
                                                                                                                                                
the nation. In cases where the war was a highly unpopular engagement and the soldiers return to 
antagonism their adjustment is greatly retarded. In the USA, the Vietnam War veterans continue to 
represent a statistically higher percentage than the national average in regards to the social challenges of 
suicide, substance abuse, mental illness, imprisonment and domestic violence perpetration. This is believed 
to be a direct result of the sense of rejection (even disdain) that they felt and received from the US public 
upon their return from Vietnam.  
653 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice CCJP in the 1980s). 




As with any wartime context, the motivations to put life and limb on the line were 
wrapped up in and intertwined with the symbolic and material promises of recognition 
after freedom was attained. The following transcriptions tie the psycho-social themes 
emanating from the desire for recognition to issues of origins (in the face of dislocation 
from country and city of birth) and the call for human dignity (in the face of disrespect 
for culture, language, gender identity and family boundaries):  
“And then the other thing that they [ex-ZIPRA  combatants] found frustrating was 
that they were told that they did not contribute much in the fighting of the country 
and therefore then they were not supposed to have been there [in the Army]. It 
was said that they did not contribute in the fighting of the country because the 
country was not theirs, being Ndebele, the country was not theirs.”655 
 
“And I think that is indicative of the stories that have travelled in time, even 
twenty years and twenty eight years after. That the same stories are still 
perpetuated to the point where Bulawayo, the second largest city, is referred to as 
a ‘dissident city’, because they say they don’t like the government of Zimbabwe, 
the Shona government.”656 
 
“Stripping them [supposed dissidents] of their identity and hitting them at the very 
centre of their culture as well, e.g. their wives and their mothers, sisters were 
being raped in open. And they would be killed; they would be beaten in front of 
their own children. Now to an Ndebele man, who is supposed to be the ‘king in 
his own home’ to be seen to be traumatised and cry in front of his own wife and 
his kids, is unacceptable. And these people would be forced to repeat things in the 
same language they hated which they couldn’t speak anyway. They didn’t even 
know some of the things they said. So you still see that the language in itself has 
become identified with the trauma that the people have suffered.”657 
 
These emergent narratives are fuelled by the fundamental human need for public 
recognition.  Author Axel Honneth658 has focused much of his work on the politics of 
‘ recognition’ as it relates to conflict.  Honneth propagates the idea that in order for 
identity-formation to be complete it clearly depends on the development of three 
components of self: self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.  According to 
                                                
655 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee of the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
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657 Ibid. 
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Honneth, these three modes of basic self-understanding can only be acquired and 
maintained through the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’.  This notion of intersubjectivity 
comes out of the work by G.W.F. Hegel and George Herbert Mead and essentially 
involves the human interchange of mutual recognition.  Honneth surmises that Marx 
would have used the term “dignity”, Sorel the term “honour” and Fanon the term 
“Recognition” to describe this process of intersubjectivity.659   
Intersubjective relationships, in Honneth’s opinion, “go beyond (a) close relations 
of love and friendship to include (b) legally institutionalized relations of universal respect 
for the autonomy and dignity of persons and (c) networks of solidarity and shared values 
within which particular worth of individual members of a community can be 
acknowledged.”660 These kinds of human relation interactions are not birthed in a social 
vacuum. They are created and developed in the crucible of “social struggles, which 
cannot be understood exclusively as conflicts over interests”.661  There is a moral logic 
for social conflicts.  That logic understands that personal and corporate identity is 
constructed around the notions of mutual recognition and respect.  When the drama of 
human disrespect is acted out in the forms of “violation of body, denial of rights, and 
denigration of ways of life”662, then, resistance will surface.  Resistance, whether 
expressed violently or non-violently is intimately linked with disrespect.  In Honneth’s 
words: 
“The ‘grammar’ of such struggles is ‘moral’ in the sense that the feelings of 
outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection of claims to 
recognition and thus imply normative judgments about the legitimacy of social 
arrangements. Thus the normative ideal of a just society is empirically confirmed 
by historical struggles for recognition.”663 
 
This ‘politics of recognition’ is probably no more better illustrated than in the 
controversies surrounding the representation of the late Dr. Joshua Nkomo and the 
symbolism of his persona both in life and death. More than any other historical figure in 
Zimbabwe’s political landscape of liberation, Nkomo remains the most contested of 
leaders with all sides to the post-independence conflict factions claiming a piece of his 
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legacy. The transcript paragraph below illuminates the transient nature of labels such as 
‘dissident’ and ‘hero’ in the production of history, as Nkomo himself was at one time 
considered the chief of ‘dissidents’ by the ZANU-PF and at a later time the most valiant 
of ‘heroes’ by the same government. 
“So heroism depends. This is actually how my last publication was, on the 
imagination of Mugabe and I was using the experiences of Joshua Nkomo. I was 
arguing that Joshua Nkomo represents something very interesting. You find 
during the Liberation Struggle from 1963, they were saying ‘no, this is a 
vacillating politician, he’s not committed to ZANU, he’s continuing to negotiate 
with Ian Smith up to 1976, and recently they said Nkomo was a heavy burden to 
Lancaster [Peace Negotiations]; ‘all that we agreed to in Lancaster was because of 
him’. Then in 1980 Nkomo campaigns as Father Zimbabwe, he then loses 
Elections, he is taunted not to call himself Father Zimbabwe and then lose the 
Elections, then the Gukurahundi is connected to destroy the Father Zimbabwe 
thing, then [in] 1987 Nkomo comes to the limelight cause he’s a good facilitator, 
he also swallowed his pride and all that for the sake of the nation and signed the 
Unity Accord. It turns, after his death when the pitch is taken even higher. Now 
he’s Hero of Heroes, founding Father of Nationalism. The title ‘Father of 
Zimbabwe’ is reinstated posthumously to him; he becomes indeed Father of 
Zimbabwe. So you can see three or five representations of the same person. And 
now with the National Galleries, Nkomo now will become a Saint or Spirit of the 
nation. The nation is now imaged around him but if you read back, this is a 
useless person…”664 
 
In the psyche of the supporters of ZAPU, this kind of political metamorphosis whereby 
their leader is denigrated as a marginalised, political reprobate and then elevated as a 
decorated, national ‘saviour’ is not only bewildering, it is too much to bear. While the 
ZANU-PF attempt to describe their about face in this matter as a gesture of reconciliation 
and a sign of unity, the ZAPU faithful in Matabeleland perceive it as a disgrace to the 
memory and the person of Joshua Nkomo. Thus, the ZANU-PF demand for, and even 
manufacturing of loyalty at all costs has resulted in the exact opposite outcome. What the 
ZANU-PF claims was an act of goodwill by integrating Nkomo as a hero in the national 
narrative of Zimbabwe, many ZAPU followers see as a shameful act of disloyalty (yet 
another political sham of the ZANU-PF regime). In other words, the hypocrisy of this 
continual public honour afforded to Joshua Nkomo year after year since his death in 1999 
is felt as dishonourable to his legacy. 
                                                
664 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
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“He [Nkomo] continued his dedicated support for the upliftment of the people till 
his untimely death in 1999. It is for his unwavering commitment to the cause of 
Zimbabwe that the late gallant Father of Zimbabwe was honoured with the Order 
of the Great Zimbabwe (Gold).”665 
 
Another cogent example of this sense of private dishonour in what appeared to be a 
public honour is when the grandson of Joshua Nkomo recently won a national award in a 
poetry contest (2007) and was summoned to the State House to be given official 
recognition by ZANU-PF. However, the Nkomo family refused to attend this event 
presumably as a form of protest (a counter-narrative) to what they saw as political 
exploitation by a government whose image and integrity were in shatters and who 
desperately needed to capitalise on the prominent and populist national status evoked by 
the name of Dr. Joshua Nkomo; a person they (the ZANU-PF) had nothing but mockery 
and disdain for in the not so distant past.666   
6.5. Voices from the Grave: Heroes, Dissidents and the Production of Memory 
 
“Wars are often summed up as the decisions of leaders and the movements of 
armies.  It is often forgotten that all of these depend on ordinary soldiers, who 
personally sacrifice to achieve advances and victories, and physically suffer the 
consequences of retreats and victories.  But their experiences are usually 
obliterated in the manufacture of histories, and may even be lost to popular 
memory.  The result is the propagation of an official mythology of war.”667  
 
While Matabeleland was being ‘purged’ of its ‘dissidents’, the central government 
embarked on a parallel campaign of ‘creating national heroes.’ Elaborate ceremonies of 
pomp and circumstance, eulogies and trophies of respect and recognition were lavished 
upon all those who were cast into the role of a ‘national warrior’ icon. The unveiling of 
Heroes Acres, the final resting places of those who were elevated to this honourable 
status, became the public domain whereby this level of affirmation was immortalized. 
This effort represented another avenue for re-narrating history which was inherently 
symbolic in both its visual and verbal manifestations. 
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“Just take the issue here of the construction of Hero’s Acre, especially in Harare, 
it’s such a permanent structure. Black marble, you know. It’s there for good and 
it’s designed not just to provide this big burial ground for people. But I think it’s 
designed to become sort of etched in the minds of people that these people will be 
heroes, and they will be heroes for the rest of time irrespective of what they’ve 
done.”668 
 
Norma J. Kriger described the two-pronged aim of this memorialisation project as 
follows: “…to foster a national identity through the discarding of colonial symbols and 
through attempts to establish their own heroes as national symbols.”669 In her reflections 
on the production of social memory, Pamela Machakanja describes how nations go about 
securing a corporate memory among their citizenry: 
“To distinguish itself from outsiders, the group retrieves from its available past 
key memories that are perceived as essential to the construction of its identity – a 
process of inclusion as well as exclusion…One way of creating a dominant 
hegemonic memory is through the deliberate fabrication of memory through 
rituals, emblems, commemorative events, and monuments that signify symbolic 
and physical markings of the past.”670 
 
Contrary to what the ruling elite expected, this endeavour turned out to be a 
highly contentious undertaking. In the first place, the White minority (who carried 15 
seats in the Parliament) was finding it most difficult to let go of their historical memorials 
and thus often evoked the negotiated ‘reconciliation’ agreements (emanating from the 
Lancaster talks) to try to preserve their public symbols.  However, what was quite 
surprising was the unexpected flurry of disagreement about what colonial symbols 
should, or should not be removed arising from the Black African communities. The most 
prominent case in point was the controversy between the central government and the 
Harare City Council over World War II Memorials. The All-Black Harare City Council 
considered these memorials as an offensive symbol of the oppressor. However, the 
central government refused to remove them insisting that they represented the world-
wide fight against Fascism, which was a noble cause.671   
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Even more explosive was the second prong of this national identity building 
programme; that of the National Heroes Acre Monument and Cemetery located some 
seven kilometres outside of Harare which eventually expanded to provincial, regional and 
district Heroes Acres across the country. Research has shown that the primary motivating 
drive for acting out violent revenge is the need to “h nour the memory of the dead.”672 
The following reflective script extracted from the field notes of this research exemplifies 
the human drive to honour the dead: 
“We travelled with AN3 who shared some of his personal experience of 
Matabeleland violence. AN3 was from Tsholotsho, an area where severe 
massacres occurred during the 1980s. He said with a surname like [his] you really 
suffered, they lumped you together with the extended family of [this prominent 
name].  He had two brothers who had to flee the country at the time in question 
and two of them that eventually changed their names.  One of his brothers went 
missing in Matabeleland over that time and the family has never seen him since.  
Sometimes AN3 even looks for his brother’s face in the crowds as he walks the 
city streets.  He poignantly stated, ‘We do not know if our brother is dead or alive 
because we have not buried any bones yet!’”673 
 
This basic, almost instinctual need, if not satisfied in a nonviolent manner, can fuel 
revenge cycles sometimes for generations.  Like an unrequited appetite, if the nation’s 
beloved dead (especially those whose blood was spilt for the cause of freedom) are not 
respected, emotions can multiply into a debilitating bitterness and block the pivotal 
trauma healing required for collective liberation. Pamela Machakanja extrapolates on this 
‘official’ (ZANU-PF) national process of remembering the dead in Zimbabwe: 
“Political funerals symbolise the liberation memory and are enacted through 
rituals and revolutionary songs and dance that capture the spirit of the political 
struggle. They represent the cycle of heroic birth, life and death. Their 
culmination usually sees the war hero laid to rest at the national, provincial, or 
district shrine, depending on the deceased’s status. The death of a political hero 
also symbolises a lifetime of service and dedication to national duty. The funeral 
process functions as an emblem of association, dedication, sacrifice, allegiance, 
and enduring service to a common cause. The deceased becomes a representative 
of heroic sacrifice whose beliefs remained uncompromised even in situations of 
profound adversity. The political sacrifice of the deceased creates a model of 
                                                
672 Ignatieff, M. 1998. The Warrior’s Honour – Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. Ontario: Viking - 
Published by Penguin Group, 188. “But revenge – morally considered – is a desire to keep faith with the 
dead, to honor their memory by taking up their cause where they left off.” 
673 Unrecorded Interview: AN3, Mtshabezi, Zimbabwe – 27/06/06 (Ndebele male from Tsholotsho, 
Matabeleland, Church Youth Leader and primary survivor of Gukurahundi violence). See Field Notes dated 
22-30 June 2006, p.3. 
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action. The story of suffering is woven into a celebration of a life of dedication. It 
is ultimately a story meant to inspire the younger generation with a call to arms 
and sacrifice.”674 
 
In contrast to the above ‘sanitised’ version of Heroes Commemorations in Zimbabwe, the 
following respondent speaks candidly about his impressions of Independence Day 
celebrations from the perspective of a child with extended family in Matabeleland and the 
Midlands during the time of the Gukurahundi violence:    
“And then what happens is, when we’re at the Heroes’ Acre on Independence Day 
or the two Heroes Days as we had two, there used to be lots and lots of dead 
bodies shown and there was a constant bombardment of how much sacrifice had 
gone into Zimbabwe’s Independence, how much blood had gone into Zimbabwe. 
Lots of songs even played on accompanying programmes like one called ‘The 
Nation’ where they talked about current affairs. And there was a very sad 
depressing wailing song written by one guy about all the blood that was spilt 
particularly by Rhodesian Forces… And over and over again you were shown 
scenes of people fighting, people dying, mass graves, I always had that same 
picture of Alsatians being unleashed onto crowds of Black people who were just 
peacefully protesting. And it was basically made to seem as ‘Look, this is the final 
chapter of our Liberation, there are people who are ‘anti-our state’, ‘anti-our 
country’… I remember going to bed, literally afraid as a kid, that South Africa 
troops or the dissidents would invade Harare and come to my bedroom, and take 
us all over and kill us and butcher us like they did the children in Matabeleland. 
Because it’s very traumatic seeing children with axe-heads left in their skulls and 
thing like that, on TV. And yah, they always used to have a sign ‘Please note that 
this is not for sensitive viewers’, but they were not shy about showing the most 
grotesque detail of amputations.”675 
  
Indeed, for many people (not just children, but also all those who had been traumatised 
by the Matabeleland violence), these official ZANU-PF ceremonies which were meant to 
‘manufacture patriotic memory’ failed to produce loyal devotion to the country and its 
leadership. Instead these rituals of remembrance created fear, paranoia and a sense of re-
victimisation. 
Thus, while the Heroes Acre project was meant to enhance and bolster the 
national unity and patriotism, it seemed to serve the opposite intent.  For Zimbabwe, with 
its internally ‘chequered’ liberation movement the problem arose when the ruling party 
attempted to categorise the dead as ‘heroes’ and ‘non-heroes’ according to its own 
                                                
674 Machakanja, P. 2008: 58. 
675 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
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partisan political narrative of the independence struggle.  A barrage of questions began to 
flow among government, political parties and the masses; who was a hero and who was 
not?  Who decides who was a Hero or who was not?  Are some heroes more important 
than others?  If so, what should be the criteria for determining this importance?  Are 
heroes only the dead, or are heroes also the living?  Not only were the answers demanded 
from these questions exceptionally difficult to agree on, but the actual decision-making 
structures and methods were under grave suspicion.  In the words of Norma Kriger:  
“The politics of choosing heroes has exposed the gap between the political 
rhetoric of equity, participation, and unity on the one hand, and the realities of an 
enormous disparity between party and government leaders and the masses, the 
leaders’ desire for control and their imposition of decisions on the population, and 
overtly partisan decision-making by ZANU(PF)…”676  
 
Other interview respondents from this research agree with Kriger’s sentiments, putting 
into serious question the procedures employed to decide on the status of those who were 
‘worthy’ of burial as national heroes, and those who were not: 
“Buried nowadays [are] people who… it’s gonna be a mixture. Some of the older 
folk who are still alive who’ll pass away, but I think a lot of it is people Mugabe 
wants to profile. Mugabe has a choice though. You know it’s almost like Mugabe 
is a king, and being buried in Heroes’ Acre is almost like a posthumous 
knighthood, and he’s the only one that can confer that knight[hood]. I’m sure 
they’ll argue that Central Committee is the one that chooses heroes but he has 
sway.”677  
 
“Willie Musarurwa is a good example; an Ndebele, a ZAPU leader who was the 
editor of the Sunday Mail. He had been fired from the Sunday Mail for 
questioning the government on something, and he lived for seven years in 
obscurity. And when he died, he was declared a national hero. And then they gave 
a sanitized version and said ‘this is the official history and he is part of our 
narrative in this line’. So being buried in Heroes Acre is kind of the ultimate 
cleansing, you know, stripping any figure of a history of questioning of ZANU-PF 
or Robert Mugabe and instead taking him out of the area of controversy and 
saying ‘here, this is how a minor figure fit[s] in. This was his valid role, and 
anything else is just a dissident view of that person…of the role they played’.”678 
 
                                                
676 Kriger, N. 1995: 140. 
677 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
678 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
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When considering the accolades bestowed on those buried in the Heroes Acre, the above 
interview transcripts make fascinating analogies to that process resembling divine rituals 
(of knighthood and life-cleansing) both of which are irrevocable and eternal in nature. In 
this way, the ZANU-PF was successful in eliciting a response of holy reverence and awe 
from the masses who watched these political ‘worship’ rituals from the periphery; the 
‘outer courts of the temple’.679 
  One of the more outstanding examples of this convoluted exercise in the 
declaration of ‘whose in and whose out’ was the thorny debate over the ‘hero’ status of 
Lt. Commander Lookout Masuku who died of ‘natural causes’680 in April of 1986. 
Masuku, the last Commander-in-Chief of the ZIPRA military structures was arrested and 
charged with treason (conspiring against the ZANU-PF) in relation to the arms caches 
that were found on ZIPRA-owned farms in March of 1982.  He became gravely ill while 
being held for four years in detention without trial despite an acquittal by the highest 
court in the land.  He was not granted hero status from the government of the day.  This 
was considered an outrage by the former ZAPU leadership and loyal followers.  In a 
highly charged emotional speech delivered to 20,000 people who attended Masuku’s 
funeral, Joshua Nkomo had these fierce words to say:  
“If Lookout Masuku is not a hero, who then is a hero of this country?...We 
accused former colonizers who used detention without trial as well as torture and 
yet do exactly what they did, if not worse. We accused Whites of discrimination 
on grounds of colour yet we have discriminated on political and ethnic 
grounds.”681   
 
There are numerous other instances of this form of subjective designation of hero 
/ non-hero in the cases of prominent liberation struggle leaders such as Canaan Banana 
                                                
679 The Holy Bible. 1973. (New International Version). Grand Rapids: Zondervan Press. Map Index, 11. 
The analogy being used here is of the ancient Jewish Temple. Accordingly, this temple was built in such a 
way that it contained an inner sanctuary called the ‘holy of holies’, a place where the Alter stood and where 
only the attending High Priest could enter to perform sacrifices and cleansing rituals. From there a series of 
courts were built reserved for Jewish men, Jewish women and finally the outer courts for the Gentiles (the 
foreigners) in Israel. 
680 The cause of Masuku’s death remains in question. The official cause of death was originally attributed 
to a ‘rare brain disease’ of which many ZAPU-ZIPRA supporters believe was a direct result of the torture 
and beatings (severe head injury) that he endured while in detention. However, in her recent memoirs 
entitled: “Through the Darkness” Judith Garfield Todd, who was a friend of the Masuku family and was 
with Lookout on his death bed, states that the cause of death was due to HIV/AIDS-related complications.  




(long-serving President of Zimbabwe) who was critical of the ZANU-PF government 
later in his life and at the time of his death, Ndabaningi Sithole (First President of ZANU) 
and a consistent voice of opposition to ZANU-PF after his ejection from the organisation, 
and James Chikerema (long-standing Vice President of ZAPU) who remained loyal to the 
ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance until he and Sithole joined forces with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 
an internal settlement that smelled of compromise with the Smith regime and was 
rejected by both ZAPU and ZANU. The key point here being that all these liberation 
leaders were refused burial at the Heroes Acres because they disagreed with or engaged 
in what the leadership of the ZANU liberation movement considered treacherous 
activities. 
However, there were also those figures whose families opposed or refused to 
allow their loved ones to be buried at Heroes Acre almost as a form of protest (a 
contrasting-narrative) to the contrived uniformity that the Heroes Acres represented. 
Accordingly, in her research on the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, Luise White 
uncovered evidence that Victoria, the wife of Chitepo was not in favour of her husband’s 
body being buried in Heroes Acre: 
“…Heroes Acres was to be the burial place for those whose ‘actions were guided 
by love and comradeship’ in ‘unwavering support’ for freedom and justice. Its 
construction was supposed to commemorate the end of violence and the end of 
exile for so many freedom fighters…A year later [1981], Chitepo’s remains were 
brought from Lusaka and buried there as well. Several friends of the family say 
that Victoria Chitepo, who had been elected to parliament from Manicaland and 
was appointed deputy minister of education and culture by Mugabe, was opposed 
to this. Some said she did not want her husband buried next to his 
murderers…”682 
 
In a similar vein, Judith Garfield Todd refused the ZANU-PF’s overture to have her 
parents (Garfield and Grace Todd) buried at Heroes Acre. Garfield Todd was a 
churchman and politician serving as Prime Minister of Rhodesia in the 1950s. His wife 
Grace, a teacher by profession was a tireless advocate for literacy and improved 
education systems for Blacks in Rhodesia and also the newly independent Zimbabwe. 
Garfield Todd was arguably more amiable toward the plight of the Black majority than 
any other Rhodesian leader. However, he was eventually kicked out of the white 
                                                
682 White, L. 2003. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo – Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe. Bloomington: 
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government and imprisoned along with his daughter Judy for their political activities and 
affiliations with the Black liberation cause. After their release in 1980, both Garfield and 
his daughter Judy became vocal critics of the ZANU-PF government. 
“No, no, she refused [her parents to be buried at Heroes Acre]. They [ZANU-PF] 
asked Judy whether she, as the heir, whether she would permit it and she said no. 
So her mother and father, they’d already bought their grave plots and so on at the 
mission and they were buried there. And Judy hated that. She thought the mission 
had gone to the dogs.”683 
      
In the aftermath of the Masuku debacle, the ZIPRA War Shrines Committee and 
the Mafela Trust were set up to function as care-taker structures to represent the ‘fallen 
heroes’ of ZAPU-ZIPRA  in the Independence struggle.  Following the formation of 
these organizations a combined (ZANU / ZAPU) National Liberation War Vets 
Association was launched in 1989 to advocate for the needs of all veterans in Zimbabwe 
at a national level, especially around the issues of promised compensation.  This 
Association was instrumental in shifting the public debate from ‘dead’ heroes to ‘living’ 
heroes, which in essence, moved the national narrative discourse from issues of honour to 
issues of accountability.  The Vets Association condemned the political elite who were 
now “…living in great luxury while the ‘forgotten fighters’ languished in poverty. [After 
all] who is not a war veteran?  Civilians, youth and detainees, as well as guerrillas, had 
paid a high price during the liberation war: the wounds of war were inflicted on the 
nation as a whole.”684 As it turned out the government promises of compensation to war 
vets only came a full fifteen years after independence.       
The concept of accountability is most clearly argued from two vantage points: 
Firstly, as a nationalist appeal to the basic human rights of its citizenry who suffered 
during the times of war.  Secondly, it can be packaged in a more symbolic and 
traditionalist moral rhetoric of what Richard Werbner calls a “moral partnership between 
the living and the dead, the breach of which requires ritual resolution.”685  This ‘ritual 
resolution’ referred to by Werbner is mediated through what he terms, “recountability - 
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685 Werbner, R. 1995. Human Rights and Moral Knowledge - Arguments of Accountability in Zimbabwe, 




the right to make a citizen’s memory known, and acknowledged in the public sphere.”686 
The ZANU-PF procedure of selective ‘hero’ identification was fraught with biased 
political manoeuvring and failed to give a platform to the contrasting narratives of 
‘recountability’ in Zimbabwe, especially for those who suffered under the accusation of 
dissidence and those Matabeleland oppositional voices who were isolated as a result of 
the Gukurahundi violence.  In failing to do this (surfacing the alternative scripts), the 
ZANU-PF regime reinforced its own prevailing narrative monologue once again. The 
following respondents give voice to the embittered silence embraced by those who have 
lost all faith in the national constructs of hero and dissident in Zimbabwe: 
“So I think that one, a ‘Heroes Acre’ in Zimbabwe is a ZANU-PF cemetery. I 
really don’t believe that they consider heroes because most of the heroes...so-
called heroes, who are buried there, are ZANU-PF guys. PF-ZAPU guys, plenty 
of them who are not in Heroes’ Acre. There are plenty people who did wonderful 
job in Zimbabwe; they are not there. There are even heroes in…musicians who 
are heroes, but they were not buried there, because they were expected by the 
ZANU-PF to support and sing for ZANU-PF. But they were entertaining 
Zimbabweans. ‘All’ Zimbabweans, they rated them as heroes. When they died, 
many Zimbabweans cried. So if someone died and many people cry, the whole 
country cr[ies]; that person is a hero. But most of them they are not there. So it’s a 
ZANU-PF cemetery and I don’t consider it as Heroes’ Acre, I ally don’t 
consider it.”687 
 
“About the Heroes’ Acre, it’s just a joke. I mean it’s something people have 
stopped taking it seriously. I mean it’s well-known ‘you must be a member of the 
ZANU-PF, Politburo, to be buried in Heroes Acre’. People have just said ‘well, 
it’s just become another cemetery, there’s no difference’. I mean the way a hero is 
determined, is defined…in fact...It’s now a matter of…if you were close to Robert 
Mugabe then you become a hero. The problem in Zimbabwe is everything has 
been personalized. So if you sing praises to Robert Mugabe then you are a hero. 
Like it really doesn’t … I think the problem of Zimbabwe is intolerance, you 
know, if you hold opposing views, then you are seen as the enemy that is the 
problem…”688 
 
“To be laid at the Heroes’ Acre, for instance, you have to be part of ZANU-PF. 
My whole idea of a hero [is that ] there is no jacket that you should put on, that 
you are ZANU-PF, that you are PF-ZAPU. You know, like in a millionaire’s 
                                                
686 Werbner, R. 1998. Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis, in R. Werbner (ed.) Memory and the 
Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power. London: Zed Books. 
687 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
688 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 - (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
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house, there are some spoons that are made out of wood, some of gold, some of 
silver, but they all served all their purpose and they’re all in the master’s [house], 
but in Zimbabwe it’s different, you are a Hero only because you are in ZANU-
PF.”689 
 
These interview transcripts illuminate a number of interesting counter-narratives to the 
dominant meta-narrative of the ZANU-PF. The first two respondents intentionally deflate 
the grandiose character of Heroes Acres by refusing to call it by name and instead 
comparing it to just any ordinary cemetery or graveyard. These narratives inadvertently 
deconstruct the mythology surrounding the ZANU-PF’s chosen glories of heroism and 
thereby equalise all Zimbabweans who contributed to the independence of the country. In 
like manner, the last respondent makes use of the comparison of Zimbabwe as one 
household where there are many different instruments of practical use made from varying 
degrees of precious materials. His plea is that the diverse contributions that were made by 
Zimbabweans of all walks of life be recognised and afforded due credit in the 
preservation of historical memory for generations to come.  
6.5.1. Voices from the Grave: Narratives of spiritual intrigue 
          Another narrative ‘stream’ that has been effectively exploited by both the ZANU-
PF and the media (for different ends) is that of the mystical. Customary belief systems 
and themes of meta-physical magical powers690 have been utilised to shroud and sustain 
the ZANU-PF narrative since its inception. During the time of the Liberation Struggle the 
ZANU openly endorsed the consultation of spirit mediums (the most eminent one being 
Mbuya Nehanda) for guidance in war strategy and to appropriate super-natural power 
from the spirit realm.691 Even in the current political climate, rumours abound surmising 
that Mugabe uses magic (muti) to maintain his health and to continually solidify his 
power.  
           Another example of this spiritual narrative world-view surfacing is in the mystery 
that has continually cast a shadow over the death of Josiah Tongogara, Minister of 
                                                
689 Interview: SM1, Durban, South Africa – 07/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher, researcher and university 
lecturer). 
690 In the southern African region the word ‘muti’  is commonly used to refer to the rituals and the herbal 
medicines used by traditional diviners to practice witchcraft. 
691 Martin, D. & Johnson, P. 1981. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. Harare: Ravan Press, 50, 75, 77-78. For an 
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Defence in ZANU and the Chairperson of the High Command of the ZANLA military 
structures. In late December 1979, Tongogara was instantly killed when the vehicle he 
was travelling in collided with a FRELIMO truck in Mozambique. He was travelling to 
report to the ZANLA commanders on the conditions of the cease-fire agreement that was 
to end the hostilities and pave the way for independent Elections to occur in Zimbabwe. 
Many people do not believe that it was coincidental circumstances that killed him, and 
many have accused Mugabe through the ZANU of setting up this ‘accidental death’ out 
of selfish ambition in order to eliminate any opposition or competition to his own 
political leadership in the future. Tongogara was known to have strongly endorsed a 
unified ZANU-ZAPU political party with Nkomo as President to stand in the 1980 
Elections:  
“I also like to think that there was some element of greed. Because look at people 
who were advocating for unity, people like Tongogara; he died mysteriously, 
towards Independence. And it was Tongogara. There is evidence to it that these 
people [ZANU-ZIPRA] had agreed to come back to Zimbabwe as a ‘united’ party 
and go to Elections as one ‘united’ party. But, you know, Tongogara was a 
powerful man in that case, and he had worked with ZAPU and with ZIPRA. And 
the way I understand that history [is] that they had in principle agreed to work 
together, but because of greed, being power-hungry, some people felt that that 
was not the right approach to it because they were not going to get that 
limelight.”692 
 
  “Now during the Lancaster House conference, a decision then was made, Josiah 
Tongogara decided to make a decision that because he was head of the fighting 
Forces in ZANLA, it would be best if Joshua Nkomo led, you see. Now the 
combined group contest the election as one. You know when the talks were taking 
place at Lancaster house, I was in England then. The Patriotic Front, ZANU and 
ZAPU were negotiating as the Patriotic Front, then Josiah Tongogara made it very 
clear, he had discussions with Joshua Nkomo to say that, ‘I think the best way 
forward is to have you, Joshua Nkomo, lead us as we go to the elections’. Mugabe 
did not like that. So what he then did; as we are moving toward Elections, Josiah 
Tongogara was eliminated. He died. And therefore Mugabe was able to say ‘we’ll 
go to Elections as separate organizations, and then merge afterwards’. So therefore 
this is how Mugabe has always come to power.”693 
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“…It was because of him [Tongogara] that the war ended. Apparently again, 
hearsay, rumours, whatever, the story goes that certain people would’ve wanted the 
war to continue, like at Lancaster House. And he said a flat ‘No’, and that I think 
was never ever forgiven. As again folklore, otherwise a story, they were both sitting 
on opposite sides of the table at Lancaster House, Ian Smith and the Patriotic Front, 
and it was ‘him’ [Tongogara], who as they were bickering about certain things, got 
up, and walked across the room to Ian Smith and shook his hand. And apparently 
that changed the mood. Because people knew, by him doing that he was saying ‘I 
want peace’. And, ‘Whether you politicians are in it or not, I want peace. So you 
can’t order my soldiers to go to war, unless I want war’. So in other words, Josiah 
Tongogara, my understanding was that he could talk to Mugabe and he would 
backchat. If Robert Mugabe told him to do something, he was a military strategist 
and he would say ‘Look, I’m sorry. We can’t do this, our men’s lives are in 
danger’. I think that was untenable which is why many people believe it wasn’t an 
accident. It was just too convenient...”694  
 
          In the early 1990s, rumours spread among the general population that the ‘ghost’ of 
Tongogara was sighted roaming around the Presidential palace (Mugabe’s official 
residence). Many of the Zimbabwean citizenry believed that Tongogora’s ghost was 
‘restless and unsettled’ and was now haunting President Mugabe who needed to be held 
accountable for his (Tongogara’s) untimely and unjust death. Even the media took up this 
story in the local and national newspapers in Zimbabwe at the time, not only because of 
the intrigue of ‘ghosts’ (which often sells newsprint) but even more interestingly as a way 
to continue to expose and in an indirect way protest against the systematic violence (both 
historically and currently) that ruled the operations of the ZANU-PF government. In the 
words of Luise White: 
 “The traces of that history where everywhere, including in idealizations of 
Chitepo and Tongogara. As topics of conversation and press conferences, and as 
ghosts, both men where portrayed as more heroic, more charismatic, and more 
judicious figures than they had ever been considered in their lifetimes. Chitepo 
and Tongogara have been reinvented as men who would have been president of 
independent Zimbabwe had they lived. The persistence of talk about Chitepo and 
of talk about visions of Tongogara literally left a trace of the idea of Mugabe’s 
illegitimacy. This is not to say that Mugabe was accused of orchestrating the 
deaths of Chitepo and Tongogara, although such accusations were not uncommon. 
Chitepo and Tongogara come back, as it were, to show that the president is 
unlawfully in his office.”695 
                                                
694 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative is a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
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One might be tempted to easily brush aside this tale of ‘haunts’ but whether one believes 
in the paranormal or not, this discourse of spiritual intrigue gave creative rise to a mass-
based script of moral outrage at the repressive tactics of the ruling party and it gave 
platform to a stringent indictment by ordinary people opposed to what they believed was 
Mugabe’s illicit grip on power. Thus, the monolithic narrative of the ZANU-PF that 
attempted to define political loyalty and disloyalty was once again re-scripted by the 
subjugated narratives of people-on-the-ground who had charted an entirely different sub-
set of layered loyalties outside of the parameters prescribed by the ruling elite.   
6.6. National Imagination and the Existence of Dissidents 
 
          This study argues that in the schema of the ZANU-PF meta-narrative, to be 
declared a ‘dissident’ is to be equated to being ‘mutinous’, a person who has abandoned 
the Liberation Struggle. Thus, the justification for the severe violence unleashed on 
Matabeleland and Midlands in the early 1980s partially hangs on proof of the realityor 
imagination of the ‘dissident’ threat. The conception of ‘imagination’ being used here is 
not in reference to illusion or fantasy. Instead, in the phraseology of Catholic Theologian 
William Cavanaugh it is:    
“…not imaginary, in the sense of being unreal, but rather are ways of seeing and 
narrating the world that are integral to ways of acting in the world… gathering 
information is only part – maybe even a small part – of the story behind the use of 
torture by the modern state.  What is the rest of the story?  The rest of the story 
has to do, I think, with fostering a certain kind of collective imagination. One 
significant part of that imagination is fear.”696  
 
In this research, certain pathways of ideas emerged that were frequently clustered 
together in narrative ‘streams’ that swirled around the controversy of the existence of the 
‘dissidents’. These bundled narratives embraced by distinct communities representing 
differing national interests, exhibit themselves in a clash of imaginations. Both the 
ZANU and ZAPU created an elaborate sense of being separate ‘imagined communities’ 
each constructed around similar themes of: ideological essentialism, lived experience of 
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violence, shared victimisation and external populist rhetoric and material support from 
the international community. 697   
A majority of the research interviews followed certain threads of reasoning 
(trying to prove or disprove the operations of the ‘dissidents). At the same time, there 
also emerged a thoughtful third-voice that seemed to indicate that the issue is not whether 
or not the ‘dissidents’ existed, but rather why t ey existed. This strain of narrative takes 
great pains to explain and justify the motivation of the ‘dissidents’ so as to exonerate 
them and vindicate their cause. What is critical to explore here is a pattern of clustering 
that has emerged from the interviews and document analysis that twins together certain 
dissident narratives with corresponding narratives of how the Zimbabwe conflict will best 
be resolved in the long-term (refer to Diagram 3, page 50). If this clustering is indeed 
occurring in what appears to be a considerably predictable manner, the ramifications for a 
sustainable peace in Zimbabwe are myriad. The implications of these various future 
projections for peace will be discussed in more detail in the final Chapter of this thesis. 
6.6.1. Official Narrative: A National security threat to the ZANU-PF 
 
This hard-liner cluster subscribes to the official narrative that the ‘dissidents’ 
posed a real and dangerous threat to the stability of the State. These people embrace the 
notion that the ‘dissidents’ had an organised strategy to overthrow the newly independent 
Zimbabwe state and they often justify the casualties as a matter of national security.   
“So then, the information that was being sent out to the public was that there has 
been a rebellion by a certain section of the population in a particular section of the 
country, which has been Matabeleland, who were trying to forfeit or who was 
trying to overthrow the government of the day; the legitimately elected 
government of the day. That was the information that was even being put across, 
and the government had taken the necessary steps to ‘quash’ such kind of 
rebellion, and to prevent the overthrow of the legitimately elected government. 
This was the information, you know, that was being put across throughout the 
media and that was being hammered and emphasized by the government.”698 
 
For the proponents of this view (mostly ZANU-PF loyalists and many Shona-speaking 
civilians), the Gukurahundi massacres were a necessary evil, a regrettable result of war, 
                                                
697 For two critical works on the socio-political dimensions of collective imagination see: Anderson, B. 
1983. Imagined Communities. London / New York: Verso (historical reflections on the origins and spread 
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698 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer).  
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even hinting at the idea that the ZANU-PF security forces were deployed in order to 
protect innocent lives:  
“From what they [ZANU-PF] said…, it was basically that, you know, dissidents 
were out in Matabeleland and so they were out to protect the people of 
Matabeleland from the dissidents, and of course to try and get rid of the 
dissidents. I think that’s what was coming out. And talking to people that were in 
Mashonaland and also had that understanding that there was a group of dissidents 
out there and they were a menace and they were causing havoc, so the 
government had to intervene.”699 
 
For the most part, this group believes that the estimated numbers of civilians killed have 
been inflated and that this is more about the Ndebele/ZAPU people ‘eating sour grapes’ 
because of their loss in the Election polls of 1980. For these people, the ZANU-PF does 
not need to apologise for this historical tragedy as it was a result of ‘being at war’. In 
their minds, the Matabeleland people should find ways to ‘heal themselves’ and just ‘get 
over’ this difficult chapter of trauma in their past.700  
6.6.2. Oppositional Narrative: To ‘wipe-out’ support base of ZAPU 
 
This moderate cluster consists of those who believe there were ‘dissidents’, but 
that they were few in number and did not pose a serious security threat to the State. For 
these persons (both Ndebele and Shona), and often the more educated, middle-class 
professionals or academics, the Gukurahundi massacres were less about an actual state 
security, and more about the ZANU-PF’s intention to totally ‘wipe-out’ all political 
opposition by destroying the opposition’s power base, which meant the people who 
support them.  
“Because it was to me, as I analyse it, it wasn’t so much the issue of the 
‘dissidents’, but the issue of crushing a vibrant, well-organised Opposition party. 
And how it was done; it was by destroying the middle-class leadership of that 
party, so that at the end of the day the top, once it fell off because [of] wear and 
tear and death and the like things, there won’t be any replacement from the 
middle group because the middle group was no longer there. The Provincial 
leadership could have had a few Central leaders killed, and then sometimes you’ll 
have Branch leaders also being killed. So that way, these who are right at the 
                                                
699 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
700 Unrecorded Interview: EN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 26/06/06 (Prominent Ndebele politician who 
carried a number of high ministerial portfolios in the ZANU-PF government during the 1980s). The phrase 
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bottom, the unit members, could not easily jump from [the] unit into getting to the 
Province without the training. That, I’m sure they achieved because from there 
henceforth, Matabeleland, in the leadership arena hasn’t come of age since that 
time.”701 
 
“Subdue them through fear and also you know, a very deliberate annihilation of 
ZAPU’s political structures in those areas, you know. We’ve got numerous 
reports, especially in Tsholotsho, of the Central Intelligence Officers and the Fifth 
Brigade arriving at ‘calls’ with lists of ZAPU office bearers and literally saying 
‘Joel, out you come’ (finger snap) boom; very clear, well organised strategy of 
annihilating people.”702 
 
This supposition (to wipe-out the opposition’s political base) is supported by the 
ZANU-PF’s historic alliance with Maoist ideology (a cultural revolution through the 
purging and re-educating of the peasant masses). This grouping works very hard to prove 
the small number of actual ‘dissidents’ identified, and the clear lack of any co-ordinated 
military plan for overthrowing the government. For this group, the solution to this 
conflict lies in the formation of government-sanctioned instrumentalities such as a 
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a d the structural reorganisation of the 
governance system into a federalist form of government that would divulge power to 
Matabeleland as a region affording it considerably more autonomy than it currently has to 
govern itself. 
6.6.3. Rural Masses Narrative: Ndebele ethnic-cleansing (genocide) 
 
This extremist cluster promulgates the conviction that the ‘dissidents’ did not 
exist at all. For those who subscribe to this belief, the Gukurahundi massacres were 
strictly an ethnic-cleansing exercise (genocide) based on historical divisions of hatred 
between the Ndebele and the Shona peoples. For this sector, the incongruence of the size 
and scope of the so-called ‘dissident’ threat and the toll from the heavy-handed violent 
response of the Fifth Brigade on the civilian population are not only incomparable, but 
also incomprehensible. 
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“…I think it was very clear that they were out there to wipe out people. You 
remember, Enos Nkala came out in the press, saying that the government was 
sending out, I can’t remember the terms he used but, as if ‘a swarm of bees’ to go 
out there and he’ll deal with people. That’s the time when he actually said he 
really wishes he was not Ndebele; if he could wash it off, he would do it. In other 
words, he was saying ‘Ndebeles are not a people, to live’, as it were. And no 
wonder then that this Army would go out and then simply butcher people. 
Because I would say he was expressing government mind, he was the Minister of 
Defence then. And to hear those statements and then to see what was happening 
on the ground, I don’t think there was any explanation that could actually say that 
the government was thinking otherwise. ‘Ndebeles were people to be 
exterminated’ in my view.”703 
 
“Up to this very time, you know I don’t feel that the people of Matabeleland have 
really accepted what was done to them because they felt it was a blunt thing by 
the ZANU-PF government. They are seeing it as revenge; maybe from the past 
event when Lobengula [Ndebele King] also killed their people. And they thought 
‘this situation just came and was an opportunity for ZANU-PF to come then and 
kill people in Matabeleland, because thousands and thousands of people were 
killed. So much [so] that up to now, people are still going through a lot of 
pain…Because what really appeared was; it was only the ordinary people who 
were not armed, that suffered most.”704   
 
“My arms were broken by the Fifth Brigade. There were no dissidents. The main 
reason why he [Mugabe] said there was dissidents is because there was enmity 
between him [Mugabe] and Joshua Nkomo. Both of my arms were broken, even 
[on] my head…I have some scars (MS1 pulls up his trousers and shows his scars). 
I have some bruises all over my body and they were broken, I was in pieces. 
Some of these were caused by the bayonet that they used to bayonet my body. The 
excuse that they are using that there are dissidents that they are looking for at 
Matabeleland…they didn’t exist.”705  
 
This grouping (mainly Ndebele) mostly comprises of less educated ‘grass-roots’ 
rural communities that have little access to information about Gukurahundi except for the 
violence that they experienced as primary and secondary victims at the hands of the Fifth 
Brigade.  The deduction that Gukurahundi was an exercise in ethnic-cleansing (even 
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genocide) is quite understandable when one realises that the Fifth Brigade consisted of 
mostly Shona-speaking soldiers who were directly accountable to the office of the Prime 
Minister and who were mandated to utilise the lethal combination of both severe state-
sanctioned violence and ethnic ‘hate-speech’ as virulent tools of oppression. More than 
not, these adherents insist that the only solution to this conflict is through secession; to 
have an independent, self-governing Ndebele nation-state. 
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In essence, it is the conviction of this research that the actual plot of the ZANU-
PF was to ‘wipe-out’ the support base of its opposition, the ZAPU. The evidence is slim 
surrounding the ZANU-PF claim that the dissidents posed a national state security threat. 
Likewise, while there is definite proof of massacres (mass killings), the counter claim of 
genocide or ethnic-cleansing by many Matabeleland citizens is hard to authenticate.  The 
ZANU-PF had to account for the Matabeleland violence to at least three audiences; the 
international community, the citizens of Mashonaland, and the Matabeleland populace. 
Knowing full well that neither the international nor the Mashona communities would 
accept the notion of using violence to wipe-out one’s political opposition, the ZANU-PF 
had to manufacture the ‘dissident’ narrative discourse to explain the Matabeleland 
massacres. For the Matabeleland masses, the ZANU-PF hid behind these narratives of 
dissidence and then added the ethnic-conflict discourse which produced the necessary 
confusion, fear and terror to silence and subjugate the civilian population. Finally, for the 
international community, eager to play a non-interventionist role in post-colonial African 
affairs, the explanations of dissidents and historic ethnic animosities satisfied any 
questions they may have had about the violence occurring in Matabeleland. Thus, the 
ZANU-PF was able to hide its motivations to eliminate the opposition by constructing 
multiple narratives which served as the covering for its violence in Matabeleland. 





















Diagram 4: Covering Narratives used by the ZANU-PF in order to hide the  





 The narratives of loyalty propagated by the ZANU-PF were particularly poignant 
in that they failed to differentiate the individual narrative from the plural narratives. In so 
doing, the private trajectories of particular actors (in this case primarily the politicians, 
soldiers and civilians in the liberation movement) were lost to the public, generalised 
story of independence and subsequent nationalism. Thus, the nuanced loyalties and 
motivational intricacies from which key players acted out the liberation drama were 
glossed over, neatly packaged into uniform political ideologies and smothered by national 
patriotic scripts. Professor Luise White articulates this concern well:   
“First, historians of Zimbabwe have to abandon the either/or paradigm in which 
either the liberation forces or the Smith regime are the casual agents of every deed 
and action during the war…Second, historians of Zimbabwe – like those of the 
rest of Africa – need to look outside the frame they’ve set for themselves, and 
shift the history of war and violence beyond their interrogations of nationalism. If 
war and violence can be uncoupled from the history of nationalism and its 
ZANU-PF 
overall plan to 
‘wipe-out’ the 
support base 





triumphs, it can have its own history, a history of guerrillas instead of a history of 
guerrilla struggle.”706 
  
The aim of this chapter was to disentangle the individual narratives of personal loyalties 
from the collective narratives of national loyalties and thereby ‘thicken the plot’ of the 
historic Matabeleland violence. 
The first section of this chapter opened with an exploration of the use of 
systematic violence by powerful states to invent the ‘enemy’ (where one does not exist) 
in order to justify their illegitimate rule. It highlighted the performance violence of 
dissident soldiers across all the political divides thereby undermining the commonly held 
belief that it was only ex-ZIPRA soldiers who were causing the dissidence.  In the second 
section, a layered discussion on the actual size and scope of the dissident operations and 
the prominent explanations for their existence was presented with a strong emphasis 
being placed on the proposition that the so-called ‘dissidents’ were a ‘manufactured 
insurgency’. This theory is supported by direct evidence of both a systematic purging of 
ex-ZIPRA soldiers from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the ZANU-PF 
security forces playing the role of soldier-by-day and dissident-by-night. In the third 
section, the reader was exposed to the dehumanising effect of narratives of revolutionary 
disloyalty. Narrative accusations of disloyalty are closely connected to the ‘stripping’ 
away of a person’s identity (label of dissident), ideology (social exclusion) and history (a 
forgetting of the past). In section four, the ‘politics of recognition’ was unpacked and 
applied to the conflict context of the ‘dissident’ movement in Matabeleland. The 
dissidents are characterised as ‘marginalised belligerents left out of the conversation’ and 
hence their dissidence served a performative function demanding that they be written into 
the national narrative of liberation (also referred to as ‘scripts of belonging’). Section five 
spoke of the role of memorialisation and the production of patriotic memory employed by 
the ZANU-PF to enforce a monolithic national loyalty. Special emphasis is given to the 
counter-narratives (including those of spiritual intrigue) that have been surfaced by 
communities of resistance in protest to this demand for uniform loyalty. Finally, the 
chapter closed by delving into the national imagination of the existence of dissidents. Of 
particular interest here is a set of narrative patterns (clusters) that have emerged that seem 
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to suggest a correlation between one’s belief in the existence or non-existence of 
dissidents and prospects of solving this historic conflict and building a hope for peaceful 












































Chapter 7: Legitimacy – Narratives of Discipline and Protest 
 
“I have got hammers to knock off their heads. These dissidents should know that I am all 
out to crush them. If it means fist fighting, I know how to use my fists. If it is knobkerries, 
I also know how to use them. And if it comes to guns, I have too many of them. We have 
one national army, one government, and one Prime Minister – not two.”707 
 
7.1. Introduction: Intersecting Narratives of Legitimacy and Violence 
 
Narratives of legitimacy inhabit at least four different spaces of meaning. The 
most concrete of these spaces is encompassed in legal boundaries; that which is legally 
compliant is legitimate. A second and less rigid translation of legitimacy would be that 
which is in accordance to accepted external ‘st ndards’; a quantitative comparison to 
outside criteria that bear common characteristics and values to that which is being 
evaluated. A third lens, and the most qualitative and broad, through which to explain 
legitimacy is that which is reasonable; the sort of common sense approach that assumes a 
shared social wisdom. Finally, legitimacy can also refer to that which is authentic; in 
essence an original or genuine article by its very nature.708  
The ZANU-PF leadership has utilised all these interpretations of legitimacy in 
order to explain their authority and justify their application of violence in Matabeleland 
during the early 1980s. While the ZANU-PF appropriated legal authority by means of 
being a majority elected government and appealed to political authority by their 
revolutionary credentials, this study reveals that they not only perpetrated gross human 
rights violations that were outside the parameters of their own constitutional law and 
international political-legal standards, but they also publicly articulated their intention to 
do so on numerous occasions. Even the ZANU-PF claim that their violent offensive in 
the Matabeleland region was a ‘reasonable’ response to the security threat posed by the 
‘dissidents’ was met with question among international actors who dared to speak out at 
that time. In an open letter to President Mugabe in 1997, Amnesty International put 
forward their concerns as follows: 
“Nevertheless, the systematic detention, torture, killing and ‘disappearance’ of 
thousands of people in Matabeleland and Midlands during that period in history 
                                                
707 ‘Ruthless War on Rebels Promised’, (1981) The Herald (Harare), 26 October. Excerpt from a speech 
given by Robert Mugabe at a rally in Gwanda.  
708 Davies, P. (ed.) 1976. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. N w York: Dell 
Publishing Co., Inc., 404.  
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still need to be addressed, because the massive human rights violations that took 
place at that time remain unexamined, undiscussed and therefore unresolved.”709 
 
Despite placing themselves under the legitimacy banner of being an authentic liberation 
movement, ZANU-PF failed to win the trust of significant segments of the Matabeleland 
population as evidenced by the strong showing of ZAPU in that region both in the 1980 
and 1985 Elections. 
Thus, after resuscitating its version of an historical ethnic-conflict (Chapter 4), 
imposing its meta-narrative version of a nationalist order (Chapter 5), and interrogating 
the loyalty of the Zimbabwean public (Chapter 6), the ZANU-PF government still faced a 
legitimacy crisis, especially in light of the tenacious ‘dissident’ resistance that continued 
to surface in the Matabeleland region. The ZANU-PF leadership then turned its attention 
to damage control around its public image and its legitimacy as the ruling political party. 
In consistent revolutionary style, ZANU-PF fashioned its legitimacy narrative in 
connection with the language of violence and the system that shrouds it. For the ZANU-
PF, infusing the concept of legitimacy with violence was of paramount importance for 
political survival. Clearly, political legitimacy has many sources. However, in the case of 
the ruling ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe, most researchers and scholars would 
agree that violence and legitimacy have been consistently articulated and coupled 
together as mutually compatible processes that the ZANU-PF leadership felt should be 
collectively embraced by the nation-state and its citizenry. 
Indeed, both ZANU and ZAPU embraced narratives of revolutionary violence as 
the only option for social change in the colonial era of Rhodesia.  These narratives were 
heavily influenced by the socialist-communist ‘scripts’ of the Soviet Union, China and 
later North Korea.  By the time of Independence, most if not all the necessary attributes 
of the ‘violence system’ mind-set and its component parts were well established and 
endorsed by both ZAPU and ZANU and their leadership. The key elements of the 
violence grid-system could be summarised as follows: 
• Violent acts are seen as part of a larger "domination system"; a world-view of 
violence.   
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• The violence system maintains that human beings are essentially violent, and that 
violence is inevitable. 
• The violence system manifests itself in a series of interlocking war zones. 
• The violence system heralds violence as the solution and as a means of human 
fulfilment. 
• The violence system objectifies (alienates) and separates (isolates) human beings 
using a ‘Divide and Conquer’ tactic. 
• The violence system continually legitimates new acts of dominance and violence. 
• The spiral of violence is propelled by the ‘violence scripts’ (language of hatred 
and revenge) used by individuals and by society at large and under-girded by 
myths of 'chosen traumas' and 'chosen glories'.710 
 
The violence system described above was entrenched by the white colonial rule in 
Rhodesia resulting in international vilification at the time which in turn, conferred certain 
integrity on the rightful cause of the black struggle. However, the moral and ethical value 
of counter-violence and the subsequent imposition of yet another violence system 
(whether black-led or not) as a justifiable revolutionary response remained a debatable 
topic. Curiously, some sources report that during his study years at Fort Hare University 
(1949-1953) in South Africa, Robert Mugabe was most interested by Mahatma Gandhi’s 
work as a non-violent revolutionary. Martin Meredith describes Mugabe’s intrigue: 
“But the most important influence on him [Mugabe] at the time, he said, was 
Mahatma Gandhi, whose passive resistance campaign against British rule in India 
had fired the imagination of many young African nationalists. ‘This gave me 
personally a new kind of vision, a new philosophy, that if Africans were united in 
the same way as the Indians were, even if they resorted to a non-violent struggle, 
they would eventually emerge victorious.’”711 
 
What is particularly curious about this quotation, aside from the ironic affiliation between 
Mugabe who flaunted violence and Gandhi who epitomised nonviolence, is the 
conditionality of the words ‘even if they resorted to a non-violent struggle…’. This 
grammatical clause can only be interpreted in one of three ways, either Mugabe did not 
believe that non-violence was an appropriate instrument of change in the African context, 
or he did not value non-violence as a means of metamorphosis, or he considered it too 
slow, too cumbersome an engagement for the purposes of accomplishing the change 
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desired in an abbreviated amount of time. Nonetheless, in the years that followed his time 
of study, whatever transpired in the mind and experience of Robert Mugabe and the 
ZANU-PF leadership, the machinery of violence became deeply ingrained as the most 
legitimate force for socio-political transformation. 
 The official stance of the ZANU-PF government in its employment of violence 
as an instrument of political policy has evolved over time. Coming out of the Lancaster 
House Peace Agreement and into the early stages of independence, the ZANU-PF 
articulated a defensive attitude toward their application of violence. During this time, the 
use of violence was described as a regrettable, but necessary evil which represented an 
inevitable requirement to solidify the total independence of the country, and the threat of 
violence was primarily aimed at what the ZANU-PF perceived as cross-border enemies. 
The Chronicle newspaper reported Mugabe’s position as follows: 
“The Zimbabwe National Army needs ‘sharpening’ to repulse South Africa’s 
continued acts of aggression against Zimbabwe’s Independence, the Prime 
Minister, Cde Mugabe said yesterday. Speaking during a Five Brigade tank 
squadron demonstration, Cde Mugabe said the army should be strengthened in 
terms of training and equipment if it was to counter the Pretoria regime’s current 
threats of sabotage against Zimbabwe. ‘We must improve the capability of the 
army and its equipment so that we can prepare to defend ourselves against South 
Africa,’ he said.”712 
 
From the view on the ground, one interview respondent couched this hyper-arousal 
surrounding the external threat of military invasion (whether by South Africa or the 
dissidents) as the feeling of a country perpetually under siege: 
“So right from the word go you were taught…the fact that life is a Class struggle 
and in Zimbabwe it was a Class struggle. We were fighting against oppression of 
the colonialist. And it was always repeated, every year it was repeated, on the 
news it was repeated. And it was always this thing of this monster that was 
waiting to attack in the form of dissidents, and you needed Mugabe to save 
you.”713 
 
However, after the surfacing of the ‘dissident’ activity, ZANU-PF campaigned for 
the use of offensive violence as the only constructive means by which to quickly 
eliminate any armed insurgency and to protect and ensure the continuity of the Liberation 
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Cause against internal threat of government overthrow. In the words of the late Edgar 
Tekere, ZANU-PF Minister of Manpower in the early 1980s: “Nkomo and his guerrillas 
are germs in the country’s wounds and they will have to be cleaned up with iodine. The 
patient will have to scream a bit.”714 Reporting on public statements made by the Minister 
of State Security, Emmerson Munangagwa the Chronicle ewspaper printed the 
following: “Likening the dissidents to cockroaches and bugs, the minister said the bandit 
menace had reached such epidemic proportion that the Government had to bring in 
‘DDT’ (Five Brigade) to get rid of the bandits.”715 These scripts are exploiting common 
English idioms reflecting on the hardships of life such as: ‘No pain; no gain,’ or ‘this is 
going to hurt, but it is ultimately for your own good.’ This progression from violence as 
‘necessary’, to violence as ‘constructive’ marked a subtle shift in the ZANU-PF 
government’s ideological outworking whereby the system of state-sanctioned viol nce as 
a legitimate means of control replaced the historic revolutionary violence as a legitimate 
means for social change in Zimbabwe. 
When it became apparent that the cessation of ‘dissident’ insurgency was not 
forthcoming and the strength of the ZAPU opposition was increasing not decreasing, the 
ZANU-PF endorsed violence as the only legitimate m ans by which to secure and 
maintain its strangulating grip on political power. The universal rhetoric of the violence 
system as discussed in this section is not new, it is only recycled from context to context.  
For purposes of this study, the research interest has focused on the dynamics surrounding 
the implosion of the violence system, or in other words, when the violence system turns 
on itself. In the case of Zimbabwe, when the violence energy was focused on an outward 
enemy (the white Rhodesian regime) it could maintain a certain degree of ‘justifiable’ 
coherency.  However, when the violence was turned inwards to its own members (ZAPU 
as a parallel Black liberation movement), it became exceptionally destructive and 
consequentially was perceived and experienced as illegitimate. The transcripts below, 
taken from letters written by ZAPU political prisoners who were incarcerated by the 
ZANU-PF in the early 1980s, speak to this painful irony with startling honesty: 
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“Imprisonment under the ZANU-PF was horrible – much worse than under Smith, 
but we survived just because we knew that the State was trying to break us and we 
wouldn’t accept that.”716 
 
“The torture and ill-treatment that I received during the Smith regime was nothing 
compared to the torture and humiliation I suffered under a black regime. But I 
was angry, not disappointed, at the gross violations of human rights, because I 
never expected anything better from this government.”717 
  
“We fought relentlessly against white minority rule out of conviction that a black 
government would better appreciate the dignity of the black majority. The moral 
blameworthiness of a black government that dehumanises its own people is worse 
than that of a white minority government. In the case of the former the sense of 
betrayal is complete.”718 
  
From these passages, the reader gets the sense that the quantitative material conditions of 
imprisonment under the white verses the black regimes were really not the issue 
(although they may have differed). The real offense articulated in these writings is a 
qualitative disparity best described by the last author as the ‘complete’ indignity and 
betrayal of being dehumanised by one’s own kind.  
Herein lays the disastrous consequences of the Matabeleland conflict.  For no 
matter how hard the ZANU-PF tried, and continues to try to maintain its violence 
narrative to explain and validate the atrocities committed against the Matabele people, 
their narrative does not stand the test of time.  The violence system is inherently unjust.  
When the violence system implodes on itself, it turns its own furious wake inward.  
When this occurs the violence system is exposed, weakened and opened to a process of 
questioning and dismantling. Unable to deal with this state of vulnerability, the violence 
system produced by the ZANU-PF immediately closed rank, choked out all space for 
dialogue and resumed its monologue while at the same time threatening all who would 
dare to question its legitimacy ‘script.’ Instead of embracing flexibility and taking on the 
risk of political adaptation, as difficult as it might have been, the ZANU-PF decided to 
move into a comfortable state of denial, inertia and ‘group-think’. In sum, after 
Independence the ZANU-PF government stance in relation to violence progressed from 
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that of a necessity, to a constructive m ans of upholding a ‘declared’ moral cause, and 
finally to the only legitimate framework in which to rule the nation.      
7.1.1. Violence Unleashed 
 The Fifth Brigade represented the zenith of ZANU-PF’s legitimation of power in 
that it was released to apply violent force without restraint (despite the public insistence 
to the contrary by the ZANU-PF) and it employed an all-pervasive language of violence. 
The following script accentuates the vicious nature of this lethal combination of acted out 
violence punctuated by the spoken word: 
“We know the dissidents don’t live on their own they live with you. If you don’t 
report [the presence of dissidents] tomorrow morning, I’m giving you one week, 
and then I’ll send my angels.  If I tell my angels I want more then 200 heads 
chopped off, they will bring them here, they will do that if I order it as Jesus.”719 
 
Fifth Brigade Commander, O.M. Pongweni, better known as ‘Jesus’ spoke these words to 
a stunned and fearful Matabeleland community in 1983. When considering the socio-
political context in which these words were uttered, the metaphorical power of the 
violence script is poignant.  
Firstly, the narrator of this text (Pongweni) understood that he was speaking to a 
peasantry steeped in political ideology and by identifying himself as a ‘Black Jesus’ he 
was invoking a form of ‘Black consciousness’ awareness. This claim to possessing a 
‘messianic’ mandate would have been scoffed at had it been sourced from a white 
Rhodesian soldier. After all, for the highly politicised rural masses on the ground the 
white man was the known ‘enemy’, but for a black freedom fighter like Pongweni who 
had considerable influence to identity himself as ‘Jesus’ was an attractive and  intriguing 
label of legitimacy. However, because of the immediate threat to life being posed by 
Pongweni, this label also provoked a paradox; an ironic and exceptionally confusing 
alternative reading of all that the black consciousness movement stood for (blacks 
liberating blacks, not blacks killing blacks).  
Secondly, Pongweni was addressing a Christianised people who would have 
immediately associated the name of Jesus with the undertaking of salvation, thereby 
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elevating himself and the entire ZANU-PF liberation government which he represented to 
a functional level of Divine redemption; ‘Saviours’ of the masses on the ground. This 
kind of rhetoric not only made a mockery of religion, it immediately established an 
uneven power status of master and slave whereby the ordinary Zimbabwean citizen was 
now obliged, even indebted to serve their newly elected revolutionary leaders who 
‘saved’ them from a banal existence of oppression. This would explain the demand for 
unquestioning obedience from the civilian population made by Pongweni in his pursuit of 
information about dissident whereabouts.  
Thirdly, by referring to his foot soldiers as ‘angels’, Pongweni spoke volumes. 
Angels are characterised by innocence and imbued with perfection in such a way that this 
reference seems to declare that the Fifth Brigade soldiers moved with complete amnesty 
when enacting their violence on innocent civilians. In the end, when threatening to cut off 
200 heads, Pongweni sent at least three clear messages about his perceptions of authority: 
that violence was preeminent no matter how gruesome or arbitrary it appeared, that his 
underlings will do his violent bidding with unwavering obedience, and that through this 
force to command violence at will he was imbibed with a God-like characteristic; that of 
being omnipotent (having absolute power). 
If these types of scripts had only been rhetorical, the recipient communities would 
have been able to insulate themselves and their families from the effects of these threats. 
However, these kinds of verbal tirades represented more than political sloganeering; they 
became frighteningly recognisable as the sadistic narrative preludes to severe acts of 
gross human rights violations for many thousands of Matabeleland civilians. The 
statements below provide first-hand accounts of this horrendous violence:  
“And I got in touch with the Catholic Church and they took me into one of their 
own churches in downtown Bulawayo, into a basement, which was filled with 
hundreds of people who had escaped from Matabeleland North. And every single 
one of them had a story to tell of family members being killed, of neighbours 
being slaughtered, of huts being set on fire and everybody being shot who ran out. 
I mean, you know, they were horrifying stories. And these were people who were 
being ‘clearly’ afraid for their lives.”720 
 
                                                
720 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
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“But I think it’s important for us to point out that the rhetoric that was used was 
such that it was impregnated with such violence, intimidation and harassment. 
And the whole idea was to instil fear and trepidation in the lives of the people. 
But derogatory language was used, e.g. sometimes they would meet up with a 
woman who would be pregnant. And they would take a bayonet from the gun and 
they would slit open the womb of the person, the woman that was pregnant. And 
they would say, ‘We are not intending to kill you, but we are killing the dissident 
in your womb.’ Or they would actually find a woman carrying a baby and the 
baby happened to be a boy. They would tie the baby on the back with a wire, 
alive. They would throw both the mother and the baby in a mine shaft. And what 
they would say is ‘We are killing dissidents. We want you to know that this is 
how we deal with dissidents.’”721 
 
“According to SS, the 5th brigade arrived in her area in February of 1983 and 
called for a meeting at Pumula Mission. At this meeting they were told that this 
army had come to kill every one in this area…The soldiers said to them ‘You, lady 
and your husband and children, take a shovel and come with us, you will die for 
no reason today’. They were beaten and bayoneted all over their bodies and 
heads…The whole SS family and two others chosen to die were made to dig their 
grave then they were made to lie on top of each other in two rows. The people in 
the grave were then shot and the villagers ordered to bury them using their hands 
as shovels. At the same time they were being beaten and made to dance on top of 
the grave as they were filling it up. She says these people were buried still alive 
because they could hear them screaming and groaning as people danced on top of 
them. The grave was only knee high. The soldiers also destroyed all the food they 
found in homes ‘to stop them from feeding the dissidents’”.722 
 
The confounding impact of these violence narratives accompanied by the debilitating 
traumatisation of horrific acts of terror and destruction are not easy to measure, but the 
effects still remain embedded in the psyche of many Matabeleland communities even 
today. 
“I think it’s a Maoist strategy…inciting violence…and don’t think that that fear 
has gone out of the people; I don’t accept that. The fear is still there in 
Matabeleland. Even now, if you really care to analyse the political behaviour 
now, you can see Gukurahundi is still at play, there is so much fear.”723 
 
                                                
721 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
722 Victim’s statement transcribed 18/08/04, Gukurahundi Violence, Siyabalandela village (Matapos Line) 
Tsholotsho, Matabeleland. 




The boldness with which ZANU-PF military and political leaders confidently 
proclaimed rhetorical violence would indicate that there was a culture of impunity at play 
for those who perpetrated political violence on behalf of the ZANU-PF government. This 
notion is reinforced in the seemingly careless public words of Enos Nkala, a prominent 
government Minister who in 1983 told the nation that:  
“We want to wipe out ZAPU leadership. You’ve only seen the warning lights. We 
haven’t yet reached full blast…the murderous organisation and its murderous 
leadership must be hit so hard that it doesn’t feel obligated to do the things it has 
been doing.”724 
   
The research conducted in this study would indicate that ZANU-PF gave its tacit consent, 
if not overt endorsement to a political system of violence. The following quotes are taken 
from public addresses given by the ZANU-PF President Robert Mugabe and are 
illustrative of the prevalence of this state-sanctioned violence system: 
“Some of the measures we shall take are measures which will be extra-legal…an 
eye for an eye and ear for an ear may not be adequate in our circumstances.  We 
might very well demand two ears for one and two eyes for one.”725 
 
“The government will invoke extremely harsh measures to administer shock 
treatment to these harmful pests and their deceitful mentors. The swords are 
drawn and it will be war to the finish…The Government will take ‘extra-legal’ 
measures to deal with the security situation. As the government appreciated the 
task of the judges, [but] it cannot allow the technicalities of the law to fetter its 
hands for the preservation of law and order…Those who work against democracy 
do not deserve democratic treatment.”726    
  
“When men and women provide food for the dissidents, when we get there we 
eradicate them. We don’t differentiate when we fight, because we can’t tell who is 
a dissident and who is not.”727 
 
In these speech excerpts the audience (ordinary Zimbabwean citizens) were made to 
understand that the violence system of the ZANU-PF was sovereign in that it could act 
outside the ambit of the Law, that the ZANU-PF government as the executor and 
mediator of violence has the power to decide on what is, or is not a justifiable retribution 
                                                
724 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. (2003). ‘The post-colonial state and Matabeleland: Regional perceptions of civil-
military relations, 1980-2002.’in Cawthra, G. and Abrahams, D. (Eds.) Ourselves to Know – Civil-Military 
Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 27.  
725 Meredith, 2008: 65.  
726 Yap, K. 2001. Uprooting the Weeds – Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland Conflict 1980-
1987. Stockholm: Elanders Novum, 170. 
727 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S, 2003: 29. 
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in the face of political threat, and that the ZANU-PF is exonerated from any 
responsibility for innocent lives that may be lost in acts of arbitrary violence. This 
chapter concerns itself with unravelling this milieu of organised violence in Zimbabwe 
and the various pillars of support that buttressed and framed the expression of violence in 
Matabeleland from 1980-87. 
7.2. Legitimacy Narratives and Liberation Credentials 
 
“The same men wore both the hat and the helmet.”728 
 
The ZANU-PF has since independence attempted to ground the nation’s identity 
and its own legitimacy as a political power in the accomplishments of the Liberation 
War.729 However, from the onset of the Fifth Brigade violence in Matabeleland, the 
overriding narrative structure of the ZANU-PF has been slowly crumbling at its 
foundations.  In part, because the dominant violence script seems to assume that those 
who lead in a liberation struggle are the only legitimate voices of power after 
independence.  Professor John Makumbe of the University of Zimbabwe summarises this 
phenomena well: 
“Indeed, whenever they are threatened with loss of political power, former 
liberation movements tend to resuscitate their original achievements as liberators 
as a license to continued tenure of office.  They also harness their wartime tactics 
of instilling fear in the Electorate in order to win elections.”730  
 
In concrete terms, the ZANU-PF appeared to have an unofficial policy that only 
liberation fighters who had fought in battle and suffered under violence itself were now 
imbued with the authentic power and moral mandate to govern over the people. 
“…they [ZANU-PF] then termed themselves to become the custodians of the 
Liberation Struggle, to be the only people who actually were authentic liberators, 
and therefore the authentic story tellers of the Liberation Struggle, so that any 
elements they excluded were, as it were, not part of the Liberation Struggle and 
should be excluded…”731 
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“How can you want to rule without having suffered? Members of the present 
Government suffered in jail for many years, and Muzorewa [leader of internal 
faction] thinks he can just become prime minister without having gone through all 
the suffering we went through. This is impossible.”732 
 
Robert Mugabe himself was projected as “the ultimate liberator, who had the people’s 
interest at [heart].”733 Patriotic narrative surrounding the person of Mugabe, the 
organisation of ZANU-PF, and the exploits of the Fifth Brigade abounded at that time: 
“With selfless determination and single-minded dedication of purpose, the first 
Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe has been in the forefront of the 
struggle for political justice in this country for nearly two decades. Detained and 
imprisoned by successive Rhodesian governments for long periods, he overcame 
the attempts of the authorities to break him by the sheer force of his commitment 
to the struggle, and his conviction in the justice of the cause and the inevitability 
of victory. He led ZANU (PF) through the armed struggle to the overwhelming 
election victory in February 1980.”734 
 
Judith Garfield Todd recounts her encounter with this emblazoned patriotism during the 
time when the Fifth Brigade entered Matabeleland: 
“But I found an all-pervading anxiety about the 5th Brigade, which was being set 
up by the North Koreans, and was told that the brigade had to start each day with 
a salute to ‘MUGABE!’ An acquaintance of mine just back from Libya was in 
poor circumstances and asked me to find out how he could join 5 Brigade. I asked 
someone who would know what qualifications one had to have , and was told (1) 
absolute loyalty to Prime Minister Mugabe; and (2) absolute loyalty to the ruling 
party, Zanu (PF).”735 
 
One interview respondent recalled the types of messages he had heard describing Mugabe 
and by default, the ZANU-PF’s essential liberation credentials in the early years of 
Independence: 
“And then you heard of horrific stories of people being tortured. So constantly 
you’re told about the fact that Mugabe himself was tortured and he was a hero, 
and because he was tortured on his testicles he couldn’t have children, and that 
story went around big time. And you just got that whole sense that ‘man, when 
are we gonna eventually squash all these people that hate us?’…You constantly 
                                                
732 ‘Nkala tells why the Five Brigade exists’, (1983) The Chronicle (Bulawayo).  
733 Ibid. 
734 Mitchell, D. 1982. Makers of History – Who’s Who 1981-82 – Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe. Harare: 
Book Centre, 139. 
735 Todd, J. 2007. Through the Darkness – A life in Zimbabwe. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 36-37. 
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got that sense that these Ndebele and the South African racist forces were 
basically trying to subvert the country.”736 
 
“And then later on looking back, you’ve been so brought up in this mindset 
that…and though Gukurahundi came out, you had this very clear version that 
there was the revolution-one [black resistance in late 1890s] which was a failure, 
and then revolution-two [liberation struggle 1965-1980] which was a success, and 
there was the counter-revolutionaries [dissidents] ; they weren’t reactionaries … 
Ian Smith and these guys were the reactionaries, and then you had the sell-outs 
[Muzorewa and Sithole]. So you had all the pieces laid out on the chess board and 
you were told who was who in the zoo. And somehow those pieces always ended 
up making Mugabe look like the best thing.” 737 
 
Yet, for much of the Matabeleland region, Mugabe and his party the ZANU-PF 
moved straight from a liberation struggle into a legitimation struggle. For the ZANU-PF 
narrative, legitimacy was equal to absolute power. However, for the pockets of resistance 
narratives in Matabeleland, government legitimacy could only be achieved by means of 
recognition for all its citizens, including the Ndebele and all those who chose to associate 
with ZAPU. In opposition to this idea that only those who had the ‘correct’ liberation 
credentials were legitimate political leaders, many counter narratives arose. The interview 
excerpts below represent a sample of these texts of opposition: 
“ If the Independence is for us all, we should all be responsible if we have some 
duties to play. Anyway, who did not fight the Liberation Struggle? Any 
Zimbabwean who was alive that time, contributed in some way or the other. Our 
parents were feeding the guerrillas when they were fighting this war. Many 
people were supplying them with clothes, I personally did that. So, I wouldn’t 
want to be segregated…We were fighting for Independence and everybody must 
enjoy it anyway, we all contribute, it’s not for the few select. And when you 
[ZANU-PF politicians] talk about the ‘legitimacy’ again, it raises questions 
whether you are legitimate yourself. How come is it that people would vote for 
you and eventually go around complaining? To me that is contradicting the 
situation. I think it’s the manipulation that is there during the times of Elections 
and probably rigging… And taking advantage of the situation that you are 
empowered, you have the resources to campaign and stop other people from 
campaigning, intimidating, you beat up people and no arrests are made for those 
who are doing all that, and [you] protect the culprits…And even some of the guys 
that would be contesting the Parliamentary seats, they even use their guns to 
campaign, yes.”738 
                                                
736 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
737 Ibid. 
738 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist). 
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“If Zimbabwe can go [back] to Independence, all those heroes, who claim 
themselves to be heroes, I think they must answer questions, because you can’t be 
a hero and then kill. They started killing from outside when they were still in the 
Struggle, and nobody said anything about it. Can you be a hero when you kill 
other people? …We need a God-fearing president there. If the head is firm, I think 
everything will be normal in Zimbabwe. But if the head, the President, is the one 
who is undecided and doesn’t know what to do; [he] has no authority…Mugabe 
has no authority. He’s using violence because he has no authority. If you can get 
a leader…who had authority, then things will be fine. You mustn’t use violence if 
you are a leader, you must have authority.”739    
 
These scripts of resistance embody universal themes expressed by populations living 
under violent repression who are determined to identify what just leadership should be 
characterised by - participation and integrity.  Firstly, there is the deep call for leaders to 
acknowledge the human dignity and recognise the sacrificial role that the civilian 
populace has played by carrying the liberation of the country from the ground up. 
Secondly, the civil society is not easily duped by abusive leadership; they recognise good 
governance when they experience it, and they understand that strong leadership must 
earn authority, not demand it (autocracy). Rhetorical revolutionary slogans such as: ‘T e 
people shall govern’ mean nothing if the citizenry of any given country is not consulted 
and feeling empowered to engage its leadership in constructive processes of consensus 
decision-making and genuine nation-building. There is a palatable reaction of cynicism 
and scorn coming from the people of Matabeleland when they hear and read public 
discourse of this nature coming from their own prime minister: 
“Without political power firmly in the hands of the people, without jobs and food 
and other necessities of life, there can be pretty little anyone can do to help the 
oppressed who are being terrorised by imperialism…let us continually bear in 
mind the people’s untold suffering and be inspired by such suffering into fighting 
harder; let us make our war the people’s war.”740 
 
“ If you allege atrocities, give us the concrete evidence. We are humanitarians, we 
don’t want to see people killed wantonly, killed for no purpose.”741  
 
                                                
739 Interview: JD1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 15/09/06 – (Female Ndebele NGO activist advocating for 
women and refugees rights). 
740 Mugabe, R. 1983. Our War of Liberation – Speeches, Articles, Interviews 1976-1979. Harare: Mambo 
Press, 122 and 132. 
741 ‘No Reason to Ban Zapu, Says Mugabe’, (1983) The Herald (Harare) 13 March. 
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These promises rang hollow for the Matabeleland region. Liberation credentials were not 
sufficient for the citizens of Matabeleland to accept repression from their new black 
government. The trust that naturally flows out of valid legitimacy was torn asunder when 
the so-called ‘freedom fighters’ of Zimbabwe transformed into ‘oppressive dictators’. 
The history of the Matabeleland massacres should remind subsequent generations of 
Zimbabwean politicians to never underestimate the visceral sense of betrayal that the 
masses feel when the leaders they look to for self-determination offer them hypocrisy 
instead.  
7.3. Legitimacy Narratives and the Militarisation of the State 
“Only the dead have seen the end of war.”742 
Professor Geoff Harris defines a militarised society as such: “the military controls 
or strongly influences government policies and actions; there is a strong military ethos 
and military ideals are dominant; security is viewed as fundamentally a military matter 
and military imperatives dominate the security agenda; and the use of force or the threat 
to use force is high on the list of possible responses to any disputes which may arise.”743 
All four of these characteristics of militarised societies were not only prevalent; they 
were actively engaged with in the context of the Gukurahundi violence in Matabeleland 
during the early 1980s. In fact, for over ten years a state of emergency was declared in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands. 744  Curfews, road-blocks and search and seizure 
exercises were employed on a regular basis. The precise legislation that had been utilised 
by the Smith regime against the Liberation struggle movements was now being applied to 
the black opposition ZAPU, the ‘dissidents’ and the civilian population. The following 
interview transcripts bear witness to life under this constant state of military emergency: 
“But I do know in 1983, that’s the time that we moved from Magwegwe West to 
Queenspark. And we moved during curfew that was in force…at that time it was 
like Gukurahundi time and there were road blocks and the cars were not going. 
But somehow, you know, when we got to a roadblock we’d explain what we were 
doing and then be allowed to go through… [Also] I know that in 1983 there used 
to be a helicopter…one of those old, you know, with the loudspeaker that would 
                                                
742 Batley, K. 2007. A Secret Burden – Memories of the Border War by South African Soldiers who fought 
in it. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, xii. (Quote by George Santayana). 
743 Harris, G. (ed.) 2004. Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa – Cost Effective Alternatives to the 
Military . Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 3.  
744 Ayittey, G. 1998. Africa in Chaos. New York: St Martins Press, 92. 
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go around and say ‘you are now being surrounded by the police and the soldiers’. 
They were going into houses and searching for weapons or whatever else.”745 
 
“Later on the soldiers began to come into our houses, just to search. Unfortunately 
my house was the first one by the corner so they came in there. They wanted to 
search in the house; they beat me up by using the butt of their batons...their guns. 
The pain I had was not of the beating, the most pain I had was being beaten up 
right in my house. Where do I run to? Because I could not run to the soldiers 
outside, they are beating up some people again. To me, that was the most painful 
experience that I was helpless, beaten up in front of my kids; that was really 
painful.”746  
 
Naturally, if having been a liberation fighter was a prerequisite for legitimate 
political leadership in Zimbabwe, then all the structures of government would eventually 
and necessarily undergo a course of militarisation. The ZANU-PF seamlessly and 
shamelessly ushered in a merging of the military and political realms in Zimbabwe as 
early as the first Independence Elections in April of 1980. Evidence shows that even at 
that threshold of democratic freedom, ZANU, through its armed wing ZANLA was 
carefully planning how to use systematic violence to harass, intimidate and even 
eliminate the rural Matabeleland populations if they did not support ZANU-PF in the 
polls. In the findings of Norma Kriger: 
“To ensure their party won the election, thousands of ZANLA guerrillas were 
deliberately kept out of the assembly camps in violation of the [peace] settlement. 
After the ceasefire, and thus also in violation of the settlement, ZANLA infiltrated 
thousands of its guerrillas from Mozambique into the country, most likely in an 
attempt to enable ZANLA guerrillas to assemble in the numbers the party had 
promised at Lancaster House…The British election monitors’ report claimed that 
in one-third of the rural areas the voters were not free to vote, chiefly because of 
ZANU (PF)/ZANLA violence and intimidation.”747 
 
Judith Garfield Todd included this voice of prophetic warning in regard to Mugabe’s 
commitment to the violence inherent in militarisation: 
 “Just before the 1980 elections, veteran Aaron Mutiti warned: ‘What Mugabe 
himself has done to his fellow Zimbabweans in exile during the last three years 
deprives his hollow assurances of any credibility. Unless the people of this 
                                                
745 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
746 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist). 
747 Kriger, N. 2003. “War Veterans: Continuities Between the Past and the Present”. African Studies 
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country are vigilant, they are in for a rude shock. Family life, religious life and 
economic life as we know it will progressively disappear if Mugabe gets to 
power. We must not close our eyes to this threat. He rates his communist ideology 
higher than people.’”748 
 
As one interviewee so aptly put it:  
“He [Mugabe] said the guns that liberated this country will be the guns that 
sustain him in power; can that give you peace?”749 
 
The pomp and circumstance of state ceremony, public ritual during official 
holidays and propaganda manufactured from the state-run media all served to consolidate 
this progression of ZANU-PF state militarisation. In order to heighten the patriotic 
fervour of the people, militarisation was show-cased as the triumph of the revolution and 
the glory of the nation. State militarisation served as a badge of honour to the warrior’s 
prowess of the ZANU-PF army, and a symbol of exaltation and praise for their fighting 
power over the dominating forces of the white colonial regime. In work on political 
memorialisation, Pamela Machakanja summarises this process succinctly: 
“People are reminded never to doubt or in any way question the living presence of 
the liberation memory. To do so would signify betrayal of the heroes and the 
nationalist ideals… Through this commemorative event [political 
memorialisation], the people – especially the youth – are reminded about the debt 
they owe the nation’s heroes who laid down their lives so that future generations 
could enjoy freedom.”750  
 
Several research respondent recollections also serve to undergird this phenomenon:  
 
“And, I remember every Heroes Day. There were three major days in Zimbabwe 
where, as a child you were traumatized by the scenes of dead bodies scattered 
across the screen, and basically how so many people had died for the country. 
And you are told over and over again that we mustn’t forget our heroes, you 
know, we had fought for our Liberation Struggle, and showed many gruesome 
scenes of white policeman beating black people and setting dogs on them, 
shooting people and things like that. And you’d hear all sorts of stories from 
grandparents, relatives. My mother had her brother who just disappeared in the 
war; no-one knows where he went. So this is all the backdrop of Zimbabwe, that 
it was a country seeped in blood. You got that sense that even to get its 
Independence, it was seeped in blood, and there was that real sense that it wasn’t 
                                                
748 Todd, J. 2007: 423. 
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an easy victory and many sacrificed. And those who are alive should be happy 
and be careful not to forget.”751 
 
“ I suppose it [the glorification of militarisation] comes, you know, nearer the 
time; like now we’re close to Independence, April 18, they’ll bring that in. We’ve 
got a Unity Day holiday and that is played. We’ve got the Heroes Day holidays 
and that comes up. Because it proceeds the days that are set aside as holidays to 
commemorate these situations, so I suppose one has to expect that, I think. It’s a 
State television thing and it ‘has’ to … it is Public Relations, ‘lest we forget’ is the 
easy way around it.”752 
Underneath the continual ‘glorification’ of ZANU-PF militarisation, there were 
also veiled threats of repressive violence meant to intimidate any critics and detractors 
who were not willing to fall in line with the status quo. Respondents describe a kind of 
socio-political climate characterised by a continuous march to the beat of patriotic, 
national militarisation: 
“And, you see the world helps Mugabe from a variety of perspectives. It 
obviously bolsters his international images, this icon of Liberation. But 
domestically, it’s not just a reminder of his and ZANU-PF history; it’s also a 
reminder of what they’re capable of.” 753 
 
 “…democracy is what we [ZANU-PF] thrust upon you; it’s a privilege. If you 
say anything; remember the gun, remember the bombs in Mozambique, remember 
the bombs in Zambia, remember the bombs everywhere. So here is what we are 
saying, this is ‘your’ democracy. We are giving it to you as a people BUT if you 
go back; remember…So it’s just a psychological gimmick to say to the people of 
Zimbabwe that ‘you can’t talk about democracy without Mugabe saying it to you 
that ‘this is democracy’. If I use psychology, it’s a whole traumatisation of the 
whole nation, scaring everybody. [It] is simply to say ‘this is how we did it’…in 
fact it is pre-empting dissent, and even war, so everybody’s scared, so it’s just to 
scare the whole nation.”754  
 
The progression of the militarisation process in Zimbabwe was comprehensive 
and stratified. It displayed an overt expression for sure, and yet through myriad other 
avenues it was nuanced in nature and reach. As discussed in Chapter 6, ZANLA 
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systematically privileged itself above ZIPRA for key positions of rank and leadership in 
the scramble for power within the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Through the use of 
extreme intimidation and ‘unofficial’ violence many ex-ZIPRA soldiers were purged 
from the Army or forced to take abuse in lower level positions. Another ‘script’ in this 
drama of militarisation was the use of highly provocative slogans by ZANU-PF officials 
and politicians without any public sanction from the central government. Exceptionally 
inciting phrases like ‘Pasi ne Machuwachuwa’ (Down with ZIPRA) and ‘Pasi ne 
vanematumbu’ (Down with those with big stomachs – referring to Nkomo), were 
regularly recited to the crowds at the beginning and end of ZANU-PF political rallies.755 
ZANU-PF not only utilised a heavy does of struggle propaganda, it refused to allow the 
furtherance of ZAPU/ZIPRA party slogans, symbols, songs and regalia at any national 
ceremonies like independence and Heroes Days.756 One patent example of this was the 
popular radio programme called Dzimbo dzeChimurenga Dzakasunungura (meaning 
Chimurenga songs that liberated Zimbabwe) which evidently only played ZANLA 
(Shona) liberation struggle songs. Apparently, this broadcast aired nationally every 
Sunday morning up until the signing of the Unity Accord on 22 December 1987.757 
   Thus, the militarisation of Zimbabwe by the ZANU-PF government 
materialised as an extension of the Liberation struggle. The former guerrillas, now turned 
national soldiers, continued to enjoy a liberal power over the civilian population, a 
privilege they had been afforded during the independence war. As opposed to being 
confined to the barracks as would be the case for conventional armies in seasons of 
peace-time, these newly empowered ZANLA freedom fighters were released to exert 
control over the rural masses in Matabeleland as in times past. In the words of one 
respondent, “I mean all parastatals are now run by ex-soldiers. At what stage is the 
community or society being free to work ‘with’ a soldier? It simply means that they are 
militarising simple, social activities. And there’s no way you can count on peace in a 
situation like that.”758   
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 75.  
757 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006: 63. 
758 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
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Identifying the source from which conventional armies and guerrilla armies are 
controlled and infused with internalised discipline is a critical distinction that is necessary 
to this discussion. Conventional armies are kept in check and balance through the 
discipline of professionalization. On the other hand, guerrilla armies are steered and 
driven by extreme politicisation; their motivation originating in radical ideological 
indoctrination.759 In Zimbabwe, the newly independent ZANU-PF ruling party 
unmistakably refused to translate its decidedly politicised ZANLA guerrilla army into a 
peace-time professional army. As a result, the ZANU-PF forfeited the ‘democracy’ that 
they had consistently promised the people of Zimbabwe and instead embraced the flawed 
and fatal destiny of state militarisation. 
7.4. Legitimacy Narratives and the Disciplinary Function of Violence           
 A state-sanctioned, ‘legitimated’ violence, whether overt or covert, serves a 
coherent disciplinary end. Structural violence can be transformed into an agent of acute 
regulation silencing any voices of dissent and subjugating any threatening actions of 
resistance and insurgency. This kind of excessive domination over the socio-political 
landscape of human networks and relational proclivities requires a residential structure; a 
presence characterised by extended tentacles of informational and interactional control. A 
comprehensive, residential presence of this nature could also be categorised as an 
occupational force. In military parlance ‘occupational forces’ represent the presence of 
alien army troops placed in a certain geographical space by outside actor-agents for the 
purposes of controlling fighting elements in that specific area. In copious ways, this 
analogy of occupation could be applied to the posture taken by the ruling party in the 
Matabeleland context during the 1980s. Put differently, the ZANU-PF occupied 
Matabeleland uninvited both as an actual military-security force and a socio-political 
presence of disciplinary power. The disciplinary power of ZANU-PF’s occupation was 
precisely in its ability to invade the private places of dissent (in people’s memory, 
political views, family homes, and work or worship organisations), expose that resistance 
and thereby demand a kind of respect through a forced ritual of renunciation in the public 
space. Commenting on the seminal work of Michel Foucault, Steven Seidman crafts a 
lucid description of the disciplinary society:  
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“In a disciplinary society, order is maintained through technologies of control 
such as spatial separation, time management, confinement, surveillance, and a 
system of examinations that classify and rank individuals for the purpose of 
normalizing social behaviour.”760 
The ZANU-PF employed a spectrum of political-structural and social-historical 
apparatuses at its disposal in such a commanding manner that it successfully dictated the 
interpretations of history, politics, media, leadership and development with far-reaching, 
disciplinary outcomes for Matabeleland. The disciplinary implication of this form of 
indirect, structural violence that was discharged during the period of Gukurahundi 
repression is the subject of dissection in this subsequent section.          
7.4.1. Discipline through Historical Indoctrination 
The prevalence of historical manipulation has surfaced throughout this study. 
Indeed, according to this research, the narratives of ethnic conflict (Chapter 4), of 
nationalism (Chapter 5), and of loyalty (Chapter 6) can only be fully understood in the 
light of subjective, historical manipulation by the ZANU-PF and its powerful political 
stooges. Pamela Machakanja describes the power of past memory when it is fashioned for 
present political purposes: 
“As a source of power, the past can be appropriated in the present as a mechanism 
that serves to legitimise or de-legitimise political actions both violent and 
nonviolent. When this process is controlled by the ruling elite, who often claim 
monopoly over interpretation of the past, certain aspects of the past can be 
distorted and manipulated to satisfy political agendas.”761    
However, this twisting of historical memory by the ZANU-PF not only served the 
convenience of the political exploitation occurring in Matabeleland in the early 1980s it 
also became a tool for the indoctrination of a whole generation of children born in post-
independence Zimbabwe. After independence, school-aged children across the nation 
were fed a one-sided liberation struggle history that gave pre-eminence to the story of 
ZANU and ZANLA. It represented an historical narrative re-write that glorified ZANLA 
military exploits and exempted ZANU from any traces of cowardice, corruption and 
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greed. In his excellent work on ‘patriotic history’, Professor Terence Ranger summarises 
this biased view of historical presentation with precision: 
“Patriotic history is intended to proclaim the continuity of the Zimbabwean 
revolutionary tradition.  It is an attempt to reach out to ‘youth’ over the heads of 
their parents and teachers, all of whom are said to have forgotten or betrayed 
revolutionary values.  It repudiates academic historiography with its attempts to 
complicate and question.  At the same time it confronts Western ‘bogus 
universalism’ which it depicts as a denial of the concrete history of global 
oppression.  ‘Patriotic history’ is propagated at many levels – on television and in 
the state-controlled press; in youth militia camps; in new school history courses 
and textbooks; in books written by cabinet ministers; in speeches by Robert 
Mugabe and in philosophical eulogies and glosses of those speeches by 
Zimbabwe’s media controller, Tafataona Mahoso.  It is a coherent but complex 
doctrine”762 
 
The book authored by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson and entitled, The Struggle for 
Zimbabwe: Chimurenga War (1981) became an official text of the liberation struggle. It 
was required reading in every secondary school across the nation, despite the fact that it 
marginalised other liberation forces and movements and exalted the ZANU-PF as the key 
protagonist in the  fight for Zimbabwe’s independence.763 According to the following 
interview respondents, this patriotic history was seeped in violence, political ideology 
and the voice of the ‘conqueror’ dominated the story: 
“And I think that whole problem was caused by the fact that you had immense 
power, you had a background and litany of violence, of bloodshed, and [at] the 
centre we had a very bloodthirsty belief system in the form of Communism, 
Socialism where the end justifies the means, and where you were either 
revolutionary or counter- revolutionary, and even growing up in Zimbabwe in 
school, I studied history for ZJC (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate). You were told 
about everything from a very Socialist point-of-view.”764 
“…history always comes in the perspective…in the view of the conqueror. If y u
are the conqueror you write the history the way you want. So I think…the reason 
why certain people have been in government for so long in Zimbabwe now is, 
they have been singing praises to Mugabe. They have not been opposing him in 
any of the policies he suggests or anything, I mean you’re so scared; even the 
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ones that came up with the issue of learning the history of Zimbabwe. You know 
like when you talk about that, then certain people will then say ‘okay, why do we 
have to go back to the 60s? Let’s start from 1980.’”765 
 
“So the problem is that, every aspect of the history of current Zimbabwe has been 
monopolised by ZANU. And unfortunately the historians, [who] have access to 
media, access to influence the policies of education; they are all Shona and they 
are all from ZANU, so the story that they tell obviously is very biased for my own 
understanding… we never hear about the exploits that ZIPRA did, it’s all 
silent.”766              
From the above transcripts, it is obvious that a ‘patriotic history’ exercise of this nature 
thrives on binary thinking; either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, there was no 
categorical space in-between. Also, of interest is the unmistakable role of fearin the 
motivation and scripting of this form of hegemonic historical account. When history 
originates and is projected out of an authorship defined by fear and traumatisation it is 
bound to be deformed in its core. If fear is the driving impulse for the production of 
history the text is bound to be written with the adversary always present in the discourse. 
In this way, a fearful history is constantly presented with the ‘enemy’ in mind; a 
continuous response to the ever-present threat of the opponent. The challenge of dealing 
with the Gukurahundi violence has been to discover how to exorcise the ‘demons’ of fear 
and insecurity whose shadows were thrust upon the interpretations of history in 
Matabeleland in the 1980s.  
While the ZANU-PF manufactured a tailor-made ‘patriotic history’, the voices of 
historical dissent continued to surface. These emergent protest narratives were fuelled by 
the fundamental human need for public recognition: 
“We want our real history to be written in the correct manner. It must be written 
by us. Each and everyone must write his history. ZANU must write its own 
history, it is ZANLA. As it happened we must write our own history. But the 
history that was written these past years is only considered ZANLA, only…But I 
myself, I spent seven years in the bush, I’m well experienced, we fought for this 
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country. This country was liberated by ZIPRA. Even the former Commander of 
the Rhodesian Army, he said in the opening words ‘If Joshua Nkomo can give me 
ZIPRA, I can rule this country from Cape to Cairo’. You can ask what it means, 
but they’re all silent and now they are changing the statements and say they 
fought.”767  
 
“…. all the songs which everyone listens to are ZANLA songs. Where are the 
ZIPRA songs? [As if] ZANU-PF fought the Struggle alone. So that’s why I’m 
saying the history is one-sided. A fair history must involve both sides. We must 
one day see [on television] the ZIPRA guys being trained in Zambia or singing in 
Zambia, crossing the Zambezi River to Zimbabwe, fully armed, sing their 
Ndebele song, but you can’t see that…That’s why I’m saying, the history is not 
enough. Like our children at the moment are being taught the ZANU-PF history 
as if the ZANU-PF was alone in the Struggle, yet the ZIPRA Forces played a big 
role. And Joshua Nkomo was ‘Father Zimbabwe’, but his history is now 
manipulated…I really don’t believe the history. I’d rather read the history from 
‘outside’, like someone who is writing from outside Zimbabwe, who is a neutral 
person, an independent writer who is writing about the struggles of Zimbabwe. I 
think he [the outsider] can write better than what ZANU-PF is telling 
Zimbabweans. There are many people who were killed even within ZANLA 
forces, being killed by Mugabe, trying to pave [a] way for himself. We understand 
people like Chitepo, Tongogara were eliminated by Mugabe, but the ZANU-PF 
doesn’t put it clear, it doesn’t tell the people exactly what happened to Tongogara. 
He died five minutes to Independence, because Tongogara wanted a ‘united 
Zimbabwe’. Mugabe wanted a ZANU-PF, Shona government.”768 
   
From the interviews conducted, there was an understandable urgency to the call for a re-
writing of the history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and consequentially, the 
history of the Matabeleland violence of the 1980s: 
“This is the major problem down there, they used this discourse which emanates 
from their nationalist history…Personally I do not agree. I think there were 
numerous nationalist actors with different imaginations. And if we have different 
types of pictures of Zimbabwe, then you cannot say I am a-patriotic or anti-
patriotic. It becomes very problematic.”769 
 
“ I remember one of my sons was picked to this Green Bomber [militarised 
ZANU-PF youth wing] training. When he came back, I was very disappointed. I 
asked him ‘Just tell me exactly what were you taught about, bring your book’. I 
was shocked; ZIPRA didn’t fight, it [ZIPRA] was full of making sex in the bush. 
                                                
767 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 
768 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former Head of Security for 
opposition party MDC and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF 
government). 
769 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele Professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
299 
 
Gukurahundi was committed by the British in 1978. This is the history that they 
are being taught in school. This is a distorted history. We need our history of the 
people of Zimbabwe. ZANU and ZANLA have their own history that side, ZAPU 
and ZIPRA have their own history that side; we put them together.”770 
 
“So I think there’s a lot to be done and to me we have to rewrite the history in an 
independent way, not biased like what is in Zimbabwe now. They are now forcing 
our children to know more about ZANLA, to know more about ZANU-PF, to 
know more about Mugabe but, Mugabe was just the Secretary General… there 
were [other] leaders within the ZANU-PF who were senior to Mugabe but we 
don’t know much about them, only Mugabe, Mugabe, Mugabe. So I still believe 
that history must start afresh.”771  
 
The revised historical script being summoned forth by these respondents seems to 
necessitate the inclusion of the voice of ZAPU/ZIPRA and those texts of multiple, 
diverse experiences of the people on the ground (both civilian and military) who ‘lived’ 
the history of the struggle. This historical re-write would in its essence be a participatory 
exercise full of cacophony and complexity; a problematic, yet realistic project in 
historical renovation. 
7.4.2. Discipline through Political Manipulation 
In the early years of Independence, the primary form of political manipulation 
that ZANU-PF utilised was election violence and intimidation. As was noted earlier, 
evidence indicates that even in the first all-inclusive election polls of April 1980, ZANLA 
operatives readily engaged in coercive tactics especially against rural voters. The British 
election monitoring report described these techniques of ZANLA as follows: 
“Whether or not they were acting on instruction of their political leaders…They 
[violent acts] extended from brutal ‘disciplinary murders’ as examples of the fate 
awaiting those who failed to conform to generalised threats of retribution of a 
continuance or resumption of the war if ZANU(PF) failed to win the election to 
psychological pressure like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines 
which would reveal how individuals had voted and to the physical interdiction of 
attendance at meetings. The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of 
recent violence, made the threats of general retribution or a continuance of the 
war a potent weapon even in the hands of unarmed activists, since it was 
independent of the secrecy of the ballot.”772   
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One interviewee articulates the sense of almost inherent violence that has accompanied 
the political activity of the ZANU-PF from its inception into power: 
“ZANU has been a violent party, and even the President himself for one time has 
been quoted to say ‘he has got degrees in violence’. So if you have got a ‘degree’ 
in violence, surely you want to expose the knowledge which you have acquired. If 
you have acquired a degree in Theology, you also want to expose that you 
understand theological concepts. You can not have a degree and stash it in the 
cupboard… People will just be beaten up for no apparent reason. And then when I 
started connecting I realized it’s a kind of control strategy that had [existed] for 
time immemorial; if you can not submit by choice freely, then we’ll persuade you 
to submit by some peer policies by way of you being beaten up.”773 
 
The violent power described here is marked by a public, boastful arrogance on the part of 
its leaders, an arbitrary application among the civilian populace, and an utter disregard 
for the free-will choice of the citizenry whom the leaders purport to rely on for support. 
According to interviews with Zimbabwean ex-combatants conducted by Norma Kriger in 
1992, “ZANLA guerrillas who had campaigned in the 1980 election were later paid by 
their victorious party for their revolutionary contributions.”774 
In like manner, election violence, intimidation and coercive threats by ZANU-PF- 
supported Youth Militia structures were prevalent in the 1985 polls. ZAPU members 
reported house damage, property loss, forcible attendance of  ZANU-PF rallies, and the 
application of repressive measures to compel people to relinquish ZAPU party 
membership cards in ‘exchange’ for ZANU-PF-issued cards, all perpetrated by party 
members and the youth militia groups trained by the ZANU-PF. The following victim’s 
statements bear witness to the repressive conditions prevailing in Matabeleland at that 
time: 
“15 youths stormed my home and ransacked it. The Zanu (PF) members threw 
[us] outside, locked our house and took the keys away. They said we would not 
get our house keys until we surrendered our party cards and got those of Zanu 
(PF). We slept outside in the cold last night, and I don’t know what we will do 
next. We reported the matter to the police, but they said that [they] had no power 
to intervene.”775      
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“It is no use reporting this sort of thing to the police [ZANU-PF Youth 
harassment] because they are afraid of party officials. Remember the post-election 
violence when they watched us being harassed and property thrown out of 
homes…it won’t help.”776 
 
“People live in fear because they may be killed at any time. People live in 
suspicion because they fear that the Zanu youths will force them to buy Zanu 
cards. People live in fear of being harassed one way or another. If we are going to 
have elections under such a situation, it means the elections will not be free and 
fair.”777 
 
What is blatantly evident in the above paragraphs is that the disciplinary network of the 
ZANU-PF violence spread beyond random acts of political vigilantism by ZANU-PF 
community members. It was further propped up by the silent complicity of the official 
public security apparatus (e.g. police) which maintained steadfast loyalty to the ZANU-
PF throughout. Not only were civilian members of the ZANU-PF allowed free reign to 
perpetrate violence without consequence, the ZAPU civilian victims had extremely 
limited recourse. Most Matabeleland victim’s testimonials depict a situation where they 
received little if no assistance from the police and other government security branches 
when attempting to report and request intervention in the violence they were 
experiencing. This only served to further widen the gap of mistrust between the citizens 
of Matabeleland and the image-tainted ZANU-PF government. This deep mistrust in the 
political realm and the inability of the state to protect its own people produced a 
deafening silence in Matabeleland. Accordingly, the below text addresses the constant 
hindrances to free-speech that plagues Matabeleland over this time:  
“[T]here was never a time when people could talk freely. You see there was 
always the youth militia…I know in the 80s there was the issue of the Brigades 
and all, the ZANU-PF Brigades, whereby most of the youths...it was mostly in the 
rural areas, they were kind of like integrated into it, you know, it was almost 
like…a North Korea type of situation, the only difference being that people [in 
Matabeleland] were only liberated through education. That is the thing of people 
being allowed to go to school, they went to school, and those who made it, made 
it big and like they understood and they held their views, so they couldn’t be 
brainwashed. But unfortunately in the villages of Mashonaland it was quite 
different. I mean every song was about Robert Mugabe, you know it was just 
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praises for him; everything...even the Zimbabwe history books which are done at 
junior certificate level, Form 1 and 2, they now talk about Robert Mugabe.”778 
 
Thus, in the above paragraph, descriptive weight is given to the scheme of ZANU-PF’s 
relentless disciplinary strategy; the effective suppression of free speech in the public 
realm by the twinning together of historical indoctrination and political manipulation. 
7.4.3. Discipline through Media Restrictions 
 
“He [Mugabe] has effectively numbed the brain through the manipulation of the 
information sector.”779 
 
At the time of independence, Zimbabwe inherited a white-dominated media with 
a clear bias against the newly elected black government of the ZANU-PF. Thus, in 
January of 1981, the ZANU-PF Ministry of Information established the Mass Media 
Trust (MMT), an ‘independent’ public trust whose mission was to ‘decolonise’ and 
‘democratise’ the print media in Zimbabwe. However, with the mounting security issues 
surfacing in Matabeleland, the ZANU-PF became increasingly determined to control the 
information sector and this lead to obvious tensions between the opposition and the 
MMT, which was rapidly being surrendered under the direction of the ruling party: 
“The trust’s ‘independent’ Board of Trustees included senior Zanu figures and 
had few representatives from the minority Zapu party or form other bodies that 
had a history of critical engagement with the Rhodesian government in the print 
media…Zapu criticised the Trust from its inception, arguing that the Ministry of 
Information used ‘the news media as Zanu propaganda tools rather than as 
channels for national development, unity, reconciliation and entertainment.”780        
 
The ZANU-PF’s misuse of the state-run media for purposes of extending its 
political propaganda and spreading hate speech against ZAPU/ZIPRA during the 1980s 
has already been well-documented throughout this research. What is less apparent is the 
extent to which the official control of the media, both restriction of movement and 
freedom of expression, contributed to the far-reaching silencing of narratives; narratives 
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that would have exposed the state-sanctioned violence being perpetrated in Matabeleland 
and given voice to oppositional truth. At stake in this battle to control the information 
sector is a contestation over the powerful role of the media to not only influence public 
opinion, but even more importantly to build a sense of pseudo-community among the 
citizens of a particular nation. In his innovative work on ‘imagined communities’, 
Benedict Anderson offers a fascinating portrayal of the command of the daily newspaper 
in shaping the experience of this surreal community: 
“The significance of this mass ceremony [daily newspaper reading] - Hegel 
observed that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers – 
is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each 
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated 
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of other of whose existence he is 
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion…What more vivid 
figure for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be 
envisioned?”781 
 
This virtual community inhabits a pivotal national space where the masses can be 
harnessed and mobilised for political ends, either constructive or destructive. In the case 
of the Zimbabwe the media was controlled by the State in an attempt to garner 
unwavering support (read here ‘legitimacy’) for its ideological agenda which was being 
undercut by the ‘dissident’ crisis in Matabeleland. To accomplish these ends, the ZANU-
PF decided to sacrifice the media’s freedom of movement and the freedom of speech on 
the Alter of absolute power. The following transcriptions attest to this contestation over 
access by the media to alternative geographical and experiential sources of information 
that would have paved the way for more progressive, objective, and advocacy-driven 
reporting to occur:           
“[F]irstly, the areas were cordoned...[media] were not allowed to go into those 
areas so information was hard to come by; journalists could not be allowed in so 
information was hard to come by.”782 
 
“The international media was harder to control. What they did was they created a 
cordon in Matabeleland North so that we were not supposed to travel throughout 
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Matabeleland North. And all of us... it was forbidden for us to go into the rural 
areas there, it was forbidden.”783 
 
When it came to freedom of speech, the ZANU-PF applied a mixed strategy of 
inundating the public with a barrage of official narrative scripts that mediated ‘reality’ to 
the nation and fear-mongering messages directed at all who would venture into 
disagreement with the ‘Truth’ of ZANU-PF’s position of power or government policy. 
Playing on the word ‘expression’, one respondent quipped: “But truly, the freedom of 
expression after expression does not exist.”784 
“…one is the state media, which then they were given a voice that had to be told. 
And it meant that The Chronicle newspaper, the state-owned newspaper in 
Bulawayo, was not reporting the violence that was happening, you know, it was 
just not to be reported. But the state media was giving the kind of ZANU-PF view 
of what was happening.”785      
 
“ I mean you [in South Africa] don’t have a situation whereby it’s one man’s word 
against the entire country. So that is the issue. I also remember there was some 
stage…in the 80s [when] Mugabe also had Prime Minister’s question time on the 
radio. I don’t know if that was live or if it was pre-recorded, but they always said 
it’s live and people are phoning in, but I had never heard anybody ask him a 
tough question.”786 
 
“So you basically just focused on those things rather than on all their negatives 
going around you. And you sort-of developed an ostrich in the sand type of thing 
where you didn’t ever criticize or argue against what was presented to you in The 
Herald. And The Herald basically was beyond debate. You had this sense that the 
journalists were just being very neutral.”787 
 
“…the ZANU PF government has relentlessly violated citizens ‘…freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without 
interference…’ (Section 20 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe). Out of political 
                                                
783 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
784 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice CCJP in the 1980s). 
785 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
786 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 - (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
787 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
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expedience the democratic principles upon which the Constitution is based are 
being contemptuously disregarded.”788 
 
The consequences of this onslaught by the ZANU-PF government to promote 
state-owned media and to repress the independent media were myriad. Firstly, this 
campaign of censorship produced a wide-spread ignorance and indifference toward the 
plight of the Matabele people among the majority living in Mashonaland: 
“Well the justification of Gukurahundi, not only then, but even now, but I want 
you to know that then, the impression that was given to the rest of the nation was 
that there was a war in Matabeleland…And they didn’t even call it a civil war. 
They said that there were people in Matabeleland who were bent to dislodge a 
legitimate government. And therefore it was the responsibility of the government 
to defend its position and the people of Zimbabwe. So, with the domination of the 
media, government-sponsored media, both of electronic and print media, the 
majority of Shonas had no idea of what was actually happening. They actually 
believed that there was a war in Matabeleland.”789 
“ [W]hen the new government took over, one of the issues or one of the things that 
it quickly did was to quickly nationalize the media into [a] state media. Even 
sadly up to today we still have [that] in Zimbabwe. So from that point of view that 
they now controlled the state media, and they deployed the Fifth Brigade into a 
section of the country; information did not quickly filter to other parts of the 
country, to the extent of people being [aware] of what was taking place in 
Matabeleland.”790   
 
Secondly, the integrity of the state-sanctioned information sector was severely 
compromised in the minds of most Matabeleland residents: 
“Yeah, people of Matabeleland are scorning that [media]. People in Matabeleland 
are not interested in buying The Chronicle that much, people are not interested in 
listening to the radio or the TV, most people here are listening to foreign stations, 
which I think is not right. They should be listening to Zimbabwean TV. And it 
simply tells you that the propaganda coming out of Zimbabwean TV is not 
palatable as far as people in Matabeleland are concerned. I think this part of the 
world could be having more [satellite] dishes on their roofs than any other, to try 
and pick up waves from elsewhere; DSTV and other things and they have no 
interest in their own local home. And to me that is a serious thing.”791  
                                                
788 Hondora, T. 2002. ‘Zimbabwe’ in So this is Democracy? State of the media in Southern Africa 2001. 
Windhoek, Namibia: The Media Institute of Southern Africa, 156. Freedom of expression is defined as, 
“[A] basic human right, vital to an individual’s personal development, his political consciousness, and the 
participation in the conduct of the public affairs of this country”, (p.156). 
789 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
790 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer).  
791 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
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Thirdly, the essential issues of debate surrounding the Matabeleland violence were 
ignored or deflected by the state-owned media who had interest in upholding the 
ideological agenda of the ZANU-PF government as their primary allegiance. The core 
issues that were skirted in the ZANU-PF clamp down on media were such matters as the 
interrogation into the actual motivations of the ‘dissidents’, the true breach of state 
security, and why power-sharing arrangements were not more readily engaged with from 
the beginning. A case in point was the ZANU-PF’s continual default mode of sourcing 
current conflicts in historical racist conspiracy rhetoric: 
“ZBC’s (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Company) conceptualisation on ‘nation’ was 
simplistic. It was based on race: The White and Black race. Based on those terms, 
the world was reduced to two nations – the white nation and the black nation and 
these stood as mortal rivals. The nation was called Africa. Whites were presented 
as Europeans who could only belong to Europe just as Africa was for Africans 
and Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans…Amongst the most damaging aspects of the 
telling of this national narrative through a series of dualisms (black/white, 
British/Zimbabwean), and compressions of the various aspects of the anti-colonial 
struggle into a single field of force, has been the enormous loss of complexity of 
the colonial encounter.”792 
 
This played itself out in ZANU-PF refusing to account for its aggressive and 
excessive violence meted out against fellow black compatriots. Instead, the state-
controlled media would frequently divert attention away from this anomaly and blame the 
dissident resistance on third-force operatives coming from the white racist Pretoria 
(South Africa) regime. One interview respondent who attempted to expose the atrocities 
being committed by the Fifth Brigade against the black civilian population in 
Matabeleland was accused of being racist: 
“I’m talking about [the] Friends of Zimbabwe thinking that I and others are 
peddling and stirring up trouble, trying to propagate the old Rhodesian rift, of 
rivalry between the Shona and the Ndebele, which I found very disturbing and 
hurtful because I had no such agenda whatsoever. I was doing Human Rights 
reporting showing that there was, you know, innocent civilians being slaughtered 
and beaten and starved.”793  
 
                                                
792 Raftopoulos, B. 2004. “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics”. A paper presented at the 
University of Edinburgh’s Centre of African Studies International Conference on States, Borders and 
Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa. May 2004.  
793 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
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The restriction of media in Matabeleland served a number of purposes. First and 
most obviously, it provided the means for the ZANU-PF to hide its excesses of violence 
and present its own sterile account of the Matabeleland conflict. Secondly, and maybe 
even more importantly, by restricting the flow of information through the media, the 
ZANU-PF denied the people of Matabeleland an opportunity to build community; to 
experience the empowerment of solidarity both internally (victims voices were silenced) 
and externally (the outside world could not empathise with the Ndebele cause because 
they were not aware). The continuity of the ZANU-PF’s strangulation on media 
expression is evident in Brian Raftopoulos’ depiction of media restrictions twenty years 
after the height of Gulurahundi: 
“As Zimbabweans listen to the radio, watch the television and read the daily 
newspapers, all controlled by the ruling party, they are being ‘informed’ about 
what it means to be a ‘good Zimbabwean,’ and a ‘genuine African’. They are also 
being told who is the ‘enemy’ within and without and advised to confront such 
‘enemies’ with ruthless exclusion if necessary. For the present this political 
assault has seriously closed down the spaces for alternative debates around 
citizenship and national belonging.”794 
   
7.4.4. Discipline through Leadership Domination 
Moving beyond its control of historical indoctrination, political manipulation and 
the restriction of media, the ZANU-PF continued to extend its surveillance network into 
realms of business, civil society and even religious affairs in Matabeleland. 
Understanding the organisational dynamics represented here is critical. In a universal 
sense, organisational culture as an impersonal corporate entity performs a robust 
disciplinary role on the individuals who may work within its system. The ‘worldview’ 
that dominates an organisation, its policies and bureaucracies becomes the regulatory 
force over the employees’ behaviours. The mind-set and values behind this 
‘organisational culture’ are best transmitted through the positions of leadership within a 
given agency. Thus, it is no surprise that the ZANU-PF embarked on a precise strategy of 
planting its devoted members in leadership posts across the Matabeleland region in the 
early 1980s. Most top government, business, education, civil society, and even many 
                                                
794 Raftopoulos, B. 2004. “Nation, Race and History in Zimbabwean Politics”. A paper presented at the 
University of Edinburgh’s Centre of African Studies International Conference on States, Borders and 
Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa. May 2004.  
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Church leadership positions were filled with Shona-speaking ZANU-PF loyalists (often 
referred to as the process of ‘shona-isation’) and many Ndebele expressed discontent with 
what appeared to be a systematic effort to exclude them from the public domain. 
“…that is why some of the people [Ndebele] think they should make violence so 
that they gain lot of things. Actually there is lot of scandal that has taken place 
here with these people [ZANU-PF]. They...even in Bulawayo here, all the 
positions, big positions, are held by the Shona. And they are continuing to do that, 
they think it’s a rightful thing, but it will explode one day. Not today, even after 
twenty or forty or fifty years, this will come up if they continue. But, if they are 
clever enough, it’s better to come down to other people and say ‘we apologise, 
let’s build our country’, that is what we want.”795 
 
“Go around [and] check who is heading what; you’ll never find … very few 
places you will find an Ndebele-speaking person or from Matabeleland. By-and-
large all the parastatals … the whole system is like the president has to be Shona, 
the vice maybe Ndebele… most of these structures, you’ll find that in 
government. It’s rare that you’ll find Ndebele-speaking person in the top 
leadership except for one reason or the other.”796  
 
One research respondent (Ndebele) relayed his personal experience of discrimination at 
the workplace: 
“Oh yes, it was all Shonas that I worked with, yeah. I can give you my examples 
that I worked at The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe. I worked in 
government; they removed me from the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 
because they kept on asking ‘how can Ndebele assume such a position when we 
have got our Shona people?’ I was the Finance and Administration Director, the 
number two man at The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe. I was seconded to 
The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe because of the corruption that takes 
place there. And so then it was decided that we second our own people from the 
government, at least [those] we can trust whilst we recruit permanent staff. So I 
was seconded. This is how I ended up [in] a post in The National Oil Company of 
Zimbabwe. I use to do work in the Ministry of Finance in the State, while we 
second[ed] someone of the Ministry of Finance to assume financial affairs at the 
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe. And because I am a Chartered Secretary 
then I could combine financial administration as well as the company secretarial 
duties, which is administration really. And then there were five of us that were 
seconded there. I did very well at the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe and I 
was the only one that was picked and then I was appointed to a substantive 
positing, without an interview. The others were not considered. I was picked by 
the Shonas; among Shonas when I was there, but on the strength of the fact that I 
                                                
795 Interview: MS2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 11/09/07 - (Ndebele male, rural farmer from Tsholotsho, 
Matabeleland and primary survivor of Gukurahundi violence). 
796 Interview: AN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader and Peace activist). 
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used to work very hard…until one day one guy who was in the army wanted a 
position came to confess to me to say ‘the reason why I victimised you or I 
rall[ied] people to victimize you, is because I wanted your post’.”797  
 
Discrimination was not only experienced by the Ndebele. It has coloured the interactions 
between the people of Matabeleland and their Shona counterparts and neighbours even in 
the current environment of Zimbabwe. The following account shows the emotive, 
seemingly traumatic link between the Gukurahundi violence of the 1980s and a young 
Shona man being appointed to a business leadership position in Matabeleland in 2007 (27 
years later):  
“Look at the water crisis that [we] are facing [in Matabeleland], the split and 
water take-over by ZENO. One gentleman came to my office, he says ‘we went 
there [ZENO] and simply told him [Shona leader] he was a young fellow, I think 
a baby at the time of Gukurahundi’; they said ‘you are Gukurahundi. So, the 
people that did that thing have not come. They’ve sent you now. You are coming 
to do another Gukurahundi. So you also, we take you to be one [a perpetrator of 
Gukurahundi]’. The man was obviously very angry. But, what is important is that 
the memory is still very fresh, and it hasn’t gone.”798 
    
The ramifications of the ZANU-PF leadership domination stretched beyond the 
private domain of ethnic humiliation, arbitrary demotion, or lack of employment 
opportunities, it extended into the collective psyche of the people of Matabeleland in that 
it impacted their corporate sense of ownership over the local governance and civil society 
structures; the public domain that existed to serve and enhance their livelihood. The 
disciplinary genius of this ZANU-PF (mostly Shona) leadership control was encapsulated 
in the Matabeleland communities’ disempowerment to meaningfully engage in the 
official civil affairs of their own geographical locality. This distancing of the 
Matabeleland citizenry from the intimate connection to the fabric of their external socio-
political networks is easily identifiable in the language used in the transcriptions above. 
The bifurcated identification labels of ‘these people’ when referring to the other ethnic 
grouping, the referencing to ‘our Shona people’ and the vivid words of distortion that 
merged the ‘Shona’ and ‘Gukurahundi violence’ as one and the same thing leave hints as 
                                                
797 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee of the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s). 




to this distancing effect. The disassociation by the Ndebele from the social contracting 
that defines and governs functional community relationships in a local context has left 
behind a profound sense of dislocation for the ordinary Matabele; leaving in its wake a 
paralysing state of disengagement.  
7.4.5. Discipline through Development Constriction 
“But, in Matabeleland, this is a region which exists for them to plunder, to pillage, to 
exploit resources and not to plough them back for development purposes.”799 
 
Matabeleland has always lagged in development in comparison to most parts of 
Mashonaland. The sourcing of this retarded development is multifarious and often 
elusive. It appears that this denial of development had its origins in the time of 
Gukurahundi when the dissident violence coincided with a severe drought in 
Matabeleland between the years of 1982-84. At that time, ZANU-PF refused to allow 
food shipments into certain parts of the region for ‘security purposes’.  
“You know, another thing that happened was they closed off our food deliveries to 
Matabeleland-North and particularly to Matabeleland-South during an era of 
drought, when people were starving. You couldn’t even say that these were 
people who had been caught doing [wrong] it was the overall population.”800 
 
What transpired at this time was the politicisation of emergency aid which led to an 
experiential logic embraced by the people of Matabeleland that they were being punished 
for ending up on the wrong side of the political divide. The politics of emergency aid, 
food security, and development resource distribution have continued to plague 
Matabeleland for the last two decades. 
“You have a situation where, whilst the physical brutalization, the physical 
killings have somewhat stopped, we still experience a genocide which is being 
silently waged against the Ndebele people; being denied opportunities, being 
denied power, being denied resources, being denied schooling, being denied 
access to water, to food, to education, and so on. And they [ZANU-PF] are 
creating a nation of helpless people, of illiterates, of uneducated people so that 
they will be able to manipulate us.”801 
   
                                                
799 Interview: CM1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 - (Ndebele Traditionalist and Cultural Activist 
advocating for a separate Ndebele nation). 
800 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
801 Interview: CM1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 - (Ndebele Traditionalist and Cultural Activist 
advocating for a separate Ndebele nation). 
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In an attempt to understand this development quandary, some respondents fixed 
blame on poor governance and structural bureaucracy: 
“No development… if we ask of a Minister of a certain post and say ‘We want a 
school’, they say ‘Go to the Minister of Education’. For road, ‘Go to the Minister 
of Transport’, etc, etc…but us as Matabeleland [we] don’t have any Ministers, 
[so] how can development come? MPs don’t have any assessment of a 
development. The only thing to the MPs, he must write a Project Proposal, to the 
Minister, asking for funds. Then when those proposals come in, in a group, they 
first get assessed and are given priority. But when there is discussion needed on 
sticky or difficult decisions, then there is no Minister to represent and talk to 
about it. So how can development come? We just have an MP only, just send the 
letter there, leaves the letter there, comes back to us and says ‘I am waiting for a 
response’. After five years he’s gone, they bring another one; he falls in the same 
category again. That’s the only system.”802  
 
Other interviewees placed the responsibility for this lack of development on the absence 
of political will and/or the capacity to provide service delivery in a time-efficient and 
effective manner: 
“Then you look at the road development of we could mention; Tsholotsho [to] 
Bulawayo is still a strip road, Bulawayo to Nkayi has taken now almost twenty 
years for that to be completed, Bulawayo [to] Kezi is not yet complete. And these 
roads are supposed to bring in development; there’s nothing. The NUST (National 
University of Science and Technology) is not yet completed. I don’t know how 
many projects have gone through that varsity. The district hospital is not yet 
completed. And then you talk about the laboratories; how many schools have got 
reasonably-equipped laboratories so that the students can really do reasonable 
science subjects? Those questions are begging an answer. Lupane University is 
still in the pipeline, the Gwayi-Shangani Dam is still in the pipeline. How many 
years now? This year is our worst drought year. The Zambezi project, I don’t 
know. There is [the] Mtshabezi dam here which has got water which is lying 
[still]; do we have pipeline to connect it to the Bulawayo water reticulation 
system? Then you talk of development (laughs). I can go on.”803  
 
Still others attribute the development neglect to an entrenched system of corruption and 
graft: 
“…it’s called ‘Small and Medium Enterprises’, they have monies that are 
dispersed to various provinces; you have a situation where, in Matabeleland, 
despite the fact that there are three provinces in Matabeleland (Matabeleland 
North, South and Bulawayo), you have only one office that is servicing the three. 
                                                
802 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 
803 Interview: JN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele teacher and activist working for the 
Catholic Commission on Peace and Justice CCJP in the 1980s). 
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But if you go to Mashonaland, within Harare, we have two offices, (Harare-urban 
and Harare-rural); then we have Marondera, Bindura, Chinoi all servicing 
Mashonaland. Then, some people are even sponsored to come in Matabeleland, 
who are from Harare, to come and make the applications in Matabeleland, and 
then they receive the money on behalf of Matabeleland. When statistics are 
written, when you look at the records, you’ll think that Matabeleland received a 
particular percentage, but it would have been given to some one who came from 
outside Matabeleland, received the money and went back to Harare or Masvingo 
or any other place. So this is a very dangerous situation.”804 
 
“You see, ZANU-PF is being supported by a few people, and mainly it is relatives 
of those that are in power...the relatives of Mugabe in power who are benefiting, 
you see, out of the corruption that is taking place in government; in allocating 
seeds, in allocating fertilizer, food, and the like.”805 
 
The most frequently cited example of this development deprivation is the much 
needed Zambezi Water Project that would greatly assist the arid Matabeleland region in 
dealing with its frequent drought problems. Unfortunately, this has become a decadal 
project beleaguered with financial and time constraints and as yet has not materialised. 
Many Matebele see this as ZANU-PF expediency, using these delays in development to 
discipline the region for its lack of political solidarity in the past. In an effort to verify 
this accusation, a number of interviews sited the fact that the government completed a 
water project of similar size and cost for the city of Mutare (Mashonaland) in a short time 
compared to the prolonged Zambezi Water Project.806 
“ I was in government myself.  We saw the allocation of monies, the projects, the 
aid organisations coming in. Very little, next to nothing, was ever going to 
Matabeleland. If you look at the roads, the schools, the clinics, the hospitals, 
nothing is taking place in that particular part of the country. Look at the water 
situation, you know, Mutare was favoured with the construction of water, I can’t 
remember the name of the project that was there. But Matabeleland has never had 
any significant [water project], it is a dry area. One would expect that to see 
something happen but [nothing], for a long time, since Independence.”807 
 
                                                
804 Interview: CM1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 - (Ndebele Traditionalist and Cultural Activist 
advocating for a separate Ndebele nation). 
805 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 
employee of the ZANU-PF Ministry of Finance and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe in the early 
1980s). 
806 Musemwa, M. 2006. “Disciplining a ‘Dissident’ City: Hydropolitics in the City of Bulawayo, 
Matabeleland, Zimbabwe, 1980-1994”. Journal of Southern African Studies, 32 (2): 250. 
807 Interview: FN1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 26/10/07 – (Ndebele Finance Manager and former 




“…he [Mugabe] has continued to neglect Matabeleland in terms of development. 
And companies continue to relocate to Mashonaland, to Harare. Not only that, but 
there is a need for water, and the Zambezi Water project [is] one that is a glaring 
example, where, if the government was concerned about Matabeleland, or 
Bulawayo, they should have done something about it. And these are issues that are 
outstanding in Matabeleland. And they continue to cause problems because 
people are not convinced that ZANU-PF government and Shonas would accept 
Ndebeles as part of Zimbabwe.”808 
 
“And even though Matabeleland was always the worst hit by drought … and I 
think that was part of a stick used to punish Matabeleland in the beginning, in 
that they had never ever had their water projects approved…And yet 
Matabeleland was worse hit and it sure didn’t make sense to me that year in year 
out people die of drought and nothing really changed for those sort of people. You 
had two water projects: Lake Kyle and Lake Kariba, which were developed 
during Smith’s regime and before. Why didn’t ZANU-PF do those sorts of things 
for the Ndebele people? So yeah, you do get that sense that it [Matabeleland] was 
actually being punished…”809  
 
Thus, in the violations of dominating leadership positions in the public and 
private sectors and withholding development as a form of political punishment of the 
Matabeleland populace, the ZANU-PF harnessed a totalising function of discipline. The 
descriptive word ‘totalising’ is purposefully chosen in the sense that this development 
discipline impacted the whole person. It destroyed prospects for both material and social 
capital accumulation in Matabeleland. In exercising the denial of development as an 
instrument of discipline in Matabeleland, the ZANU-PF not only ensured that the 
Matabele population suffered physical hunger, thirst, sickness and disease; but it 
ensconced a psycho-social suffering by undermining the sense of collective pride and 
corporate identity in community achievement, and by denying the Matabele people the 
dignity of being able to provide a social and material legacy for the generations to come. 
7.5. Legitimacy Narratives and the Violence System: A ‘Forensic Audit’ 
 
By attaching its legitimacy to violence, the ZANU-PF became the progenitors of a 
violence system that took on a trajectory of its own. This violence system became larger 
                                                
808 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
809 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 




than life, rising above powerful leaders and political brilliance, defying rationality and 
ideology, and acting above the Law. Although the ZANU-PF master-minded a highly 
organised violence, violence by its very nature eludes a completing order. It is drawn to 
the centrifugal pull of chaos and disorder, and as such the systematic violence of the 
ZANU-PF government eventually became unwieldy. It was besieged by incongruence, 
riddled with inconsistencies and as a result certain salient ironies were set into motion in 
Matabeleland. This section explores a number of the elemental components that nurtured, 
as well as exposed the paradoxical essence of the ZANU-PF violence system. 
7.5.1. The Regenerative Nature of Violence 
Buried within every act of ZANU-PF state-organized violence in Matabeleland 
there were multiple narratives of personal trauma and political revenge awaiting birth in 
order to raise their texts of protest. As the ZANU-PF violence kept reinventing itself in 
cycles of endless justifications, it was in turn continually confronted with the dissenting 
voices of the victimised. In response to the victims’ cries, the ZANU-PF perpetrators had 
to grant themselves amnesty over and over again. In a show of ceremonial, public 
absolution, top ZANU-PF politicians and the state-run media issued the following 
sampling of statements: 
“In circumstances in which we find ourselves, tempers rise in the police because 
of the long hours which they work. They find themselves acting rather over-
enthusiastically. We must sympathise with them rather than begin to criticise 
them…What the courts regard as torture now might not have been torture in the 
days of Ian Smith…but because we are more liberal, we have a democratic order, 
any little scratch…is interpreted as torture. I think we must feel for those whose 
duty it is to give maximum security to the nation.”810 
 
“There are people in rural Matabeleland who will swear that the Five Brigade was 
sent into the region to wipe out the Ndebeles. Most of them will confess, on close 
interrogation, that this is what they have been told by their politicians. The Five 
Brigade was sent into the region to deal with the dissident menace. Its members 
garnered a reputation for a type of brutality not normally associated with the 
regular army of Zimbabwe…Fuelled by political propaganda, this anti-Ndebele 
image of the Five Brigade took a firm grip of the imagination of the peasants.”811 
  
                                                
810 Yap, 2001: 227, taken from: Assembly Debates, vol. 7, 13 July 1983, cols 397-98, (Quote by Prime 
Minister Robert Mugabe). 
811 ‘Excited by the Five’ (1983) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 30 October. 
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“If some innocent people are caught up it is regrettable but it is not a Zimbabwean 
peculiarity that in a conflict situation some innocent individuals get some 
bruising.”812 
 
However, in a cruel twist of fate, these acts of impunity, far from breaking 
cyclical violence only served to keep violence alive in the offender’s conscience and in 
the victim’s memory; resulting in a broken society. The generational transmission of the 
twin poisons of perpetrator guilt and victim’s revenge in Matabeleland are given witness 
to in the following transcriptions: 
“It’s still there. I mean for some of us who are healed we can feel it, you can see it 
in others, like you may go to Hillbrow [South Africa], go to some drinking places 
and you sit and the Ndebele guys are talking, you know, and he’ll openly tell you 
‘if I were to meet a Shona guy here I would kill him’, and he means it. So it’s still 
an anger which is there… So I think that’s a problem. The reason why there 
hasn’t been any closure on the issue is that most people don’t know where their 
relatives are buried, they just disappeared and that was it. They don’t know; 
people were buried in mass graves. So that is the real issue why the anger will 
continue. And with time it’s passed on to generations you know. They sit down 
and they talk to their kids and say ‘you see …’, like my father would always say 
‘you know ..’ , whenever we are sitting and watching television and Mugabe 
appears and he’ll say ‘this man is very evil, this man is very evil’. And if you as a 
kid always hear your parents say that, you’ll tend to believe it, it must be true. 
And he says ‘no, the entire clan, the entire tribe of these people, they are 
terrible.’”813  
 
“He’s [Mugabe] trying to woo people to follow him and say Nkomo did this so 
you people in Matabeleland must do the same that Joshua Nkomo did. That is 
what he’s after. Actually, in Matabeleland we know what we are doing, I think. 
We are not going to be hood-winked by people who don’t know what ruling of 
people is. We are just step-watching. There is a day where this [will] come to an 
end, but we did not want to retaliate. But what we wanted, we wanted these 
people to say that that was a mistake and we apologise, but they don’t want to do 
that. So we are watching. Even our children will just keep this. T ere is a time 
where the time bomb will have to do something in this country, but we are not 
praying for that because we want peace and [to] develop the country, together. 
But if they persist in doing what they are doing, there is no alternative. I think 
clever people say ‘history repeats itself’. So what they are doing, they will get it, 
sometime. But we need not be in a hurry.”814  
 
                                                
812 Spring, 1986: 117. (Quote by Minister of State Security, Sydney Sekeramayi). 
813 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 - (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
814 Interview: MS2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 11/09/07 - (Ndebele male, rural farmer from Tsholotsho, 
Matabeleland and primary survivor of Gukurahundi violence). 
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The regenerative irony of violence echoes in these words of then Prime Minister, Robert 
Mugabe: “Those who take to violence deserve punishment through violence because 
those who wield the sword should perish by the sword.”815 While Mugabe used this 
proverb in arrogant defence of the ZANU-PF campaign against dissidence, as opposed to 
‘smashing’ the resistance through violence which was the goal of the ZANU-PF , this 
ancient idiom provoked just the contrary response; a desire for violent revenge in the 
Matabele youth as indicated by the last transcription above. Thus, in the wisdom of the 
sages of old, “Violence begets (gives birth to) violence.”816 This self-fulfilling prophetic 
utterance seems to have revisited full-circle in the Matabeleland context. 
7.5.2. Sacred Violence 
In his seminal work on the Violence and the Sacred817, French social-
anthropologist Rene Girard posits the idea that for the most part the modern nation has its 
origins in acts of creative violence (defensive or offensive) and as such violence remains 
foundational as the modes operandi in the affairs of the state. The challenge then 
becomes how to account for this state-sanctioned violence both internally and externally. 
Girard maintains that this justification is achieved when violence is cast in sacred 
ideology, symbolic worship ritual and sacrificial ceremony. The redemption and 
sanctification that is necessary for a culture of violence to continually be purged and 
consecrated from one generation to the next is necessarily grounded in a sacred space. 
Humankind has always gravitated to ‘the sacred’ as a place to locate its legitimacy. 
Religion has, and continues to indirectly function as a motivational rationalisation of 
existential meaning, life purpose, social order, and political power in many societies. In 
its continual search for legitimacy, the ZANU-PF capitalised on the ‘sacred’ as one of 
multiple means for defending its promotion of violence.      
                                                
815 ‘State to step up War on Banditry’, (1982) The Herald (Harare) 18 September. 
816 Unknown source. The earliest reference found to the exact phrase is from The Sham Squire by William 
J. Fitzpatrick printed in 1866 but citing a letter from 1798. A slightly later reference but from a book 
printed earlier is Alvan Lamson's Sermons of 1857 which has the words right after a quote from Jesus 
about living by the sword (Matthew 26:52), probably explaining the popularity of the phrase. Retri ved 
from the web 27/07/09. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reference_desk/Archives/Humanities/2006_October_24#Origin_of
_the_phrase_.27violence_begets_violence.27 
817 Girard, R. 1972. Violence and the Sacred, (Translated by Patrick Gregory). Baltimore and London: The 





In the last chapter, this research highlighted the use of spiritual intrigue 
(including the consultation of spirit mediums and the sighting of Tongogara’s ghost) by 
the ZANU-PF government and the media in order to propagate narratives of political 
loyalty (see Section 6.5.1., Chapter 6). Taking this further, this section explores how the 
sacred was employed to vindicate the overall application of violence endorsed by the 
ZANU-PF government. During the Matabeleland massacres, the Fifth Brigade often used 
strong Christian Biblical imagery to elucidate its power mixed with threats of severe 
violence. A classic example of this Scriptural parody is found in the words of Minister 
Emmerson Mnangagwa in a speech he delivered to a rural community who were forced 
to attend a rally in Matabeleland North in April 1983:  
“Blessed are they who will follow the path of the government laws, for their days 
on earth shall be increased. But woe unto those who will choose the path of 
collaboration with dissidents for we will certainly shorten their stay on earth.”818  
 
This statement is both stilted and haughty in linguistic style, and sacrilegious in content. 
It is formulated around the liturgical verse of Jesus’ recorded teaching on what is 
commonly known as the Sermon on the Mount. 819 For those familiar with these words of 
Jesus, they make-up the cornerstone of his teaching on ethics for Christian living and 
morality, particularly as it relates to active nonviolence as a lifestyle ideology and 
practice. Thus, once again with gross hyperbole an official spokesperson of the ZANU-
PF government invokes the sacred in its exertion of power through violence. Embedded 
in this verbiage is the rhythmic insinuation that ZANU-PF has been endowed with the 
absolute, Divine right to take or give life as it so chooses. 
 Building on this sacred ‘right’, this study elicited a curious response regarding the 
ZANU-PF and its explication of violence by means of sacred connections: 
“Mahoso [newspaper columnist] wrote a piece saying that the legitimacy of 
revolutionary ZANU does not spring from elections. He went back to David Lan 
[author]. But he always says, even David Lan was forced to admit that…main 
argument [legitimacy does not come from elections]. He went back to David Lan 
on the contract between the spirit mediums and the guerrillas, the bringing 
                                                
818 Yap, 2001: 228. 
819 The Holy Bible (New International Version). 1973. The Gospels of Matthew 5: 1-11. Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan Publishers, 886. 
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together of youth and ancestral wisdom; the legitimacy of ZANU-PF lies in 
that.”820 
  
What we have here is the ZANU-PF’s effort to take their revolutionary legitimacy out of 
the evaluative grip of democratic and electoral frameworks and instead source it in the 
twinning together of the revolutionary passion of the youth and the age-old wisdom of the 
spiritual realm (spirit mediums). In doing this, ZANU-PF attempted to resuscitate its 
legitimacy by recalling its youthful lustre characterised by innocence, purity and 
unquestioning revolutionary zeal, thereby dismissing the fomenting opposition stirring 
among the matured adult citizenry who no longer accepted the ZANU-PF’s dominant 
political discourse without question. At the same time ZANU-PF lodged its revolutionary 
mission in an ‘other-worldly’ authority; the ‘living-dead’ (spirit ancestors who exist 
beyond the human realm), and in so doing, assuming one subscribes to a spiritual 
worldview, they left precious little room for anyone to question their legitimacy. Thus, by 
insisting that their identity and image be grounded in ‘youthfulness’ the ZANU-PF froze 
itself in a historical snap-shot of eternal juvenile idealism refusing to acknowledge the 
complexities of its own evolutionary maturation as a struggle movement. Also, by 
alluding to their origination being rooted in the sacred, the ZANU-PF attempted to imbue 
their power with an external, supernatural essence, and to source their ultimate legitimacy 
in the mysterious unknown, thereby suspending the judgement of that legitimacy outside 
of the parameters of the known, the measurable, and the debatable.       
7.5.3. Violence and Hierarchy 
The violence system thrives on hierarchy. Hierarchy is typified by exacting 
‘chains of command’, authority ranking, class and power differentiation, unquestioning 
obedience, and indirect, one-way communication flows. Under armed revolutionary 
circumstances hierarchical military structures are of the essence in order to accomplish 
the mission of a violent, quick and complete change. However, if a revolution is to be 
authentic, the violent power of hierarchical systems must be diffused and decentralisation 
must occur in order to give ‘power to the people’. ZANU-PF assumed it could retain its 
                                                
820 Interview: TR1, Oxford, UK – 21/10/08 – (White British professor, researcher and widely published 





legitimacy as the ruling party and yet continue to act with a highly militarised hierarchy 
which proved to be an untenable goal. One respondent referred to how ZANU-PF’s 
power and self-proclaimed legitimacy were apparently not negotiable:    
“So I think it was about political power but it was also about a message saying 
‘don’t question our authority’. We will run and you just follow’…And the 
government’s message throughout about the dissidents and Joshua Nkomo and 
everything was ‘there is nothing to discuss’. It was just a question of ‘they don’t 
question the way we run things’.”821  
 
While the ZANU-PF officially gave ‘lip-service’ to upholding democratic 
principles, there was never a sense that the ruling party leadership was genuinely 
committed to carrying out a democracy mandate.  This may explain why the ZANU-PF 
has found it so difficult to truly nurture the space of freedom where citizens can actively 
participate in governing structures in safety and without fear of reprisals or threats of 
repression. In the best of estimations this vacillation between revolutionary autocracy and 
mass-based democracy could have been attributed to honest leadership confusion and the 
conundrums of post-independence ideological quagmire. However, in the worst of 
scenarios it gives credence to the notion that from its inception the ZANU-PF has slowly 
been tightening its stranglehold on the space of choice f r all Zimbabweans; the choice of 
media, choice of political affiliation, choice to publicly express dissenting opinions, and 
choice to be actively engaged in their own development. In her well-executed dissertation 
on Matabeleland, Katri PohjolainenYap concluded that: 
“Thus, citizens’ multiple political party choice became a hindrance to the 
hegemonic plans of the ruling party. To address this, it is argued, the ruling party 
needed to limit choice both in terms of discourse space and in the selection of 
political allegiance…Furthermore, it was emphasised that the ruling party’s 
position was the politically correct choice both in terms of security and national 
unity…The option available is seen as a space of choice assumed and practised by 
citizens to exercise free political thought and democratic rights. However, it is 
argued that this space of choice was contested, as the ruling party intended to 
implement a one-party state and strengthen the party’s power position. The 
contestation of this space where citizens select their political allegiance is 
concluded to be the site of struggle in the conflict.”822  
 
                                                
821 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
822 Yap, 2001: 17-18. 
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Hence, the hierarchical scaffolding that supported the violence system and the shrinking 
of the spatial forums which allowed people to engage in political choice were intimately 
linked together in Matabeleland.  
7.5.4. Violence and Competition 
“If you want to follow it, the choice is yours. And [if] you don’t want to, just stay away 
from it. As long as you don’t open your big mouth and try and create something else; 
there’s competition.”823 
 
The violence system is a breeding ground for competition. Structural violence is 
inherently driven by the force of possessive power; the need to lord over people, 
circumstances or territories. Ultimate violence means elimination of all that threatens, 
thereby giving the illusion of power over life and death. However, the violence system 
becomes null and void, rendered completely ineffective when confronted with the ethic 
of power diversification; sharing power-with or granting power-to other people.824 
Conceptions of violence as competition assist in understanding why the ZAPU and 
ZANU political parties and their armed wings were so circumspect to join forces under 
one united front for Liberation, and why any oppositional voice of criticism became 
intolerable to the ZANU-PF and its decided grip on power after independence. 
In the Matabeleland context, ‘competitive violence’ was manifest in various 
gradations of interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. Some research respondents situated 
this competitive violence in the interpersonal conflicts between the personalities and 
ambitions of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe: 
“But at the end of the day, in 2002 when Mugabe was addressing rally in Lupane, 
he said it more than twice that [the] massacre of Matabeleland people was an act 
of madness, between me and Joshua Nkomo. Then, I can’t understand why he’s 
saying ‘and Joshua Nkomo’, because Mugabe was commanding the army. So if 
you’re saying ‘and Joshua Nkomo’, I don’t know where Nkomo fits in there, 
because he was the victim.”825 
 
                                                
823 Interview: DN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07- (Ndebele retired journalist and one of the editors for 
the state-run newspaper the Chronicle during the 1980s). 
824 Adapted from nonviolence course materials prepared by Dr. Lisa Schaech, Professor of Peace-building 
at Eastern Mennonite University, Summer Peace-building Institute, May 1998.  
825 Interview: RM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 14/09/06 – (Ndebele former security officer for 
opposition party and survivor of severe torture as a political prisoner under the ZANU-PF government). 
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The following excerpt taken from a personal letter written by Dr. Joshua Nkomo to then 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe on June 7, 1983, exemplifies the enmity that existed 
between these two grand political personalities:  
“It is obvious to me why you decided to form the 5th Brigade…so that you may 
use it as a party and tribal brigade for eliminating and liquidating, as you have 
many time said, those you choose to destroy. As a matter of fact, when I 
questioned the formation of the 5th Brigade outside the ZNA without consultation 
you angrily replied: ‘Who are you to be consulted?  This brigade,’ you said, ‘has 
been formed to crush those who try to subvert my government.  And if you 
attempt that they will crush you too.’”826  
 
Other respondents nested this competitive violence narrative in both the interpersonal 
conflict between Nkomo and Mugabe, but more importantly in how it played itself out in 
the rivalry and antagonism between the political parties they represented (ZAPU and 
ZANU respectively): 
“But it was really the person of Joshua Nkomo, it was the organisation, the 
formation of ZAPU which he couldn’t stand, because ZAPU claimed a slice of the 
cake, because ZAPU claimed a role in the Liberation Struggle…And Robert 
Mugabe has never reconciled himself to that. And what better than to wipe them 
off the face of the earth, not because they are Ndebele, but because they are 
ZAPU. Not because, you know, they worked with the Russians, no, but because 
they are being led by Joshua Nkomo. Joshua Nkomo has consistently been a 
threat to Robert Mugabe. Robert Mugabe always felt inferior. He has consistently 
had an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Joshua Nkomo, who loomed large. While he 
was alive, Joshua Nkomo could conduct a political rally anywhere in the country. 
No other leader other than Robert Mugabe could do that. Today Robert Mugabe 
can only hold rallies in the rural areas and in the most urban areas, by forcing 
people to the rallies. And so I would go for the fact that they really wanted to 
create a situation where people would in fact say ZAPU never existed…The first 
person to call it ‘Zimbabwe’ was actually Joshua Nkomo, when he created ZAPU. 
That infuriates Mugabe [to] no end. So, wipe them out, get rid of them [and] make 
them completely irrelevant to the Liberation Struggle; failing to actually realise 
that you don’t kill off people in order to affect that, you really make them icons of 
the history of your country… And that’s exactly what happened. And Robert 
Mugabe to this day struggles with having to do a balancing act between ZANU-
PF in the original, and PF-ZAPU in the original.”827 
 
Thus, beyond the personal competition between Nkomo and Mugabe as political 
leaders; their particular giftedness, charisma, recognition and political clout inside and 
                                                
826 ‘Nkomo speaks form the grave’ (2005) The Zimbabwean, Vol. 1 No 37, 21-27 October. 




outside of Zimbabwe, this competitive violence was cased in the question of who had 
ownership over the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. This was a structural battle over 
recognition in the political realm. The ZANU-PF wanted to see themselves as the only 
authentic revolutionaries, the rightful heirs to rule Zimbabwe alone. The ZANU-PF was 
unable to accept that this honour would have to be shared with ZAPU who laid claim to 
the exact same political-revolutionary inheritance. Judging from the transcripts that 
emerged in this study neither the ZANU, or the ZAPU were the rightful heirs to 
Zimbabwe. Yes, ZANU-PF may have won the vote of the people, but the country of 
Zimbabwe was to be the possession of the people who lived inside its borders. The 
revolutionary impulse of the Matabeleland masses was to own the land; the very nation 
itself, and in so doing they offered their inheritance to the political care-takers who were 
dutifully elected. The ZANU-PF leadership, who were endowed with a solemn 
responsibility to steward not hoard the whole nation, failed the people of Matabeleland in 
this regard.     
 Other narratives suggest that the severe extremities of violence in Matabeleland 
resulted from the disparate armed security branches of the ZANU-PF being locked in 
direct competition with one another in order to prove their violent prowess and in a 
desperate attempt to win the approval of the newly elected ZANU-PF government. Lt. 
Col. Munemo, former commander of the Fifth Brigade spells it out in plain terms: 
“You know, any security forces when they are operating, there is going to be 
competition. Particularly in highly politicised atmosphere that we deployed into 
the period we were in Matabeleland. It appears to me by then there was very 
strong spirits of competition amongst the various sections of the security forces. 
Between the task Force, the battalions, the intelligence people (CIO), The ZNA. 
Everybody wanted to deliver the final solution to the prime minister. I am not 
absolving the Fifth Brigade, but his is what suspicions I have. In this contest to 
deliver the final solution, I think the other [army] people felt marginalised by the 
Fifth Brigade and must have done more harm to get good results. That is my 
perception.”828 
 
The preceding script confirms the interrelationship between violence and competition. 
However, it also inhabits the space of a number of critical assumptions that need certain 
deconstruction.   
                                                
828 Yap, 2001: 229. 
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Firstly, it assumes that all the security branches desired to compete over the ‘delivery’ of 
the final solution (that this was even a legitimate goal to start with). Secondly, it assumes 
that all the security branches were willing to commit gross human rights violations in 
order to accomplish this goal (the concept of ‘final solution’ insinuates this). Thirdly, it 
assumes that the other security branches were jealous of the Fifth Brigade and therefore 
outdid themselves in their application of violence as compared to the Fifth Brigade (this 
displays the arrogance of the Fifth Brigade as a special army unit of Mugabe). Fourthly, it 
assumes an outcome of reward (‘good results’) from the violence system when armies 
overstep the known and acceptable boundaries of restraint (the violence worldview has 
always promoted the idea that the end justifies the means).   
  This line of reasoning is not only flawed, it skirts around the core of the issue: 
was the Matabeleland violence justified? This text trivialises the Matabeleland violence 
by the cavalier manner in which it references the competition; as if speaking about a 
sporting match or a friendly test-game on the field. It lessens the epic proportions of the 
stand-off between the two leaders and their structures as legitimate revolutionary rivalries 
(ZANU and ZAPU), and it deflects from the Fifth Brigade and its role in the wholesale 
instigation of human rights abuses and violent terror throughout the Matabeleland region.   
7.5.5. Violence and Motivation 
 The violence system consistently distorts and covers the true motivations of the 
antagonists involved. The revolutionary violence of the ZANU-PF was often defended 
because it was employed in the service of a morally just cause (the freedom and 
independence of Zimbabwe). However, herein lies the paradox; within every act of 
justified violence perpetrated by the ZANU-PF there seemed to reside another contrary 
‘script’ of injustice that repelled every claim of moral superiority on the part of the 
oppressor. Hence, with each effort by the ZANU-PF ruling party to forcibly legitimise 
itself through violence the opposite occurred; it lost legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Matabeleland civilian population. There are multiple illustrations of unintended 
consequences which resulted in a backlash of dilemmas for the ZANU-PF and the 
navigation of its violence system.  
 Although the actual aim was to ‘wipe-out’ the political base of the opposition 
party ZAPU (see Chapter 6, Section 6.6.2.), probably one of the Fifth Brigade’s most 
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‘successful’ accomplishments was to solidify tribalism and ethnic conflict (see Chapter 
4). The perceptions around the hardening of ethnic prejudice were based on the Fifth 
Brigade’s use of indiscriminate violence, almost exclusive use of the Shona language, 
and frequent recourse to tribal justifications as an explanation for the violence. The strong 
identification between ethnicity and political affiliation came as a result of the overt 
targeting of ZAPU leadership (which was mostly Ndebele) in the operations of the Fifth 
Brigade.   
“The Brigade’s operations were crucial in amplifying both a political and an 
ethnic interpretation of violence: the almost entirely Shona-speaking Fifth 
Brigade regularly used an overtly tribal and political discourse, and its all-
encompassing violence could not be explained as militarily motivated.”829  
 
Research on the meaning assigned to the Fifth Brigade violence by the civilian 
population of Matabeleland, bears out this ethnic interpretation.  For example, the rapes 
committed on the civilian population by the ex-ZIPRA dissidents or other members of the 
security forces such as the Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) were often described as 
primarily abuse of power.  However, rapes committed by the Fifth Brigade were 
perceived as a systematic attempt to create a generation of Shona children.830 
Likewise, the act of building schools by the Fifth Brigade was not seen as 
welcomed development, but instead as another way to introduce Shona-speaking students 
and teachers into the Matabeleland region. For many this display of supposed 
humanitarian concern by the Fifth Brigade was little more than a damage control exercise 
embarked on by the ZANU-PF in order to save-face in the midst of its waning legitimacy. 
In a state-run media publicity stunt, The Chronicle (Bulawayo) newspaper attempted a 
valiant composition to lift the failing image of the Fifth Brigade by magnifying their 
assistance in the construction of schools in Matabeleland: 
“Thanks to the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army which stepped in to 
help alleviate the problem [hindered construction of schools]. In addition to their 
normal function of hunting down dissidents, their trucks are also being used to 
ferry sand, water, bricks and other building materials to construction sites…He 
[Cpt. Claudius Makowa] said it has always been the policy of the army to engage 
in productive projects… ‘It is the school committees which approach us whenever 
they want help and we are always willing to give such free help,’ he said. ‘A busy 
                                                
829 Alexander, et al, 2000: 218. 
830 Ibid: 223-4. 
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soldier is a happy soldier,’ said Brigadier Major Mike Sango who is the 
commander of the Fifth Brigade unit in the district. He expressed satisfaction at 
the progress the soldiers were making in helping to build the school.”831 
   
Apparently, the Matabeleland public reading this newspaper were not to be convinced. 
For the ordinary Matabele on the ground, this hailing of the noble deeds of the Fifth 
Brigade soldiers as ‘good Samaritans’ (to use Biblical metaphor) was nothing more than 
another pretentious, deceptive campaign by the ZANU-PF to try and bolster its 
legitimacy which had collapsed in tatters after the wave of violent onslaught that had 
been unfurled on Matabeleland by the state-sponsored Fifth Brigade. 
7.5.6. The Production and Performance of Violence Narratives 
“What follows is an attempt to put this sequence of events in the perspective of…how 
violence generates mythmaking, which itself becomes a constitutive element of further 
violence.”832 
 
The ZANU-PF was always careful to produce and publicly pronounce a 
validating narrative of violence before they would execute acts of systematic violence. 
This section of the study promulgates a direct correlation between violent discourses as 
precursors to violent actions. Put differently, violence narratives manufacture the social 
reality in which acts of performative violence are then realised. The Matabeleland 
violence which sprawled over seven years of time abounds in examples of official scripts 
of violence being exploited as a means to construct the necessary platforms for violence 
to then be performed in the public domain.  
For instance, in November of 1981, violent clashes between ex-ZANLA and ex-
ZIPRA soldiers broke out in the demobilisation camps located in the densely populated 
Entumbane Township in Bulawayo (See Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1.). These skirmishes 
have frequently been attributed to a number of trigger sources such as the restlessness of 
the ex-soldiers awaiting a slow process of demobilisation, excitable civilian mobs that 
were easily susceptible to politicisation, and conflicts springing out of the drunken 
revelry of soldiers and community members. While all these source citations are 
documented, many Matabele will quickly add the significance of the words uttered at a 
                                                
831 ‘Soldiers to the rescue’ , (1984) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 12 August. 
832 Lemarchand, R. 1994. Burundi – Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press and Cambridge University Press, xi (preface). 
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ZANU-PF political rally just a few hours before the severe violence broke-out between 
these two factions. More specifically, many refer to the barrage of fiery, inciting verbiage 
promulgated by government minister, Enos Nkala while addressing a crowd of ZANU-PF 
supporters in White Stadium in Bulawayo: 
“As from today Zapu has become the enemy of Zanu-PF…The time has come for 
Zanu-PF to flex its muscles. Our supporters must now form vigilante committees 
for those who want to challenge us. There must be a general mobilisation of our 
supporters. Organise yourselves into small groups in readiness to challenge Zapu 
on its home ground. If it means a few blows, we shall deliver them.”833   
 
This rallying ‘war cry’ discourse and the ensuing violence that erupted in the streets of 
Bulawayo soon after provide an element of correlation value to the ‘violence narrative’ 
leads to ‘violent action’ presupposition being put forward in this section. 
In a similar vein, starting in 1982, the year the arms caches were uncovered on 
ZAPU-owned farms (Chapter 5, Section: 5.4.2.), the violence rhetoric against Joshua 
Nkomo and the ZAPU became increasingly virulent and thereafter Nkomo’s life was put 
under threat and the ZANU-PF deployed the Fifth Brigade effectively escalating state-
sanctioned violence exponentially in Matabeleland. After the ‘discovery’ of arms caches, 
Mugabe publicly threatened the life of Nkomo is his usual vitriolic and metaphorical 
manner, “He [Mugabe] likened Nkomo’s role in the Cabinet to having ‘a cobra in the 
house’ and went on: ‘The only way to deal effectively with a snake is to strike and 
destroy its head.’”834 Thereafter: 
“…on 17 February [1982] he [Mugabe] sacked Nkomo and most other Zapu 
members from his cabinet. On 11 March, Dumiso Dabengwa and Lieutenant 
General Lookout Masuku, Isaac Nyathi and others were arrested [and] eventually 
charged with treason.”835  
 
After this, in December of 1982 the Fifth Brigade had its ‘passing out’ parade and on the 
26th of January 1983 it was deployed in Matabeleland North. According to certain 
sources, “Reports of atrocities began within days”836. The first documented cases of 
                                                
833 Meredith, 2008: 61. 
834 Ibid: 63. 
835Todd, 2007: 43. 
836 CCJP/LRF. 1997.  Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace – A Report on the Disturbances in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988. Harare: CCJPZ and LRF, xv. 
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atrocities were gathered and presented to the ZANU-PF government already in February 
of 1983. Then in March of 1983, Nkomo was placed under house arrest: 
“Nkomo was well aware that his life was in grave danger after the verbal threats 
of violence from Prime Minister Mugabe…Shortly after eight that night [Sunday, 
6 March 1983], Nkomo received a message that his driver and two others had 
been shot dead in cold blood at his house. The killers then rampaged through his 
home, destroying all they could, smashing the windscreens of three cars with their 
rifle butts and slashing the upholstery. Nkomo’s wife MaFuyana was with him 
and implored him to flee Zimbabwe. He had done so on Sunday night.”837 
 
As a result of Nkomo’s successful escape, Bulawayo was cordoned off by the Fifth 
Brigade for four days and 1,000 ‘suspects’ (supposed ZAPU/ ex-ZIPRA dissidents) were 
arrested over that time.838 On 19 April 1983, in his official speech commemorating 
Independence Day, Mugabe had these sobering words to say to a rally gathered in 
Bulawayo, “Obviously it can never be policy to mete out blanket punishment to innocent 
persons, but in areas where banditry and dissident activities are rampant and civilian 
sympathy is a common feature, it may not be possible to distinguish innocent from 
guilty.”839 By the end of 1983, one year after the deployment of the Fifth Brigade, there 
were a total recorded number of 2,610 violent acts (including murder, disappearance, 
property damage, torture, detention, assault and rape) perpetrated by known branches of 
the armed security forces of the ZANU-PF. In contrast, recorded violent incidents 
ascribed to armed civilians, dissidents and unknown entities totalled at only 91 for that 
same period.840   
Again in 1984, state-sanctioned violence significantly increased in Matabeleland 
South and once more the ZANU-PF Ministry of Information spokesperson insisted that 
this was as a result of heightened dissident activity and the recent killings of white 
farmers in the area. In that same year, while addressing the funeral of a murdered ZANU-
PF official on the 18th of May 1984, Mugabe indirectly summarised government policy as 
follows:  
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“We are going to see this through to the bitter end. I shall give power to the 
police, security forces, all of them, to mount a manhunt not only in houses, but 
also in bushes, anthills, and trees.”841 
 
The monumental outcomes of this government policy of violence in 1984 are explicitly 
described in the bleak, almost disparaging language of the following text: 
“Although no more than 200 dissidents were active in the area, the government 
deployed some 15,000 troops and police, including 5 Brigade, and imposed harsh 
curfew measures on the civilian population. The area was already suffering from a 
third year of drought…In a move that was bound to lead to widespread starvation, 
the government closed all stores; halted all food deliveries to the area, including 
drought relief…Hundreds of thousands of ordinary civilians were quickly reduced 
to a desperate state…An officer in 5 Brigade, explaining the army’s food policy at 
a meeting with local Ndebele, said, ‘First you will eat your chickens, then your 
goats, then your cattle, then your donkeys. Then you will eat your children and 
finally you will eat the dissidents.’”842  
 
The total number of violent acts committed by state security branches rose from 2,610 in 
1983 to 3,014 in 1984. As in the previous year, the violence assigned to non-state actors 
(including the dissidents) was exponentially less, only totalling 43 incidents in the same 
year (1984). 
Violence spiked again around the time of national elections in July of 1985, as 
could be expected in the highly politicised environment of Matabeleland. The militarised 
youth wing of the ZANU-PF was particularly active in exerting violence over this time: 
“ZANU-PF Youth rampages continue[d] before and after the July elections, resulting in 
2000 being left homeless and scores dead in Matabeleland, the Midlands and Harare.”843 
Other sources depicted this youth violence as such: 
“As the 1985 election approached, Matabeleland was subjected to further 
violence. Zanu-PF Youth Brigades, modelled on China’s Red Guards, were 
unleashed onto the local population, coercing them into buying party cards, 
forcing thousands onto buses to attend party rallies, and beating anyone who 
stood in the way.”844 
 
Describing Mugabe’s inciting rhetoric just before the 1985 elections Judith Garfield Todd 
exposes the connection between violent narratives and direct violent action:  
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“[Mugabe]…warned people prior to the 1985 elections that a vote for Nkomo’s 
party would be interpreted as a vote for dissidents. Many remembered, I wrote, 
how he urged his people to remove the stumps and how Zanu youth and women 
then took to the high-density areas in Harare and elsewhere, looting, attacking and 
killing some Zapu supporters and destroying their properties.”845 
 
 Interestingly, in a subtle form of protest, dissident violence also increased 
immediately after the 1985 elections. There are at least two explanations for this: Firstly, 
the 1985 elections may have been a source of renewed sense of confidence for the 
dissidents when ZAPU was once again voted in as the main opposition (15 seats in 
Parliament) with a sweeping majority across the Matabeleland region, so they stepped up 
their activity. Secondly, the 1985 elections may have been a source of dissident anger at 
the wave of ZANU-PF election repression that surrounded the election period coupled 
with the harsh response of the ruling party to the final election results. Overestimating its 
legitimacy in Matabeleland, the ZANU-PF expected to gain over the ZAPU in the polls 
of 1985. When ZAPU took the region in a landslide victory, ZANU-PF responded with a 
fury of indignation at this snub by the opposition. For example, as a way of disciplining 
Matabeleland, ZANU-PF forced Enos Nkala on a constituency that did not vote for him 
and appointed him Minister of Home Affairs, a very sensitive position of power 
mandated to deal with all security issues including the dissident problem. Nkala, an 
arrogant firebrand of a politician and a master at narrative manipulation, not only 
increased the military repression against the dissidents and the Ndebele civilian populace, 
but used this position to ban all political activity of ZAPU (June 1987) and eventually 
commanded a raid that completely shut-down the ZAPU party offices (September 1987). 
Statistically, during the three years that the Fifth Brigade was deployed in 
Matabeleland (1983-1985), the violence was without a doubt the most severe. The total 
incidents of violence documented for the period of 1982 to 1987 is 7,246. Out of this total 
6,831 incidents occurred between the years of 1983-1985. Of these 6,831 incidents, 5,743 
were perpetrated by the Fifth Brigade.846 Thus, these numerical statistics suggest that the 
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Fifth Brigade was responsible for the majority of the violence experienced in 
Matabeleland.  
This study extends the discussion of the ‘who, how and what’ of violence to 
inquire into the ‘why’ of violence as it relates to the social constructivist nature of 
narrative. This research maintains that with the coming of the Fifth Brigade, the ZANU-
PF engaged in a psycho-social narrative of violence that was profoundly powerful and 
damaging to the psyche of the people of Matabeleland and was instrumental in the 
enactment of the actual violence itself. In this way, the violence discourse that functioned 
as a forerunner to and as an accompanying text of the Fifth Brigade’s deployment in 
Matabeleland only served to further compound the physical scars of violation left in the 
Brigade’s wake. Hence, narrative is understood to shape violence.  
However, the converse is also true; violence can shape narrative. Thus, the 
‘narrative before violence, or violence before narrative’ dilemma is not an ‘either/or’ 
proposition, but a ‘both/and’ scenario. The violence between the oppressor and the 
oppressed is like a conversational dance; a lethal dialogue of brinkmanship. Each 
ensuing act of violence and counter-violence builds up into a crescendo of chaotic 
contestation over identity, space, time and power. Violence as ‘social practice’ becomes 
the conduit through which the script is written, explored and publicly expressed. In turn, 
that script becomes the channel through which respondent violence is then acted upon 
again. And the cycle continues.  
7.6. Conclusion: Sourcing Legitimacy 
 
This chapter has explored patterns of legitimacy; how and where it is sourced. 
More specifically, the ZANU-PF government’s attempt to obtain political legitimacy to 
rule Zimbabwe was the interest at hand. For the ZANU-PF, the fatal flaw in its 
unrelenting search for legitimacy merged at the nexus of where legitimacy and violence 
intersected. In the inception of ZANU-PF’s rule, political legitimacy was claimed on the 
basis of popular vote and attached to the liberation credentials of individual leaders and 
the armed movements from which they emerged. As time progressed, the ZANU-PF 
began to feel the need to further entrench its legitimacy through a concerted and strategic 
effort aimed at the militarisation of the state. This policy move was consistent with the 
articulated goal of the establishment of a one-party state endorsed by the ZANU-PF 
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government, but eventually abandoned in 1990 under public political pressure (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.).  
Capitalising on the patriotic display of a powerful militarised state, the ZANU-PF 
embarked on a covert campaign of violent control that accentuated its disciplinary 
function across numerous political structures and social sectors within the Matabeleland 
region. These repressive surveillance measures included historical indoctrination in 
schools, political manipulation, media restrictions, dominating government, business and 
civic leadership positions, and the constriction of development through bureaucratic 
ineptitude, indecision and the blockage of funding resource flows. In the final section of 
this chapter, the constitutive elements that secured the ZANU-PF’s violence system were 
unraveled. Of interest here was the establishment of the linkages between violence and its 
re-creative tendencies, violence and the sacred, violence and hierarchy, violence and 
competition, violence and motivation, and finally violence and its production and 
subsequent performance.      
Although political legitimacy can be negotiated through social contracting and 
even legislated on behalf of the collective good or the nation as a whole, in general terms, 
legitimacy within the human relational web is most authentic when it has been earned 
through honest interaction. Whether in the personal or public political domain, legitimacy 
loses its very essence when it is forced upon interactional networks. By attempting to 
forcibly impose their legitimacy on the Matabeleland region, the ZANU-PF evoked a 
prevailing public pretence on the relational protocol in the political domain. In this 
equation, the Matabeleland people were required to play the role of contented, obedient 
subject and the ZANU-PF government to play the role of ordained, authoritative leader. 
While this commanding posture of capitulation and subservience on the part of 
Matabeleland was well-suited for the ZANU-PF’s political ambitions of attaining 
absolute power, for the masses it was saturated with insincerity and mocking parody. In 
his excellent work on the ‘public transcripts’ between the dominant and the subjugated 
members of society, James C. Scott expounds on this pretentious interactive 
communication below: 
“With rare, but significant, exceptions the public performance of the subordinate 
will, out of prudence, fear, and the desire to curry favor, be shaped to appeal to 
the expectations of the powerful...The public transcript, where it is not positively 
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misleading, is unlikely to tell the whole story about power relations. It is 
frequently in the interest of both parties to tacitly conspire in 
misrepresentation…The theatrical imperatives that normally prevail in situations 
of domination produce a public transcript in close conformity with how the 
dominant group would wish to have things appear. The dominant never control 
the stage absolutely, but their wishes normally prevail…In ideological terms the 
public transcript will typically, by its accommodationist tone, provide convincing 
evidence for the hegemony of dominant values, for the hegemony of dominant 
discourse.”847 
  
Harsh discipline of the subjugated may result in compliance, but only on the basis 
of fear. ZANU-PF assumed its legitimacy derived from the fear that it so ably instilled in 
the people of Matabeleland through its crusades of violence and terror. However, fear can 
never form the source of genuine political legitimacy. Hence, to the ZANU-PF, as they 
surveyed the political landscape of Matabeleland, it appeared to be quiet, submitted and 
acquiescing in its demands for political recognition and autonomy, however barely under 
the surface a marked oppositional posture took firm root. This root system of resistance 
while seemingly hidden underground provided the consistent nourishment required for 
multiple counter-narratives to not only survive, but also to thrive as living monuments of 
protest silently railing against the legitimacy of the ZANU-PF in the minds of the young 
and  old alike in Matabeleland. With clarity, Scott gives descriptive thickness to the 
dynamics of this veiled protest: 
“…The greater the disparity in power between dominant and subordinate and the 
more arbitrarily it is exercised, the more the public transcript of subordinates will 
take on a stereotyped, ritualistic cast. In other words, the more menacing the 
power, the thicker the mask.”848 
 
The metaphoric use of the word mask is illuminating here. The mask has two pivotal 
functions: to disguise and/or hide the face, while at the same time to present to the public 
a particular image that is acceptable; conforming to the status quo. In Matabeleland, this 
analogy played itself out through the mask of violence worn by the ZANU-PF and the 
mask of silence worn by the Matabele citizenry. The mask of violence displayed by the 
ZANU-PF provided covering for their unequivocal lust for perpetual political power 
while at the same time projecting itself as a form of legitimacy. The mask of silence 
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donned by the Matabeleland masses hid their prolific scripts of protest against the 
ZANU-PF while at the same time projecting a false submission to their claim to 
legitimacy. These masks were motivated by fear of rejection on the part of the ZANU-PF 
and fear of annihilation on the part of the Matabeleland populace. These masks will not 
be removed unless the symbiotic, cyclical connection between violence and the 
production of fear is broken. Only then will legitimacy emerge as a tangible reality in the 
socio-political discourse of national co-existence in Matabeleland. Bona fide legitimacy 
































Chapter 8: Unity – Narratives of Uniformity and Diversity 
 
8.1. Introduction: The 1987 Unity Accord – An Exhausted Unification  
 
“Claims for recognition of the wholly unacknowledged post-independence violence posed 
a different challenge to nationalist narrative: they threatened the new myth of UNITY to 
which both the former Zapu leaders [who joined government circles after the 1987 Peace 
Accords] and ZanuPF now subscribed”849 
 
By the beginning of 1987, Matabeleland was exhausted from violence. The 
civilian masses were terrorised, living in a perpetual state of fear and grief, the ZAPU 
opposition was imprisoned, harassed or in hiding, and the ZANU-PF armed forces were 
losing patience trying to ‘crush’ a small dissident movement that seemingly would not 
die. It appeared as if the season for peace had finally arrived. After a great deal of behind 
the scenes manoeuvring and shuttle diplomacy conducted by then President Canaan 
Banana and other influential persons (including civil society and religious leaders), 
ZANU-PF and ZAPU entered into unity talks in February of 1987. By April of that same 
year, the unity talks were abandoned only to be resumed again in October and brought to 
the climax of a signing ceremony between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo on 27 
December 1987 officially identified as the Unity Accord.850 The talks were abandoned in 
April under the ZANU-PF accusation of increased dissident violence. However, it would 
be prudent to note that over the same period of time as the unity talks were suspended, 
the ZANU-PF exercised its unilateral power through executive fiat, banning all ZAPU 
political activity and later ransacking and shutting down the ZAPU offices in an official 
raid.  
 Multiple political theories of conflict management and peacemaking (ranging 
from highly favourable to highly sceptical) exist to try to explain the coalescing that 
occurred around the Zimbabwe Unity Accord. One of these conceptions, the ‘ripeness 
theory’ of conflict resolution851 anchors itself on the idea that a conflict must escalate to a 
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critical level of maturity before it can be truly resolved. This theory maintains that violent 
impasse cannot be resolved until the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of 
continuing the conflict on the part of all parties involved. If the benefits of the conflict are 
still more enticing than a future-view of peace, the conflict will be prolonged. The 
cessation of violence must appear to be the most attractive option for resolution, before 
conflicting parties can be successfully guided to the negotiation table for peace talks and 
the nation can embark on a profitable reconstruction programme. 
Therefore, in this stream of thought, conflict interventions that are applied too 
early in this cycle of ‘ripeness’ will necessarily fail no matter how skilfully facilitated. 
Put differently, unless all the parties to a dispute desire peace, it will remain unattainable. 
The notion of ‘ripeness’ in conflict resolution processes could be useful in explaining the 
Zimbabwe Unity Accords. After all, the ZANU-PF patience had been spent trying to 
wipe-out the dissidents and the oppositional strongholds of ZAPU in Matabeleland to  no 
avail, and the pressure from internal and external sources was beginning to take its toll. 
However, this research would venture to discount the ‘ripeness’ theory in the Zimbabwe 
case of the Unity Accord in that while it may have appeared as  if the ZANU-PF was 
responding to a sense of battle fatigue, in reality they had ulterior motives. Realising that 
their aim of subduing the Matabeleland populace through fear and terror had temporarily 
succeeded and that by all accounts they remained the dominant force in this conflict 
equation, the ZANU-PF had little to lose in power and much to gain in reputation as they 
entered into the unity talks.  
ZAPU, on the other hand, feeling exceptionally demoralised and politically 
cornered in a trajectory of certain defeat, capitulated. By that point, ZAPU as the political 
representation of the Matabeleland region had suffered heavy losses, not only in civilian 
deaths, but in seven years of underdevelopment. Aware that ZANU-PF was not about to 
renege on its threats of ongoing violence and that in the political climate of the ZANU-PF 
cosmology there was no room for rigorous opposition, ZAPU as the junior party to the 
conflict surrendered. The few ex-ZIPRA ‘dissidents’ remaining quickly fell in line behind 
ZAPU in a classic move of allegiance and deference to their former (albeit estranged) 
political leaders. In this scenario, the ZAPU had much to lose giving up a long history of 
political power and influence, and little to gain except for the stoppage of blood-letting 
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which by that time had already extracted a gigantic traumatic price from the people of 
Matabeleland. Thus, as the ZANU-PF stepped into the unity negotiations with their own 
mapped-out, yet hidden political agenda, the ZAPU crossed the threshold of unity talks in 
sheer exhaustion and tired defeat. In other words, the ‘ripeness’ theory of conflict 
resolution applied to ZAPU, who came to the negotiation tables weakened and 
beleaguered, but it did not apply to ZANU-PF who may have exhausted their violence 
options, yet still had other alternatives and resources at their disposal.  
   This research argues that the Zimbabwe Unity Accord, far from being a highly 
transformative invention, was the expedient alternative to an exhausted violence. For the 
ZANU-PF the ‘exhaustion’ was sourced in a relentless military campaign that had run its 
course and for the ZAPU the exhaustion originated from the extreme suffering of untold 
thousands who were lost in a seemingly endless flow of bloodshed over a seven year 
period. Thus, this study suggests that it was these forms of violence exhaustion, as 
uneven as they were between ZANU-PF and ZAPU that motivated and propelled the 
Unity Accord design, as opposed to it being the outcome of a genuine interest in power-
sharing between two rival political parties. This chapter further explores this line of 
thinking as it relates to the dynamics surrounding the Zimbabwe Unity Accord of 1987 
and its myriad representations to the various actor-agents involved in this supposed 
‘dramatic finale’ to the Matabeleland violence of the early 1980s.  
8.2. Unity Accord: A Triumphant Diplomacy 
 
The ZANU-PF meta-narrative touted the Unity Accord as a skilled piece of 
diplomacy which ushered in a highly sought after peaceful resolution to a protracted civil 
war. For the ZANU-PF, the Unity Accord was a strong symbol of their benevolence and 
willingness to engage in a power-sharing arrangement that would bring about a political 
agreement for the sake of the unity of the nation. Throughout the process, ZANU-PF 
continued to exonerate itself as the only legitimate power and to emphasise that any state-
sanctioned excesses in violence that occurred between the years of 1980-1987 were by 
and large defensive and protective in nature. The ZANU-PF presented itself in a 
controversial and condescending role posturing as the father or the older brother (to use a 
familial analogy) choosing to look beyond the faults of its reckless, rebellious, younger 
sibling (ZAPU) and thereby receiving its son/brother back home with a paternalistic 
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warning, but welcoming arms nonetheless. Speaking after the initial collapse of the Unity 
talks, and the supposed discovery of a link between ZAPU and the dissidents, Mugabe 
had these patronising words of exhortation: 
“Other governments would have banned ZAPU a ‘long time ago’, said Cde 
Mugabe but because some of the party’s leaders were involved in the liberation 
struggle he felt that they should be given a chance and they could correct the 
situation. He said the Government wanted ZAPU to operate legally and as openly 
as possible and not use its offices to further dissident activities. ‘They shouldn’t 
try to get through dissident activity what they have lost through the ballot,’ said 
Cde Mugabe.”852     
 
In full diplomatic flare, Prime Minister Mugabe described the culmination of the Unity 
Accords as follows: 
“After eight years of experience we have examined the position in the country: 
the interests of our people, the interests of our parties and the interest of the 
leadership and we have come to no other conclusion than that unity would 
enhance our freedom and independence…We hope that those who yesterday felt 
they had cause to wage a political fight because we were divided, can now take 
note and cognisance of out unity and lay down their arms, come and join the rest 
of the people and work constructively for the nation.”853  
 
In between the lines of this official text above, other veiled scripts were being heard loud 
and clear by the opposition. Firstly, Mugabe speaks in the plural of ‘we have examined 
the position of the country’, but many critics would question whether or not this was a 
joint examination or that of the ZANU-PF alone. For many commentators analysing the 
political climate at that time, it was well understood that the ZAPU party came to the 
process relegated to a subjugated position of defeat, the less powerful party at the table. 
Secondly, Mugabe delineates a three-prong set of ‘interests’ – those of the people, the 
parties and the leadership - which were taken into consideration. For the Matabeleland 
populace this was politic-speak, knowing full well that the offices (and de facto 
operations) of their political party had been completely closed down and their true 
interests of maintaining a strong opposition voice and sharing power in government were 
completely crushed under the heavy hand of the Fifth Brigade and the Gukurahundi 
violence. Thirdly, as a backdrop to Mugabe’s talk of ‘enhancing freedom’ was a self-
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proclaimed interest in establishing a one-party state which surfaced in the public domain 
only two years later in 1990. Fourthly, Mugabe invites ZAPU (and by reference the 
‘dissidents’) to ‘join the rest of the people’ (including the ZANU-PF one must assume) in 
building the nation. This insinuates that the party that must make the first move toward 
unity is the ZAPU; they must assimilate into ZANU-PF as opposed to any mention of a 
collaborative effort moving ‘hand-in-hand’ in partnership toward unity. In sum, the 
ZANU-PF meta-narrative projected itself as the political benefactor and the former 
ZAPU as the beneficiary of the Unity Accord and in so doing the Unity Accord itself was 
cased as a generous political gesture of the victor graciously opening the storehouse 
doors so that the vanquished could share in the spoils.  
8.2.1. A Necessary Political or Military Solution? 
In the politics of war, the memory speaks louder than the words. The previous 
seven years of non-negotiable, state-supported violence could not be erased from the 
minds and hearts of the people of Matabeleland, despite the verbal accolades given to the 
Unity Accord denoting it as a prime example of political diplomacy through negotiations. 
By the actions of the ZANU-PF, one would have to surmise that the ‘dissident / 
opposition’ problem was only to be dealt with through a military operation, not a genuine 
political (non-violent) solution. In fact, in 1986 Mugabe publicly declared his intentions: 
“The solution in Matabeleland is a military one. Their [the dissidents] grievances 
are unfounded. The verdict of the voters was cast in 1980. They should have 
accepted defeat then…The situation in Matabeleland is one that requires change. 
The people must be reoriented.”854   
 
In the eyes of ZAPU and its Matabeleland constituencies, the Unity Accord 
amounted to a convenient intervention on the part of ZANU-PF after their military 
operation was finalised. Therefore, for the majority of Matabeleland, the Unity Accord 
was a farce; a political union manipulated with the instrumentation of violence. Professor 
G. Feltoe of the Faculty of Law at the University of Zimbabwe summarised this 
predicament in a straight forward manner: “Zanu ruthlessly got its way. It finally caused 
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Zapu to capitulate and come in as junior partners, and have a political unity 
arrangement as the result of intimidation and terror.”855 
8.2.2. Blanket Amnesty: Necessary Compromise or Short-cut to Unity? 
 
In April 1988, in accordance with the Unity Accord protocol, ZANU-PF granted 
amnesty to all dissidents still at large. For many in Matabeleland this was a welcome 
move and the most tangible benefit to be derived from the Unity Accord: 
“The Unity Accord by itself was nothing more than a piece of paper. The people 
of the region [Matabeleland] wanted to see something more concrete and this 
gesture of goodwill [dissident amnesty] has probably done more to convince them 
than any amount of political sloganeering or unity rallies.”856 
 
“Some benefits were beginning to accrue from the unity accord. On Zimbabwe’s 
eighth birthday, 18 April 1988, President Mugabe declared an amnesty for all 
dissidents and Joshua Nkomo urged them to lay down their arms and come in 
from the bush. In a Government Gazette published on 3 May, clemency and full 
pardon was extended to all dissidents who surrendered their arms and reported to 
the police between 19 April and 31 May…By the official deadline of midnight on 
Tuesday 31 May 112 men had handed themselves over to the authorities.”857  
 
However, the ZANU-PF then declared blanket amnesty for all its military personnel for 
any atrocities committed during the time period of Gukurahundi, much to the dismay of 
the multitude of victims and survivors of violence in Matabeleland. 
“In June 1988 the Amnesty was extended to include all members of the Security 
Forces who had committed human rights violations: all army personnel who were 
serving sentences for crimes committed in the 1980s were released from jails. The 
1980s disturbances were finally at an end, leaving in their wake both relief and, in 
some parts of the country, a legacy of health and practical problems, material 
impoverishment and a mistrust of the authorities.”858  
 
While this unilateral declaration of a blanket amnesty for all security forces was not 
surprising, or unexpected within the general bounds of political peace agreements, it did 
nonetheless excuse a voluminous number of gross human rights violations committed by 
the State against its own citizenry, and it effectively silenced any confessions or 
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acknowledgement of complicity in the violence that had so adversely affected thousands 
of people in the Matabeleland region.  
“I understand that in 1987 after signing the Unity Accord, and the integration of 
some of the people from the Matabeleland into mainstream government activities 
and cabinet officials, there was a blanket amnesty that was issued by the then-
Prime Minister and that in itself ‘prevented’ prosecutions from taking place: 
holding people who were engaged in these activities…accountable. And in a way, 
that is viewed by majority of people to be an obstacle to the healing process and 
the need to unite the people of the country.”859  
 
The conception of impunity, while serving a legal function of pardon and a 
political function of ‘peace’ (as the cessation of war) is not embodied with the essential 
ingredients necessary for individual or corporate healing and psycho-social recovery. A 
blanket amnesty, as opposed to conditional amnesty, applied in a post-violent 
reconstruction effort, becomes a short circuit to reconciliation. A body of scholarly 
research continues to amass within the ‘justice’ disciplines (legal, restorative, transitional 
and indigenous)860 which attests to the notion that genuine justice hinges on those who 
have acted in the wrong embracing some form of responsibility for the dire consequences 
of their violations.  It was precisely this pivotal principle of acknowledgement; a 
confession and an obligatory acceptance of past wrong-doing that was denied the 
Matabeleland constituency by the ZANU-PF in this Unity Accord. This collective wound 
continues to fester in Matabeleland even up to the present. 
8.2.3. Unity for whom? The failings of ‘Top-down’ Approaches to Peace 
 
History has shown that political compacts that are jettisoned at a national level 
often fall short of finding a satisfactory means of translating the benefits of the agreement 
to the masses on the ground. The Zimbabwe Unity Accord was no exception. In order to 
truly integrate peace across the vertical sectors of society, extraordinary measures of 
mass-based consultation, direct participation and time are required. Beyond this, the civil 
society and religious networks which remain most closely connected to the community 
                                                
859 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer).  
860 Helmick, R. & Peterson, R. (eds.) 2001. Forgiveness and Reconciliation – Religion, Public Policy and 
Conflict Transformation. Philadelphia / London: Templeton Foundation Press; Galaway, B. & Hudson, J. 
(eds.) 1996. Restorative Justice: International Perspectives. Amsterdam / NY: Kugler Publications and 
Criminal Justice Press; Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. & Huyse, L. (eds.) 2003. Reconciliation After Violent 
Conflict – A Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).    
341 
 
contexts must be mobilised to use their human and infrastructural resources in a 
concerted manner in order to educate, advocate and delivery programmes for peace at a 
local level. So while there were voices of praise coming from both politicians and 
peasants who felt they had gained from the Unity Accord, they consisted of a minority 
grouping. At the signing ceremony of the Unity Accord, Dr. Joshua Nkomo spoke in 
sombre tones, yet clearly mustering a future-focused discourse: 
“Comrades, we in Zapu have always said, and I continue on this signing day and 
this sealing of the fact, that the unity we have attached our names to, Cde Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, means the real unity of our people. There is 
no going back. The continuance of this unity is essential for the future of our 
country. We do not want to leave behind us the legacy of division of the people of 
Zimbabwe. We want to lay the beginning of the foundation of one people, one 
nation.”861 
 
One villager from Esigodini, Matabeleland spoke of the Unity Accord in glowing terms: 
 
“Unity has brought a new Zimbabwe: it’s as if we’d just become independent. A 
lot of bad things were happening in the villages in Matabeleland, but now many 
development projects have begun. Unity has changed every body’s life.”862 
 
To its credit, the Unity Accord made provision for the offer of government posts 
to former disenfranchised ZAPU politicians who had been dismissed in 1982, and the 
release of ex-ZIPRA political prisoners who had been detained after the discovery of 
arms caches. While these shifts appeared to be positive progress, the ordinary Matabele 
citizen on the ground perceived them to be primarily benefiting a few political leaders at 
the top (a ‘top-down approach’).  
“I don’t think it’s effective. I think, at least from my observation, the Unity 
Accord was something that happened at the top level of the parties, ZANU and 
ZAPU, these two parties. But it was not something that happened at the grass-root 
level, and so because of that, even if you talk ‘unity’ out there … but generally 
speaking, if you follow the trends out there you‘ll discover that there is no unity 
here; the unity is up there. That’s why there’s always an emphasis from the top to 
say, ‘we signed the Unity Accord, we signed the Unity Accord’. That message has 
been drilled, as it were, into the hearts and minds of people, because people really 
don’t know, they never accepted that. That’s why today there are still parties that 
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want to call themselves ZAPU, they want to revive that. Because they ‘know’ 
there is no unity down here, the unity was up there.”863  
 
There are numerous reasons for this conviction that the Unity Accord represents a 
failed ‘top-down’ approach to peace. Some respondents subscribe to the theory that the 
top leadership on both sides of the political divide concocted a scheme whereby they 
would restrict the sharing of the national wealth between each other and their extended 
families, and thereby exempt themselves from the responsibility to distribute the nation’s 
wealth (rich natural resources) among all the population.  
“In the first place, I remember hearing about the Unity Accord, that ZANU and 
ZAPU ha[ve] signed the Unity Accord. People had a sigh of relief, of course. And 
it had become a popular slogan ‘there is unity now’. But if you look at it from an 
intellectual perspective, this is what we call a ‘post-conflict resolution strategy’, 
the elite make a pact between themselves, they see we have common interests. 
From ZANU and from ZAPU we fought for this country. And the fact that we 
fought for this country we need to benefit ahead of everybody. And why spend 
time fighting instead of spending time sharing. This to me is the logic behind 
ZAPU accepting to be accommodated. It was actually a ‘class’ accommodation. 
We are in the same class with similar class interests. The ideological issues away, 
but generally what unites us is the class interest. And honestly, between ZANU 
and ZAPU, ideologically there is no clear division except personality clashes. 
And I think over the years they realized that they are more similar than different, 
and for economic advancement as persons, we can accommodate each other. And 
this happens at top level.”864 
 
This intriguing view reduces the Unity Accord to the binding interests of classand 
especially the shared desire of material accumulation of the new rising elite.865 While this 
argument presents an interesting, albeit cynical angle to the unity agreement, its 
plausibility is questionable. This is not so much because of unquestioning revolutionary 
idealism that would never assign such selfish motives to liberation fighters turned 
bourgeoisie, but more on the basis of the feasibility of a hidden agenda of this nature 
producing an equitable outcome. Put differently, in any commitment to ‘divide the spoils’ 
there must be equal power between the parties in order for it to be just and beneficial. In 
the Zimbabwe Unity Accords, this was not the case; the negotiating table was uneven. 
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The ZANU-PF not only came to the talks with more social capital (political power), they 
also brought complete control of the material capital (economic power) to the negotiation 
process. In this instance, while the ZAPU political leaders who were incorporated into the 
ZANU-PF government may have personally benefitted from the material currency that 
accompanied their political positions, it was still only at the discretion of the ZANU-PF 
who maintained an upper hand throughout the process. As they assimilated into ZANU-
PF, the former ZAPU leaders forfeited real control in decision-making over the corporate 
redistribution of wealth in the country. Thus, these former ZAPU leaders still remained in 
a position of dependence on the ZANU-PF after the Unity Accord. 
Others suggest that the Unity Accord represented a failed top-down approach 
because there was not enough consultation of the people and therefore it did not retain 
the ownership of the masses. Key to the measurement of this ‘ownership’ of the people is 
the participation of citizens from all sectors of society in the mending of relationships 
across ethnic-political divides. This, according to the following respondent remains as 
‘unfinished business’ from the Matabeleland violence of the 1980s: 
“Well, from the angle of the politics of ZAPU at that time, having been at a 
disadvantaged position, it was fine, to go into bed with ZANU-PF… purely for 
stopping the massacres; for short-term purposes that’s fine. But as a long-term 
strategy that looks into the interests of the Ndebele people, it is not anything to 
talk about. We are not represented by people that we have selected and appointed 
to go in there. The agreement was between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Gabriel 
Mugabe, their signatures. And I believe even the Shonas have a right to turn 
around and say ‘we are not committed to this agreement because there is nothing 
that united the Ndebeles and the Shonas. It united the political leaders of ZAPU 
and political leader of ZANU into that unity and it did not unite the ethnic groups. 
So, ‘that’ unity itself was alright for stopping the massacres; ZANU-PF was 
satisfied with that; that is fine. But, as a solution to ethnic divide and ethnic 
differences that has a bearing on what is going to happen in the future, that have a 
bearing on the causes of the massacres in the early 80s, it never did anything.”866 
 
Still others posit that the Unity Accord failed because of the lack of significant 
material developmental progress accomplished in the Matabeleland region since its 
inception. The reasoning here is straight forward, if there was truly unity than all the 
people of Zimbabwe could surely have put their differences aside and with the enabling 
                                                





function of a unified government, worked to prosper the nation of Zimbabwe over the 
past two decades. This is certainly not the current reality for many Zimbabweans: 
“When I first heard of that I was happy, just hearing that. Because I thought [to] 
myself this man Nkomo is wise. He has seen what is happening to his 
people…how they are being butchered on a daily basis and he opts to submit to 
the new government even though he doesn’t agree with everything that is going 
on. I actually said he is a hero; he has the people in heart and not himself. But as 
time went on, I began to see that it was just a Unity Accord on paper, like some 
other unity accords that ha[ve] been signed elsewhere, not only in Zimbabwe. Or 
where people have been celebrating lying down of arms and amnesty is being 
given and so and so on and yet, in a short while or if that kind of peace was short-
lived, then there was…war again breaking out. If that Unity Accord had actually 
brought us somewhere, there would not have been the kind of fighting that we 
have had [current violence since 2000]. Let me really call it ‘fighting’ because 
even if strangers go across Zimbabwe’s soil and they don’t see it, but we see it, 
we know it. Because even when it comes to employment and so on there is so 
much nepotism and so on, you see the type of unfairness that on a daily basis one 
ethnic group should be progressing even at the expense of the other group. And 
all those wars are being fought all over; in our industries, in our government, at 
home, [in] the community, and so on. So when it comes to that I still feel like that 
Unity Accord would have accomplished the wishes of the men who actually 
submitted and caused that to come into, maybe, effect. But it didn’t go nowhere to 
alleviate our problems. So for me for the Unity Accord has not helped.”867  
 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the Unity Accord was experienced as an 
imposed settlement on the people of Matabeleland and was clearly only profitable for a 
few political leaders at the top. It did not sufficiently allow the citizenry to partake in the 
conversation about the meaning and appropriate implementation of a viable unification 
process, and it certainly did not bring tangible results in the advancement of sustainable 
development in the Matabeleland region.     
8.2.4. Who Owns the Unity? 
 For some of the former dissidents (ex-ZIPRA soldiers) a fascinating narrative 
emerged after the Unity Accord. Evidently, in a bid to exert their rightful role in the post-
independence violence, these dissidents articulated a mission that located the concept of 
unity as a central organising motif in their dissident struggle. In what appeared to be a 
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public relations exercise, these former soldiers embarked on a campaign to reinvent 
themselves as the progenitors of the unity cause all along. Most likely, this co-option of 
the national unity script for their own enhancement was motivated by the drive to clarify 
their position as insurgents. Hence, they felt the need to re-interpret their battered image; 
a conversion from being seen as ‘violent rebels’ to that of ‘noble warriors’. The following 
scripts give credence to this dissident counter-narrative that attached itself to a visionary 
horizon which claimed guidance from lofty ideals such as ‘national unity’ as its 
organisational aim from the beginning of the struggle. In the words of one former 
dissident: “What we had been fighting for we achieved, the unity between Zanu/Zapu.”868 
The following texts from former dissidents (ex-ZIPRA combatants) summarise their 
views of the Unity Accord and the subsequent amnesty that resulted: 
“We were not afraid. Because we were based on unity, that was our major point, 
to build a unity accord. For everyone to live without fear, to become one people. 
We were not afraid of that [to give up under amnesty], because that [unity] was in 
our ideology. You cannot be afraid of your ideology. You sacrifice, whether you 
die or you survive.”869     
 
“Unity between our parties has removed the reason why many of us were fighting. 
We felt excluded from Government after independence, despite having fought for 
our freedom from the Rhodesians. The Government, however, has now offered as 
a chance to rebuild.”870 
 
Indeed, for the dissidents who found themselves marooned in the bush in 1987, 
the Unity Accord embodied their only hope for mercy and the sparing of their lives from 
certain capital death. It did not necessarily improve their physical and economic well-
being, however, and as such there was the motivation to at least augment their socio-
political standing in society. This they did by refocusing the debate on unity and 
colonising its conception as that of their own. In so doing they accomplished three 
objectives: First, by claiming to have had unity as their overarching goal throughout the 
struggle, they were able to ‘save-face’ in the disgraceful wake of their own complicity in 
a number of high profile acts of severe violence. Second, by aligning themselves with 
unity, it allowed them to emerge as ideological purists; the keepers of the revolutionary 
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call. Third, identifying with the cause of unity provided them with the opportunity to 
reclaim their destiny as the faithful remnant of the struggle. Each of these narrative 
factors assisted these few dissidents in their endeavour to regain the moral high ground 
after the devastating results of the Matabeleland violence. 
However, not all ex-ZIPRA narratives so readily embraced the unity discourse, 
especially those who believed that their revolutionary approval depended on their 
strength in military battle. In contradictory fashion to the idealistic discourse on unity, 
there were other texts that described the great chasm of mistrust that engulfed the 
relationships between ZANU-PF and ZAPU during the negotiations leading up to the 
Unity Accord agreement. Envisioning the Unity Accord as yet another attempt by 
ZANU-PF to “trap” ZAPU, rumoured scripts spoke of ZIPRA military back-up plans just 
waiting to happen: 
“You’ve also heard, and this is now jumping forward to when the Unity Accord 
was finally signed but, it was such a precarious time that, apparently there were 
[military] Units on standby. And what I piece together of Gukurahundi since then 
is, those Units that were on standby waited for just one message from Joshua 
Nkomo, or potentially from my uncle, but from the ZAPU side, that if it was a 
trap. I think very few people trusted Mugabe …[and] if it was a trap and the 
Unity Accord wasn’t genuine, that the war would resume, the Civil War. And a 
lot of the stashes of arms were basically kept back for that purpose; those are the 
rumours I hear.”871 
 
Whether or not the rumour above is ‘accurate’ is hard to ascertain. In this case, the 
research found no corroborating statements to verify this story and thus, it may be a well-
manufactured narrative of perceived military might which gave added value to the ex-
ZIPRA soldier’s dented image. This narrative of military advantage supplied a kind of 
psychological anaesthesia to the wounded pride of the ex-ZIPRA combatants; a false 
sense of power required for the ZAPU/ZIPRA alliance in order to assuage the humiliation 
of having to approach the Unity Accord negotiations as the weakened, defeated partner.  
8.3. Unity Accord: A Compromised Ceasefire 
 
In defiance to the ZANU-PF-generated narrative, the ZAPU-ZIPRA counter-
narrative acknowledged the Unity Accord as an agreement for ‘peace’, but solely 
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motivated by a desperate need to stop the killing and bloodshed that had ravished the 
Matabeleland people and their region. In the assessment of the more serious oppositional 
thinkers, the Unity Accord was at best a compromised ceasefire and at worst a tool for 
the imposition of uniformity. In conflict theory terminology the resultant, prevailing 
outcome of this unity settlement would be classified as a negative peace as opposed to a 
positive peace.872 Negative peace is descriptive of an atmosphere where there has been 
the cessation of war, or the absence of direct violence. The use of the word ‘negative’ 
refers to the action of negation (e.g. negating war or violence). In contrast, positive peace 
refers to a constructive process whereby the negated space (now absent from violence 
and war) is filled with the energy and activity of intentional social construction toward 
harmonious co-existence. Negative peace would be associated with the short-term 
activity of peace-keeping, whereas positive peace would be associated with the activity of 
long-term peace-building. The following transcripts harness the short-comings of the 
Unity Accord with humour and candour: 
“By and large, yes, it [the Unity Accord] stopped the altercations that prevailed 
then. I mean, people came together and accepted [it] for what it was, for what it 
brought, for what it promised. Whether it’s brought what people hoped for and 
wished for or not, is another question… But, come [to] ‘unity’, so it’s a way of 
looking at things at the time, yeah. Horses for courses; the course is long…yeah 
well, it’s a donkey, it’s a shorter course which aims at something nearer and 
attainable.”873 
 
“Well, the Unity Agreement was actually about … it wasn’t a good bargain but it 
was a bargain and what it said was ‘okay, you people have been imprisoned and 
tortured and so on. You can now run Matabeleland. We will run Zimbabwe and 
you can run Matabeleland’. So the people who had been running Matabeleland 
had to stay with the Unity Agreement.”874  
 
“…I had a chance to write about the Unity Accord, looking at its implications; 
politically, economically, and the aspect of development…To the people of 
Matabeleland, that was the time where the war ended. The war didn’t end in 1980, 
but the war ended in 1987…People were still burying their beloved ones and then 
it was still a painful time…And some people even went to a point to say ‘no, no, 
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we will not really take part in this unity thing’. They felt it was not really ‘unity’ 
because they are feeling that Matabeleland is still discriminated and marginalised 
in a lot of areas.”875 
 
In the case of the Unity Accord of Zimbabwe, the resultant status of negative 
peace was blamed on the ZANU-PF government and characterised by the lack of 
transformation in antagonistic relations with the opposition, the continuation of political 
structures of division and marginalisation, and public systems of conflict resolution that 
created alienation as opposed to rapprochement. Specifically, this research surfaced a 
conceptualisation of negative peace which was defined by what ZAPU / ZIPRA saw as 
the employment of coercive violence (the Gukurahundi) as a means to drive Nkomo to 
the signing table, the application of opponent humiliation as form of punishment in order 
to further weaken the opposition, and a forced uniform assimilation int  the ZANU-PF 
governance conglomerate as opposed to a mutual power-sharing arrangement. The above 
three components of how the opposition perceived the Unity Accord form the basis of the 
deliberations in the section.     
8.3.1. Joshua Nkomo: A Subdued, Silenced, Statesman  
 
A majority of the interview respondents in this research indicated that they 
believed that Joshua Nkomo was ‘forced’ by the circumstances of severe violence to sign 
the Unity Accord. That is, in general, Nkomo was perceived to be a principled politician 
who found the terms of the Unity agreement less than satisfactory, but felt compelled to 
sign it for the sake of ‘his’ people who were being massacred at an alarming rate. In so 
doing, Nkomo accepted the risk of being misunderstood as too accommodating, too 
compromising, and too ‘soft’ a negotiator by his own political party and the constituency 
he represented. His political reputation among his most radical revolutionary followers 
was considerably tarnished as a result of signing the Accord: 
“When the old man realized that the innocent people are dying, innocent people 
are disappearing, small children are losing education, he called senior officials of 
ZAPU to make a Unity Accord agreement. Some of them refused, Mabena, 
Malunga, were of those that refused. They said ‘No, the best thing is to [do] this, 
let us write our own things this side, and ZANU writes theirs on this side. Then 
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[we] compare which things to choose and pick [for] the unity’. Then, this man 
called John Nkomo who is serving the government now, he made a disaster. He 
was sent there [and] he took the document of ZAPU, and he threw it away. And he 
only considered what ZANU-PF has written. He put that to [Joshua] Nkomo. The 
old man was very old; he didn’t realize what was written, ‘Please Mr Nkomo, just 
sign here’. Then after signing this, when [Joshua] Nkomo called the ZAPU 
officials when he ha[d] signed the paper [they asked], ‘what is this?’ Whatever … 
they have already signed. So that made ZANU to remain up to now.”876 
 
This transcript comes from an ex-ZIPRA combatant who later referred to the 
entire Unity Accord as a “scheme” meant to “trick” Nkomo and who thus concluded that, 
“No, there was not a Unity.”877 While this source is both reliable and believable in that he 
was well-positioned in the political machinery of the struggle, this same insider-
perspective lends itself to multiple conspiracy theories. Here again, without 
corresponding scripts to give validation to this theory, it is most likely that this text about 
the incompetence of one particular ZAPU leader (John Nkomo) who was tasked to carry 
the ZAPU mandate and yet failed to do so, may have signified the ‘best’ plausible 
narrative explanation for the Unity Accord debacle for die-hard ZAPU/ ZIPRA 
revolutionaries. This explanation and the subsequent blame of one individual offered the 
radical elements in ZAPU/ZIPRA a conflict ‘scapegoat’ necessary for the purging of 
themselves and the now compromised liberation cause. This was a narrative alibi that 
could be readily internalised by the ZAPU/ZIPRA alliance in order to produce meaning 
out of the great sense of betrayal that they felt in the singing of the Unity pact.  
However, as indicated in the early part of this section, there was a considerable 
amount of expressed empathy for Nkomo’s decision to save lives, no matter how it came 
about:  
“I think Joshua Nkomo recognised that unless he reached an accommodation with 
ZANU-PF, those scales of simmering conflicts would just continue. And I think 
that for principled reasons he decided to stop that by, you know, joining the 
coalition… the Unity Accord. He has been criticised a great deal and he was sort 
of just selling out and he saw it as an elite pack that benefited those senior leaders 
of ZAPU. But, whilst that may have been an element, my own view is that Nkomo 
himself was primarily dominated by the desire to bring peace. That’s why he did 
it.” 878 
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“No. You know why Nkomo signed, because a lot of Ndebeles were dying, a lot of 
ZAPU supporters, they were being killed. Nkomo just wanted to stop this killing, 
not because he wanted, he didn’t want [the Unity Accord]. And he told Mugabe, 
if you ask others, that he can’t swallow that [the killings].”879 
 
“…although at a certain point, people of Matabeleland said Joshua Nkomo 
betrayed them because he accepted to join ZANU-PF. But if you really look at 
what was happening then, Joshua Nkomo didn’t want to see many lives being lost 
in the way things were happening in Matabeleland. And he was feeling that 
Matabeleland was getting into deeper, deeper pains and deeper losses and he said 
‘no, let me join these guys for the sake of peace’. H  was a man who loved to see 
people living peacefully, and I think he was a hero.”880 
 
“…there was no unity at all, really. Only that the Ndebele people were afraid of 
being beaten up and that’s one part that Joshua Nkomo had to come to, as a 
rescue[r]; that if he signs the Unity Accord, the Shonas will stop killing the 
Ndebele people, saying at least ‘we are one’.”881  
 
            For the Matabeleland region, the Unity Accord resulted in a momentous sigh of 
relief. Metaphorically speaking, the Matabele masses could now breath again, survey the 
damage and decide how to pick-up the pieces of their lives and slowly return to a 
semblance of order and normalcy. However, in the language of trauma recovery, after the 
numbness of denial has passed, the anger and subsequent grieving ov r what has been 
lost begins. The Unity Accord ushered in a variant of peace, but in the process a number 
of acute losses were also felt on a personal level in Matabeleland. With the signing of the 
Unity Accord, ZAPU was forced to grieve the loss of the critical role of influence that 
Nkomo had played which had been splashed in colourful strokes of paint across the 
political landscape of Zimbabwe for 30 years (1957-1987).  
“So I think [when] Nkomo joined ZANU-PF, he had no choice, and they knew that 
he had no choice. And even when he was there, he had no influence. As it is now, 
Joe Nkomo, [Joseph] Msika, all those people [former ZAPU leaders], they don’t 
have any influence. The political bureau of ZANU-PF is controlled by [a] few 
ZANU-PF guys. Those from ZAPU they are just few there but they are just 
useless. No, it was not a power sharing because even today if you can count 
ministerial position[s], you count ZAPU guys who are there, otherwise there is not 
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even one, there’s only one I think or two. Look at Ambassadors. So, it was not 
power sharing because power sharing they were supposed to sit down and share 
the ministerial positions, ambassadors, secretary of ministries, commissioners, all 
those things, even within the army, [and] the police. Power sharing, it means you 
share ‘every’ dept. of the government.”882  
 
 Not only was Nkomo’s important contribution of political influence subsumed in the 
Unity Accord agreement, but as an oppositional political party ZAPU also had to grieve 
the loss of their voice of advocacy which was silenced after the unity merger. This 
‘voice’ that had been silenced was epitomised in the booming, passionate and fiery 
oration of their nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo:   
“After 1987 Joshua Nkomo who had previously been outspoken, valuable, 
emotional, and always the source of a good quote from the press, became 
completely silent. So he made a bargain, you know…and I think he did it because 
he didn’t want to see his people slaughtered anymore, so he didn’t want to live in 
fear for his life. And he accepted a position of an elevated position that gave him 
a great deal of money and comfort, and also he didn’t have to worry about his 
house being raided, his family being arrested and others being killed and that…I 
also think he had a heart and in the end he could have just said, ‘I don’t want 
anything to do with Robert Mugabe’, but I think he saw the suffering of the 
Ndebele people throughout, by 1987 and thought ‘there is no way that this can be 
stopped unless I make a devil’s bargain with Robert Mugabe’. And I grant him 
that place in history; that he cared enough about his people that he was willing to 
silence himself and go into a pact with ZANU-PF…in order to stop the murder of 
his people…But he kept silent about that and when he died he was given a hero’s 
burial. Whether or not…he died a broken man…I can’t tell you that…[Nkomo 
was] Zimbabwe’s leading nationalist and then was a silent partner to a 
government that he detested.”883 
 
Lastly, the Matabeleland had to grieve the loss of a great statesman fondly referred to as 
the ‘Father of Zimbabwe’. Nkomo had articulated the vision for national independence 
from the start of the Liberation struggle and over the decades he had meticulously 
nurtured a broad-based network (both continental and global in nature) of political and 
financial support for the cause of freedom in Zimbabwe. After the signing of the Unity 
Accord, all of this history and the socio-political resources that ZAPU symbolised and 
represented were amalgamated under the shadow of the ZANU-PF government. For 
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whatever his faults, posthumously Nkomo has been remembered most for his gracious 
diplomatic manner and his sincere concern for the people he served. 
“Yes, yes. In other words, rationality was more in Joshua Nkomo. When Joshua 
Nkomo hugged Robert Mugabe in 1987 and together they raised their hands, 
people were saying Joshua Nkomo is a statesman, because here is Mugabe getting 
away with absolute deception…He [Mugabe] had agreed to many things. One of 
the many things he had agreed to was that when he goes out of office as President, 
a leader from ZAPU would come in as President, first of the party, and then if he 
wins the election, then of the nation. Mugabe has consistently rejected that now 
after Joshua Nkomo has died…And so you do have a situation where people 
would actually see right through Robert Mugabe and say ‘No, Joshua Nkomo is 
more the statesman than Robert Mugabe’, more so today, yes.”884 
 
            For many Matabele, all that the Unity Accord signified was not only excessively 
painful, but it was also infuriatingly convenient and opportunistic on the part of the ruling 
party. After the signing of this pact, the ZANU-PF government clung to all the unifying 
images it could muster as its legitimacy waned. The nation was subject to a barrage of 
repetitive state-generated media footage depicting Mugabe and Nkomo signing for ‘peace 
and reconciliation’. For citizenry of Matabeleland this media blitz not only denoted 
betrayal, more importantly, it remonstrated with the obvious use of ‘selective memory’ 
and a sinister, monolithic recounting of history on the part of the ruling party.  
“That’s hypocrisy, as far as I’m concerned. I’m saying to myself; Nkomo is not 
far more popular now that he’s dead than when he was alive. When he was alive 
he was labelled a dissident, an enemy of the state. But now he’s late, he’s being 
used to kind of make the people in Matabeleland to  be part and parcel of the 
systems.”885 
             
For the ZANU-PF, Nkomo was only a hero after he has capitulated to the violent pressure 
and excessive use of force by the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland. Only after the repressive 
carnage of the State’s military machinery had taken its full effect; only after he was 
forced to conform to the image and brute power of ZANU-PF (unity as uniformity); only 
after he had been grafted into the grand-narrative of the ruling elite, then, and only then 
was Nkomo’s life celebrated and honoured as a hero of the people and the nation. All the 
historical narratives of intrigue and nuance, the stories of the who, what, why and how of 
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the life and politics of Joshua Nkomo and all the complexity of what he stood for, and 
what he stood against were trivialised by the narrative discourse of the ZANU-PF, held 
hostage in the immediate set of circumstances (the Unity Accord), and thus, ultimately 
relegated to the halls of silence in a forgotten history. 
8.3.2. The Humiliation of Uniformity 
 
 In the best of negotiated political settlements, for the parties locked in the impasse 
of violent conflict to agree to share power requires certain degree of humility. When one 
is called to release deeply cherished, seemingly non-negotiable ideals and bow in 
equitable respect to the one who was once the ‘enemy’, all pride and arrogance must be 
reined in. Unfortunately, this mutual interchange of humble posturing was not evident in 
the Unity Accord agreement. Instead, respondents affiliated with ZAPU articulated a 
deep sense of humiliation as they were constrained to conform to the ZANU-PF rubric of 
reality.   
“And of course when people ask him [Nkomo] why he consented, he said he 
wanted to save lives. So you can see he doesn’t have things to bargain with. His 
was merely to save lives by [humbling himself], simple. So this unity if we are to 
talk about [it] was a way of humbling ourselves in case those in power would 
have mercy on us as Ndebeles. But then what’s surprising is why he [Mugabe] 
doesn’t have mercy on us. If we are on our bellies and still he doesn’t have mercy 
on us. Why is he not merciful?”886 
 
In the subsequent transcript, the interviewee gives the impression that the pact that was 
made would be better characterised as a kind of ‘uniformity’ as opposed to a ‘unity’ 
accord. 
“‘Reconciliation’ is not an acceptance that there are many different voices, many 
different groups that are working together. ‘Reconciliation’ became a thing where, 
you know, ‘you come in and you accept our uniform voice. Accept the status quo’ 
and specifically ‘don’t question our version of how things happened in the past 
and are happening now. You…don’t expect within reconciliation to give a 
different view of things because reconciliation means you accept our view. We 
will let you live your life but you must accept our narrative, our view of things’. 
And that was true of the Whites, and it was also true of ZAPU. And it [Unity 
Accord] actually was not a reconciliatory process, it was not a process of 
embracing all variety of ethnic groups, of opinions in Zimbabwe , but it was an 
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imposition of a single saying, you know, ‘everybody’s in the tent but then there’s 
only going to be one voice that’s going to heard in that tent’, a d that’s 
consistent.”887 
 
The various elements of the ZANU-PF demand for uniformity and their significance for 
ZAPU are unearthed in the subsequent section.  
8.3.3. ZAPU was ‘Swallowed-Up’ 
 
Many opposition politicians viewed the Unity Accord with suspicion perceiving it 
to be the capstone trophy of the ZANU-PF in its campaign to solidify the vision for a 
one-party state. Many civilians on-the-ground interpreted the Unity Accord as a structural 
‘deception’ that forced the ZAPU/ZIPRA alliance to succumb to the ZANU-PF mould of 
uniformity as opposed to a call to unity amidst the diversity that characterized the 
Zimbabwean people as a nation. Thus, the oppositional counter-narrative that was 
nurtured at that time was a cynical script that spoke of ZAPU/ZIPRA being invited (read 
here co-opted) into a system of ‘sameness’ or forced into becoming ‘like’ ZANU-PF 
which ultimately meant embracing the official manuscript and policies of the meta-
narrative of the ZANU-PF as the ruling party. The language of analogy that surfaced 
repetitiously throughout this research was that of ZAPU being ‘swallowed up’ by the 
ZANU-PF. 
“So, if you can’t beat them, you swallow them. And then they start…And I 
saw…a relationship between ‘a threatened breakdown in negotiations’ and 
‘escalation of violence’. Now, when a man is threatened to violence and 
sometimes even violence meted against them, and then you are dragged to the 
negotiations table, you are not negotiating on equal terms. This is why some of us 
will say ‘ZAPU was swallowed’. I know some will try to argue [putting] things 
theoretically but really, it was swallowed.”888  
 
The discourse enveloping the metaphorical ideation of being ‘swallowed up’ 
possesses two noteworthy domains of meaning. It speaks to both the physical and the 
psycho-social dimensions of meaning. First, at the experiential, physical level it provides 
an apt description of the visceral feeling that accompanies the process of being chewed 
up, choked down, ingested and digested with the end result being the loss of essential 
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substance or becoming wastage. While this verbiage embodies a rather earthy, biological 
analogy it gives expression to the gut-wrenching procedure of political assimilation and 
ultimately elimination felt by the ZAPU as it was consumed by the far-reaching appetite 
of the ZANU-PF-driven Unity Accord agreement.  
Second, the phraseology of ‘swallowed up’ also possesses a psycho-social 
meaning. It encompasses a description of a kind of death; a dying to one’s own essence 
or identity; as in the phraseology of ‘being swallowed up in death’. At the same time, in 
the course of dying there is always the commensurate process of lament. The progress of 
being ‘swallowed up’ inevitably evokes certain emotion which is located and grounded in 
the travail of lament. The word ‘lament’ is an ancient concept imbued with rich 
understandings of not only the identification of loss and the grieving of what could have 
been, but also entailing the venting of anger and revolt, introspective remembering, as 
well as the search for a future-view; one which could lead to destructive despair or 
restorative hope.889 When ZAPU felt like it had figuratively lost its nationalist leader, 
Joshua Nkomo in the signing of the Unity Accord, a grieving of that individual loss 
occurred (see section 8.3.1. of this chapter). In a similar vein, this personal grieving 
process is mirrored in the collective journey of lament, the ‘valley of the shadow of 
death’ that ZAPU was forced to pass through in the midst of the ZANU-PF demand for a 
coerced uniformity in the outworking of the Unity Accord. The ZAPU lamented its lack 
of representation in governance structures, the lack of an engaging role to play in 
oppositional politics, the lack of meaningful symbols, and the lack of access to 
development in the Matabeleland region, even after the Unity Accord came into effect. 
8.3.3.1. Lack of Representation 
By incorporating the top ZAPU leaders into the ZANU-PF government the 
ordinary members of ZAPU on-the-ground felt profoundly isolated as there seemed to be 
no one to represent their cause. While the ZANU-PF continued to tout a message of all-
inclusivity in the new Unity agreement, the Matabeleland constituency knew full well 
that their ‘cause’ was not satisfied in the Unity Accord and therefore, the incorporation of 
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their leaders into government was not securing them a voice, it was suffocating any 
advocacy on their behalf: 
“ It’s ZAPU being collapsed into ZANU, not the people itself. Well, the people 
didn’t care, to them it was like, in fact, people said Nkomo betrayed them through 
it. Because now they had no representative…So it was the politicians, because 
people say it was the politicians who were greedy, they are leaving us in poverty. 
Because, funny enough, what happens is they say ‘these guys decided on a unity 
pact, oh. Because they want to move and stay in Harare, let them go’.”890 
 
“ It was ZAPU swallowed by ZANU-PF, and that’s it. The reason why I would say 
‘swallowed’; if people like Dumiso Dabengwa, if people like Joe Nkomo, Sikanye 
Ndlovu, who are breaking up here and there as ZANU-PF stalwarts, were 
representative of our interests or could sit in the [ZANU-PF] Central Committee 
and say ‘this is what we stand for and we stand for Ndebele people and this is 
what Ndebele people are expecting’, and it can be listened [to] and we can see 
changes, than it can be fine. But they failed to represent us. We had problems in 
this part of the world [Matabeleland] which they needed to have represented us if 
that Unity was working. I mean they are not representative. So, that Unity Accord 
was something else and not an agreement that satisfies our needs.”891  
 
Lamenting the Unity Accord as a “Grand Deception”, the following respondent 
delineates the lack of representation that occurs in a hierarchical governance system 
where power, decision-making and communication only flow in one direction, especially 
in the case of Joshua Nkomo assuming the role of Deputy President as a result of the 
Unity Accord: 
“There was no power sharing if one is President and the other one is Deputy 
President. It’s no power sharing; its delegation. The sender remains the sender. 
I’ll give you an illustration, which is classic, which is real. The President of 
Zimbabwe is the only position which can be elected nationally, where the whole 
country is one constituency. That is by design of ZANU PF. Everybody else is 
either appointed by the President or they have to run for elections in a 
constituency and win it. In…1995, I did the study of the elections. Joshua Nkomo, 
as a Member of Parliament, had to run for constituency. He was always winning. 
Anyway, in 1995 he said, ‘This is ridiculous. I am the Vice President and, I don’t 
need to run for a constituency. I have to represent the whole country and so I’m 
not going to take any constituency. If Robert Mugabe doesn’t appoint me to the 
position of Vice President, I will not be in parliament’. And of course Robert 
Mugabe had no choice but to appoint him.”892 
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In sum, this interview transcript associates a symbiotic relationship between political 
recognition and political representation. Hence, in the face of political disrespect (lack of 
recognition), Nkomo was willing to defy the function of representation and by 
consequence force the command function as the default mode of operation in the 
dictatorial structure of ZANU-PF to be given dominance. 
8.3.3.2. Lack of an Engaging Role 
 
More than just the grieving of the silencing of their nationalist leader and chief 
spokesperson, Joshua Nkomo, the ZAPU as an organisation lamented their structu al 
marginalisation from any empowered, constructive role in government opposition. No 
doubt the Unity Accord had afforded them a place in the status quo, but in so doing 
ZAPU’s distinctive role as standing in the political gap on behalf of minority groups and 
their issues of concern was effectively smothered. 
“It is definitely not working. You see the Unity Accord was a way of the ruling 
party, ZANU, swallowing ZAPU so that it could not have opposition. Joshua 
Nkomo’s ZAPU was meant to be an opposition in parliament. But oppositions in 
Africa are generally not accepted or tolerated, and therefore now in order to crush 
that opposition which was from Joshua Nkomo and from the Ndebeles, it was 
drawing support from the Ndebeles, it had to be crushed or coerced. It had to be 
crushed and therefore coerced into an agreement. Now therefore the Unity Accord 
has never really worked for the Ndebeles other than working for the Shonas to 
silence the Ndebeles.”893 
 
The above interview respondent articulates the stark contrast of discourse polarisation 
between the official ZANU-PF narratives of the Unity Accord as a vehicle for increased 
power-sharing to the view from the ground which categorically saw the Unity Accord as 
the funeral ceremony for the ZAPU; a structural blockage of any organised opposition. 
On a side note, once again the reader is also struck with the entrenched use of ethnic-
based language and the freedom with which this respondent utilises an interpretive 
discourse placing the Unity Accord as a machination of the ZANU-PF and therefore 
squarely in the hands of the Shona people, and the opposition a creation of ZAPU and 
therefore being seen as equivalent to being ‘Ndebele’.  
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8.3.3.3. Lack of Meaningful Symbols  
Another source of lamentation for ZAPU was the disappearance of meaningful 
symbols in the public domain as a result of the Unity merger. Two crucial symbols that 
featured boldly in the Unity agreement were the name and emblem of the new emerging 
unity government. ZAPU insisted on a finding a synchronised name for the government 
that would bring together both of ZANU and ZAPU identities, and they advocated for a 
new logo for the unity government that was not a carry-over from either of the struggle 
movements’ pasts. On both of these counts, ZANU-PF reneged after the signing was 
complete.   
“He [Mugabe] had agreed to a lot of things including changing the symbol of the 
party from the cockerel to an agreed symbol, I don’t remember what it was, but 
he never did. He had refused to change the name of the combined party to 
something taking in the acronyms of both sides. He had insisted that it would 
simply continue to be called ZANU PF. And Joshua Nkomo had, you know, 
graciously agreed…”894 
 
“And…the way it turned out, it turned out to be an elite pack because ZAPU was 
just swallowed and not even a ring left; in the name or the logo.”895 
 
The power of political symbols is a topic of debate. Some would argue against the 
‘real’ power of symbols and instead promote access to material or organisational 
structures as a more important source of power. However, in the scheme of narrative 
social construction, the power of symbol should never be underestimated. The 
significance of symbol in the political realm is large. Patriotic fervour and the 
mobilisation of masses of people to rally behind a collective political cause often hinges 
on the ability of government leaders to manipulate national symbols effectively. 
Traditional symbols such as flags, parading uniforms, military hardware, and national 
anthems are based on a system of sacred violence. However, new symbols of artistic 
mediums of inspiration, commemorative statuary, ceremonies of memorialisation, and 
infra-structure or architecture that represents national heritage and achievement, all lend 
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themselves to the socio-political production of a constructive spirit of peace and unity 
within a nation or people group.896  
 Had the ZANU-PF agreed to change the name of the newly ‘formed’ unity 
government to include a hybrid identity that would have grafted ZAPU into the 
configuration, this would have sent a strong signal to the nation and the international 
community that ZANU-PF was serious about re-inventing itself and re-interpreting its 
position of dominance in the new equation of power-sharing which was an integral 
element to the Unity Accord protocol. However, by refusing this name change, the 
ZANU-PF sent the exact opposite message to ZAPU; our supreme control will remain the 
same and you as ZAPU will be asked to fall in line with the structures of authority that 
already exist. Likewise, with the ZANU-PF party logo (rooster) remaining the same, the 
implication for the merging ZAPU leadership was loud and clear; the ZANU-PF 
command, clout, and political muscle will continue without interruption. The magnitude 
of this latent threat and the symbolic power of visual images can be more easily 
appreciated if one has ever had the opportunity to drive past the ZANU-PF headquarters 
in Harare; a severe, towering building with a large emblem of the cockerel looming over 
the passer by’s on the busy urban streets below. The message of this protruding political 
decal that punctuates the Harare sky is unmistakable: the ZANU-PF rule is here to stay.       
8.3.3.4. Lack of Access to Development 
 
 In the previous Chapter 7 (Section 7.4.5.), the disciplinary function of 
withholding development to the Matabeleland region was discussed in detail. This 
development discipline was particularly instrumental in the politicisation of emergency 
relief aid (both food and water), and its specific use by ZANU-PF to punish its political 
opponent (ZAPU) during the Gukurahundi violence. However, with the signing of the 
Unity Accord, the dissident problem was purportedly resolved and there was renewed 
expectation among the Matabeleland populace that the Unity Accord would facilitate the 
opening up of restricted development channels. Unfortunately, Matabeleland was once 
again to be disappointed: 
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“(Respondent sneers). It’s a Unity without unity itself. Actually what the president 
of ZAPU wanted was that he wanted people not to die. He never meant that 
[farcical unity]… Because even up to now they are celebrating something that 
does not exist, there is no unity. Even if you see here in Matabeleland, there is no 
development whatsoever, just because they know what they are doing. Actually, 
we don’t know what really happened at Lancaster House, I think it is where the 
trouble started there.”897 
 
“When I talk about the Unity and Independence, as far as I’m concerned this 
region has never had its Independence. The situation seems to begetting worse 
and worse for us unfortunately, even in a number of areas. There was no ‘unity’ 
per say as far as I’m concerned. It was simple ZAPU joining ZANU, that’s it. 
Nothing in this region is really considered important by the present government. I 
even imagine in a situation like this right now where we have no water in the city. 
The last dam that was built was 1976, and I’m told the population of Bulawayo 
has since grown by 77% also. The issue really here is not water, no. Last week 
some of the pastors went to the dam in Mtshabezi, 100 kilometres away, just to 
check if there’s anything happening bringing water to  
Bulawayo, there was nothing, but…They found about 40-something million cubic 
metres of water, and our [Bulawayo] consumption is about 200 000 cubic meters 
a day. So it may take us some three years or so if we were to take from that 
source. So our problem here is not water, but it is the way the government has 
used the region.”898  
 
Not only did the misery of constricted development remain paramount in 
Matabeleland, the citizenry now felt the double punishment of restricted development 
and, with the incorporation of the ZAPU leaders into government, a restricted voice for 
promotion on their behalf. Although the Unity Accord was proclaimed as the channel 
through which all the peoples of Zimbabwe would now to be mainstreamed into national 
development protocols, in reality it served to coopt the oppositional leaders and thereby 
gag them from promulgating the development cause in Matabeleland. Put differently, the 
Unity Accord carried a double jeopardy for the region of Matabeleland; a continued 
neglect of development coupled with the submergence of all oppositional pressure. This 
coupling together of lack of service delivery and lack of advocacy had the cumulative 
affect of eliminating the forum for appeal in the process of appropriating development. 
Thus, the ZANU-PF government managed the Unity Accord in such a way that it had a 
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layered subjugating effect on the Matabeleland region; ZAPU felt ‘swallowed up’ by 
ZANU-PF as they remained consumed in a quagmire of development delay. On top of 
this, they had lost their platform for appeal and protest on behalf of their cause of need.   
8.4. Unity Accord: A Defining Moment 
 
Regardless of one’s view of the Unity Accord, it became a defining moment in the 
political history of the Zimbabwean nation whereby the consummate power of the 
ZANU-PF meta-narrative was at its pinnacle of realisation, and the subjugated narratives 
of Matabeleland went into a season of hibernation. This dormant state lasted about a little 
over a decade until a new round of resistance and protest scripts manifested with the 
release of the comprehensive report on the Matabeleland massacres in 1997.899 Appearing 
as a mirage of the fruit of unity, those ten years (1988-1998) ushered in a permissive 
democracy that was given consent to by the ZANU-PF who seemingly turned a blind eye 
to new levels of freedom of speech and affiliation within the socio-economic networks 
across the nation. The following verses extracted from a poem written by Michael Nyathi 
give the sense of empowerment felt by civil society at that time:  
“A dead civil society is a cancerous spot 
It dulls and spoils the whole social pot 
Leaving an insipid society embedded in slumber 
Its fires being reduced to smoldering amber. 
 
A lively civil society guarantees a bright future 
We need to be informed through literature 
Decisions on crucial issues shall be ours 
Our children shall have all the powers.”900 
 
During that period of years there was considerable expansion of civil liberties and 
the instruments of human rights, gender equity and the development of the rural poor 
were given new levels of expression. Also at that time, the independent media flourished 
at its height901, and the economic strength and output of the country was seemingly being 
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maintained until the downturn in the economy around 1998902. Hence, while democracy 
appeared to be solidifying in Zimbabwe in the decade between 1988-1998, it was under 
the watchful, all-knowing surveillance of the ZANU-PF and eventually, when the 
economics began to spin completely out of control and political unrest began to rise, the 
ZANU-PF clamped down on civil society, unions, media, and the newly formed 
opposition and once again showed its true colours of violence. This time the ZANU-PF 
violence (killings, disappearances, torture, and imprisonment) no longer focused on 
Matabeleland but spread across the nation (including Mashonaland) giving vindication to 
the subjugated narratives about the nature of the ZANU-PF violence that the Matabele 
people had suppressed since 1987. The primary themes of these sublimated Matabeleland 
narratives were clustered around three critical convictions: the Unity Accord never 
represented an authentic reconciliation, the ZANU-PF would easily commit this kind of 
violence again given the ‘appropriate’ circumstances, and finally, the ZANU-PF had 
never expressed any apology and therefore had no genuine feelings of remorse for the 
massacres perpetrated in Matabeleland in the 1980s. 
8.4.1. Reconciliation Unrecognisable    
 
“Organized bands of Zipra followers were refusing to recognize the sovereignty of 
the government…If those who have suffered defeat adopt the unfortunate and 
indefensible attitude that defies and rejects the verdict of the people, then 
reconciliation between the victor and vanquished is impossible.”903 
 
ZANU-PF came to power on a political reconciliation platform that was based on 
what one might call reconciliation through amnesia.  The official version of this 
particular brand of reconciliation was based on the concepts of ‘closing the chapter’ of 
the Rhodesian past and starting afresh with a ‘clean slate’ or a blank page on which the 
new history of Zimbabwe would be recorded from 1980 onwards.  While all this seemed 
noble and laudable, especially after the devastation of the liberation war, it was simply 
not possible, nor realistic.  In retrospect, it has become evermore clear that the proverbial 
                                                
902 Bond, P. & Manyanya, M. 2002. Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism and the Search for Social 
Justice. Durban: University of Natal Press. 
903 Meredith, 2002: 60. Mugabe’s words in a speech delivered in June 1980, after reports that there were 
renegade bands of ex-combatants (both ZIPRA and ZANLA) that had not made their way to the 
demobilisation camps yet. 
363 
 
ghost of the Rhodesian colonial past and the internal violence of the Liberation struggle 
itself had come to haunt the Zimbabwean present. 
“That was just talk, it was just talk. There was no reconciliation plan. It was not 
there. I’m sure even when there was celebration in 1980, I’m sure it didn’t 
happen in Matabeleland…people must have been mourning, people must have 
been mourning because…those who participated in the bush war will tell you 
‘okay, they did notice some traits in Robert Mugabe then’. You know, because the 
way some people just died, you know, they just became suspicious. Unfortunately 
a lot of them were silenced…and those who knew [but kept quiet] were 
rewarded.”904 
 
“ In terms of reconciliation or unity as far as I’m concerned, it is not. They cannot 
even talk about it … I think we cannot even go to reconciliation, you know. I’ll 
come back to that but while I still remember this, they [ZANU-PF] refused for 
Ndebeles to talk about Gukurahundi, but they show us clips of what the Smith 
soldiers used to do, on TV. And they’re telling us ‘we mustn’t talk about what 
happened to us now because we’re opening old wounds’, but they’re taking 
images that happened some 30, 40 years ago, and graphic images for that matter; 
dead people being pulled by White soldiers and that kind of thing. All we’re 
saying is that we want to talk about what happened to us. We don’t want to go 
and pile the bones of the people that you killed, you know. You refuse us an 
opportunity to talk openly about it, to ourselves. We would talk to families that, 
even among themselves, they have never talked about it. You know…recently, we 
took two families …. In this community what they [Fifth Brigade] did was, they 
took people from one community and went and killed them in another 
community, [in] 1987. Those relatives were seeing those graves for the first time 
[in 2007]; they’ve never seen those graves.”905  
 
The necessary truth-telling and healing processes around the Matabeleland 
violence have not been truly comprehended or fully allowed to surface in the public 
discourse in Zimbabwe to date.  While this debate did flourish at the release of the 
CCJP/LRF Report, and the ensuing dialogue through the private cyber-space of Zimnet in 
the 1990s, the government of the day has yet to engage in this dialogue directly with the 
communities of Matabeleland.  When confronted with the evidence of violent atrocities 
in the early 1980s, the government has continually responded with denial and 
justifications. Massacres were brought to light with the uncovering of the mass graves at 
                                                
904 Interview: DL1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 11/08/06 - (Ndebele Journalist employed as a business 
editor for a prominent newspaper). 
905 Interview: DN3, Johannesburg, South Africa – 30/10/07 – (Ndebele NGO peace worker facilitating 




the location of Mpindo exposed by torrential rains, and the discovery of mine shafts filled 
with human remains at Antelope and Silobela (Old Hat Mine # 2) which were standing in 
disuse.   
“Bodies of guerrillas are known to have been thrown down mine shafts in the 
1970s by the Rhodesian army and the first response of the government to finds in 
the 1990s was that these were Rhodesian victims. However, post-independence 
minted coins found in the pockets of the deceased, dated the remains in Antelope 
Mine to the 1980s.”906 
 
Sources indicated that when these mass killings were publicized, local police and Central 
Intelligence Officers (CIO’s) were sent to guard these sites under investigation.  Local 
people were threatened if they came forward with information, visitors were refused on 
site and there is strong reason to believe that evidence was tampered with.907 
“ Interviews on record, both archivally and recently, refer to nightly departures of 
trucks from Bhalagwe [location of Antelope Mine], taking away bodies, Accounts 
by villagers living near the mine confirm that was the destination.”908  
 
The below interview respondent narrates a traumatic script, a common occurrence where 
ZANU-PF government construction or utility workers stumbled across shallow graves of 
victims of Gukurahundi violence in Matabeleland: 
“And tragically in one instance the electrical power company actually dug one of 
the graves when they were putting up the pole, and we’re saying they’re never 
conf[irm]…To make matters worse, they were Shona employees of this power 
company. So if … to people, ‘you came and you killed us, and now you are 
desecrating our graves’ there’s no respect. Why couldn’t they have asked? And 
when they discovered that there were bones there, all they did was to shift…I’m 
not going to talk about metres but centimetres from where the graves are, literally 
centimetres. And, you know, people feel disrespected, you feel like you don’t count 
in the grand plan of ZANU-PF. So all these things…there’s too many reminders, 
so we cannot even talk about reconciliation because there is no conducive 
atmosphere of reconciliation. We actually need to begin to talk about the 
stories.”909 
 
Speaking of the traumatic fear that still remains in Matabeleland, this interview transcript 
links that ever present fear with the inability to discover or experience true reconciliation: 
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“This is why some of us will argue that ‘there has never been unity’, it is not 
there. People still have this fear, understandably so. Gukurahundi was not a joke; 
it was brutal in its form. And so people [were] brutalized…even now, it’s a 
strategy that they used…somebody walks in here and say[s] ‘I’m from the 
President’s Office’ ; that is meant to give you peace of mind. ‘Ah, welcome 
gentlemen from the President’s Office’. In Matabeleland it is not like that. 
Somebody says ‘from the President’s Office’...[you] disappear, because a lot of 
people disappeared. Some of them I knew. One or two in Silobela disappeared up 
to now. Traces unknown and you think you can talk peace, and you think you can 
talk unity under those [circumstances]. There has never been any move to 
reconcile; none at all. All that we read is ‘a moment of madness’. ‘Madness’ (?)  
You can’t end there. So I think the challenges lie ahead. This nation...in fact for 
now, there is no nation. As far as I’m concerned there is no nation, there are 
several nations sharing common borders.”910  
 
In sum, any inference to the Unity Accord heralding reconciliation in 
Matabeleland has been aggravated. It has been punctuated by the stark and shocking 
discovery of unidentified human remains scattered across the region in shallow graves, 
and it has been left mute in face of the continual censorship of the Matabele victims’ 
stories of pain and trauma. These harrowing tales reside in the bodies of Matabeleland 
survivors as permanent reminders of the horrific violence of Gukurahundi in the early 
1980s.   
8.4.2. ‘Forced to Resort to the Same Measures Again’ 
 
Another measure of the validity of the Unity Accord is the on-going official 
ZANU-PF narrative discourse that transpired after its ratification. Once again, ZANU-PF 
failed to convince the Matabeleland public of its bona fide interest in unification. In a 
public address made in 1993 as part of his ‘Meet the People’ national road show, Robert 
Mugabe categorically stated his response to the Fifth Brigade atrocities in Matabeleland: 
“I won’t apologise. This is what happens in a war.”911 In October of 1999, the Financial 
Gazette published an article written by ZANU-PF stalwart Nathan Shamuyarira declaring 
that the Matabeleland violence of the early 1980s was “handled the only way possible.” 
In a rebuttal article entitled, ‘Shamuyarira explodes myth of 1987 Unity Accord’, Judith 
Garfield Todd had this to say: 
                                                
910 Interview: PN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (Ndebele historian, author, researcher and 
archivist). 
911 ‘Tell me Another One’, (1993) Horizon (Harare) January, 11. 
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“I wrote that by stating that the 1980s disturbances had been ‘handled the only 
way possible’, Shamuyarira had dashed my hope that those complicit in state 
violence unleashed since 1980 were repentant. In his words: ‘If such a situation 
were to arise in any part of the country today, the government may be forced to 
resort to the same measures again as soon as it feels that law and order are being 
threatened.”912    
 
These official statements by senior ZANU-PF politicians sent at least two highly 
troubling messages to the Zimbabwe public in general and the Matabeleland region 
specifically. First, Mugabe’s defiant refusal to apologise magnified the violence 
worldview of ZANU-PF and only served to confirm the lack of change in the entrenched, 
forceful mind-set that still prevailed in government circles. Second, the printed comments 
by Shamuyarira inferring that ZANU-PF would not do anything differently in 
Matabeleland insinuated that there had been no dismantling of the violence system or the 
structural components that support it. Therefore, if the ZANU-PF government expressed 
willingness to use the same level of state-sanctioned violent force twelve years (1999) 
after the signing of the Unity Accord (1987), it would serve to correlate that the ZANU-
PF conception of ‘unity’ was still heavily defined by uniformity and not a respectful 
diversification of political thought and power.        
8.4.3. Remorse Denied 
 
In May of 1997, before its official publication, ‘Breaking the Silence’ - the most 
comprehensive report on the Matabeleland massacres prepared by the Catholic 
Commission on Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) - 
was leaked to the press. This leakage opened up a furore of political debate across the 
country regarding the Matabeleland violence. The Chronicle of Bulawayo portrayed the 
report and the issues of debate as follows:   
“Shedding light into this otherwise buried part of Zimbabwe’s post independence 
history, the detailed 200-page atrocities report…says Government forces caused 
great pain and suffering as they swept through the villages. Thousands of innocent 
people are said to have been killed or abducted as it seemed they were being 
punished for harbouring dissidents.”913  
 
                                                
912 Todd, 2007: 405. 




Concerned about the political ramifications of the early release of this document, 
the CCJP withdrew its plans to print the report. However, the LRF resolved not to let this 
media break hamper its plans to go public and mandated the publishing of the report in 
that same year. 
“…it was ‘done’ by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace but it was put 
out by the Legal Resources Centre. The Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace was too afraid to publicly challenge Mugabe by putting that out. And so 
they sat on that report for a couple of years and it was the Legal Resources Centre 
that finally said ‘no, no, we were the partners in this and this is our reporting too 
and we’re putting it out. And you may be too frightened to do that but we’re 
going to put it out’. I think then the Catholic Church has become more outspoken 
in its criticism of the Mugabe government but the Catholic bishops were afraid. 
They knew Mugabe, they knew that ‘any thing’ from what [they were] saying 
would be completely rejected and be a kind of announcement of oppression or 
antagonism between them, so it was the Legal Resources Centre that had to do 
that.”914  
 
When a copy of the CCJP/LRF Report was put into the hands of President Robert 
Mugabe, he offered this cautious and rather ambiguous public response: 
“If we dig up past history, we wreck the survival of the nation and can tear our 
people apart into tribes and villagism will prevail…History should be a register 
that will remain as what never to do. If that was wrong and went against the 
sacred tenets of humanity we must never repeat [it], we must never oppress 
man.”915  
 
While ZANU-PF claimed this as their certified ‘apology’, many others in Matabeleland 
and beyond questioned the legitimacy of this statement and its content consistency; some 
saying it was an apology and others saying, an excuse. Nonetheless, this utterance was 
both obscure and nebulous, no matter the angle from which one might choose to 
approach the analysis of this discourse. This distraction was probably exactly what the 
ZANU-PF desired from this communication; a debatable confusion. Always the one to 
avoid being caught out or tacked down, this expression gave ZANU-PF just enough 
emotive sentiment to appease the critics, but not too much to lose the trust of the 
loyalists. What is abundantly clear is that this scripted, executive ‘apology’ was highly 
conditional. The operative word throughout this text was ‘if’. For the wrong-doer, to start 
                                                
914 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
915 ‘5 Brigade atrocities a mistake’ (1997) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 11 May. 
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an apology (even with good intentions) with the phrase, ‘if that was wrong’ is to 
effectively negate the suffering of the victim. This state-sanctioned apology was 
emotionally received by the victimised masses as their powerful oppressor rationalising 
his wrong-doing. All hints at a sincere apology at a national or individual level hung on, 
or were lost in, that small but extremely potent word ‘if’. Accentuating the importance of 
public political apology, journalist Benedicta Madawo penned these words: 
“APOLOGY, a small word yet replete with meaning. To a true lover or 
committed Christian it may come easily, but to the people of Matabeleland it is a 
big word they would very much want to hear from the lips of Government.”916  
    
Not only did Mugabe refuse to offer an apology, but almost in the same breath he 
railed on those responsible for the production of the report calling on his fellow 
Zimbabweans to be “wary of detractors of unity, who disguised themselves in religious 
garb.”917 This demonstrates a classic discourse from the violence system when it feels 
itself to be under threat. First, this formulation assumes that it is not possible or desirable 
to revisit the past as it purportedly destroys the bonds of unity. The violence system has 
much too lose if the atrocities of past violence can be identified, interrogated and 
integrated into the healing of a people group or nation. Thus, the violence system will 
necessarily employ a fear tactic that lays claim to the premise that resolving the pain of 
the past and true unity in the present are mutually exclusive phenomena. The ZANU-PF 
violence system had no place for the co-habitation of the ideas that the people of 
Matabeleland could have recovered from their past hurts and yet still dwelt in unity with 
the rest of Zimbabwe in ‘real-time’ understanding. 
   Second, the violence system often insinuates that anyone (more specifically 
peace practitioners and advocates) who question or act against the prevailing violence 
status quo are considered to be trouble-makers. Those who promote structural change 
away from oppression and toward justice are accused of being ‘rabble-rousers’. The 
violence system, as with all structures of power, is configured for self-protection. Bearing 
this in mind, when the acclamation of peace and unity for the future requires dismantling 
the violence in the ‘now’, the violence system assumes a posture of hyper-preservation. 
                                                
916 ‘Apology is all the people of Matabeleland want to hear’ (1998) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 14 
September. 
917 ‘5 Brigade atrocities a mistake’ (1997) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 11 May. 
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The ZANU-PF’s attempt to publicly discredit and undermine the image and legitimacy of 
those advocating for positive peace in Zimbabwe was a blatant outgrowth of its desperate 
need to try to remain impenetrable.   
Mugabe’s defence of the Matabeleland violence became increasingly shrill and 
paradoxical the more he spoke and with ironic flare he proceeded to hold himself up as 
champion of reconciliation: 
“Giving himself as an example of true reconciliation and forgiveness, he said 
people should not go by happenings of the past. ‘If we go by the past, what cause 
would compel us to keep Ian Smith (former Rhodesian prime Minister). Perhaps I 
would be the first to cut his throat.’ He said.”918 
 
More precisely, Mugabe is quoted to have expounded this startling line of vengeance in 
even more detail as recorded in another Zimbabwean newspaper published on the same 
date: 
“If we go by the past, would Ian Smith be alive today? What will there be to 
impel us to keep him alive? Perhaps I will be the first man to go and cut his throat 
and open up his belly but no we shall never do that.”919  
 
Despite the attached moral disclaimer at the end of this diatribe, one cannot help 
but associate these words as descriptive detail for the actual violence carried out by the 
Fifth Brigade on the Matabeleland civilian population in the early 1980s. The most 
profound message from this official verbiage is two-fold. In the first place, through his 
words, Mugabe elevated violent revenge as not only permissible but apparently a quite 
justifiable and valid human response. With this precedence established, Mugabe furthers 
an ironic twist of logic that seems to suggest that while violent revenge would serve a 
noble cause, it is out of the magnanimous benevolence of his personhood that he has 
decided to transcend this defendable urge and walk on a higher plane of existence. In the 
second place, in this short but toxic tirade, it becomes patently understood that the 
ZANU-PF views itself as possessing the moral mandate and the political power alone to 
exact this form of violent revenge on whomsoever it wills. This kind of declaration on its 
own leaves little room for expressions of remorse to emerge.   
                                                
918 Ibid. 
919 ‘Beware of mischief makers – President’ (1997) Sunday Mail (Harare) 11 May. 
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 The official government response to the report on the Matabeleland atrocities left 
a sting of discouragement on the Matabeleland region. However, the public release of the 
report in and of itself was an exceptionally empowering happening for those victims and 
survivors who had been privately carrying their traumatic pain for so many years. 
Although their suffering was not fully recognised by the government authorities, it was 
now a documented, undeniable reality that needed to be grappled with by the majority of 
Zimbabweans both Shona and Ndebele alike.  
“Despite the hostile government response, these reports played an important role 
within Matabeleland for the public confirmation for the first time of the existence 
of government atrocities, and their sparking of a public debate about the need for 
acknowledgement and healing.”920  
 
The human dignity that is transmitted in this universal acknowledgement of suffering is 
often hard to measure in concrete terms. Thus, the release of this report, while only a first 
step, nonetheless must be considered a milestone in th  long journey of recognition and 
healing for the people of Matabeleland. 
8.4.4. Responsibility Deferred 
 
The ZANU-PF has consistently minimised its role and responsibility for the 
perpetration of violence in Matabeleland. Particularly noteworthy is the continual 
utilisation of the word disturbances to describe the Gukurahundi period of violence. In 
the Special 25th Anniversary edition of the state-controlled newspaper, The Chronicle, the 
only mention of the Matabeleland violence came in the form of one sentence under the 
biographical account honouring Dr. Joshua Nkomo’s life. It reads as follows: “There was 
mistrust between ZAPU and ZANU, leading to disturbances in the 1980’s.”921 Make no 
mistake the ZANU-PF was strategic in its utilisation of this particular phraseology.  
The discourse surrounding a concept like disturbances has far-reaching political 
connotations; all the dictionary meanings given to this word infer an intrusion into the 
accepted status quo by external agents of sabotage, which fit well into the dissident meta-
narrative of the ZANU-PF.922  As commonly used in everyday life, the word disturbance 
                                                
920 Alexander, et al, 2000: 257. 
921 ‘Profiles of  Zimbabwean Luminaries’ (2005) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 18 April. 
922 Davies, P. (ed.) 1976. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. N w York: Dell 
Publishing Co., Inc., 210. The word disturb is defined as: 1.) To upset the tranquillity or settled state of, 2.) 
To intrude upon; interrupt, and 3.) To disarrange. 
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infers at least three implicit, if not explicit meanings. First, a disturbance often refers to a 
happening that has had a diminished affect. It incurs the notion of annoyance, a minor 
irritation or slight disruption in a normal routine. One might comment on a pestering fly 
or a mosquito as a disturbance while eating or sleeping. Thus, by using this word the 
ZANU-PF denied the extremity of its violence and denied the satisfaction of the 
Matabeleland citizenry an opportunity to exploit the evocative meanings of verbiage like 
massacres, killings and atrocities. Second, a ‘disturbance’ also speaks to an abbreviated 
time-frame.  A disturbance is usually understood to come and go rapidly; a short interval 
of distraction. It may arrive unexpectedly and leave just as quickly as it came. In this 
way, by using this word the ZANU-PF was able to give the impression that the 
Matabeleland intervention was short-lived and by implication not as severe as may have 
been suggested. Third and finally, a ‘disturbance’ elicits the notion of neutralised 
responsibility. Disturbances are often expressive of natural phenomena whose origins are 
blurred or hazy in interpretation and an occurrence that is detached from any structural 
grounding. Hence, the placement of fault or guilt in the causation of a disturbance is not 
easily isolated. In this definition and use of the word, the ZANU-PF inadvertently 
exonerates itself from being held accountable as an agent of perpetration in the 
Gukurahundi violence. Even out of deference to the ruling party, and in order to stay as 
politically impartial as possible the CCJP / LRF decided to designate the word 
‘disturbances’ in their title for the report on the Matabeleland conflict.  
Being denied an apology, the people of Matabeleland seized on the public release 
of the CCJP / LRF Report, and pursued all avenues of compensation at their disposal as a 
way to hold the government accountable for the violence that had been enacted in the 
region. This advocacy campaign for material and symbolic restitution initially confronted 
a blanket refusal for consideration from the government: “Notwithstanding President 
Mugabe ruled out the possibility to either compensate or apologise to the victims…”923 
Eventually one year later these advocacy efforts paid off by prompting a verbal assent by 
the ZANU-PF to assist the victims of the Gukurahundi. In October of 1999, ZANU-PF 
made a public commitment to compensate Matabeleland victims of violence:  
                                                                                                                                                
  




“The Government will soon compile a list of people affected by post-
independence disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands and explore ways of 
compensating them, President Mugabe said yesterday… ‘We should never let a 
conflict situation occur in the future. What happened was regrettable and caused a 
lot of suffering, some of which still persists today’, he said. Cde Mugabe said 
people out to promote disunity made it appear as if the Government was not 
aware of the need to help those affected by the atrocities…The Government 
would not discriminate against any ethnic group in the country, the President said. 
‘We have learnt a lot from our history and from our liberation struggle and will 
leave no room for tribalism in Zimbabwe. People should be free to work or live 
wherever they want to without being discriminated against along tribal lines.’ He 
added.”924 
 
Unfortunately, nothing ever materialised from these empty promises. Despite the 
obvious effort on the part of ZANU-PF to show-case a reconciliatory tone and to reassure 
the Matabeleland region of its sympathy and compassion, it was an exercise in ‘lip-
service’ alone. In July of 2000, a short (4 paragraph) article was tucked away in The 
Sunday Chronicle of Bulawayo:   
“A COMMITTEE tasked by President Mugabe to look into the compensation of 
the victims of post independence disturbances in Matabeleland will be dissolved 
next weekend because it has not received financial support from the Government 
to do its work, a committee member said yesterday…Cde Mugabe described the 
political disturbances which occurred in Matabeleland and Midlands between 
1982 and 1987 as an ‘act of madness’ which should not have happened. He said 
the committee was working to ensure that the victims were compensated.”925 
 
In September 2000 an opposition member of parliament, Tafadzwa Musekiwa proposed a 
truth and reconciliation committee be set up to investigate the Matabeleland massacres: 
“He [Musekiwa] said a parliamentary select committee should be appointed to 
investigate the perpetrators of violence, causes of the disturbances, the role of the 
army, the police , the Central Intelligence Organisation and the ZANU-PF youth 
brigades. The committee, he said, would make recommendations on the issue of 
damages and compensation to victims, the prosecution of the perpetrators and on 
measures to stop a reoccurrence of similar violence. He said the committee would 
also look at the need to erect monuments at mass graves similar to those at 
Chimoio and Tembwe in Mozambique, and on the engagement of teams of 
counsellors, psychologists and health practitioners to assist victims.”926 
 
                                                
924 ‘Atrocities victims to be compensated’ (1999) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 18 October. 
925 ‘Compensation committee to dissolve’ (2000) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 09 July. 
926 ‘MP calls for probe into disturbances’ (2000) The Chronicle (Bulawayo) 22 September. 
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To date, this too seems to have fallen on deaf ears. There has been no follow-up or 
implementation of this proposal, and it has not been tabled in Parliament since, although 
the demands for a truth and reconciliation commission continue to grow in the wake of 
the current government of national unity formed in Zimbabwe in 2008. 
With the ZANU-PF government denying an apology and deferring responsibility, 
the people of Matabeleland have observed another decade pass without feeling a sense of 
healing closure or experiencing the relief of even a moderate reparations package. In 
hindsight, this gives explanation as to why there was such a sceptical response by the 
Matabeleland region to the signing of the Unity Accord and the ZANU-PF overtures of 
reconciliation that it was enshrined in; after all, they were hollow in content and intent.  
8.5. Conclusion: Uniformity Masquerading as Unity 
  
“Whether opening [old wounds] constituted a destructive or healing act, were 
subjects of contention which begged a range of questions regarding the proper 
commemoration of the dead and the appropriate ways in which history might be 
invoked in the present without ‘tearing the nation apart’.”927 
 
This chapter has wrestled with the inter-play between narratives of uniformity and 
narratives of diversity and the hold that each of them claim over the conceptualisation and 
the actualisation of national political unity. Coming out of seven years of severe violence 
in Matabeleland, the introductory section unfurls the back-drop of exhaustion that both 
ZAPU and ZANU-PF (albeit for different reasons) came to the signing of the Unity 
Accord in 1987. The second section outlines the ZANU-PF narrative version of the Unity 
Accord which was in essence considered a triumphant piece of diplomacy. However, 
other narratives question this line of reasoning on four fronts: it appeared to be more 
about a military than a political solution, the blanket amnesty compromised justice, it 
benefited top leaders and not the masses, and it was primarily owned by the politicians 
and not the most affected people of Matabeleland.  
In contrasting script, section three explored the ZAPU-manufactured narrative 
discourse on the Unity Accord which perceived it to be at best a compromised ceasefire 
enforced by the brutality of violence that had already been unleashed on Matabeleland for 
years. This argument was built on the silencing of Nkomo as the ZAPU spokesperson, the 
                                                
927 Alexander, et al, 2000: 259. 
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humiliation of forced uniformity, and what many termed as ZAPU being ‘swallowed-up’ 
by ZANU-PF. The metaphor of being ‘swallowed-up’ meant the loss of at least four 
pivotal aspects of political power and influence for ZAPU: lack of representation, lack of 
an engaging role, lack of meaningful symbols, and continued lack of access to 
development. In the final section, the research suggests that the Unity Accord was a 
defining moment in the history of Zimbabwe primarily because it ensured the complete 
public imposition of the ZANU-PF meta-narrative over the nation and the complete 
public subjugation of the counter narratives of resistance in Matabeleland. This 
seemingly hopeless fate was reinforced by an unrecognisable reconciliation and the 
ZANU-PF continuing to verbalise a position of no regrets about the Matabeleland 
intervention. To exacerbate this situation even further, the ZANU-PF denied 
Matabeleland a remorseful apology and failed to take responsibility to provide 
compensation to Matabeleland victims of violence, despite official promises to the 
contrary. This defining moment only lasted for about a decade until the release of a 
comprehensive report detailing the extent of the ZANU-PF violence in Matabeleland 
whereby a national debate was opened up again. However, the desire for healing and 
reparations remains an illusive dream for Matabeleland even up to the present.  
In sum, the elusive notion of unity finds its vigour in providing the boundaries for 
a set of fully expressed diversities without becoming imbalanced itself.  This unity in 
diversity is maintained through respectful mutuality and complimentary 
interconnectivity. The ZANU-PF was unable to, or chose not to appreciate this dialogue 
of unity through diversity.  Hence, the monologue of uniformity continued to try to quell 
and subsume every counter narrative in Zimbabwe even after the signing of the Unity 
Accord. The below interview respondent (an ex-ZIPRA combatant) illustrated this all 
encompassing uniformity with simplicity: 
“A so-called Unity…I can explain the question. If I take this water red, I take that 
water blue, we mix together, what colour comes? It’s a different colour. But after 
[unity] it’s still ZANU-PF ‘black’, still ZANU-PF slogans, ZANU-PF principles. 
Is that unity? If you make a unity, Mr. Man; you change things completely, I 
change my thing, you change your thing; we have a new thing in front of us that’s 
called ‘unity’. This is black, this is white, we mix; we have a different colour. 
Second to this Unity; if you talk about unity, you talk about equality, 50-50. But 
now, if I can tell you that in ZAPU who is a [government] Minister, it’s only 
[Kembo] Mohadi as a Minister of Home Affairs only. Then there are ‘deputies’. I 
375 
 
think if you can understand the meaning of ‘deputy’, then you can have it very 
clear; that’s our problem.”928  
 
In a straightforward manner, the above transcription lays out two critical component parts 
of authentic political unity: first, genuine unity will have a combined, yet essentially 
different identity than either or any of the particular identities of the individuals or 
organisations that make up the different elements of that unity agreement. Second, valid 
unity agreements will spell out socio-political and structural contracts that delineate 
equitable power-sharing arrangements for the future. There will be equal access to 
positions of power and influence in government. These power-sharing contracts, while 
given lip service and token consideration by ZANU-PF were not seriously or carefully 
entrenched in the Zimbabwean Unity Accord of 1987. ZANU-PF maintained its identity 
of dominance and equality was missing in the incorporation of ZAPU leaders into the 
government structures.   
The clamour for recognition coming from the subjugated voices of Matabeleland 
is a cry that is increasing in volume and intensity. These protests cannot forever be 
ignored.  In Zimbabwe, Unity Day (December 22) is a national commemoration of the 
signing of the Unity Accord in 1987.  In 2002, Max Mnkandla, information secretary of 
the Zimbabwe Liberators’ Peace Platform (ZLPP) announced that Unity Day should be 
kept as a day of mourning.  He called on all Zimbabweans to:   
“…not to be fooled into celebrating an accord which legitimated the slaughter of 
kith and kin. Instead of expensive celebrations an ‘upright government’ should 
spend money on exhumations and reburials.  History itself needs to be exhumed.  
On December 22 we shall be in our black robes remembering those who perished 
and lie in mass graves.”929   
 
In contrast, commenting on this commemoration in that same year, President Mugabe re-
confirmed that the ZANU-PF’s historical monologue was still alive by declaring that: 
“Whatever remains were historical differences. These remain as history of our country 
and we can’t bring ugly history into the present affairs and rewrite that ugly history. 
                                                
928 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 
929 ‘A Time of National Mourning’ (2002) The Standard (Harare) 24 December. It should be noted that 
some sources have accused the ZLPP of being a false, front organisation sponsored by the State CIO as a 
counter to the ZLP (Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform). However, these claims have not been substantiated. 
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No.”930 In retrospect, Mugabe’s narrative discourse above was miscalculated; one can 
bring ugly history into the present affairs and one can rewrite it. According to journalist 
Tracey McVeigh, Liberation War veteran Gibson Nyandoro and many other ordinary 
citizens just like him across the nation of Zimbabwe are doing exactly this on a daily 
basis: 
“So when, five days ago, [Gibson] Nyandoro, [a war veteran] 58, rattled his bike 
into the centre of the opposition rally – he said, he thought his heart would stop in 
fear – and told the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) candidate and her 
supporters that a group of his comrades had sent him to ask if they would be 
welcome to join, it was an unprecedented act. It was time for a change, he said, to 
great cheers. ‘We don’t want this power-hungry dictator any more. We have lost 
our dignity through this ruling party and have nothing in return.’”931   
 
In no uncertain terms, the unity masquerade of the ZANU-PF is beginning to crumble; 
tearing at the seams as narratives of diversity push their way to the surface removing the 
















                                                
930 Ranger, T. 2003. “Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: the 
struggle over the past in Zimbabwe”. Journal for Southern African Studies 30 (2), 29. 
931 ‘How Mugabe faithful became the opposition’ (2008) The Observer 23 March. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion- Emancipatory Narratives and the Search for Durable Peace 
9.1. Summary of Thesis Findings and Conclusions 
• Overall Question: How did narrative discourse mould the violence in 
Matabeleland, Zimbabwe between the years of 1980-1987, and how has / has 
not this violence discourse influenced the socio-political crisis being 
experienced in Matabeleland today? 
 
In a decisive departure from the dominant ‘structural-functionalist’ analysis of 
political conflict, this thesis employed a social constructivist approach which interrogated 
the Matabeleland conflict of 1980-1987 through the intersection of the violence narrative 
and the production of ‘preferred realities.’ Of critical relevance to this study was the 
interplay between the violence meta-narrative manufactured by the ZANU-PF 
government and imposed on the people of Zimbabwe and the myriad of contrasting, yet 
subjugated counter-narratives that were formulated as alternative resistances. Through a 
comprehensive literature review (Chapter 2), and purposive in-depth interview sample 
and document analysis methodologies (Chapter 3), this study deconstructed the 
generative nature of scripted conflict in Matabeleland through the exploration of the 
language of violence, spontaneous performance of violence, and the social conflict 
phenomena of stage-managed dramaturgical applications of violence as the means to 
accomplishing political power ends.  
Over the duration of the Matabeleland conflict, the dominant meta-narrative of the 
ZANU-PF was characterised by themes of victor, order, exclusion, discipline and 
uniformity. In response, the Matabeleland people nurtured a set of sublimated narratives 
of insurgency pulsating with stories of vanquish, disorder, inclusion, protest and 
diversity. While the exertion and protection of violent power represented the centrifugal, 
motivational pull of the ZANU-PF government narrative, the subjugated narratives of 
Matabeleland continued to rise up in order to complicate and detract from the neatly 
packaged ZANU-PF grand-narrative. The coupling together of these divergent narratives 
of victor-vanquished, order-disorder, exclusion-inclusion, discipline-protest, and 
uniformity-diversity resulted in the ‘thickening of the narrative plot’ of the Matabeleland 
violence. By nature, these narratives repulsed each other, yet a traumatic bonding 
developed between these binary narrative texts; a lethal attraction was birthed and a fatal 
dance of brinkmanship was released between the ZANU-PF government and all who 
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dared to speak an alternative story of reality. This narrative competition spawned a 
discourse of threatening terror, state-sanctioned structures of violence, and mob-induced 
moments of torture and intimidation eventually culminating in the unity agreement of 
1987, which was paraded as a public peace, yet privately masked a plethora of silenced 
narratives of insurrection.    
• Specific Aim One: What are the salient themes (component parts) of the 
Meta-narrative constructed by the ZANU-PF in order to explain and justify 
the violence that occurred in Matabeleland over this time frame? 
 
• Specific Aim Two: What were the counter-narratives that emerged during 
this time and how were they subjugated and silenced by the ruling ZANU-
PF? 
 
This thesis examined the following five salient thematic trajectories of the 
ZANU-PF grand-narrative and the Matabeleland counter-narratives that emerged in the 
course of the research: Ethnicity, Nationalism, Loyalty, Legitimacy and Unity. The 
specific aims one and two above have been placed together as they represent two sides of 
a mirror. The ZANU-PF meta-narratives and the alternative narratives that surfaced in 
Matabeleland between the years 1980-1987 are deeply intertwined; merged in a 
dialogical narrative discourse. Thus, for purposes of this analysis section summary on the 
thesis findings and conclusions, the dominant ZANU-PF meta-narrative and the 
corresponding subjugated narratives from Matabeleland will not be presented separately; 
they will be laced together into one narrative conversation.      
Chapter 4 of this Thesis argued against the ethnic-essentialist script of ancient 
animosities, by tracing the formative origins of the historical narrative of ‘victor and 
vanquished’ as embraced and rejected in both the Ndebele and Shona identity stories 
from as far back as the 1800s. This study traced the ethnic identity narratives of the 
Matabele and Mashona through three eras of time: pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial. In each of these epochs the Ndebele and the Shona identities took on the roles of 
the offended and the justified offender. Narratives of superiority and inferiority were 
manipulated by the colonial powers and the writers of history. The perceived ethnic-
based conflict was solidified after independence when the ruling ZANU-PF government 
(supposedly representing the Shona majority) embarked on a lethal strategy combining 
the use of ethnic-hate language and severe, protracted violence unleashed on the civilian 
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population of Matabeleland (representing the Ndebele minority). The following five 
theorems of ethnic identity formation surfaced in this research on the Matabeleland 
conflict and would suggest that ethnic hostilities are not innate, but shaped by context and 
social-political impetus: 
• Ethnic identity is not static, it is often in flux 
• Ethnic identity is pluralistic, not monolithic 
• Ethnic identity is often manipulated by historical conflict memory and political 
opportunism 
• Ethnic conflict identity is often formed around the psychology of victor (chosen 
glories) and vanquished (chosen traumas) 
• Overemphasis of one facet of our identity can exacerbate conflict  
 
With the entrenchment of the ethnic-conflict, Chapter 5 explores how the 
ZANU-PF regime embarked on a nationalist project buttressed by a set of ‘ordering’ 
narratives. Finding itself on the tail-end of the post-independence, African nation-state 
experiment, the ZANU-PF struggled to manage the nationalist discourse from revolution 
to rule. Moving from the tidy rhetoric of revolution, to the untidy text of negotiated peace 
settlements and the multiplicity of post-independence narratives, the ZANU-PF needed to 
manufacture a regulatory memory and a normative experience for the nation. To regulate 
and manipulate the affections of the nation, ZANU-PF built their national narrative 
around the emphasis and expression of a powerful centralised government, a one-party 
state, and revolutionary leader veneration. 
To manufacture a normative experience for the nation, the ZANU-PF produced 
the platforms on which to stage-manage violent performances of ‘dis rdering’ 
proportions and thereby reinforce their imposed order on the nation. The violent clashes 
between ex-ZANLA and ex-ZIPRA demobilisation camps at Entumbane (Bulawayo) 
functioned as Act One of this disordering play. The ‘discovery’ of arms caches on 
ZAPU-owned farms became Act Two and the abduction and murder of six international 
tourists served as Act Three. Each of these dramaturgical Acts represented highly 
contested terrains. The ZANU-PF government used the official interpretation of these 
events to discredit the ZAPU opposition as ‘poor losers’, counter-revolutionary, and a 
threat to the safety of the international community, and they seized upon each of these 
events and the resultant chaotic violence, to further justify their nationalist agenda; the 
enforcement of an ordering script of ultimate control. However, surrounding each of 
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these performances, narratives emerged that suggested deceitful schemes of government 
compliance (stage-managed violence) and each of these Acts were appropriated by the 
Matabeleland opposition as proof that the ZANU-PF-dictated nationalist ‘ordering’ script 
had failed. 
In order to maintain its nationalist vision, Chapter 6 of this thesis investigated the 
narratives of loyalty demanded by ZANU-PF.  Capitalising on the scripts of exclusion 
and inclusion, the ZANU-PF gave particular attention to the binary labels of heroand 
dissident. The ZANU-PF government launched an outright attack (of narrative discourse 
and accompanying physical violence) on the opposition in Matabeleland which was 
aimed at erasing ZAPU-ZIPRA from the historical record and eventually attempting to 
obliterate them from the national memory. This narrative discourse struggle embodied the 
life and death contestation of patriotic memory and the revolutionary recognition that 
qualified a warrior’s honour or a traitor’s shame.  
The loyalty narrative of the ZANU-PF was based on contrasting and contrived 
narratives of enemy-invention (in this case the ‘dissidents’). These ZANU-PF narratives 
of disloyalty functioned to accomplish two critical goals; to dehumanise and question the 
national ‘belonging’ of the Matabeleland opposition and by default the civilian 
population that supported them. The dehumanising scripts served to strip the opposition 
of identity, ideology, and history. The scripts of belonging touched on a deep, visceral 
nerve of ethno-national and cultural ‘rootedness’ as well as the need for political 
recognition. The determination of the existence (size and scope) of the dissidents in 
Matabeleland galvanised the moral imagination of the nation with the resultant outcome 
of three distinct narratives of explanation coming from three distinct levels of society; the 
ZANU-PF government inflated the  numbers of dissidents as a threat to national security, 
the civil society actors in Matabeleland minimised the dissident threat describing the 
Matabeleland violence as an attempt to wipe-out the support base of the ZAPU 
opposition, and the mass populace on-the-ground denied the dissident threat and instead 
emphasised the violence as genocidal in proportion; an ethnic cleansing exercise by the 
Shona against the Ndebele.      
As the unquestioning command for ZANU-PF loyalty begin to fade, legitimacy 
needed to be reinforced (Chapter 7). This the ZANU-PF regime accomplished by 
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embedding its legitimacy narratives in the disciplinary nature of the systematic violence 
and in the repudiation of the protest scripts against that violence coming from the 
recipient communities. In an attempt to fuse together the concept of legitimacy and 
violence the ZANU-PF government overemphasised their legitimacy as embedded in 
their liberation credentials and the militarisation of the state. Through intensive 
surveillance and infiltration measures, the ZANU-PF extended the disciplinary function 
of violence into multiple sectors of society in Matabeleland. This included a state-
sanctioned control of historical indoctrination in schools, manipulation of political power, 
media restrictions, leadership domination in business and civil society affairs, and the 
constriction of material and infra-structural development flow to the region as a whole. 
This research identified six component parts that functioned to prop up the ZANU-PF 
violence system: 
• Violence as Regenerative 
• Violence as Sacred 
• Violence as Hierarchical  
• Violence as Competitive 
• Violence as Motivational 
• Violence as the Production and Performance of Narratives      
 
In a show of well-orchestrated dramaturgical display, ZANU and ZAPU signed 
the Unity Accord of 1987 (Chapter 8), however for the people of Matabeleland the 
ZANU-PF narratives of unity resounded with hollow echoes of a ZANU-PF demand for 
uniformity dissolving the scant hope of a power-sharing arrangement that would respect 
the diversity of socio-political narratives that existed in Zimbabwe at that time. This study 
argues that the Unity Accord of 1987 represented an exhausted unification. ‘Exhausted’ 
in the sense that ZANU-PF had run out of ways to consolidate their meta-narrative of 
power and the ZAPU was completely defeated and undermined through the severe and 
protracted violence that was heavy over Matabeleland at that time. The ZANU-PF hailed 
the Unity Accord as a political triumph in diplomacy; a negotiated settlement that offered 
blanket amnesty for both sides, that provided for power-sharing arrangements for both 
ZANU-PF and ZAPU, and that secured peace and unity for the masses on the ground. For 
the Matabeleland opposition and their constituencies, the Unity Accord was at best a 
compromised ceasefire that resulted in the subsiding of killing. For many voices in 
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Matabeleland the Unity Accord was experienced as a defeat; the subjugation and 
silencing of ZAPU’s leadership and ideological views. Using the metaphor of being 
‘swallowed-up’ the Matabeleland opposition experienced the Unity Accord as the 
humiliation of uniformity characterised by the lack of representation, lack of engaging 
role, lack of meaningful symbols and lack of access to development processes. This 
thesis suggests that the Unity Accord represented a defining moment in the solidification 
of the ZANU-PF meta-narrative. Not only was ZANU-PF successful in subsuming the 
oppositional narratives but, it successfully subsumed the oppositional structures as well.   
• Specific Aim Three: What are the inter-relational connections between the 
narrative discourse and the social construction of preferred realities, both of 
violence and peace in the Zimbabwe context?  
 
In an on-going effort to investigate the connection between narrative discourse 
and the social construction of reality, one of this thesis’ aims was to interrogate the 
linkages between heightened narrative discourse on violence and the subsequent increase 
in performative violent action and/or the inverse. There was evidence that performative 
violent action increased the level of violence narratives (e.g. Lookout Masuku’s death 
after being held in custody without trial for four years released a barrage of narrative 
condemnation, see Chapter 6: Section 6.5). Thus, it would appear that there is a 
symbiotic, didactic relationship between narrative and action with the sequencing of these 
events flowing in either direction (narrative then action, or action then narrative).  
From this research there was evidence of at least three synapses whereby 
hyperbolic violence narratives seemed to have a ‘cause and effect’ on the levels of actual, 
direct violence being experienced in Matabeleland. The first involved the dissemination 
of biased patriotic history and ethnic-hatred language used by the Fifth Brigade soldiers. 
These narratives motivated the violent performance of the government security forces, 
and on the other hand increased the violent resolve of a handful of ex-ZIPRA dissidents, 
and a large number of the civilian population in their resistance against the homogenising 
meta-narrative of the ruling ZANU-PF party (Chapter 6: Section 6.2). Secondly, violence 
increased exponentially in connection to the violent rhetoric used by ZANU-PF political 
leaders in public speeches. One example of this was the Entumbane violence that erupted 
in Bulawayo between the two demobilised liberation armies after a particularly hateful 
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and inciting speech delivered by the fiery ZANU-PF government minister Enos Nkala 
(Chapter 5: Section 5.4.1.). Another illustration of this phenomenon was the ‘discovery’ 
of arms caches on ZAPU-owned farms which increased the violent language in regards to 
the Matabeleland dissidents and the eventual justification of the Fifth Brigade launch into 
the region (Chapter 5: Section 5.4.2.). Lastly, violence seemed to increase in and around 
critical political events that represented highly intensified arenas of political contestation 
such as the heightened direct and civilian-initiated violence before and after the 1985 
elections (Chapter 7: Section 7.5.6.).     
• Specific Aim Four: What are the linkages (if any) between the processes of 
surfacing subjugated and silenced narratives in Matabeleland and finding a 
durable and sustainable peace in Zimbabwe for the future?     
 
In conclusion (Chapter 9), this thesis argues that there are linkages between the 
Matabeleland violence and the current political violence being unleashed on the 
opposition in Zimbabwe since the year 2000 (primarily experienced in Mashonaland). 
The commonalities between past and present violence in Zimbabwe have connections in 
a set of unusual circumstances. Namely, a joint narrative voice for survivors of violence 
is being discovered and expressed through a series of eclipsing narratives (at an 
international, national, and local levels), through layers of shared victimisation, and 
through the quest for a future vision in Zimbabwe.  Out of these experiences, networks of 
survivor solidarity have begun to develop in Zimbabwe. These citizen movements of 
survivor-solidarity networks are being led by those who have walked a journey of trauma 
healing and who have had first-hand experience as victims of political violence that span 
multiple time periods in Zimbabwe. In this way, Matabeleland survivors of violence are 
uniquely placed to lead these survivor-solidarity campaigns as they find strength and 
unity in the envisioning and charting out of a future direction for a transformed 
Zimbabwe.  
To this end, this chapter proposes a transitional justice model for Zimbabwe that 
is formulated around the guiding values of re-constructing a shared memory, re-
establishing a sense of corporate belonging and responsibility, re-investing in public 
participation processes, and re-engaging in collective healing. Each of these values is 
related to corresponding guiding principles for transitional justice programmes in 
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Zimbabwe characterised as victim-centred, responsibility-oriented, community-driven and 
compensation-based. It is the premise of this thesis that durable peace in Zimbabwe will 
only be realised to the degree that the silenced victims of the Matabeleland massacres are 
given a public voice and sustained recognition in the collective memory of that nation. 
9.2. Linking Past and Present Violence  
 
“The past is always before us.” 932 
 
This ancient African proverb has a number of rich, textured meanings; it suggests 
that the past is somehow also located in the present and may even make a surprise visit in 
the future. In the first place this idiom is a splendid example of the non-linear, cyclical 
thinking of the cosmology of many traditional African cultures whereby the spiritual ties 
between the past, present and future remain alive and active in the 'now'. Secondly, this 
proverb carries a cautionary meaning; a warning to be aware of the past’s unfinished 
business as it has a tendency to interrupt the present and unless it is resolved and healed it 
will continue to 'haunt’ a person in the future. Thirdly, this proverb inhabits an instructive 
meaning which highlights the need to learn from our past; if one is reflective and open to 
change one need not have to repeat past mistakes. All of these meanings have bearing 
when applied in a comparative manner to the Matabeleland violence (1980-1987) and the 
most recent political violence sweeping Zimbabwe (2000-2008) with its eventual 
culmination in a government of national unity being formed between the ZANU-PF and 
the leading opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).     
 In the Matabeleland case, this African wisdom-saying speaks to the ties between 
the historic violence of Gukurahundi and the current violence unleashed against 
opposition since the year 2000. While some scholarship may question the direct linkage 
between the past and present violence in Zimbabwe, this research indicates that there are 
powerful conceptual and narrative connections; each mirroring the other’s form and 
repeating a cyclical, inter-generational violence with glaring resemblance933. Of obvious 
                                                
932 An African proverb, (Public Domain): The geographical origins of this particular wisdom-saying are 
uncertain.  
933 Kriger, N. 2003. “War Veterans: Continuities Between the Past and the Present”. African Studies 
Quarterly 7, no. 2&3: Retrieved from web 2007/11/07. URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i2a7.htm: 
1-12. In this article Kriger makes a cogent argument for the connections between the tactics of the ZANU-
PF in partnership with the war veterans between the periods of 1980-7 and 2000-3. These tactics were 
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and pivotal significance in this equation is the congruent and consistent link represented 
in the ZANU-PF government itself as a party to each of these protracted conflicts and in 
many instances an instigating perpetrator of violence against the Zimbabwean citizenry in 
both time periods under question. Three other crucial ‘past-present’ inter-relational 
dynamics revolve around the phenomena of eclipsing narratives; interlocking scripts of 
geo-political recognition that are in a perpetual, textual competition one with each other 
at the global, national, and regional/local levels, the shared stories of violence and trauma 
emitting from the experiences of multiple victims both then and now, and the ZANU-PF 
government’s intractability in the past and their inability to envision and inspire a future 
view in the present. It is the premise of this thesis that all three of these processes must be 
considered, understood and mitigated against if viable, peaceful co-existence is to prevail 
in Zimbabwe. Hence, the next three sections of this chapter will expound on these topics, 
followed by an exploration of general recommendations deemed appropriate for a 
strategic peace-building intervention to be sustained in Zimbabwe, and a concluding 
section that summarises the findings of this thesis.  
9.3. Eclipsing Narratives 
 
“But then the world was saying, ‘We want to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
Black people for running their own affairs’. Come 2000, we are still being 
murdered. Exactly the same psyche that pervaded in Mugabe’s psyche when we 
won Independence is actually being perpetrated now on the Black people of 
Zimbabwe...What I am saying is: Mugabe has always been killing people but, the 
world at some point, chooses to look [to] the other side ‘to see no evil, and hear 
no evil’.”934 
 
            This study has given focused attention to the investigation of a phenomenon that 
is being referred to as ‘eclipsing narratives.’ This term speaks to the overlapping effect of 
competing narratives especially when it relates to the global/international narratives that 
tend to overshadow or subsume national narratives, which in turn close down the 
expressive space for local/regional narratives to emerge. The Matabeleland conflict in 
                                                                                                                                                
summarised as: power-mongering, liberation war appeals, and violent intimidation of the civilian 
populations.  
934 Interview: GS1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 17/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer and survivor of 





Zimbabwe provides a curious and relevant case study in this regard. When ZANU came 
to power in 1980, there were already afloat highly influential and well-established 
political narratives of liberation from colonial/minority white rule that became the ‘wave’ 
in which ZANU rode upon as it claimed victory in the independence of Zimbabwe.  This 
narrative rallied against all forms of neo-colonialism, capitalistic greed, racism and unjust 
oppressive regimes across the so-called two-thirds world.  It also hailed the idea of 
justified violent revolutions ushering in democratic change, multi-party politics and racial 
reconciliation. Behind this ideological rhetoric there were also practical geo-political 
considerations: 
“I think that they [international community] acted in an expedient fashion. I think 
that they had other objectives in mind. The most important thing was to keep 
Mugabe out of the Soviet Bloc, to a less extent, out of the influence, beyond the 
influence of the Chinese…The second thing was that the West was very much 
focused on trying to bring Apartheid to an end and they saw Mugabe as being 
their key component in resolving that crisis… [Evidence] shows that Western 
NGO’s like Oxfam actually read reports of what was going on [in Matabeleland] 
as early as March 1983. But those reports were stifled. Furthermore, there were 
contemporaneous press reports in leading British and other newspapers. So, it’s 
hard to conceive how Western Governments didn’t know what was going on. We 
also know that in some countries, notably Canada and Australia, where people 
have used access to information, ‘freedom of information’ laws that pertain in 
those countries. They have managed into go to archives, and I’m told, I haven’t 
seen it myself, but I’m told that there’s very clear evidence that those 
governments knew what was going on. The West conveniently chose to ignore.”935 
 
             ZANU-PF was highly tactical in taking advantage of this international narrative, 
not only did they ride the wave of anti-colonial racism but they also gave ‘lip-service’ to 
the democratic reform being called for. As the world celebrated the ZANU-PF’s victory 
in the revolution and the 1980 Elections, the ZANU-PF was poised as the ‘golden child’ 
of the West and handed a blank cheque of ‘white guilt’ to do as they pleased.  This kind 
of international euphoria, characterised by an uncritical and unreflective type of sweeping 
idealist narrative became a dangerous snare and provided the necessary canopy of 
protection to hide almost any form of political and social repression enacted by ZANU-
PF. Thus, as the world cheered on the revolutionary victory of black independence over 
white supremacy regimes in Africa, ZANU-PF launched an outright frontal attack on its 
                                                




black opposition and all those who seemed to threaten the power monopoly their one-
party state rule was bent on solidifying and enjoying. Unfortunately, the ZANU-PF was 
not only successful in hiding its Matabeleland treachery from the international 
community (the first eclipsing narrative) it also duped the majority population in 
Mashonaland who believed that their government was legitimately containing a rebellion 
(the second eclipsing narrative): 
“While it will be easy for someone in Manicaland, or in Harare for that matter, or 
any other part of the country, to believe what was being said in the media to say, 
the government has only gone as far as quashing a rebellion that sought to 
overthrow a legitimately elected government of the day. It would be naïve actually 
for anyone to think otherwise or to want to believe otherwise or to want to 
interrogate such kind of situations or statements coming from the government. 
But for people who were on the ground in the Midlands and in the Matabeleland, 
it was obviously to them a different story because they were the people who were 
the victims, they were the people who were on the ground to actually experience 
these things firsthand. And I’m sure, I can only imagine what they were feeling 
then to want to ‘let out’ or ‘to let [it be] known’ what they have seen, to recount 
what did happen to them, to their loved-ones and to their relatives, you know, that 
kind of thing.”936  
 
          This unquestioning narrative of justified liberationist violence coming from the 
international and the national Mashona communities not only gave the covering of 
impunity to ZANU-PF’s internal violence, it had the cumulative effect of even further 
silencing the victim’s voices of Matabeleland (the third eclipsing narrative). There was 
no place or space to point an accusing finger at the ZANU-PF who embodied the hopeful 
expectations of so many peoples across the globe who were living under oppression and 
who were toiling with perseverance to see the fruition of their liberation. The results were 
catastrophic in terms of the victim-survivors of the Matabeleland massacres who 
effectively had their narratives subjugated by three eclipsing narratives. First, their cries 
for help were subjugated by the cacophony of the international narrative of justified 
violent revolution. Second, they were silenced though fear and terror by the state-
sanctioned Gukurahundi violence and the quiet approval of the majority of Mashonaland. 
Third, the Gukurahundi violence insured a traumatic silence among the civilian 
population themselves by forcing them to participate in the killing of one another; 
                                                




massacring their own neighbours and fellow villagers leaving a mortified, internalised 
horror across the Matabeleland region. This internal silence was further cemented when 
after 2000, another set of victims voices (all opposition to ZANU-PF including Shona-
speaking activists), who had experienced political violence were given audience by the 
outside world in what appeared to be a prioritisation by the international community 
overshadowing the voices of the Matabeleland survivors once again. 
“And people in Matabeleland have developed an attitude of saying ‘we will just 
keep quiet’ because even the outside world didn’t listen to our story. When we 
cried and said ‘here we are, we are suffering at this time when we thought we have 
attained our Independence’, the outside world kept quiet. And so many people up 
to now, they are really worried even to this moment they are saying ‘okay, when 
Mugabe came into power, we told the outside world that here is the person whom 
we thought is going to be our saviour, he is killing us’. The outside world kept 
quiet. And they [people of Matabeleland] are saying ‘now, why was it like that?’ 
And they are saying ‘now, it’s surprising that it’s only now that the outside world 
is now seeing that this man really can kill people’, because a lot of people have 
been killed. And they are saying ‘now, it’s surprising that the outside world is 
becoming now really concerned’. And they are feeling that maybe they [outside 
world] are not really also genuine because they are feeling that ‘it’s only maybe 
that the White farmers are now affected, that the colonial powers are coming back 
and seeing that ‘okay, this man was bad’. Because there was never a time when we 
felt that really Britain was concerned about what Mugabe was doing to the people 
of Matabeleland…Nobody listened to them.”937 
 
Diagram 5 below illustrates the thematic and contradictory essence of the three layers of 
eclipsing narratives that served to silence the witness and testimony of the Matabeleland 









                                                
937 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 




Diagram 5: Eclipsing Narratives 
 
 
          The last ‘eclipsing’ of the internal narratives of Matabeleland victims by the recent 
Mashonaland victims who have garnered the attention of human rights activists 
worldwide, has little to do with the actual motivations of the Mashona (whether or not 
they are hard-hearted or callous). Rather, it has much more to do with the fickle and 
hypocritical nature of the international community and their expedient manner of 
‘policing’ the geo-political issues that serve their narrow self-interests while discarding 
those that do not. Put differently, when Mugabe and the ZANU-PF were the liberation 
victors they were claimed as the key protagonists in the rhetorical narrative discourse of 
both the East and the West as antagonists in the Cold War stand-off. For the East it was a 
script of triumph for socialism and communism and for the West it was one of democracy 
and freedom. As the world (East and West) rejoiced in each of their respective 
ideological triumphs (albeit highly contrasting in nature), they decided to turn a blind eye 
and a deaf ear to any indications of violent repression being used by the ZANU-PF 
against their own people. However, when the cries of the victims of recent political 
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violence came to the fore after decades of revelations that ZANU-PF and Mugabe truly 
did exhibit violent dictatorial tendencies, the West was now suddenly attentive. Certainly, 
one could argue that the global awareness and advocacy attention around issues of human 
rights violations has heightened considerably since 1980 and the fall of communism, 
however, the outside world did know of the Matabeleland massacres and chose to remain 
‘neutral’ for the sake of ‘political correctness’ on all sides of the Cold War scenario. 
Thus, the world’s inaction became the indirect instrument of consent for, and an 
accomplice to the silencing of the narratives of Matabeleland violence and the scripts of 
the victims and survivors of the Matabeleland massacres were seemingly lost in 
obscurity.  
          As mentioned above, the most important difference between the experience of the 
victims of Gukurahundi and those of recent repression is that the current victims of 
ZANU-PF violence have captured the listening ear of the international community and as 
a result have had opportunity to galvanize the needed global support to cause a public 
outcry. Until recently, the Matabeleland victims could only dream of such advocacy on 
their behalf however, the Matabeleland narrative refuses to disappear. As the old adage 
goes, ‘The blood cries out from the ground’938, so it is in Matabeleland. Interestingly, as a 
new space opens up on the international stage for the witness and testimony of 
Zimbabwean victims of recent political violence, the suppressed voice of the 
Matabeleland victims is finding new channels through which to surface and be 
highlighted in the public domain for the first time.  
          What appears to be occurring is that there is a growing citizen’s movement that is 
pushing forward with a new set of eclipsing narratives. These eclipsing narratives are 
contrasting to those at the time of independence in two significant ways. First, instead of 
the promotion of narratives characterised by self-interested, geo-political ideologies 
promoted at the expense of genuine freedom and justice for the masses, these new 
eclipsing narratives are driven by local contexts of traumatised communities who are 
rising above geographical and political divisions and seeking authentic healing and 
                                                
938 The Holy Bible – New International Version. 1973. Genesis 4:10. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Bible 
Publishers, 4. This quote is adapted from the story of the first homicide recorded in the Bible when Cain 
murdered his brother Abel. Verse 10 actually reads, “The Lord said [to Cain], ‘What have you done? 
Listen! Your brother’s blood cries out to me from the ground.”   
391 
 
justice. Second, instead of a top-down approach guided by a few high-up leaders these 
new eclipsing narratives are being propelled from the ground; a bottom-up approach led 
by a multiplicity of popular leadership that represent networks of grass-roots 
constituencies. The sequencing in vertical movement of these sets of eclipsing narratives 
is also different. Whereas, in 1980 it moved from international to national and then down 
to the regional/local level, the current eclipsing narratives seem to be moving from the 
regional/local sphere to the international stage of transitional justice and then finally 
bringing a transformative pressure to bear at the national level. However, all this is yet to 
unfold in full and thus it is conjecture at present. What is important to take cognizance of, 
and to build upon is the evident momentum that is occurring as multiple victims of 
political violence across all political divides in Zimbabwe begin to give utterance and 
leadership to their demand for healing, reconciliation and justice under the watchful eyes 
of international instruments of human rights protection and advocacy.    
9.4. Multiple Victims, Layers of Silence 
 
            Zimbabwe as a nation presently has multiple layers of traumatised victims and 
survivors to deal with in its future. The interview sample of this study consisted of a 
number of distinct categories of survivors of political violence in Zimbabwe. First, there 
were those whose primary experience was focused on the political violence of the 
colonial Rhodesian government (the older generation). Second, there were those who 
experienced the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s (representing the largest number of 
the purposive sample). Third, there were those who experienced the more recent political 
violence since 2000 (representing the smallest number of the purposive sample). Fourth, 
there were those who had experienced multiple layers of victimisation, those who 
represented one or more of the combinations f victimisation mentioned above 
(representing the medium number of the purposive sample). Diagram 6 below lays out 
these various categories of victimisation and their corresponding numbers extracted from 
the purposive interview sample (total of 35) from this thesis research project. This graph 
charts out the nature of the research sample as representative of inter-generational, as 
well as multiple and protracted experiences of trauma. The intersection of these various 
victim-survivor narratives sheds light on the interplay between the past and present 
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formulations of violence and the exploration of peaceful co-existence in Zimbabwe for 
the future. 




           Following the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
opposition party in 1999 and the ZANU-PF’s defeating ‘no confidence’ vote in a 
referendum in February 2000, there was a rash of Zimbabwean victims of political 
violence; killings, imprisonment, abduction, rape and torture. As indicated in the previous 
section, a major difference between the state-sanctioned violence of the early 1980s and 
that of the early 2000s was that the most recent violence tended to focus on Mashonaland 
as opposed to Matabeleland as was the case at the time of Gukurahundi. What this meant 
is that for the Matabele this phenomenon gave rise to a strong sense of historical 
vindication on their part. For the Matabele, it was understood that now Mashonaland was 
experiencing the state violence that they as Matabeleland had been struggling to 
overcome for decades. For the Matabele survivors it was an empowering moment in 
which they could seriously express to their Mashona counterparts, ‘we told you so, but 
you would not believe’. However, this proverbial sense of retributive satisfaction on the 
part of the Matabele was not always expressed with empathy; at times it was said with a 
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certain smug ‘aloofness’, as if coming from a distant, removed onlooker, reminiscent of 
the posture taken by a majority of Mashona during the time of Gukurahundi. 
          For the ‘new’ victims of political violence scattered across Mashonaland, this state-
sanctioned violence was both startling and overwhelming. It was surprising because 
many of the Mashona political activists and civil society stalwarts never believed that 
‘their’ liberationist government could turn on them with such terrorising violence. It was 
overwhelming because their revolutionary dream of a free and democratic Zimbabwe was 
now crumbling before their eyes two decades into Independence. For understandable 
reasons, many of the recent victims of state-supported political violence were hard-
pressed to focus on anything but their own recent trauma. Thus, to try and lead them back 
to reflect on the trauma of the Matabeleland massacres of the early 1980s was highly 
difficult if not, impossible. This was due to two reasons: First, many of the recent victims 
of political violence were Mashona and they had little knowledge or awareness of the 
Matabeleland killings of the past (due to past government media control). The classical 
plea of political ignorance by the complacent majority, ‘we did not know’ is often evoked 
in this instance. Second, even those Mashona who did have some knowledge of the 
Gukurahundi violence, while able to cognitively empathise with the Matabele survivors 
found it hard in the midst of their own severe trauma to make sustainable connections 
between the past tragedy of Matabeleland and their present state of distress. 
           Thus, outside of the experience of white Rhodesian violence shared by the older 
generation of black Zimbabweans across the country, one finds a scenario of two distinct 
groupings of victims in Zimbabwe; those who survived the Matabeleland massacres and 
those who survived the current political violence, who mostly hail from Mashonaland. 
These two groups have been isolated from each other; separated geographically as well as 
by their unreconciled trauma. The Matabeleland survivors are often unable to reach 
forward in empathy to the Mashona victims because they are still locked in their 
historical pain that has never been given opportunity to be spoken about, dealt with, 
and/or healed from. The Mashonaland survivors are often unable to reach backward in 
empathy to the Matabeleland survivors because they are still consumed with the present 
shock of their recent trauma and find it hard to move past their own self-absorbed pity. In 
this way, the actual responses to the resulting traumatisation of political violence have 
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served to divide rather than unite the victims who jointly suffered under severe state-
sanctioned repression.   
          However, outside of the isolating trauma between these two groups of victims, they 
share a common experience of both being silenced by the ZANU-PF. Not only have the 
voices of the Matabeleland victims been historically silenced, but another entire set of 
recent Mashonaland victims have also been suppressed, gagged and physically dislocated 
by being chased out of the country since the year 2000.939 The resultant confusion from 
this continuous subjugation of victimisation narratives springs from the forceful, layered 
process of multiple silencing whereby neither the past or present groups of victims have 
been given any recognised platform in which to tell their stories. However, while this 
multiple silencing is being ‘officially’ enforced by the ZANU-PF government at a local, 
regional and national level, as mentioned above, the international community is now 
providing a ready audience for the dramatisation of these pivotal victim transcripts. This 
research points to what appears to be a promising connection between these victim-
survivors coming out of these different time periods of political violence in Zimbabwe’s 
history.  
          Out of the ashes of their shared suffering under the terror of ZANU-PF, there is 
potential for a fresh, hopeful level of survivor solidarity pulsating among both Matabele 
and Mashona victims of violence. The key bridge-spanning links in this consolidation of 
solidarity seem to be two-fold in nature. First, this sense of solidarity resides in those 
persons that have walked an intensive journey of trauma healing. Second, it also resides 
in those who carry the historic memory or actual experience of being victims and 
survivors of multiple periods of national political violence. These interlocutors are the 
individuals who carry the long view; they refuse to get stuck in the memories of the past 
(those who have unresolved trauma from Rhodesia or Matabeleland) or paralysed by the 
horror of the present (those who cannot see beyond their own current trauma). Instead, 
these inter-generational mediators of healing stand poised for the future, confident that 
                                                
939 Accurate figures are not accessible. However, estimates are that there are approximately 500,000 legal 
and up to 2 million illegal Zimbabweans living in South Africa and at least 1 million living in the UK 
alone. This represents one quarter of the Zimbabwean population which numbered at 11,631,657 in the 
2002 census. Retrieved from the web on 28/09/09 http://zimpundit.blogspot.com/2005/08/census-numbers-





the ZANU-PF violence system will be fully exposed, and ready to give public testimony 
to the narratives of decadal political violence with integrity, consistency and conviction. 
Matabeleland survivors who have passed through a process of trauma recovery are 
strategically positioned to play this intercessory role as they have witnessed and often 
experienced multiple time periods and expressions of political violence. This emerging 
nation-wide network of solidarity is making room for all voices of victimisation in 
Zimbabwe which is bringing forth a new attentiveness to the Matabeleland story for the 
first time.  
“…of course there is a continuation of violence. It’s a continuation of violence in 
the sense that the ‘issues’ that were pertinent in the lives of the people, have not 
been addressed. And therefore there is always that expectation of an explosion, 
when people remain a time-bomb, as it were, for along time. But it’s disconnected 
in that it is not necessarily arising from Matabeleland. It is arising from other 
quarters that simply find fertile ground of people that opposes [ZANU-PF], that’s 
how I’m seeing that.”940 
 
“My hope is in that ‘okay, the ZANU-PF government will not live forever’. And I 
believe that maybe when somebody come[s] up; these issues will be dealt with 
appropriately. But at the present moment, ah! , it’s very difficult to say where we 
are going because things seem to be going worse. It’s surprising that at the 
present moment, even those people who, when we were experiencing these 
atrocities in Matabeleland, were supporting Mugabe; they are now coming back 
to say, ‘really this man did a lot of pain to the people of Matabeleland’. Even 
those who were close to him, those who were thinking he was doing the right thing 
because of their affiliation of their ethnic grouping in Mashonaland, they are still 
feeling now ‘yes, this man did a lot of bad things in Matabeleland’. Yeah, the 
hope is there, because we would believe God has a way out for us in this 
situation.”941  
  
It is this sense of common solidarity that will overcome the archaic instruments of ‘divide 
and rule’ that have dominated the ZANU-PF’s tactics over Matabeleland in the past and 
Mashonaland in the present, and that could create an open healing space for the people of 
Zimbabwe to jointly dream about a different future. 
 
 
                                                
940 Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed 
by 5th Brigade soldiers in 1984). 
941 Interview: CM2, Kitwe, Zambia – 09/05/07 - (Ndebele teacher and community development worker 




9.5. No Room for a Future View  
 
“Zimbabwe has been a country stuck at looking backwards. It needs to look 
forward. It needs to look forward with hope. And I think the reason why it hasn’t 
been able to look forward is because these leaders won’t allow it. Because the 
leaders are concerned that if the people look too far forward, they’ll see a future 
without them in it. And I think that terrifies a number of leaders in Zimbabwe.”942 
 
            One of the most gripping aspects of the meta-narrative of ZANU-PF is that it has 
forced the people of Zimbabwe to live in a perpetual state of the present. This ‘present’ 
state of consciousness was entrenched in, and informed by a historical text that was 
imposed on the current reality. The ZANU-PF script of patriotic history was so tightly 
woven together that it produced a sophisticated system of uniform thinking and acting 
among a majority of ordinary citizens. Most of the unique, individual resistance or 
personal agency of political differentiation was immobilised under the cynical rhetoric of 
an ideology that would terribly deconstruct and demolish all contrary notions and 
worldview ideations that it encountered or that it perceived to be standing in its way. 
Beyond the immediate goal of an imposed uniformity in thinking and acting, the ZANU-
PF meta-narrative served to protect the ruling regime by refusing to allow the 
Zimbabwean citizenry the freedom to exercise their political imagination and thereby 
dream of a future without the ZANU-PF. 
          It has been imperative for the ZANU-PF government to keep a tight reign on the 
subjugated narratives of Matabeleland precisely because these repressed scripts do not 
feature ZANU-PF or Mugabe in their future-view. Many political analysts surmise that 
the ZANU-PF’s cling to power is motivated by the ‘blood on their hands’ from past 
violence reaching back into the internal leadership struggles within the liberation 
movement. This study would suggest that it is not only the ZANU-PF’s tangible fear of 
prosecution that motivates there power mongering, but just as importantly, it is the 
related visceral fear that in the event of the oppositional leadership inheriting the helm of 
political power in Zimbabwe, they will eliminate ZANU-PF from the national script. In 
the same way that ZANU-PF attempted to erase the ZAPU-ZIPRA alliance from the 
                                                
942 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 




liberation struggle history (Chapter 6: Section 6.3.3.), now ZANU-PF is afraid of being 
written out of Zimbabwe’s history for the generations to come. For Mugabe and his 
ZANU-PF henchmen to be lost in the memory of future generations is a terrifying 
thought.  
          Diagram 7 below shows the component parts of the imposed meta-narrative of the 
ZANU-PF.  Buttressed by the five themes interrogated throughout this thesis: ethnicity, 
nationalism, loyalty, legitimacy and uniformity; the ZANU-PF meta-narrative was 
suspended in a ‘liminal’ space between the past and present. The ZANU-PF existed for 
the present; its one aim was to secure and protect its power through the establishment of a 
one-party state, perpetual leader veneration, and the nurturing of a fiercely independent 
national sovereignty in the present. In order to explain its present state, the ZANU-PF 
continually invoked a past filled with revisionist patriotic history and a stream of enemy 
formulations that defined self and ‘other’ in imagined binary categories. There was no 
future narrative in the ZANU-PF scheme, because the future would inevitably involve 
change, something that ZANU-PF was unwilling to engage in, especially if they were not 
central to the change taking place. 


















































afraid to let 
the people 
look forward 
and envision a 
future view 
that may not 
include them. 
Imposed ZANU-PF Meta-Narrative 
398 
 
           In summary, the necessity of a future view is a relatively new demand in 
Zimbabwe. The Gukurahundi violence occurred in the context of the birth of an 
independent nation and therefore the only direction in which the newly elected black 
government and its followers could look was into the future. However, the current 
violence has been unleashed in an exceptionally different context; one characterised by 
an ‘exhausted nationalism’ 943. Key to this exhausted nationalism is a whole new 
generation born after 1980 crying for a future vision that will capture their imagination; 
something the ZANU-PF government has been unable or unwilling to offer them. The 
demand for a fresh, unifying future direction or the alternative call for Matabeleland 
secession944 remain strident as is evident in these interview respondent scripts: 
“Because I still believe in Matabeleland people need to approach that area 
[patriotism] with also this question of generations. That the old guard, that is now 
the die-hard supporters of ZANU-PF in Matabeleland and who think ZAPU is 
inside and we are now following ZAPU, and there is now no other party than 
ZAPU. And they are many in Matabeleland, Ndebele-speaking people who are 
fanatic about that. But the younger generations which is actually against all those 
things. The end of ZAPU was the beginning of alienation groups instead, from the 
country, from everything. And it is this alienation from the party, the government, 
and the State itself, which has produced this‘Mthwagazi’ politics who is based in 
the UK and which is maybe happening for the secession of Matabeleland from 
mainland people.”945 
 
“They took it [patriotism] very seriously. I think at one stage it was very serious, 
and now they don’t care. For the man in the street, now he doesn’t care. In 
particular, because the man in the street now, the bigger population of the man in 
the street are people who never knew the war, or what I call ‘born-frees’, because 
they were born after 1980. So the majority of the population are very 
young…And I’ve seen people who’ve been the most ardent supporters of ZANU-
PF, turn against ZANU-PF when they realized that this is not about the people 
anymore, it’s about one man. And it’s sort-of like when you start a deviation of 
two lines going up from a point. When you’re only starting it doesn’t look as if 
they’re that far apart, but many kilometres down they’re miles apart and it looks 
                                                
943 Bond, P. & Manyanya, M. 2002. Zimbabwe’s Plunge – Exhausted Nationalism, Neo-liberalism and the 
Search for Social Justice. Durban: University of Natal Press. 
944 The call for Matabeleland secession is a clear indication of the extent of ‘exhausted nationalism’ felt in 
certain parts of Zimbabwe. While a majority of the interview respondents suggested that unity would 
require some form of national truth and reconciliation process, there were a few adamant voices that 
insisted that an armed struggle, international criminal courts, secession, or some variation of a highly 
federalist governance system were the only ways forward.    
945 Interview: SG1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 20/12/07 - (Ndebele professor of Political Science, 
researcher and author). 
399 
 
like they were never together...some people did realize the consequence of some 
of Mugabe’s rhetoric.”946 
 
9.6. In Search of Harmonising Narratives 
 
“Since wars are born in the minds of men,  
it is in the minds of men we must build the ramparts of peace.”947 
 
It is the premise of this thesis that just as violence meta-narratives predicate 
structural violence and the manufacture of systematic violent action, so multi-narratives 
of non-violence if allowed to flourish lead to a corporate vision and responsible 
obligation to create and build durable peace at an individual and collective level. In 
reality, durable peace entails two crucial elements: First, durable peace requires 
bolstering social capital. Second, durable peace requires material development. Both of 
these component parts of durable peace are inextricably linked together, and have their 
origins in the narrative function of social construction of preferred realities. Social 
capital948 as a narrative discourse is nested in the nurturance of communal, relational 
networks. These networks lay a foundation for interactive connections and linkages that 
produce meaning, identity, dignity, and purpose as well as the production of power; 
collective power to change the configurations of social co-existence.949 Material 
development as a narrative discourse moves away from a focus on psycho-social human 
interactions and the accompanying creation of community, and grounds itself in the 
corporate structural production of systems, organisations and instrumentalities that secure 
human populations from systematic acts of aggression and violence that would otherwise 
severely disrupt daily life routines for protracted periods of time. Such infrastructural 
securities would primarily include legal, economic, food, health, and environmental 
                                                
946 Interview: TM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 01/11/07 – (Shona Businessman whose relative was a 
prominent leader in the ZANU-PF government). 
947 Quote by Archibald McLeish. Despite the traditional and singularly sexist use of the word ‘men’ to 
generically represent ‘humankind’, if one can overlook the gendered language employed here, one can also 
appreciate that historically violence does feature more prominently in the minds of men than women. The 
violence systems of military, prisons and gangs readily confirm this majority male-dominated make-up. 
Whether due to biological predisposition, chemical balances of testosterone or socialisation processes, this 
remains the global reality. 
948 Bourdieu, P. 1986. The Forms of Social Capital, in J Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood, 241-258.  
949 Sawatsky, J. 2008. Justpeace Ethics – A Guide to Restorative Justice and Peacebuilding. Ore on: 
Cascade Books, 18-19. Sawatsky places the concept of ‘interconnectedness’ as the core (the heart of the 
matter) in his proposed model of Justpeace Ethics. 
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aspects of peace sustenance. Thus, from a peace-building argument, a strong social 
capital would ensure living in ‘freedom from fear’ and a solid material development 
would secure living in ‘freedom from want’ both of which are foundational measures for 
humanity to thrive.  
For purposes of this thesis and its immediate concern with the study of narrative 
discourse, the following sections on future recommendations for peace-building will 
focus on the augmentation of social capital in the journey of violence recovery in 
Zimbabwe. That being said, these recommendations which are aimed at buttressing social 
capital are a critical forerunner to the establishment of a material development that 
enables long-term peace. Put differently, structural development that is transformative 
will necessarily be formed by a participative, engaged social capital, which in turn is 
shaped by a reflective and reflexive narrative discourse that is allowed to flow freely, yet 
at the same time is channelled in a constructive manner within the public domain. The 
recommendations that follow are fourfold; to re-construct memory, t  re-establish 
belonging and responsibility, to re-invest in participation, and to re-engage in healing. 
These suggested frames are to be understood as ‘sign-posts’ that give guidance and 
direction in the search for harmonising narratives on the path to peace in Zimbabwe. 
They are premised on the following three assumptions: 
• The subjugated narratives of the victims of Matabeleland need to be written into 
the historical narrative of Zimbabwe in order for there to be durable peace in the 
future of the nation. 
• Transitional justice and peace-building practitioners will need to embark on a 
series of sustained ‘dialogue encounters’ in order for reconciliation and co-
existence to be transformative in Zimbabwe for the generations to come. 
• There is a need to publicly surface the silenced narratives of the victims of 
Matabeleland in order for healing to occur in the long-term. 
 
9.6.1. Re-constructing a unifying Memory 
 
Zimbabwe is poised on a thirty-year threshold since independence characterised 
by a perpetual bombardment of ZANU-PF patriotic history that attempted to manufacture 
a uniform national memory dating back to the late 1890s. The past and present victims of 
ZANU-PF political violence carry a more recent memory (since independence in 1980) 
that is continually being denied, minimised and strangled under the weight of the 
imposing ZANU-PF national meta-narrative. Hence, these post-independence survivors 
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of political violence are calling for an interrogation into the historical memory of 
Zimbabwe as a nation.  
“So, I mean, you have to give Mugabe this: he’s been consistent throughout 
saying ‘this is the voice, this is the version that is true and any other version is not 
true, is not valid, is not guarding the sovereignty of the nation’, you know. ‘Any 
other voice is suspect’. And he’s been consistent about this right from 1980 until 
now. And I would say probably before then if you look at ZANU-PF’s history and 
ZANLA’s history. Mugabe has been consistent in trying to wipe out any other 
voice, any other version to what is happening to ‘just his’.”950 
 
The Matabeleland region is particularly insistent on a narrative post-mortem as the 
complexities of its oppositional script have been reduced to insignificance under the 
dismissive label of dissident terror. 
“If we are fighting a war on terror, then there is not need to consider the ideas, the 
aspirations, the historical grievances of the people who oppose us.  We are simply 
fighting ‘terrorists’, people who believe in nothing, other than the blowing up of 
innocent civilians. History is erased… [and] is thus inherently amnesiac. When 
the enemy is imagined as crazy people who believe in nothing more than blowing 
up innocent people, there is no need to examine one’s own historical sins.”951 
 
Olga Botchavora952, a Russian-born Psychologist who worked extensively with 
former Yugoslavian refugee populations, has situated the act of ‘creating heroes’ and 
‘creating enemies’ (in the Zimbabwe case, ‘dissidents’) as part of the revenge cycle that 
facilitates the repetitive and destructive pattern of moving from being the victimized to 
being the aggressor. The antidote for this distorted hero and enemy formation is, 
according to Botchavora, the often elusive, but essential ministration of ‘re-writing 
history’, both figuratively and actually.  To be effective, this de-mystification and 
deconstruction of the historical memory has to be jointly contested as well as mutually 
agreed upon as a ‘consensus narrative’; a script that describes the past in plausible and 
acceptable terms to all the stakeholders involved in the conflict. Zimbabwe’s future peace 
is dependent on the national will to launch a historiography project that would aim to re-
write the national patriotic history by folding in the formally subjugated voices of other 
                                                
950 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
951 Cavanaugh, W.  2006. “The Sacrifice of Love – The Eucharist as Resistance to Terror and Torture”. A 
Lecture presented at O’Shea Centre, Wilston. Melbourne: Catholic Communications, 15.  
952 Botchavora, Olga. 1996. Adapted from a presentation made at the European Conference on 
Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (ECPCR) held in Varna, Bulgaria. 
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parallel liberation struggle structures (ZAPU-ZIPRA), the 1980s victims of Gukurahundi 
from Matabeleland as well as the recent victims of the last decade. This would require 
developing an integrated educational curriculum which would be taught in all schools 
across the country and that would represent this national consensus narrative and the 
diverse social contracts that are required to uphold it. 
“I think Zimbabwe is a good example of the fact that there can be ‘ o single 
history’. That there are going to be…you know, it’s to open up to say ‘there are 
‘many’ different voices, many different accounts, many different versions of the 
same event, and we want to hear them all’. And each one is valid, and some are 
going to say ‘we’re invalid’ and some are going to be crazy but, you know, we 
want a process in which all can step forward and say ‘this is mine, that was mine, 
that was my mother’s story, this is my aunt’s story, this is how it was told to me’, 
everything.”953 
 
Writing within the framework of ‘choosing appropriate conflict resolution processes’, 
author Pamela Machakanja suggests at least three constructive implications to consider 
when embarking on a national memory re-write of such a nature: 
“Third, memories should be looked at historically; that is, one must realize that 
the meanings attached to the past change over time and are part of a larger, 
complex social and political dynamics and scenarios…Fourth, there exists the 
potential for conflict resolution in the transformation of memories of a violent 
past to memories of post-conflict justice and peace…Fifth, conflict resolution can 
act as a catalyst for cooperation and a bridge between the other sectors necessary 
to create peaceful social memories.”954    
 
This recommended historical revisionist endeavour should not be based on a 
competitive clamouring of past voices each striving for dominance above all others in the 
public domain of the national psyche. Instead, it should be a critical, yet consensual re-
writing of national memory which respects and honours a diverse set of shared 
recollections about national origins and make-up. This kind of memory re-write would 
serve a number of essential functions. First, it would usher in a form of symbolic justice; 
a vindication for those whose voices were repressed in the past. Second, it would create a 
sense of restoration for those who felt personally isolated and whose stories were 
marginalised from the collective social spaces of the nation for decades. Third, it would 
                                                
953 Interview: AM1, Johannesburg, South Africa – 10/08/06 – (White American Journalist who lived in 
Zimbabwe from 1980 until he was deported by the ZANU-PF government). 
954 Machakanja, P. 2008. “Politics of Memory: Collective Remembering and Manipulation of the Past in 
Zimbabwe”.  Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 1 (1): 63.  
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provide a vehicle through which meaning could be acknowledged and reinstated for the 
whole nation. Catholic theologian and author, William Cavanaugh insinuates that the act 
of meaning-making is wrapped up in our ability to utilise our imaginations:  
“The point is more about our imagination. If we did not think of opponents…as 
enemies and backward fanatics, if we thought of them as rational beings, we 
would have to consider our own policies, and consider the possibility that 
opponents might have some legitimate grievances.”955 
 
This need for meaning-making to occur in the lives of those who have survived 
severe violence cannot be underestimated. In her seminal work on trauma recovery, Dr. 
Judith Herman956 uses the analogy of broken, splintered glass as representative of the 
shattering aftermath of violence and trauma in an individual’s life. Central to Herman’s 
model of recovery from complex post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS) is the need to 
gather the disparate pieces of one’s trauma memory and fit them back together into the 
flow of a coherent life story that makes sense (has meaning) for the survivor once again. 
This ‘meaning-making’ effort only comes through a laborious process of repetitively 
recalling the trauma experience over an extended period of time. Just as the traumatised 
individual gains wholeness through this re-fitting of the scattered pieces of trauma into a 
cohesive life narrative, so too recovery from corporate trauma can occur when a grouping 
of people or a nation embarks on a historical memory re-write in order to tell and re-tell a 
shared, diverse and inclusive story to future generations. Re-telling the historical memory 
and harmonising the narratives of antagonists is “es ential to the task of rendering the 
terror understandable.”957 As social anthropologist Paul Richards succinctly puts it, 






                                                
955 Cavanaugh, W.  2006. “The Sacrifice of Love – The Eucharist as Resistance to Terror and Torture”. A 
Lecture presented at O’Shea Centre, Wilston. Melbourne: Catholic Communications, 13.  
956 Herman, J. 1997. Trauma and Recovery – The aftermath of violence from domestic abuse to political 
terror. New York: Basic Books-a Division of HarperCollins Publishers. 
957 Nordstrom, C. 1992. The Backyard Front, in C. Nordstrom and J. Martin (eds.) The Paths of 
Domination, Resistance and Terror.  Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press. 
958 Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest – War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: 
James Curry, xxix. 
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9.6.2. Re-establishing corporate Belonging and Responsibility 
 
This thesis has explored the contested nature of ‘belonging’ and its powerful 
manipulation by the ZANU-PF through the imposition of a meta-narrative of order 
(Chapter 5), exclusion (Chapter 6), and discipline (Chapter 7). Those who dared to defy 
or resist the script of uniformity (Chapter 8) imposed by the ruling political party were 
effectively disposed of, ostracised or silenced. Belonging is deeply dependent on the 
inter-subjectivity of recognition and respect which in turn is tied to the formation and 
affirmation of dignity as a human person (see Chapter 6: Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4). To 
bolster the formulations of belonging and responsibility in divided nations such as 
Zimbabwe is to add to the quotient of human dignity which is the critical motivation for 
increased commitment to nation-building; the expression of an identification bond with a 
particular people grouping.  
During the severe and protracted violence of the Gukurahundi period, the people 
of Matabeleland not only suffered a great physical trauma, they also suffered a great 
humiliation; the loss of human dignity. Once a people have been stripped of a precious 
psycho-social commodity such as this (human dignity) it cannot easily be replaced. One 
of the key avenues being used to restore human dignity and the sense of human worth in 
transitional justice approaches is that of national truth-telling and reconciliation 
programmes. The recovery of national truth and reconciliation are proving to be essential 
in the re-establishment of belonging and responsibility in the political spheres of a nation 
and these values (belonging and responsibility) supply critical ingredients for a sustained 
unity and restoration at a collective level in society. 
The interview respondents of this research articulated a wide spectrum of 
transitional justice views ranging from national healing processes to armed struggle 
against the ZANU-PF. These varying transitional justice views have been categorised as 
restorative justice options (Diagram 8) and adversarial justice options (Diagram 9)in 











This thesis unearthed a strong and urgent call for Zimbabwe to institute a national 
truth-telling (justice) and story-sharing (reconciliation) exercise often referenced by the 
various Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) efforts conducted across Africa and 
globally. As indicated by the above chart (Diagram 8), most interview respondents 
endorsed a restorative justice application (truth and reconciliation, apology, and 
compensation) in Zimbabwe’s transition to peace. This is a positive result especially in 
view of the degree of trauma and repression that many of the respondents have 
experienced as either primary or secondary victims of severe and protracted violence.    
Diagram 9 below exhibits a smaller number of respondents who leaned heavily 
on adversarial responses (whether violent or not) as appropriate transitional justice 
measures. All of the respondents in this category hailed from professional backgrounds 
based on punitive ideologies such as military, security services or legal professions. 
Adversarial approaches were more readily promoted by those who appeared to still be in 










The majority response in favour of restorative justice approaches is significant in 
a number of ways. First, it indicates that despite the severe and protracted violence 
experienced by many Matabele there remains a strong commitment to unify, reconcile 
and heal the nation of Zimbabwe. Second, this would suggest that there are resources for 
trauma healing and non-adversarial responses to violence that are available and perceived 
as viable for the communities of Matabeleland. Third, it speaks to the enduring and 
drawing power of non-violent narrative applications (relationship building through 
dialogue and negotiations) for social co-existence and peace-building by the people, as 
opposed to violent structural applications (forced legal or institutionally imposed order) 
for the political power and empire-building purposes of a few. In sum, despite their tragic 
past, this sample research would indicate that many people in Matabeleland look as if 
they are prepared to stake a claim in the future of Zimbabwe as their country 
(belonging), respectfully acknowledge the inherent diversity within the nation (politics 
of recognition and dignity) and take the risk to search and discover a ‘shared moral 
landscape’959 that would function to guide and direct their attempts to reconstruct their 
livelihoods for the common good of all (responsibility). Given the vision, freedom and 
                                                




the appropriate opportunities, the Matabeleland region seems poised to play an active, 
even leading role in harmonising the shaping narratives of historic memory and future 
restoration of the nation.         
9.6.3. Re-investing in public Participation 
 
“I don’t know if a voice will be able to rise; ‘a voice of the voiceless’ if you want to call 
it, whereby people will be able to stand up and talk freely. Well I’m sure people ‘are 
talking’, the problem is ‘no-one is listening’. The problem is no-one is listening, the 
government is not listening.”960 
 
Despite any number of flirtations with democratic, multi-party ideations over the 
past few decades, the ZANU-PF from its inception has remained resolutely committed to 
the establishment of a de facto one-party state (Chapter 5). A one-party state whether 
benevolent or not, by its very nature cannot afford to allow a diversity of opposing 
structures or voices of alternative reasoning to flow freely, or it will run the risk of 
loosing control of its power.  In the case of Zimbabwe, this centrifugal pull toward one-
party state politics did not make room for a genuine, participatory administration of 
power-sharing and unity building, much less submit itself to a collective narrative re-tell 
(see Section 9.5.1.). When participative outlets are not available or are systematically 
denied the individual and/or the corporate body of citizenry that makes up a nation, it is 
extremely disempowering and debilitating over time. Resuscitating the machinations of 
public participation in Zimbabwe will not only serve to liberate and free the populace it 
will also empower the masses to re-engage in the constructive pursuit of re-building 
Zimbabwe.  Public participation processes are instrumental in the production of 
‘empowerment’. 
The conception of ‘participation’ in the scheme of social capital production 
moves beyond the domain of added value and into the realm of fundamental human need 
theory. In the field of conflict resolution studies, Professor John Burton pioneered the 
idea of the interconnectivities of conflict and the denial of human need.  It was Burton’s 
premise that if subaltern human needs (like participation) are being denied or threatened, 
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conflict resolution efforts will be impeded. In other words, people who feel that their 
fundamental human needs are being violated will resort to survivalist, instinctual conflict 
behaviour and will use any accessible power to guard and defend their sense of human 
need fulfilment. Regardless of the skill with which a particular conflict resolution process 
is facilitated, if parties to the conflict feel that their freedom to participate is being 
inhibited, a satisfactory resolution to the conflict at hand is highly unlikely.961 
Dove-tailing with Burton’s theory is the notion of Human Scale Development, a 
people-centred framework for development formulated by Chilean economist, Manfred 
Max-Neef. Max-Neef identifies what he terms are nine fundamental human needs that are 
universal in theory (superseding economic, social or cultural status) and yet particular in 
context application. These needs are the spokes of the wheel of human ‘existence’ (being) 
and ‘activity’ (doing). These nine fundamental needs are protection, idleness (leisure), 
creation, subsistence, affection, identity, understanding, freedom and participation. Whe  
any of these ‘spokes’ are damaged or broken the wheel of ‘wholeness’ is thrown into a 
state of imbalance. Max-Neef explains that these fundamental needs are met through 
what he terms ‘satisfiers’. These satisfiers can be conventional (material) or non-
conventional (immaterial) and they can also be negative (causing conflict and 
destruction) or positive (causing peace and development). Max-Neef describes the 
disconnection between fundamental human needs and current trends in development as 
being driven by ‘pseudo-satisfiers’ (that which people are convinced or persuaded will 
meet their fundamental human needs but in the long-term fail to do so). While all nine of 
the needs identified are universal according to Max-Neef, the satisfiers required are not, 
they are specific and contextual according to the setting under question. Thus, appropriate 
satisfiers in one context may not be appropriate in another.962 
Max-Neef’s thinking assists in understanding the degree of felt-need frustration 
experienced by the general Zimbabwean public as they have been continually denied the 
option of participation in their own national governance systems for decades. Open 
arenas of socio-political dialogue are an essential marker in the measurement of national 
                                                
961 Burton, J. (ed.) 1990. Conflict: Human Needs Theory. London: MacMillan Press. 
962 Max-Neef, M., Elizalde, A., Hopenhayn, M. 1989. “Human Scale Development: An Option for the 
Future”. Development Dialogue – A Journal for International Development Cooperation, published by Dag 
Hammarskjold, Uppsala, Sweden: 1.  
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participation. A healthy democratic environment will constantly be giving birth to, and be 
nurtured, challenged, and transformed by ‘inter-locking spheres of dialogue’963 among its 
citizenry.  
Curiously, the ZANU-PF has always allowed elements of political dialogue in 
Zimbabwe but only in isolation one from another. Disguised as democratic inclination, 
the ZANU-PF would turn a blind eye to certain dialogical impulses provided they were 
running on congruent or parallel tracks. The goal of ZANU-PF was to ensure that these 
dialogues were always divided; separated in order to keep the spark of synergy from 
erupting. ZANU-PF knew full well the power of resistance contact and the exponential 
duplication of ideas and applications of insurgency. The transference of social capital in 
human networks inherently brings with it growth and change; innovative means of 
expressing and exerting the people’s will. To the fortress mentality of the ZANU-PF 
government these synergies were deeply threatening and have had to be systematically 
and continually blocked.  
Thus, the ZANU-PF surveillance allowed ongoing pockets of political dialogue to 
ensue but only if they remained disconnected one from the other. The moment these 
various dialogues gained too much momentum and transformative linkages emerged the 
ZANU-PF would shut them down. In Zimbabwe’s future view, this dialogical tension 
will need to be allowed its full course and will have to be sustained across multiple 
sectors both vertically and horizontally. Through a national, cross-sectoral dialogical 
process, trust will be built, new shared narratives constructed, and new patterns of 
communication forged in order to move forward in joint action and networking for a 
better Zimbabwe in the future.        
Transitional justice in Zimbabwe will need to encourage a proliferation of 
‘dialogical platforms’; structured forums in the public domain where all Zimbabweans 
can freely participate without fear of intimidation or reprisal from the State security 
apparatus. These dialogue platforms will provide the necessary locations where 
Zimbabweans can formulate and produce a diversity of narratives in conjunction with the 
governance and developmental structures of their local communities and of the nation as 
                                                
963 This phrase was coined by Philip Visser in describing the inner-workings of a Video Dialogues Project, 
a media approach to peace-building implemented in the violence-racked townships of Thokoza, Kathlehong 
and Vosloorus located in Johannesburg, South Africa from 1996-1999. 
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a whole. Urgent national dialogue is required in the arenas of constitutional reform, 
structures of human rights, gender equity, labour and land mediation, union/worker 
relations, educational policies, community policing initiatives, and local development 
programmes to name but a few. 
“So, I think peace will come; if there is a Constitution, the culture of tolerance, of 
accepting each other. This culture of wanting to hear the views of other people 
without necessarily saying ‘this person is opposed to me’, accept logical debate. 
But what happens now is what we were doing as boys when we were growing up 
in the bush. If we talk and debate and…I find that I’m losing the debate, I then tell 
my opponent, ‘even if you think you know more or much and you think you have 
good or better ideas, you cannot beat me, physically’. So all of the sudden the 
conversation turns into violence, physically. And I see that happening on the 
ground, where people are saying ‘ok fine. You might have good ideas but you can 
not necessarily beat me physically’.”964  
 
Essentially, these dialogical platforms would resemble the social technologies 
evoked in public participation965 and sustained dialogue966 frameworks. In general, both 
of these conceptions move along a participatory spectrum from inform, to consult, to 
involve, to collaborate, and finally to empower.967  Facilitation of these processes relies 
heavily on the following principles: broad-based representation, high levels of 
engagement, incorporating many avenues of ‘knowing’, ability to manage commonalities 
and diversities (including conflict) with creativity, leaving time-frames open-ended, 
exploring as many as outcomes as possible, and providing a place for deep listening to be 
transacted. Among the many constructive benefits of these kinds of processes, the 
following list was developed around a sustained dialogue process in New Zealand: 
• An educational approach is not enough 
• The value of having a parallel process to formal government procedures, 
                                                
964 Interview: DN1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 29/03/07 – (Ndebele Church Leader whose father was killed 
by 5th Brigade soldiers in 1984). 
965 Public participation  approaches usually involve most of the following facilitated forums / sessions: 
Community information, community conversation, community healing, community engagement, public 
judgment, and public reflection. Retrieved from web 15/02/2009. http://www.co-
intelligence.org/CIPol_publicparticipation.html  
966 Saunders, H. 1999. A Public Peace Process – Sustained dialogue to transform Racial and Ethnic 
Conflicts. New York: Palgrave. Sustained dialogue approaches include at least five stages: Deciding to 
engage, mapping and naming, exploring problems and relationships, scenario building or developing 
options, and acting together. Retrieved from web 29/10/2008.  http://www.scpi.org.nz/delberations.php  
967Arnstein, S. “ Ladder of Public Participation”. Arnstein speaks of public participation within the context 
of high to low power ranging from manipulation, to therapy, to informing, to consultation, to placation, to 




• The action of citizens outside of government, 
• The importance of moving beyond time constraints, 
• The value of having a systematic process with substance, 
• The importance of ongoing connections and communication, and 
• Going beyond a legal solution to issues.968 
 
Citizen activity of this nature is already being proposed and acted upon in Zimbabwe 
since the formation of the Government of National Unity in late 2008. One illustration of 
this is the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) which has launched a National 
Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice programme that has as its 
mission to “facilitate national healing, sense of belonging and dealing with past 
injustices”.969 CPIA describes its work as: 
“…seeks to reconcile parties, as a process of managing and /or resolving conflict 
in order to avoid unnecessary violence, injury to people, loss of lives and armed 
conflict that hinder positive development in Zimbabwe. It paves the way for the 
much needed dialogical engagement at all levels in the country and to facilitate 
the transformation of relationships at all levels of our society.”970 
 
These forms of civil society engagement that stimulate citizen-to-citizen action for 
corporate justice, healing and reconciliation are not only commendable, they are essential 
as Zimbabwe struggles to re-invest in the people’s participation in the governance and 
development of the country. Public participation and sustained dialogue represent two of 
the process frames through which narrative construction of social reality is realised. If 
facilitated and managed skilfully, these public participation scaffolding will assist in 
harmonising the many divergent narratives that currently exist in Zimbabwe. 
9.6.4. Re-engaging in collective Healing 
 
Collective healing will begin to flow as the nation of Zimbabwe is able to 
embrace a joint historical memory (Section 9.5.1.), to redefine and diversify its 
                                                
968 Retrieved from web 29/10/2008.  http://www.scpi.org.nz/delberations.php 
969 Hove, S. 2009.  National Reconciliation, Social Cohesion and Transitional Justice Programme. A case 
study prepared by the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA), Harare, Zimbabwe, 15/04/09: 1. Other 
important initiatives of this kind are the Habakkuk Trust (Bulawayo) which is training rural and urban 
communities in Matabeleland in advocacy skills in order to empower local leaders to mobilise the 
communities to pressurise the government for basic needs provision such as the delivery of food, water, 
electricity and sanitation (habakkuktrust.blogspot.com). The Christian Legal Society (CLS-Bulawayo) is 
educating rural populations on their legal rights, holding public participation meetings on current 
legislation, and finding ways to make the legal system more accessible to the people at a grassroots level 
(www.advocatesinternational.org/pages/africa/zimbabwe.htm)   
970 Hove, S, 2009: 1-2. 
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understanding of inclusion and belonging (Section 9.5.2.) and to give impetus and 
implementation to a vibrant public participation framework (Section 9.5.3.). Collective 
healing requires the reconfiguration of socio-political spaces for healing; safe spaces, 
familial and community-building spaces, transformative spaces, and spaces for advocacy. 
Safe-spaces refer to the base-line physical security required for people who have suffered 
under trauma to speak without fear. The notion of safety is also considering the 
psychological trust and emotional boundary protection required for victims of violence to 
feel comfortable to share stories of grief and loss, vent anger and rage and disclose 
intimate concerns for the future. Familial and community-building spaces sp ak to the 
need to reconstruct the relational webs of social support that solidify identity, belonging, 
dignity and purpose to human existence. The very acts of violence and war are psycho-
socially destructive, disempowering people by cutting them off from intimate relations 
(by killing or forced migration) and thereby alienating or isolating the individual from the 
power of the familiar (familial ties) and the meaningful ‘in-context’ relationships of 
community that give the individual existential power. Transformative spaces t p into the 
human need for introspection, reflection, and spiritual devotion. For the religious person 
these spaces are often found in the spiritual disciplines of prayer, fasting, meditation and 
forms of transcendent worship. These spaces are characterised by time and location 
considerations that are conducive to being alone, quiet and restful, or which could entail 
activities that involve didactic interactions with those considered as spiritual mentors and 
or peer counsellors. Finally, spaces for advocacy must be developed. The idea of 
advocacy is pivotal for the future healing of those who have suffered under violent 
repression. For those populations who have lived under systematic oppression and who 
experienced no structural outlet of appeal to their subjugation, the reassurance of 
advocacy support structures becomes essential. Restorative justice requires that the future 
intentions of the perpetrators (former oppressors) be addressed in a satisfactory manner 
for the victims or survivors involved to feel safe again.971 Having the relational 
structures, constitutive systems, and legal policies or procedures for advocacy in place 
and accessible for public consumption inevitably translates into higher levels of 
assurance for the formerly voiceless victim.         
                                                
971 Zehr, H. 1990. Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice. S ottdale: Herald Press. 
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 Collective healing is also about generational thinking972. It is a gift for the sake 
of future generations. For a nation to heal it requires going backwards and coming to 
terms with its painful past, while at the same time living out and building for the future, 
laying a foundation for durable peace. The movement of memorialisation973 that is taking 
shape in many post-conflict sites around the world opens the way for assisting nations to 
think and act inter-generationally. Memorialisation functions not only to remember what 
was (past), it reminds of what is (present) and shows what will be (future). In her action 
research on memorialisation in South Africa, Ereshnee Naidoo presents the power of 
memorialisation in the psyche of a nation: 
“Memory, as perpetuated through processes such as memorialisation seen in 
national monuments and commemorative celebrations can assist divided societies 
to re-write the narratives of the past; recognise and assist survivors of human 
rights violations through symbolic reparations to begin the process of healing; and 
assist the previously divided society in processes of reconciliation.”974 
 
Memorialisation has often been disregarded as a healing agency in the transitional 
justice movement because it is perceived to be a non-essential for at least three reasons: 
First, due to its symbolic nature, it is seen as intangible process that is extremely difficult 
to measure or objectify. Second, in some circles, it does not carry the same ‘weight’ as 
the political discourse or legal frameworks that surround many transitional justice 
approaches. Third, it is often perceived as a less significant form (immaterial) of 
reparations as compared to financial compensation or substantive restitution (such as 
land). While there is always the danger that certain governments may use 
memorialisation as a cover-up to their failure to delivery on material reparations, recent 
research is discovering the significance of memorialisation at multiple levels: 
“…memorialisation has a variety of purposes and is able to address some of the 
intangible aspects of conflict related to issues of culture; dignity; human 
relationships and collective identities…According to [South African research] 
                                                
972Sawatsky, J. 2008: 19-20. In his work on justpeace ethics, Sawatsky locates the perspective of a 
generational lens in the relational-focused approach to change. 
973 Hamber, B. 2007. Reparations as Symbol: Narratives of Resistance, Reticence, and Possibility in South 
Africa, in J. Miller & R. Kumar (Eds.) Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries. New York: Oxford 
University Press; Hamber, B. & Wilson, R. 2003. Symbolic closure through Memory, Reparation and 
Revenge in Post-conflict Societies, in E. Cairns and M. Roe (Eds.) Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, 
Macmillan Publishers. 
974 Naidoo, R. 2006. “The Ties that Bind: Strengthening the links between memorialisation and transitional 
justice”. Transitional Justice Project Brief, Johannesburg: The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR), August; 1.     
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respondents, the purposes of their own memorialisation initiatives included truth-
telling; seeking justice; building a culture of democracy; commemorating 
previously marginalised histories and heritage; and recognising victims and 
survivors of human rights violations.”975   
 
Two critical hurdles to memorialisation are the dangers of stakeholder 
consultations being politicised, and/or the timing and sequencing of the process either 
exploding due to the mismanagement of highly sensitive content issues and relationship 
protocols, or being encumbered with so many delays and overshadowed by current events 
as to be rendered irrelevant. The concept of ‘living memory’ (how to keep the 
memorialisation process relevant, interactive and growing) is gaining particular 
momentum in recent years.  
“…it is necessary that initiatives continually evolve to accommodate changes in 
its social, cultural and political milieu…To ensure that memorials continue to 
evolve with different generations, whether it means transforming the meaning of 
divisive memorials, or ensuring that post-conflict memorials accommodate for 
identity shifts within society, it is necessary that ongoing reflection and evaluation 
is undertaken.”976      
 
Memorialisation is but one channel through which the space for collective healing is 
reconfigured. Memorialisation has the potential to provide a safe-space, a community-
building space, a transformative space and a space for advocacy in the process of the 
recovery from collective trauma. Memorialisation becomes the instrument through which 
the many scattered national narratives are harmonised for the purposes of nation-building. 
9.6.5. In Search of Reconciliation in Zimbabwe 
For better or for worse, the process of genuine ‘unity-solidification’ cannot be 
arrived at by taking socio-political ‘short-cuts’. Genuine transitional justice initiatives 
must be ‘stratified’, even as the violence system is complex. Recent experience and 
research indicates that there are pluralistic and seemingly contradictory ‘voices’ that must 
be invited to come to the ‘meeting place’ of reconciliation. In the poetic literature of the 
Judeo-Christian scriptures, the Psalmist writes: “Truth and Mercy have met together; 
Peace and Justice have kissed”977. Within this one line of verse resides a picture of 
                                                
975 Ibid, 2. 
976 Ibid, 3. 
977 The Holy Bible, Spanish Version (in translation), Psalm 85:10. 
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seemingly disparate concepts that find ways to ‘meet’ and even intimately connect as 
they form an integrated whole of reconciliation: 
• Truth - (acknowledgement, transparency, revelation, clarity and storytelling) 
• Mercy - (acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion and healing) 
• Justice - (equalizing power, right relationships, reparations, restitution and  
reconstruction) 
• Peace - (well-being, harmony/unity, safety/security, respect/dignity, trust /loyalty, 
and co-operation)978 
 
To explore reconciliation from this perspective requires an ability to handle or 
manage multiple layers with inherent paradoxes impressed upon the process. This calls 
for taking a risk to open up a place that may bring indictment and freedom 
simultaneously; an environment where the demarcations of perpetrator/victim, 
right/wrong, justified/unjustified will not be easily exercised. Holding this tension 
between accountability and freedom in a balance is precisely the point at which 
transitional justice approaches often fail. This is in part due to the adversarial and 
retributive nature of the legal frames in which most transitional justice programmes are 
designed under. The legal binaries that force choices between either truth (blame and 
prosecution), or mercy (impunity or amnesty) and between justice (enforced punitive 
measures), or peace (avoidance, accommodation or compromise) prevail. Discovering 
ways to re-employ and move beyond the ‘either/or’ cosmology of the defining political-
legal system of the day is pivotal in order to find new expressions of relational-centred 
practices that satisfy the needs for human justice and reconciliation for all stakeholders 
involved.  
“I think one of the third ways we’re looking at, in Rwanda and others, and we’ve 
been encouraging this, but Rwanda is the only one that’s really done something; 
technically they call it Gacaca…this is a way we could link a ‘national’ Truth 
Commission process through a local process that would find ways to deal with the 
compensation and the relationship mending and bridge-building. And somehow 
bring out a little more sense of healing, of closure. So we’ve all been trying to 
encourage the TRC’s in Sierra Leone and Rwanda that we work with to try and 
look at indigenous practices of justice and bring a restorative component that will 
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be much more meaningful at a local level as a process for this whole thing as 
opposed to leaving that in the hands of the national government.”979   
 
The resurgence of traditional indigenous practices of this kind appears to be one of the 
most promising applications of alternative justice and reconciliation processes currently 
available. A Zimbabwean transitional justice model can learn from the competencies and 
challenges faced by other African nations who have embarked on similar projects. In the 
remaining part of this section, attention will be given to the learning garnered from three 
other African transitional justice endeavours and a proposed model for a Zimbabwean 
transitional justice approach will be outlined.   
9.6.5.1. South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
In the case of the South African TRC, while it moved away from blanket amnesty 
(the primary experience of South America) and embraced impunity only on the condition 
of full disclosure of the truth, it fell short on a number of other critical measures. First, it 
was perceived to be perpetrator-centred as opposed to victim-centred in part because of 
the amount of time and attention given to the legal aspects (rights and procedures) of the 
amnesty applicants. For example, victim-offender interactions were seriously hampered 
by the legal constraint that confined perpetrators to only discuss the past within the 
parameters of the amnesty hearings themselves. The perpetrator was liable for any 
confessions, admissions of guilt, or apologies expressed outside the amnesty hearings in a 
court of law. Hence, in this case, the law actually stood as a barrier to accomplishing the 
essential outcomes of relationship-building and reconciliation. Second, the South African 
TRC functioned from a top-down approach which was successful in opening up a robust 
debate on reconciliation at a national level, but it failed to translate that reconciliation 
experience in practical application at the local community level context. In South Africa 
there was no formal interface between the TRC and other traditional, indigenous 
practices of justice, healing and reconciliation. Third, the South African TRC ended up 
making a once-off payment of money to its victims thereby, failing to engage perpetrators 
                                                





and communities in creative, meaningful efforts of compensation and reparations that 
would restore dignity, build community and bring closure to a violent, repressive past.980  
From the above discussion there are at least three key learning that can be taken 
from the South African TRC experiences. Firstly, the legal frameworks in which TRCs 
are often wrapped in have an inherent perpetrator focus and what appears to be an 
offender bias in the eyes of the victims and survivors. Secondly, it cannot be assumed 
that a national TRC process can or will be automatically or easily translated from the 
state level to the local community context. To implement the measures of a ‘top-down to 
bottom-up’ approach takes intentional, concerted and strategic planning, time and energy.  
Thirdly, a meaningful restorative justice effort must go beyond narratives of confession, 
testimony and apology and must enact tangible (material or structural) 
compensation/reparation reciprocities for it to be seen and felt as complete by the masses 
on-the-ground.      
9.6.5.2. Gacaca process in Rwanda 
 Building on the South African TRC experience, Rwanda took their transitional 
process a step further and engaged in a local, community-based approach to justice called 
Gacaca981 which was mandated to run parallel (compliment and supplement) to the legal 
process of an International Tribunal that had already been launched by the International 
Criminal Courts in Arusha, Tanzania. The benefits of this process are myriad and the 
world is watching with bated breath to see the long-term, potential success of this effort 
at building a sustainable climate of reconciliation and healing in Rwanda.  
Interestingly, some of the most stinging critique of the Rwandan experience of 
transitional justice has not been in relation to the internal-structure or effectiveness of the 
Gacaca approach, but instead the political interference of governmental ideology and 
                                                
980 Van der Merwe, H. 1999. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Community Reconciliation: An 
Analysis of Competing Strategies and Conceptualizations. Doctoral Dissertation, George Mason 
University: Fairfax, Virginia, (summer semester). 
981 Wolters, S. 2005. “The Gacaca Process”, African Security Review 14 (3). Retrieved from the web on 
19/09/09. http://www.iss.co.zapubs/ASR/14No3/AWWolters.htm. The Gacaca process involves the 
community electing nine community leaders / elders who function as the third-party judges in each case. 
These nine community arbitrators are tasked with gathering as much information as possible about the 
genocide activity in their local village. They then bring together the survivors, accused offenders, family 
support networks and the community at large. Truth-telling is core to the process with the use of witnesses 
to corroborate the findings. Opportunity for offender admission of guilt, confession and apology as well as 
survivor-offender mediation and reconciliation are emphasised throughout the process. Forgiveness, 
reduced prison sentence, compensation or punitive discipline is then decided by the community judges.  
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policy that swirls around the national definition of ‘genocide’. Vigilant against any 
language or action that smacks of ‘genocidal ideology’, the government in Rwanda has 
outlawed the use of the ethnic designations of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’, and keeps a tight 
surveillance on any organisations that appear to only work with or favour one ethnic 
group in neglect of the other. While this is quite understandable in lieu of the horrific 
nature of ethnic genocide that has transpired in that nation’s history, it has had the 
unintended consequence of ‘silencing’ a rigorous and honest debate about ethnicity and 
genocide within the country.982  
On top of this, in an over-eagerness to exonerate itself from the violence of 
1994983, and suppress all hints of genocide ideology in the country, the ruling party has 
embarked on a rigorous campaign to carefully distinguish between the language of 
genocide (organised violence intent on eliminating an entire ethnic group) and all other 
forms of violence (mass killings or massacres). On the surface this linguistic 
differentiation seems straight forward, however for the narrative processes of healing 
being discussed in this thesis it has dangerous implications. First, it has allowed the ruling 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to excuse itself from implication in violence, claiming 
that whatever massacres or mass killings that may have transpired under its watch were 
strictly a consequence of war and in defence against the ‘genocide’. Second, this clear 
definition of language infers that only Hutu people could have had genocide intentions. 
Third, as the Gacaca process was set up to deal with the aftermath of ‘genocide’ 
specifically and not the past violence in Rwanda generally, by implication the Gacaca 
process appears to carry a bias in favour of Tutsi and against Hutu.984  
The key learning here is that any process of truth and reconciliation (whether in 
amnesty or prosecution) must hold an impartial standard to all persons or organisations 
involved in perpetrating violence regardless of which side one may fall on, or whether or 
                                                
982 Tiemessen, A. 2004. “After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”. Afric n Studies 
Quarterly 8 (1). Retrieved from the web 19/09/09. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i1a4.htm  
983 The ruling Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) represents the armed struggle movement launched in 1990 
by exiled Tutsis in Uganda (with support from moderate Hutu) who fought against the Hutu-dominated 
government of that time. In 1994, the RPF penetrated Rwanda through Uganda and cut a path straight to 
the capital Kigali as the genocide raged. Along the way the RPF was also accused of numerous massacres 
and mass killings. 
984 Mamdani, M. 2001.When Victims become Killers – Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda. Oxford: James Curry, 264-282 (Conclusion: Political Reform after Genocide). 
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not one claims a moral high ground in the cause of violent struggle. Without this 
demarcation against violence across the board, there will remain a mind-set of victors 
(winners) and vanquished (losers) which will only lend itself to continued revenge cycles 
in the future. Plus, the transitional justice movement runs the risk of sending the signal 
that certain violence is justified and permissible if it fails to hold all perpetrators of 
violence in equitable standing.985  
9.6.5.3. Fambul Tok in Sierra Leone 
 After a brutal terrorising twelve year civil war, Sierra Leone instituted a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in a bid to promote healing and restoration. As part of the 
negotiated peace settlement in Sierra Leone, the rebel movement (Revolutionary United 
Front - RUF) was granted blanket amnesty. In response to this blanket amnesty, the 
International Criminal Courts seized the moment to apply prosecution measures against 
the highest ranking leaders responsible for crimes against humanity perpetrated during 
the civil war. At a national level the TRC embarked on a truth–telling exercise seasoned 
with a collective historical re-write and the spice of public ‘confession-apology-
forgiveness’ transactions. Unfortunately, under the weight of a voluminous final report, 
the Sierra Leone TRC also struggled to find innovative ways to inculcate the spirit of 
reconciliation at a community grassroots level.  
 However, one of the most promising civil society responses to this dearth of 
community instituted healing processes is the Fambul Tok (in the local Krio language 
this is literally translated, ‘Family Talk’). Fambul Tok was launched in early 2008 by a 
Sierra Leonean human rights organisation, Forum of Conscience986 with support from 
Catalyst of Peace987, a foundation based in the United States. Fambul Tok is touted as a 
community-driven effort that boasts the following vision: “Fostering sustainable peace 
in Sierra Leone through reviving our communities’ traditions and values of confession, 
forgiveness and reconciliation.”988 The approach itself is based on traditional practices of 
resolving conflicts within the confines and safety of the family network. Organised and 
                                                
985 Lemarchand, R. 1994. Burundi – Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press and Cambridge University Press, 160-177 (Chapter 9: Hegemony, consociationalism, democracy, or 
none of the above?). 
986 For more information see www.forumforconscience.org 
987 For more information see www.catalystforpeace.org 




implemented within the local village context, the encounters integrate innovative 
measures of dialogue and healing such as what is termed ‘truth-telling bonfires’ and 
various traditional cultural cleansing ceremonies. These interactions are facilitated by 
local leaders / elders who provide the wisdom and moral structure for the interface. 
Following these events, the momentum for healing and reconciliation is capitalised on 
through practical activities of radio-listening clubs, football games and communal 
farming projects. Initially, 161 ceremonies of this nature were planned at a chiefdom 
level around the country, however the significance of this approach has spawned a great 
demand for this process at all levels of the society and as such there are plans to see 
thousands of these kinds of ceremonies conducted across the nation. With the Sierra 
Leonean TRC completed and the closure of the International Criminal Courts coming to 
an end, it is predicted that the process of Fambul Tok will play a leading role in securing 
healing, reconciliation and peace in Sierra Leone for the future. The significance of this 
creative approach is described as follows: 
“Fambul Tok…is a face-to-face community owned program that brings together 
perpetrators and victims of the violence in Sierra Leone’s eleven-year civil war 
through ceremonies rooted in the local traditions of the villages that were 
affected. It provides Sierra Leonean citizens with an opportunity to come to terms 
with what happened during the war, to dialogue, to experience healing, and to 
chart a new path forward – together.”989      
 
The key learning from here is that Fambul Tok shows the potential of community-
initiated programmes to deliver healing and reconciliation across a nation. Despite 
government inabilities to translate the reconciliation experience from the top echelons to 
the ground, Fambul Tok illustrates the energy spark and creative genius of civil society 
and community-based innovation when allowed to dream and act out a better future for 
themselves.  
 In summary, out of the various African transitional justice experiences discussed 
above, one could deduce that there are a number of critical elements to the process of 
transitional justice that should not be overlooked. First, transitional justice is best served 
when facilitated from within its own indigenous tradition by an ‘insider-impartial’ 




(trusted ‘in-context’ leaders)990. Second, transitional justice is understood to be a breach 
of community harmony, well-being and order and therefore to repair this corporate 
fissure the victims, offenders, extended families and community networks must all be 
involved; it is a communal problem. Third, culturally appropriate platforms for truth-
telling, confession, apology, forgiveness and reconciliation should be explored 
throughout the process. Fourth, material forms of reparations, restitution and 
compensation are expected as signs of peaceful goodwill and as indications of human 
responsibility and obligation to make right the wrong. Fifth, symbolic gestures of ritual 
healing, cleansing and resolution are an important means of reintegration of offenders, 
release of the victim-survivors and psycho-social closure for all who have been affected 
by the conflict.        
9.6.5.4. A Values-based Transitional Justice Model for Zimbabwe 
 
In reviewing the content of the research transcripts from this thesis, four distinct 
threads of recommendation emerged in regard to what the respondents considered to be 
the constitutive components that should be included in any transitional justice process in 
Zimbabwe. These were as follows: victim-centred, responsibility-oriented, community-
driven, and compensation-based. These four characteristics could be understood to be the 
‘guiding principles’ for developing the structures and activities of transitional justice in 
Zimbabwe. Each of these recommended ‘guiding principles’ appear to be connected to 
particular needs that were deeply neglected by the ZANU-PF ruling party since it came to 
power in the independence elections of 1980.  
The call for a victim-centred approach to Zimbabwe’s transitional justice is a 
response to decades of victim neglect, silencing, and subjugation by the ZANU-PF 
government. The layers of victims and survivors of political violence in Zimbabwe is 
expansive (see Section 9.3.). The victims of violence in Zimbabwe have not only been 
denied their voice and participation in political governance, they have been humiliated by 
being blamed for the traumatic violence that they have had to endure, all the while, the 
principle perpetrators (ZANU-PF) continually praising themselves. Thus, the transitional 
justice process must not only be inviting to the victims and survivors of past political 
                                                
990 Taken from notes on ‘Fundamentals for Peace-building’, a course taught by John Paul Lederach at the 
Summer Peacebuilding Institute (SPI), May-June Session 2000. 
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violence, it must be built around the core of victim’s experiences and needs. The 
following research transcripts represent sample responses on this issue: 
“Our policy is that there should be a Truth Commission that is victim-orientated. 
In other words provide an opportunity to victims, firstly to tell their story, just to 
get it out…and secondly to ask them what they desire to achieve justice. Be ause 
I just think there’s a real danger that politicians, lawyers, anyone else who’s 
inherently arrogant, you know, will decide what the victims want…”991     
 
“We are also doing what we are referring to as “Liturgical Spiritual Activities” 
e.g. having funeral services within communities where we have identified the 
shallow graves, we secure those shallow graves, and we have a formal funeral 
service, which has never been done. With names and epithets written of the 
people, when they were born and when they actually died. It means that officially 
the relatives can actually go to the grave and mourn. It means they are beginning 
to deal, to bereave officially. So these are the ways and means in which we do 
that. We are doing so specifically that we need to demystify the whole aspect of 
the suffering and the trauma that was caused in Matabeleland. By demystifying it, 
we are keeping the whole Matabeleland massacre, as we call it, on the map that 
it’s not going to be hidden.”992 
 
Rallying for a responsibility-oriented transitional justice approach incorporates 
the crucial need for the perpetrating (individual or organisational entity) to publicly 
acknowledge wrong-doing and submit to an accountability structure. This is a definite 
response to the culture of impunity that has been entrenched by the ZANU-PF since the 
beginning of its rule. The Matabeleland masses on the ground feel they have not heard an 
apology yet. Instead, there has been a continuous stream of rationalisations and 
justifications coming from the central government that eventually always seem to lead to 
granting the offending political leaders unconditional amnesty. The following research 
transcripts present a clear argument in this regard: 
“I think there’s no doubt that a real process of accountability ‘has’ to take place. 
There are a lot of things that the current government has done with ‘impunity’ and 
there’s a lot that was done with ‘impunity’ in the name of the present government. 
For people to be able to know and understand that they have to respect Human 
Rights, you have to demonstrate that by holding them accountable.” 993 
 
                                                
991 Interview: DC1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - 13/09/07 (White Zimbabwean Human Rights Lawyer and 
politician). 
992 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
993 Interview: SD1, Johannesburg, South Africa - 18/08/06 – (Shona Human Rights Lawyer).  
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“…culturally, if I offend someone, if I really want that person to know ‘I’m sorry, 
I want to reconcile that’, culturally we send a mediator on my behalf to speak my 
words. I put words into that person’s mouth and they speak those words. I feel 
like the people in Mat-south are saying ‘we are not crying for the president 
himself to come and address us, but if he sends word’…So I feel like the people of 
Matabeleland they are waiting for an apology…In our culture a word of apology 
is very powerful…So that’s what they are waiting for and I’m not sure for how 
long they’ll have to wait until something is done.”994 
 
“…government through this President, Robert Mugabe, needs to accept that they 
have failed. Until we get [to] that point, things will not change. If they accept that 
they’ve failed then they can swallow their internal pride and allow dialogue to 
take place…so that we can start getting a move towards the best condition…But 
until government accepts they have failed, in all ways possible then we can not 
start going forward.”995   
 
The push for a community-driven transitional justice process hinges on the 
decentralisation of national government structures and a relocation of the power centre 
among the civil society and communities on the ground. This is a tangible response from 
the grassroots to highly centralised, and autocratic one-party state that has attempted to 
control the nation’s justice system for years now. This is not a cry for political anarchy 
meant to undermine the authority of national government; it is an invitation for 
politicians to share power with the people they purport to lead. It is a challenge to the 
authorities to allow the transitional justice process to proceed organically, within the 
boundaries of the law, but evolving as a ground-swell from the bottom-up as opposed to 
the hierarchical, top-down approaches so prevalent in the past. The following research 
transcript lends a strong voice to this concern: 
“A Truth Commission is an environment that is conducive for people to tell their 
stories of what happened, under a legal framework, statutory of parliament, with 
the idea and goal to have restorative justice within these areas and these people. 
So we see this as a long process and we see this as something that must come 
from villages, to communities, to districts, to provinces, and to regions, and to a 
national level. It is a problem of Zimbabwe, it must not be left as a Matabeleland 
problem; it is a Zimbabwean problem… we need to avoid the South African 
position and the Zimbabwean position where the Unity Accord was between two 
                                                
994 Interview: NM1, Mtshabezi, Zimbabwe – 28/06/06 – (Female Ndebele Peace Activist working with 
rural Matabeleland women). 
995 Interview: PK1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 30/03/07 – (A prominent member of Ndebele Royal Family). 
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political parties, and the victims by and large were left hanging. We would like it 
to be something that is driven by the ordinary people.”996 
 
Finally, the reoccurring strand advocating for a compensation-based transitional 
justice programme is a clear response to the corrupted concentration of the nation’s 
wealth in the hands of a few and the long-standing development neglect that the 
Matabeleland region has felt every since independence. While personal restitution given 
to individual families would be an appreciated step forward in acknowledging the 
victim’s pain and suffering, the more frequent plea from this research sample was for 
structural development to flow again in Matabeleland; something that has been missing 
since the early 1980s. In the minds of the following research respondents, reparations and 
material development were definitely coupled and both were regarded as forms of nation-
building for the future. 
“The new government that comes here…must address the issues of the Fifth 
Brigade activities first, [they]’re welcome. We don’t want a government who I’m 
going to tell, ‘No, you solve this problem first’, but now you see it later. When 
you talk some times and [they] also behaves like the past government. As soon as 
it comes to the ‘power’ it must address this issue first. Then secondly, you must 
start developing the country. But failure to address this issue here in 
Matabeleland, Midlands…‘You can pardon them, but you never forget’. If they 
are serious about this, they should have apologized. Even the government himself 
is asking for birth certificates of the people that have been killed, instead of trying 
to help the people. How can you feel it in your stomach? They want the witnesses 
instead, but what if they were killed by the same person?”997    
 
“But then ‘Truth Commission’ as a way of revealing more of what actually 
happened and accepting responsibility with those that are involved and with what 
they were involved in, [I] can accept that ‘it’s me that actually did that’, right. And 
then the next step; they accept that some form of reparation towards that, which 
will be less than replacing our people. That will create a conducive, nationhood 
atmosphere, right, for that reason, yes. But the Truth Commission purely for 
somebody who has lost a relative and that relative will not be replaced, and 
whether there’s a Truth Commission or not, that relative remains dead; that Truth 
Commission is meaningless.”998   
 
                                                
996 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 
trauma healing and reconciliation among rural Matabeleland communities and survivors of Gukurahundi 
violence). 
997 Interview: AN2, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 12/09/07 – (Ndebele Ex-ZIPRA Soldier). 




 To propose a detailed, technical practice model to implement as a transitional 
justice programme in Zimbabwe would to step outside of the time and content mandate of 
this thesis. However, in the interest of providing some form of narrative accompaniment 
to the Zimbabwean exercise in justice, healing and reconciliation, this research would 
like to propose a set of guiding values and principles that could serve as a map for 
Zimbabwe’s transition. This proposed ‘values-based model’ (Diagram 10) below has at 
its core the four guiding values of the need to reconstruct a unifying memory (Section 
9.5.1.), re-establish a sense of belonging and responsibility (Section 9.5.2.), re-invest in a 
vibrant public participation process (Section 9.5.3.), and re-engage in a collective healing 
journey (Section 9.5.4.). These guiding values are meant to inform the big picture vision, 
mission and strategic direction of a transitional justice effort. Then, with the lessons from 
other African transitional justice exercises serving as a back-drop, each of these ‘guiding 
values’ are paired with the four ‘guiding principles’ of victim-centred, responsibility-
oriented, community-driven, and compensation-based that were surfaced in the research 
transcripts of this study and which are meant to give structure to the project activities and 
action plan of a national transitional justice endeavour. These interacting values and 
principles could also be utilised as the basis for a monitoring and evaluation framework 




















 Exemplar forms of this kind of integrated justice, healing and reconciliation 
approach are currently being practiced at local and regional levels in Zimbabwe. One 
such hopeful initiative is described by two respondents from Matabeleland (the first from 
a facilitator’s perspective and the second from that of a participating community leader): 
“But we are also taking pastors and leaders from Mashonaland into the deep areas 
of Matabeleland to meet with key leaders and to hear from community leaders 
what happened and for them to share what happened. And we have had a number 
of these. One such one we did about five months ago, where out of about three 
hundred, over three hundred people, there was not even one person who was not 
crying in that meeting, including these Shonas. And one elderly Shona pastor 
said, ‘I wish I could find a hole where I can hide, I can’t take it anymore. Please 
don’t continue to talk.  I’m so ashamed and I can’t even stand in front of you. I’m 
ashamed of being a Shona.’ And for an Ndebele, one Ndebele elderly man stood 
up and he said ‘Now I can die because I know and I have seen with my own eyes 
and heard with my own ears that there are real people in Mashonaland’.”999  
 
                                                
999 Interview: RM2, Johannesburg, South Africa - 26/02/08 – (Shona NGO peace activist advocating for 





“I have been involved in this programme of peace-building for the almost five 
years up to now. And we have been really trying to negotiate that to our own 
people. We even went to a point of inviting Shona pastors to come and see, even 
listen to these stories being told by the victims from that end. And [in the] last two 
months we had a service at Zbonkululu whereby we received around seventeen 
pastors from Mashonaland. They came to us; they gave people some chances to 
say out what really transpired. At the end we asked those guys from 
Mashonaland, maybe to apologise on behalf their counterparts, the Shona-
speaking people…what they really did at Matabeleland. At least because of that 
service that took place, really people have started just forgetting some of these 
things.”1000 
 
However, the impact of these interventions is somewhat contained and their locations 
somewhat scattered. It would be beneficial to advocate for national efforts to 
systematically replicate and multiply these kinds of approaches in order to reach a wider 
constituency in the nation, and resourcing through the avenues of public government and 
private donor partnerships would provide the necessary encouragement to carry this vital 
work forward. 
9.7. Releasing Emancipatory1001 Narratives 
 
“ Freedom is useless if we don’t exercise it as characters making choices … We are free 
to change the stories by which we live.  Because we are genuine characters, and not mere 
puppets, we can choose our defining stories.  We can do so because we actively 
participate in the creation of our stories.  We are co-authors as well as characters.  Few 
things are as encouraging as the realization that things can be different and that we have 
a role in making them so.”1002 
 
This analysis has explored the mixture of a lethal narrative cocktail that has been 
consumed by the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe.  This highly potent drink has 
combined a solidified grand-narrative (particular political ideology) with a one-party 
State power structure draped in the language of sovereignty and leader veneration, under 
which all other disparate and contrary murmurings that have raised their voices in 
resistance have been systematically subsumed.  The vibrant colours of the dialogue 
                                                
1000 Interview: RZ1, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe – 11/09/07 – (Ndebele Church leader in Rural Matabeleland and 
secondary survivor of Gukurahundi violence) 
1001 Ericson, M. 2001: 35 & 458. Ericson makes use of the phraseology of ‘ towards a culture of 
emancipatory conversations’ which she has borrowed from Arnason, V. 1999. “Towards a Better Life – 
The Possibility of Universal Discourse Ethics”, paper presented at the UNESCO Conference on Universal 
Ethics: From the Nordic Perspectives, Lund University, 3-5 June. 
1002 Eldredge, J. 2001.  Wild at Heart – Discovering the Secret of a Man’s Soul. Nashville: Thomas Nelson 
Publishers, 219 (Quote by Daniel Taylor). 
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around identity, nationalism, loyalty, legitimacy and unity in all their variant hues have 
been uniformly reduced to a dull grey in this overwhelming script.   
The communities of Matabeleland have a narrative just waiting to emerge.  It is 
like an aging wine that has been silently expanding and is now ready to burst out of its 
confining wineskins.  Up until now, this narrative discourse has only been granted 
sporadic, splintered ‘sound bites’ of time in which to present itself in the public domain.  
The people of Matabeleland need to speak and tell their story. Voices like that of 80-year 
old Moffat Tshabangu need to be heard:  
“The events of those years [1980-87] will forever remain etched in our minds.  It 
is a story I will tell my grandchildren and great grandchildren so that they can 
fully understand the history of this country.  All the things they read about in the 
country’s history books are pure, refined nonsense meant to placate the egos of 
ZanuPF Chefs.”1003  
 
Or, the haunting voice of another Matabeleland villager, Kennias Ngwenya:  
 
“As for those who participated in the murders, may God make the memories of 
our dead linger forever in their minds.”1004 
 
When the all-consuming monolithic narrative of the ZANU-PF ruling party has taken its 
bitter and final course, a new spring of discourse will flow.  A dialogue which refuses to 
be threatened by divergent voices and dissenting views will stand tall to fill the public 
discourse of Zimbabwe’s socio-political domain. A rich and textured narrative of this 
calibre will bring justice to the land, healing to the memories of those in Matabeleland 
and reconciliation to all Zimbabweans who have suffered violence in body, heart and 









                                                
1003‘ Matabeleland rural memories of the Fifth Brigade killings in the 1980’s’ (2003) The Daily News 




Appendix I - Open Interview Guiding Questions and Prompts 
Stage I: Introduction to Open Interview process 
• Welcome and ‘setting the tone’ – ensure that interviewee is comfortable 
• Express appreciation for participant’s availability & giving of their time 
• Reiteration of the voluntary nature of the interview 
• Motivate the request for tape recording process & solicit participant agreement 
• Give a brief overview of the research project aim and specific objectives 
• Describe and clarify the Open Interview process 
• Discuss follow-up processes: availability of transcripts, participant feedback to analysis 
findings and access to final thesis document. 
 
Stage II: Uninterrupted Story-telling process 
Instructions: The aim of this section of the interview is to gather as much uninterrupted 
narrative as possible in a natural, relaxed conversational style.  Your role as the 
interviewee is to feel free to tell your story as you would like to, with as much detail as 
you can recall.  The role of the interviewer will be to actively listen and will only 
intervene for the purposes of clarification or the need for more information. 
   
1.) Please tell me a personal story of your experience of violence (answering the 
questions of who, what, where, when and why?) that occurred in Matabeleland 
between the years of 1980 and 1987. 
(1a.) What happened? 
(1b.) Who was involved? 
(1c.) Where did the violence occur? 
(1d.) When did the violence occur? 
(1e.) Why do you think this violence occurred? 
 
Stage III: Detail Expansion, Elaboration and Clarification 1005 process 
 
1.) Did the government of the day, make any comment on the particular experience of 
violence that you are telling me about now? 
 
2.) If yes, how did they describe or explain this violence? 
 
3.) Was the description or explanation given by the government at that time acceptable 
and understandable to you?  If yes, why?  If no, why not? 
 
4.) What do you think are the ‘root-causes’ of the violence you experienced in the story 
you just related to me? 
 
5.) Was there opportunity to publicly tell your story about the violence you had 
experienced in Matabeleland at that time?     
                                                




(5a.) If yes, could you describe the forums in which this story-telling took place?  Where 
were the locations?  Were these gatherings informal or formal?  If informal, who was 
present and what was discussed?  If formal, who planned them, who attended, and who 
facilitated the group proceedings?  Who set the agenda / programme for these gatherings? 
 
(5b.) If no, why were the opportunities for story-telling around the issues of Matabeleland 
violence not possible?  Did you tell your story in private?  If so, who was present and 
what was discussed? 
 
6.) Were there particular periods of time during the specific years under study (1980-
1987) that you remember the violence increasing or decreasing?  In your opinion, what 
would be the reasons / explanations for these fluctuations?   
 
(6a.)What could have been the causes of the violence increasing or decreasing at that 
time? 
 
7.) In the current situation (socio-political reality) in Zimbabwe do you feel free to tell 
your personal story about your experience of violence in Matabeleland that we have been 
discussing in this interview?   
 
(7a.) If yes, could you describe the forums in which this storytelling takes place?  Where 
are the locations?  Are these gatherings informal or formal?  If informal, who is present 
and what is discussed?  If formal, who plans them, who attends, and who facilitates the 
group proceedings?  Who sets the agenda / programme for these dialogues? 
 
(7b.) If no, why are the opportunities for story-telling around the issues of Matabeleland 
violence not possible?  Do you freely tell your story in private settings?  If so, who is 
present and what is discussed?    
 
8.) Do you believe that there is a connection between the violence you personally 
experienced in Matabeleland – 1980-1987 and the current situation being experienced in 
Zimbabwe today?  If no, why not?  If yes, please explain. 
 
(8a.) If yes, could you describe what these connections are? 
 
(8b.) Describe how there could be a relationship between what has been spoken about 
and or happened in the past to what is being spoken about and/or happening in the 
present? 
 
9.) Do you think that people in Zimbabwe, (both those who were victimised and those 
who perpetrated violence) need to speak-out about the issues surrounding the 
Matabeleland violence from 1980-1987?  If no, why not?  
 
(9a.) If yes, why?  How would talking out the issues of past violence in Matabeleland 
benefit you? 
 
(9b.) If the people (civil society) and the current ruling party had the freedom to publicly 
dialogue about the issues of violence surrounding Matabeleland (1980-1987), would this 
assist in the process of building peace in Zimbabwe?  Yes, No or Maybe?  Please explain 
how and why?  
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Appendix II - List of Interviews Conducted 
Name: Sector Representation  Date of Interview: 
1.) BK – (Male) ZAPU Politician / Professor 
(Ndebele) 
26 / 06 / 2006 
2.) EN - (Male)  Former ZANU-PF Politician 
(Ndebele) 
26 / 06 / 2006 
NOT RECORDED 
3.) NM – 1 - (Female) Woman Peace-builder / Teacher 
(Ndebele) 
28 / 06 / 2006 
4.) AN – (Male) Tsholotsho Victim Representative 
(Ndebele) 
28 / 06 / 2006 
NOT RECORDED 
5.) AM - (Male) Expelled Journalist  
(White American) 
10 / 08 / 2006 
6.) DL - (Male)  Self-Exiled Journalist (Ndebele) 11 / 08 / 2006 
7.) GS - (Male) HR Lawyer / Torture Survivor 
(Shona) 
17 / 08 / 2006 
8.) SD - (Male)  HR Lawyer, (Shona) 09 / 2006 
9.) RM - (Male) MDC – Security / Torture Survivor 
(Ndebele) 
 
10 / 2006 
10.) JD - (Female) Woman Human Rights Activist 
(Ndebele)  
 
10 / 2006 
11.) NM - 2 (Male) Zim Coalition – NGO Advocacy 
(Shona) 
11 / 2006 
NOT RECORDED 
12.) SM - (Male)  Researcher / Junior Lecturer 
(Ndebele)  
07 / 03 / 2007 
13.) DN-1 - (Male) Church Leader – BICC 
(Ndebele) 
29 / 03 / 2007 
14.) CM - (Male) Bulawayo Agenda – NGO 
(Ndebele)  
29 / 03 / 2007 
15.) GM - (Male)  Bulawayo Agenda – NGO 
(Ndebele) 
29 / 03 / 2007 
16.) JN - (Male)  CCJP – Activist & Teacher 
(Ndebele)   
29 / 03 / 2007 
17.) PK - (Male) Ndebele Royal Family – Prince  30 / 03 / 2007 
18.) DN-2 - (Male) Retired Journalist – Chronicle 
(Ndebele)   
30 / 03/ 2007 
19.) PN - (Male)  Historian / Bulawayo City Council 
(Ndebele) 
30 / 03 / 2007 
20.) BN – (Male) Farmer / Businessman  
(Ndebele) 
31 / 03 / 2007 
NOT RECORDED 
21.) CM - (Male) Youth Activist- ZAPU /Teacher / 
OVC worker (Ndebele) 
09 / 05 / 2007 
22.) MS-1 - (Male) Tsholotsho Victim Representative 
(Ndebele) 
11 / 09 / 2007 
23.) MS-2 - (Male)  
 
Tsholotsho Victim Representative 
(Ndebele) 
11 /09 / 2007 
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24.) RZ - (Male)  Tsholotsho Church Leader – BICC 
(Ndebele) 
11 / 09/ 2007 
25.) AN-1 - (Male)  Church Leader / BICC Peace Comm. 
(Ndebele) 
12 / 09 / 2007 
26.) AN-2 - (Male)  Ex-ZIPRA Soldier 
(Ndebele) 
12 / 09 / 2007 
27.) DC - (Male)  HR Lawyer / MDC Politician 
(White Zimbabwean) 
13 / 09 / 2007 
28.) FN - (Male)  Former Staff of Ministry of Finance 
(Ndebele) 
26 / 10 / 2007 
29.) DN-3 - (Male)  NGO Advocacy Activist, Director of 
Grace to Heal (Ndebele) 
30 / 10 / 2007 
30.) TM - (Male)  Relative of Current ZANU-PF 
Deputy President Masika (Shona) 
01 / 11 / 2007 
31.) JA - (Female)  Academic & Author 
Africa Studies Centre - Oxford 
University  (White American) 
30 / 11 / 2007 
 
NOT RECORDED 
32.) SN - (Male) Academic & Professor (Ndebele) 
Monash & Open University 
20 / 12 / 2007 
33.) JM - (Male)  Academic and Professor (Shona) 
University of Zimbabwe, Harare 
26 / 02 / 2008 
34.) RM - (Male)  NGO Advocacy Activist, one of the 
founding leaders of Christian 
Alliance – (Shona) 
26 / /02 / 2008 
35.) TR - (Male)  Academic & Author 
Africa Studies Centre - Oxford 
University  (White Zimbabwean) 

















Appendix III - Research Programme and Schedule 
Year: Activities: Timeframe: 
2004 – 06 Competed Literature Review  
2006 Completed writing and defence of  Thesis Proposal May  
 First Field visit to Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
9 days - Conducted four (4) interviews 
           - Two training events (Mtshabezi) 
           - Consulted Partners  
22-30 June 
2006 Conducted eight (8) interviews in South Africa: 
Seven (7) in Johannesburg 
One (1) in Durban 
August to November 
2007 Second Field visit to Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
 4 days – Conducted eight (8) interviews 
             - Document Analysis in Chronicle Archives 
28-31 March 
2007 Conducted one (1) Interview in Zambia  May  
2007 Third Field visit to Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
7 days – Conducted six (6) interviews  
07-13 September 
2007 Conducted three (3) interviews in Johannesburg SA October – November 
2007 Conducted one (1) interview in Oxford, England 
Document Analysis in British Library & Archives 
November 
2007 Conducted one (1) interview in Johannesburg, SA December 
2008 Conducted two (2) interviews in Johannesburg , SA 
Hosted a Zimbabwe Advocacy Consultation  
February 
2008 Interview Transcriptions July – September 
2008 Fourth Field visit to Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 
Visit and consultation with partners 
21-25 September 
2008 Conducted one (1) interview in Oxford, UK October 
2008-09 Thesis Writing  August 08 – June 09 
2009 Thesis Reader Evaluations & Written Adjustments  July – November 
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